Transition expertise: Cognitive factors and developmental processes that contribute to repeated successful career transitions amongst elite athletes, musicians and business people by Connolly, Christopher James
  
 
 
Transition Expertise 
 
Cognitive factors and developmental processes 
that contribute to repeated successful career transitions 
amongst elite athletes, musicians and business people 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Christopher James Connolly 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
School of Social Sciences 
Brunel University 
November, 2011
  
 
 
  
  
Abstract 
This thesis examines the nature of transition expertise which enables individuals 
to make repeated successful transitions over the course of their career. It 
addressed four areas that contribute to transition expertise: 1) cognitive flexibility 
that enables the generalisation of expert knowledge and processes; 2) inferential 
and inductive cognitive mechanisms that enable expertise to be generalised; 3) 
personal intelligences that are used to support transitions; and 4) practical 
intelligence as it supports performance contextually during transitions.   
The study used retrospective interviews to gather data from elite performers in 
three fields who had made successful career transitions: sports people who 
become national coaches or heads of national bodies; successful musicians who 
become heads of faculty or principals of a conservatoire; successful business 
people who become senior vice presidents or CEOs.   
Participants were able to generalise expert knowledge and processes beyond their 
primary domains, contrary to widely held views about the domain specificity of 
expertise. Cognitive flexibility enabled this generalisation and was developed 
through broad based training, early exposure to multiple domains and the early 
use of generative cognitive processes during the development of primary domain 
expertise. Inductive, inferential and analogical cognitive mechanisms were the 
main tools through which expertise was generalised during transitions. 
Personal intelligence contributed to transition expertise. Intrapersonal 
intelligence enabled individuals to understand how their abilities, values and 
motivations shaped their career progression.  Interpersonal intelligence enabled 
individuals to respond effectively to the requirements of their peers, direct 
reports, stakeholders and organisational context. Contrary to expectations, self 
regulatory processes did not play a central role in the management of transitions.  
Practical intelligence enabled transition expertise. It involved more than applying 
subject-area and tacit knowledge. It encompassed the abilities to: identify and 
resolve problems; manipulate environmental objects in the form of 
administrative tasks, schedules and plans; utilise resources in terms of people and 
materials; and shape their environment, corporate structures and culture. 
Transition expertise develops and evolves over the course of a career as it uses 
convergent and divergent cognitive processes, inductive mechanisms, personal 
awareness and cognitive pragmatics to address issues of increasing scope and 
implication. While motivational factors, self belief and personality resiliency are 
important contributors to transition expertise they did not form part of this study. 
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IV. Terminology 
 
There are a many different uses of terminology in the study of human behaviour 
and performance. Words can be used almost interchangeably by some theorists 
whereas others will use narrow, specific definitions and even attempt to 
expropriate terms for their exclusive use. Words that are part of everyday 
vernacular are often given very specific denotations. Consequently I would like 
to clarify how some common terminology will be used in this dissertation.  
Intelligence definitions vary widely. They can be narrow or broad, more trait or 
more cognitively based, more knowledge related or more general, and more 
inherent or acquired. Some elements of intelligences are more tied to specific 
types of performance e.g., mathematical or verbal, others are broader e.g., gc and 
gf, while still others are more generic e.g., inference and induction.  Intelligence 
in this study will mean the collection of traits, abilities and cognitive processes 
possessed by humans to vary degrees. Most of these can be developed.  
Abilities are componential elements of intelligence and expertise. For example, 
expertise might be composed of cognitive, psychological, or physiological 
abilities which enable one to make effective financial decisions, perform in a 
concert hall or react faster to a moving ball.  Abilities are both innate and 
developable. I will use abilities to identify elements of intelligence which may 
also be elements of expertise. 
Giftedness and Talent are often linked with intelligence and sometimes used 
interchangeably.  Some associate talent with achievement and giftedness with 
xiii 
 
potential. Others reverse this relationship. Both terms have been associated with 
expert performance and can often be tied to a particular domain. I will avoid 
using the terms talent and giftedness and focus on intelligence and expertise. 
Domain is a particular arena of endeavour or activity with associated abilities, 
processes, and knowledge.  A domain in which one performs might be chess, 
orthopaedic surgery, football, the piano, chemistry, opera singing, mathematics, 
stock trading, engineering psychotherapy, politics, acting, etc. A domain may use 
abilities or elements of intelligence but these abilities are not inherently tied to a 
specific domain e.g. mathematical intelligence might be used by a mathematics 
professor, an accountant, an engineer and an equities trader.  Someone with 
kinaesthetic intelligence may be a football player, a dancer or actor.  
Field describes the socially defined arena in which a specific domain operates. 
So for example the field of football will include the striker who scores goals, the 
goalkeeper who defends the goal, the coach who trains the striker and 
goalkeeper, the manager of the team, the referees, board of directors, the fans, the 
television commentators, etc. It also includes the domain knowledge, agreed 
social norms for the field, the physical arenas in which individuals perform, etc.  
I will use it most often to describe the various career stages, positions, roles and 
functions associated with the domains under discussion 
Expertise is the aggregation of abilities, skills, and knowledge which produce 
high levels of performance in a specific domain e.g., ‘He is an expert equities 
trader’ or ‘She is an expert pianist.’  Expertise is usually determined through 1) 
recognition of high achievement by others in the same field and/or 2) meeting 
high standards of achievement in a domain as determined by tests, performance 
xiv 
 
and other more objective measures. Expert processes are used to acquire, store, 
retrieve and apply expert knowledge to achieve expert performance in a domain. 
An expert is someone who demonstrates expertise in a specific domain. 
Primary domain will refer to the performance domain in which an individual first 
attained expertise e.g. cycling, playing the violin, and engineering. Secondary 
domain will be used (somewhat more generally) to describe any of the career 
positions taken up in the same field after an individual completes their 
performing phase in the primary domain e.g., when a cyclist has moved to 
coaching function, when a violinist becomes head of strings faculty at a music 
college, when an engineer takes on the design strategy for the power train of a 
vehicle. This differentiation between primary and secondary domains is mostly 
one of convenience for comparison within this study. 
Transition in the general study of the lives of human beings can be used to 
describe any change from one life situation to another such as marriage, illness, 
moving home, etc. In this study it will be used to describe career transitions 
which involve movement to different positions within the same field e.g., from 
pianist to professor of piano.    
Characteristic is used in two ways. One is more theoretical as when used most 
often in theories of personality such as “perseverance seems to be a characteristic 
of individual who make transitions…” The other is more general such as “the 
approach to the study will have several characteristics...” Attribute has similar 
double usage. It can be used in attribution theory for example, “An individual 
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will attribute an external locus of control when…” and in more general usage 
such as “One of the attributes of second stage transitions is that…”  
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V. Preface  
 
This project is the outgrowth of an impasse I reached in my career as a 
psychologist and performance consultant for athletes, business people and 
musicians. In the early part of my career I helped individual performers develop 
their full potential and achieve optimal performance in their expert domain  
some would say with relative success. I applied performance related academic 
research in the field and wrote about my experiences. As I began to work with 
more senior individuals, I was increasingly asked to help them make transitions 
to new career roles or to recover from difficulties they encountered in a transition 
to new role. Often they found it challenging: successful and affluent financial 
traders struggled to lead a department of similar traders; elite athletes 
encountered obstacles when building a career as a coach or manager; musicians 
who were brilliant performers on the world stage didn’t know how to head up a 
faculty of music.  The more I worked with these leaders in their fields, the more I 
was confronted with a fundamental dilemma: despite my years of relative 
success I couldn’t say why or precisely how I was successful in coaching 
transitions or why I failed. 
I tried to rectify my lack of understanding by surveying the literature related to 
the field of career transitions. I was disappointed: the literature was often out-
dated, directed at identifying the skills required for new roles, and often more 
concerned with how to achieve stability in a new position rather than manage the 
transition itself. Career transition models (mostly from the business community) 
that did attempt to explain transitions were often full of ‘folk-wisdom’ and 
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developed relatively anodyne processes with stage names like arriving, 
surviving, and thriving. More problematic was that many addressed transitions in 
terms of dealing with issues like fear, anxiety, and control which had not 
characterised many of my experiences in coaching transitions in which I 
encountered enquiry, ambition and excitement. Few models provided satisfactory 
explanations for the cognitive abilities and skills used to successfully manage 
career transitions repeatedly. So after 30 years of working in the profession I 
decided to stop coaching, go back to school and discover more about the 
fundamental principles and processes of what I have come to call transition 
expertise.  
Because the structure of this dissertation may vary from a standard approach in 
that the theoretical discussion is spread over several chapters rather than 
frontloaded, a brief summary will be useful. 
Part 1 will consist of three chapters presenting the context and objectives of the 
dissertation and the methodology of the study used to collect the data.  
Chapter 1. Introduction will introduce the concept of expertise and then give an 
overview of major theoretical approaches to the study of career development and 
career transitions. The review will look for common themes across models which 
might indicate the nature of transition expertise. The chapter will then identify 
the major areas which will be studied in the dissertation and focus in particular 
on the cognitive processes associated with expertise and intelligence.  
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Chapter 2. Methodology will discuss the theory behind the decision to use 
qualitative methodology, why retrospective interviews in particular were used for 
collecting data in the study and the process used for the analysis of the data.  
Chapter 3. The pilot and the main study will explain the reason for the use of a 
pilot study and a main study and describe the two studies conducted in this 
project. It will explain how the main study was modified in light of some 
methodological shortcomings and some preliminary theoretical outcomes that 
were identified in the pilot. 
Part 2 will consist of four chapters, each of which will address one of the major 
theoretical areas under consideration in this dissertation and their operation in 
career transitions. Perhaps atypically, the theoretical review will be spread over 
these four chapters so that the analysis and discussion of the data take place in 
proximity to the relevant theory. Each chapter will be structured in the same way: 
firstly a review of the appropriate literature and theory, then analysis of the data 
and finally a discussion of the data in light of the theory.  
Chapter 4. Expertise and expert generalisability will give an overview the major 
theories of expertise and identify some of their most important cognitive 
structures and processes. It will address specific issues which affect cognitive 
flexibility such as encoding specificity, deliberate practice, reductive bias, 
automatisation, and functional fixedness. It will then discuss how they may 
constrain the generalisation of expert knowledge and processes that have been 
acquired or developed in the primary expert domain to secondary domains and 
subsequent career stages. It will then investigate how cognitive flexibility can be 
developed in ways which mitigate these limitations.  
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Chapter 5. Intelligence and inferential processes will present an overview of the 
major approaches to the study of intelligence. It will focus primarily on those 
cognitive factors or mechanisms which support cognitive flexibility and the 
generalisation of the cognitive processes and knowledge from one domain to 
another. It will then investigate how these factors  inference, induction and 
analogy in particular  operate to generalise expert knowledge and processes 
during transitions. 
Chapter 6. The personal intelligences in transitions will review the important 
place given to intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence in most models of 
intelligence. It will explain how intrapersonal intelligence provides self 
awareness, self control, and the ability to adapt consciously to changing 
circumstances during transitions. It will then explain how interpersonal 
intelligence enables individuals to situate themselves in their context, learn from 
their environment and respond appropriately during transitions  
Chapter 7. Practical intelligence in transitions will review this somewhat 
awkward but useful conceptualisation of an area of intelligence theory which 
provides a ‘basket’ into which a variety of real life applications of intelligence 
can be collected and studied. The main focus will be on three common forms of 
practical intelligence as they operate during transitions: problem resolution, 
administrative organisation and the use of environmental resources.  
Part 3 will consist of three chapters which will identify and review the overall 
patterns and findings of the study as they elucidate the operation and 
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development of transition expertise. It will include the conclusion to this 
dissertation. 
Chapter 8. Transition expertise over the career cycle will revisit the career cycle 
and the stage transitions discussed in the first chapter. It will also review further 
theories about the development of intelligence and expertise in adults and their 
correspondences with adult developmental theories such as wisdom models of 
expertise and evolving self-concept models. The development and evolution of 
transition expertise over the course of a career will be discussed in light of these 
models and the supporting evidence in the data.  
Chapter 9. The transition process and transition expertise will review the 
transition process itself and in particular the movement from a stable career 
position through an unstable transition process to a different but stable new 
position. It will then discuss some important types of transitions including 
reactive transitions, initiated transitions, failed transitions, and choices to not 
transition. It will examine the operation of convergent and divergent cognitive 
processes during transitions and how these provide further insight into the nature 
of transition expertise 
Chapter 10. Conclusion will summarise the findings of the dissertation, present 
general conclusions drawn from these findings, and suggest areas for future 
study. 
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Chapter 1. Careers, Career 
Transitions and Transition Expertise  
Introduction 
Expertise is generally defined as superior performance in a domain as agreed by 
expert representatives for the domain or by an established measure of expertise: a 
concert pianist, a Wimbledon champion, a Nobel Laureate scientist, an 
accomplished Shakespearian actor, a famous sculptor, a successful politician are 
all experts in their domains. Indeed there are expert ‘tinkers, tailors, soldiers and 
sailors.’ The pursuit of expertise extends uninterruptedly throughout Western 
history. Socrates and Plato sought to elicit the highest standards of ethics in 
young leaders while the Sophists taught excellence in oratory and the law. The 
medieval guild system developed its expertise hierarchy of Novice, Initiate, 
Apprentice, Journeyman, Expert and Master. The universities in the Middle Ages 
developed a curriculum of trivium (Latin, rhetoric and logic) and quadrivium 
(arithmetic, astronomy, geometry and music) to educate and promote expert 
scholarship. The systemisation of knowledge by the Encyclopaedists and the 
music guilds of Baroque Germany are illustrations of the pursuit of expertise in 
the enlightenment.  The reintroduction of the Olympic Games by D’Coubertin 
sought excellence in body and mind. 
Three studies in the 2
nd
 half of the 20
th
 century set the benchmark for studying 
expertise. Anne Roe (The making of a scientist, 1952) interviewed leading 
scientist in United States to identify what characterised individuals who were 
“the best men in each field” (Roe, 1952). Harriet Zuckerman (Scientific Elite: 
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Nobel laureates in the United States, 1977) interviewed American Nobel 
Laureates focussing on how future Laureates found study opportunities, worked 
with expert mentors and were socialised into the world of the scientific elite.  
Benjamin Bloom’s (Developing talent in young people, 1985) study of talent 
identified how gifted young people developed to their full potential in adulthood. 
It was conducted across several domains: 1) athletic or psychomotor talent, using 
Olympic swimmers and world class tennis players; 2) aesthetic, musical, and 
artistic talent, using concert pianists and sculptors; 3) cognitive talent, working 
with research mathematicians and research neurologists; and 4) interpersonal 
relations talent.  
Specific models of expertise have emerged more recently in the form of the 
General theory of expertise (Chase & Simon, 1973; Richman et al., 1995a; Gobet 
& Simon, 1996a); the Expert performance approach (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch 
Römer, 1993; Ericsson, 1995); and Mental model paradigms such as frames and 
schemata (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Zeitz, 1997). 
The fields of talent, creativity and giftedness have been researched extensively 
by Koestler (1964), Tannenbaum (1983), Csikszentmihalyi (1990), Runco 
(1992), Amabile (1996), Simonton (1988), Gagné (2000), Sternberg (2003), 
Renzulli (2005), and others. Their research has regularly overlapped with the 
study of intelligence or expertise and in the process there has been considerable 
entanglement of conceptions and components of giftedness, talent, creativity, 
intelligence and expertise. 
Transition expertise, the object of this study, is oxymoronic.  Expertise is 
generally considered to be a relatively homeostatic or stable state. It is achieved 
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over time through a combination of ability, training, dedication, and sometimes 
good fortune. Transition on the other hand is an unstable, non-homeostatic state: 
a change in careers, a dropping of old patterns to adopt new ones, dealing with 
ambiguity and uncertainty, moving from a homeostatic state into a non-
homeostatic state. But in this apparent conflict resides the particular value and, 
consequently, objective of this dissertation.  Transition expertise, can be defined 
as: the skills and abilities to manage oneself, one’s performance and one’s 
environment in ways that produce repeated and successful non-homeostatic 
transitions between one homeostatic career stage or position to another. What is 
it that characterises or is acquired by individuals who are consistently able to 
make successful transitions in a way which sets them apart from their peers? Can 
the key components of transition expertise be identified and measured? Is there 
such a thing as a transition expert?   
This study will focus particularly on experts who make repeated successful 
career transitions through their career up to senior positions in their field of 
expertise: a clarinettist who becomes principal of a faculty of music, a yachtsman 
who becomes chef d’Equipe of an Olympic team, a chemist who becomes chief 
scientist of a major energy company. All the participants in this study will have 
been experts in their primary domain. These three criteria  expertise in a 
domain, careers in the same field as their primary expertise and repeated 
successful career transitions to very senior levels in their field  are the main 
characteristics of the participants in this study. 
Before questions about the nature of transition expertise itself can be answered, it 
is necessary first to understand careers, how they develop over time and the 
  
4 
 
process of career transitions in particular.  Consequently, this introductory 
chapter will have four parts which will present an overview of the major 
theoretical issues and models that concern careers and career transitions and 
identify the major theoretical model that will be used understand the nature of 
transition expertise. The first part will briefly review the most relevant of the 
multitudinous theories of career development and transitions. The second part 
will identify common patterns shared by these theories for the major career 
stages and the transition processes which individuals go through between stages. 
The third part will then give an overview of the main theoretical areas of 
research that will be addressed in this dissertation: Intelligence, Expertise, 
Cognitive Flexibility, Inferential Mechanisms, Personal Intelligence and 
Practical Intelligence. Together these will be considered to constitute the main 
cognitive elements of transition expertise to be studied in this project. I will 
briefly summarise the broader research issues associated with these areas and 
then identify the central questions I will be asking as to how these abilities, skills 
and cognitive processes might operate during transitions. I will then compare 
these to similar elements found in the main career theories. The fourth part will 
identify a further area of interest for this dissertation: the construct of Self 
Concept and how it may evolve over the course of a career with specific 
reference to changes in and development of the foregoing elements of transition 
expertise. 
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1.1. Career theories 
1.1.1. Career cycle or career stage models 
Early career development models tied career development to the personal life 
cycle and the development of identify over the course of one’s life. Most 
theorists developed models with distinct career stages. Miller and Form (1951) 
identified five career stages: Preparatory work period, Initial work period, Trial 
work period, Stable work period, and Retirement. Hall and Nougaim (1968) 
identified five similar stages: Pre-work, Establishment, Advancement, 
Maintenance, and Retirement. Dalton and Thompson (Dalton, Thompson & 
Price, 1977) developed a four stage professional career model consisting of 
Working under direction of others, Going into depth in one area, Developing 
greater breadth of experience and Providing direction to others. Super (1963) 
conceived of career development based on an evolving self concept employing 
self perception and self assessment in relationship to factors like race, gender, 
social class, education, abilities, characteristics, and physical attributes. It also 
had five stages: Exploratory, Growth, Establishment, Maintenance and Decline. 
Psychologically based development models are best represented by Erikson’s 
(1985) epigenic matrix which mapped the relationship between psychosexual 
development, life stages and a series of ‘psychological crises’ mostly concerned 
with relationships and identity.   
Levinson’s life cycle model (Levinson et al., 1978; Levinson, 1986) is a highly 
regarded adult developmental model. His life structure is similar to Super’s self 
concept and is the “underlying pattern” of a person’s life which is a continuous 
and evolving process that reflects the way the aspects of the self are lived out, 
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how the socio-cultural world impinges on the individual, how the individual 
participates in the world and the choices they make. An individual goes through a 
sequence of relatively orderly developmental eras and transition periods in their 
life which alternate between 6 structure-building stable periods and 5 structure-
changing transition periods (Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1. Levinson Life cycle model: From Levinson  (1978) 
 65 Late Adulthood 
 60 LATE ADULT TRANSITION 
 55 Culmination of 
Middle Adulthood 
 
 50 Age 50 Transition  
 45 Entering Middle 
adulthood 
 
40 MID-LIFE TRANSITION  
33 Settling down   
28 Age 30 Transition   
22 Entering the Adult 
World 
  
EARLY ADULT TRANSITION   
Childhood and Adolescence    
Transitions are a part of Levinson’s model. For example, in the three major 
transition periods  Early Adult, Mid-Life, Late Adult  the life structure is 
subject to major changes and the course of life to major redirection. But these 
transitions are viewed as stages in a career and can often last for 5 years. They 
also concern major revisions of identity and purpose rather than the processes for 
successfully managing a particular career transition. 
Edgar Schein (1978) proposed a work career cycle (in addition to a biosocial and 
family cycle) which has been widely recognised as mapping the major stages of 
the work life of an individual. It is linked to age over the course of a life-time but 
not explicitly tied to personal or familial development (Figure 1.1). 
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Table 1.1 Stages and tasks of the career cycle. Based on Schein (1978) 
STAGE AGE ROLE 
1. Growth, fantasy, exploration  Age 0-21 Student, aspirant, applicant 
Passage into an Organisation or Occupation 
2. Entry into world of work Age 16-25 Recruit, entrant 
3. Basic Training Age 16-25 Trainee, novice 
4. Full membership in early career Age 17-30 New but full member 
5. Full membership, midcareer Age 25 + Full member, tenured member, life 
member, supervisor, manager 
6. Midcareer Crisis Age 35-45  
7. A. Late career in non-leadership 
role 
Age 40-
retirement 
Key member, individual contributor, 
member of management. Good 
contributor or deadwood 
Passage through Inclusion and Hierarchy Boundary 
7 B. Late Career in Leadership Role Age 40-
retirement 
General manager, officer, senior partner, 
internal entrepreneur, senior staff 
8. Decline and disengagement Age 40 – 
retirement 
 
Passage Out of the Organisation or Occupation 
9. Retirement   
Schein’s career cycle is noteworthy for its diverging paths at stage 7 where an 
individual either peaks in their career cycle, most often staying in their field of 
specialisation, or continues to progress within the organisation often moving 
laterally away from their main area of specialisation before continuing a 
hierarchical progress. To explain such lateral moves Schein (1978) developed a 
three dimensional organisational model (Figure 1.2) which shows how an 
individual making a transition may move along one of three different dimensions 
that are regulated by boundaries that maintain the identity and consistency of the 
organisational culture. The three dimensions are: 
1. Hierarchical (promotion) in which an individual moves up a hierarchy 
increasing rank and status usually accompanied by increase in power, 
authority and control over resources. 
2. Inclusion (membership) in which one moves from the outside to the 
inside of an organisation or visa-versa without necessarily moving up the 
vertical ladder e.g., moving to the outside such as running a small but 
autonomous function in a different country, or to the inside taking up a 
function with relatively little control over resources but more input into 
the strategic direction of the organisation. 
  
8 
 
3. Functional or technical (rotation) in which an individual moves 
around an organisation e.g., from manufacturing to design to marketing 
which again could be without any vertical progression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schein proposed that an individual would be most subject to organisational 
socialisation prior to and during boundary transitions, whereas stable career 
periods an individual would be more likely to engage in innovative behaviour. 
The model explains why career transitions may not necessarily be hierarchical. 
Torbert (Torbert, 2004) used an action inquiry approach to develop his 
leadership development framework (LDF) which identifies progressive 
developmental stages through which individuals pass (Table 1.2). 
 
Function 
Inclusion 
R
an
k
 
Figure 1.2 A three dimensional model of an organisation. Based on Schein (1978)  
Sales 
Production 
Marketing 
Mark. 
Sale 
Prod 
Etc. 
Etc
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Table 1.2 Leadership stages. Based on  Torbert ( 2004)  
Opportunist 
(5%) 
Winning any way possible Self-oriented, manipulative                 
“Might makes right” 
Diplomat 
(12%) 
Avoiding overt conflict Wants to belong, obeys group norms and 
rarely rocks boat 
Expert 
(38%) 
Efficient problem solving Seeks rational proficiency 
Achiever 
(30%) 
Effective performance Achieves goals through teams, juggles 
managerial duties and market demands 
Individualist 
(10%) 
Interweaves  competing personal 
and company action logics 
Creates unique structures to resolve gaps 
between strategy and performance 
Strategist 
(4%) 
Generates organisational and 
personal transformations 
Exercises  mutual inquiry, vigilance and 
vulnerability for short and long term 
Alchemist 
(1%) 
Generates social transformations Integrates material, spiritual and society 
transformation 
The figures under the name of the stage reflect the percentage of individuals 
measured by the LDF who fall into its different categories and they follow a 
more or less normal distribution with the most frequent stages being expert 
(38%) and achiever (30%). The LDF action-logic model is intriguing because it 
decouples personal development from hierarchical career positions, i.e. the stages 
are not strictly sequential and it is possible for an individual to rise hierarchically 
to the top of an organisation without having traversed all of the developmental 
stages. For example, while a Strategist and Alchemist utilise more ‘highly 
developed’ action-logics, an Opportunist or Achiever action-logic might still 
attain the highest CEO levels in an organisational hierarchy. 
For all their different terminology and categories, there are common, progressive 
stages that run more or less in parallel through the different models (Table 1.3). 
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Table 1.3 Comparison of adult development models 
Erikson  Dalton & 
Thompson 
Super Torbert Schein  Levinson 
Life Cycle Career 
Stages 
Self-Concept  Leadership 
Development 
Framework 
Career 
Cycle 
Seasons of a 
Man’s Life 
Infancy; 
Early 
childhood; 
Play age; 
School age; 
Adolescence  
 Exploratory 
Stage 
Age:  0 to14 
 Growth, 
fantasy 
exploration  
Age: 0-21 
Pre-adulthood    
Age: 8-22 
 Young 
adulthood  -
Intimacy vs. 
Isolation 
Working 
under 
direction of 
others 
Growth Stage 
Age: 14 to25 
Opportunist Entry into 
world of 
work     
Age: 16-25 
Early adult 
transition   
Age: 17-22 
 Basic 
training  
Age 16-25 
Entry life 
structure for 
early adulthood 
Age: 22-28 
Going into 
depth in 
one area 
Diplomat Full 
Membership 
in early 
career     
Age: 17-30 
Achiever Age 30 
transition   
Age: 28-33 
 
Adulthood - 
Generativity 
vs. 
Stagnation 
  
  
Developing 
greater 
breadth of 
experience 
Establishment 
Stage 
Age: 25 to 45 
Full 
membership 
mid-career  
Age: 25 + 
Culminating 
life structure 
for early 
adulthood Age: 
33-40 
Expert 
Mid Career 
Crisis    
Age: 35-45 
Mid life 
transition   
Age: 40-45 
Providing 
direction to 
others 
Maintenance 
Stage 
Age: 45 to 
retirement 
 
 
 
 
Individualist Late career 
in non 
leadership 
role       
Age: 40  - 
retirement 
Or… 
Late career 
in leadership 
role Age: 40 
– retirement 
Entry life 
structure for 
middle 
adulthood  
Age: 45-50 
Age 50 
Transition Age: 
50-55 
Strategist Culminating 
life structure 
for middle 
adulthood   
Age: 55-60 
Late 
adulthood - 
Integrity Vs. 
Despair 
 Decline Stage 
Age: 
Retirement to 
death 
Alchemist Decline and 
disengage-
ment Age: 
55 until 
retirement 
Late adult 
transition    
Age: 60-65 
    Retirement Late adulthood 
Age: 65 – 
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1.1.2 Transition process models 
Transition process theories describe specific transitions and associated issues 
between career stages  though transitions can sometimes take place within a 
career stage.  They are of particular interest to this study for defining the target 
periods in careers of individuals during which transition expertise will be most 
operative. Strauss’s seminal study Mirrors and masks: The search for identity 
(1959) contributed to the early examination of life transitions. Van Gennep’s 
(1960) Rites of Passage was a seminal study of life transitions from a 
sociological and anthropological perspective which had three stages: separation, 
where the individual moves away from or lets go of their previous environment 
or role; initiation, in which they break more completely from their old role, are 
introduced to their new role and prove themselves in their new role; and 
reintegration, in which the new role is fully assumed and they move fully back 
into their social structure. Glaser and Strauss’s Status Passage (1971) continued 
the work on identifying the social determined nature of life transitions. More 
pragmatically, Tiedeman and O’Hara (1963) framed career development in terms 
of choice and adjustment.  Crites (1976) presented a transition cycle that focused 
on the Early Adulthood or Establishment Stage of his work adjustment theory 
which might correspond roughly to Schein’s (1978) Full Membership mid-career 
or Levinson’s (Levinson et al., 1978) Culminating Life Structure for early 
adulthood.  It  has five stages: 1) Career motives involve the needs and drives for 
attaining career success; 2) Task and problems describes how the individual 
seeks to meet the requirements of their new role; 3) Career adjustment describes 
the psychological mechanisms for dealing with frustrations, conflict and the 
accompanying adjustment of goals; 4) Anxiety or tension reduction describes 
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how the individual deals with blocks or frustration through coping mechanism; 
5) Satisfaction and success describes how the individual has adjusted in a career. 
This model was designed primarily to address adjustments to a steady or stable 
state career rather than the continually evolving careers which are typical of most 
of the participants in this study. It is also a process which can extend over many 
years and may involve a number of transitions within it. Nicholson (1984) 
proposed a process model which had a more narrow scope dealing with a specific 
transition. It also has five stages:  1) Preparation involves anticipation and 
expectation of a change; 2) Affect and sense making occurs during the first few 
weeks of the new position; 3) Adjustment shows how the individual adjusts both 
themselves and their job role to reduce person/role misfit; 4) Stabilisation arises 
when the person is connected and settled in their role; 5) Preparation starts the 
next transition.   
Bridges (1991) proposed a three stage model: endings in which individuals let go 
of the past, attachments, old behaviours and fears of the new; neutral zone which 
is neither the old nor the new and in which the individual is subject to fears, 
anxiety, self doubt and consequently requires structured processes, goals, small 
wins, etc. to move through the zone; and new beginnings which includes 
purpose, future picture, vision, planning and having a part to play. The cycle 
focuses significantly on managing ambiguity and anxiety through structured 
processes designed to minimise uncertainty and establishes clear, sequential steps 
for generating a new role, function and career identity. Elsner and Farrands 
(2006) devised a four stage model: leaving last role; arriving in a new role and 
dealing with issues of competence, relationships and trust; surviving which 
involves finding one’s own “internal compass”, relying on resiliency and self 
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belief and winning the confidence of others to lead; and  thriving in which the 
individual can focus on the “right things” such as the opportunity to experiment, 
self-awareness, openness to personal change and the confidence to hold 
uncertainty. They also proposed a reflexive “Cycle of Enquiry” (Figure 1.3) 
during transitions that consists of: “reflecting on experience, reframing 
understanding, and reshaping practices.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of particular interest is Herminia Ibarra’s (2004) concept of working identity 
which focuses specifically on changing careers to a different field and the 
identity changes accompanying such a transition away from primary domain 
expertise, for example, when moving from being a Wall Street banker to 
becoming a writer or from a professor of Spanish literature to becoming a 
stockbroker. Ibarra derives her theoretical background in part from Schein’s 
(1990) work on career anchors, Bridge’s (1991) work on transitions and Hazel 
Markus’s work on possible selves (Marcus, 1977; Markus & Nurius, 1986). 
Figure 1.3 The cycle of enquiry. Based on Elsner & Farrands (2006) 
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Markus postulates the existence of multiple potential selves which are not to be 
confused with psychological constructs like multiple personalities.  Such possible 
selves may include who we think we might become, fear we might become, think 
we should become, aspire to become, dream of becoming, etc. Using a grounded 
theory approach to her research, Ibarra discovered that during major career 
changes individuals who are successful in radical career changes often take time 
to explore their possible selves before making the career move.  Ibarra’s 
“reinventing your career” transition cycle has three stages: 1) Exploring possible 
selves, 2) Lingering between identities and 3) Grounding a deep change.  She 
further identified an iterative three-stage process called Identity in practice that is 
used when making major career changes. This is the ‘engine’ of her change 
process and also involves three more-or-less sequential processes: crafting 
experiments, shifting connections and making sense. Each of which has a 
number of representative activities (see Table 1.4). 
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Table 1.4 Identity in practice: processes and practice. Based on  Ibarra (2004) 
 Process Practices 
Crafting 
experiments 
Trying out new identities 
on a small scale or 
practicing professional 
roles before making a 
major commitment  
The experimental method 
 Compare and contrast 
 Narrow the search 
Opening Gambits 
 Side projects 
 Temporary assignments 
 Back to school 
Gutsy thinking 
 i.e. intuitive, affective, non-rational decisions 
Committed flirtation 
 i.e. rigorous investigation without final 
commitment or foreclosure 
Shifting 
connections 
Developing contacts, role 
models and peer groups 
who can open doors to 
new worlds, can guide us 
and which can be used to 
benchmark our progress 
Ties that bind (and Blind) 
 i.e. overcoming close, familiar contacts that 
may constrain 
New faces, New places 
 New peer groups 
 Guiding figures  
 Communities of practice 
A secure base 
 I.e. a safe support context 
Making 
sense 
Discovering and making 
catalysts or triggers for 
change and using them as 
opportunities to rework 
one’s story 
Alert intermissions 
 I.e. pivotal events the give meaning 
Defining moments 
 Unfreezing events 
 ‘Jelling’ events 
Preparation prepares reinvention 
 Stepping back 
 Windows of opportunity 
Telling ourselves 
 I.e. practicing one’s new self narrative 
Ibarra’s model is very much concerned with non-homeostatic transitions: the 
people investigated in her study were often changing their careers to completely 
different domains and fields. The processes and practises she identified are 
largely concerned with working within the transition state itself. Furthermore, 
Ibarra (1999) upends the traditional ‘plan and act’ sequence associated with 
traditional problem solving and replaces it with a reverse process of ‘test and 
learn’ in which individuals experiment with a variety of different new selves or 
identities, “trying out” possible new selves without committing to them.  
Through testing and learning individuals narrow in on new identities using 
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iterative trials and refinement processes in which the new identity is slowly 
discovered or uncovered rather than designed, planned and implemented. 
A comparison of some of the transition process models is presented in Table 1.5.  
Table 1.5 Comparison of some recursive transition cycles 
 
van 
Gennep 
Separation Initiation Reintegration 
Crites Career 
motives 
Tasks and 
problems 
Career 
adjustment   
Anxiety 
reduction 
Satisfaction and 
success 
Nicholson Preparation Affect and 
Sense making 
Adjustment Stabilisation and 
preparation 
Elsner & 
Farrands 
Leaving Arriving Surviving 
reflecting, reframing, reshaping 
Thriving 
Bridge Endings Neutral zone New beginnings 
Ibarra Exploring 
possible selves 
Lingering between identities 
crafting, shifting, making sense 
Grounding deep 
change 
 
1.1.3 Vocational and typological models of careers 
Typology and vocational models have been widely used in career development.  
They tend to use psychometric measures to identify personality characteristics 
and abilities of individuals which correspond to job and performance 
requirements. Holland (1973, 1978) used factor analysis to identified 6 
personality types as the basis for his Vocational Preference Inventory (VPI) to 
predict what kinds of careers would be most appropriate for different individuals 
by matching their scores with occupational environments associated with 
different types of jobs. The Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory (SCII) (Hansen 
& Campbell, 1985) used Holland’s work to identified commonalities of interests 
in different occupational groups to determine how well an individual would 
integrate into a work setting. Their proposal that congruence between personal 
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needs and requirements of a job would lead to more satisfaction and longer 
tenure was supported by a variety of studies (e.g., Dawis & Loquist, 1984; 
Osipow, 1983).  
Schein’s (1971) used his concept of career anchors  mentioned earlier as a 
contributor to Ibarra’s working identity model  to aggregates motivation, 
values, innate abilities and self perceive abilities into personality patterns that 
oriented and directed career choices and development (see Table 1.6). 
Table 1.6 Career anchors. Based on Schein (1971) 
Technical-
functional 
competence 
Individuals organise their career around the acquisition of specific technical 
skills or functional competences and make transitions based upon the 
opportunities to maximise their expertise in these areas. 
Managerial 
competence 
Individuals move through the corporate hierarchy to senior management 
positions where they can exercise control over a large area.  This competence 
has three sub-competencies: a) analytical competence; b) interpersonal 
competence;or  c) emotional competence in responding to challenges.  
Security and 
stability 
Individuals seek stability in job positions, organisational continuity, family 
stability, etc.
 
 
Creativity Individuals - called entrepreneurs by Schein - need to create ideas, a product, a 
company of their own, etc.  
Autonomy and 
independence 
Individuals make choices which often take them out of organisations or large 
institutions and into professions like writing, consulting, and free-lance work.
 
 
  
Schein (1978) subsequently suggested that there might be other career anchors, 
naming four in particular: Basic identity requires clearly defined roles, symbols, 
functions; Service to others which might involve social work and health care; 
Power, influence and control as represented by politicians, doctors, and 
ministers; and Variety which might be represented in consultants, journeymen, 
and freelancers.  
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1.1.4 Adjustment models 
1.1.4.1 Work adjustment models 
Work adjustment models view vocational satisfaction as an indicator of personal 
congruence and stable careers.
 
For example, the work adjustment theory of the 
Minnesota Studies in Vocational Rehabilitation (Osipow, 1983; Dawis & 
Lofquist, 1984; Rounds, Dawis & Lofquist, 1987) is structured in terms of 
satisfactoriness  how well the worker can perform their job as measured by the 
correspondence between an individual’s abilities and the requirement of the job  
and satisfaction  how well the interests or vocational needs of a worker 
correspond to the reinforcer systems of the organisation. A well adjusted worker,  
as indicated by tenure in a job, is one who achieves satisfaction and performs 
satisfactorily. Incongruence leads to dissatisfaction and often to leaving an 
organisation (Wanous, 1980), though dissonance reduction during the early 
period of the transition (Vroom, 1966) can lead to fewer departures than would 
be predicted.  Crites (1976) maintained that high career adjustment is reflected in 
less conflict between expectations for a role and the actual identity achieved in 
that role.  Holland’s (1973) hypothesis that congruent individuals will be more 
satisfied and less likely to change work situations was supported by Spokane’s 
(1985) review of multiple studies.  Holland’s more provocative hypotheses  that 
incongruent persons will be shaped or influenced by their organisational culture 
and environment to move towards congruence  has also been confirmed 
(Gottfredson, 1979; Gottfredson & Becker, 1981). 
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1.1.4.2 Other adjustment models  
There are a huge range of other adjustment models that have occasionally been 
applied to understand career transitions with varying degrees of success. 
Psychologically based adjustment models were developed to explain adult career 
patterns. Gould (1978) focussed on how individuals face and master false 
childhood assumptions about life. Neugarten (1976) focussed on aging and 
adaptive patterns in older adults. Valliant (1977) focussed on resolving defensive 
conflicts in adulthood and moving toward career consolidation. Pollock (1987) 
addressed the mourning process and how learning from it impacts on the second 
half of life.  
Social gerontological models have been applied to career transitions, particularly 
in the case of sport, in which the ending of a performing career  often at an 
early period of one’s life  can be thought of as paralleling the aging process. 
Activity theory (Havinghurst & Albrecht, 1953) suggests that individuals attempt 
to maintain homeostatic levels of activity through their life and will attempt to 
adjust the activity in their life so that when one activity ceases they substitute 
another. McPherson (1980) applied this to transitions in sport when, having 
retired through injury or age, individuals seek to replace sporting performance 
with other new or compensatory activity. Continuity theory (Atchley, 1989) 
focuses on how individuals seek to maintain well-establish or stable patterns of 
behaviour when making transitions to retirement so that there is minimal 
disruption, i.e. the best adjusted individuals continue activity and manage change 
effectively.  Continuity may reflect how much the former role of person is 
viewed as more or less central to that individual’s identity e.g., the higher the 
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importance of the primary identification with a sporting identity, the less 
continuity in the transition (Rosenberg, 1981).  Exchange theory (Homans, 1961) 
explains how, as people age, they rearrange their activities so that their reducing 
energy is distributed to maintain maximum returns. Some theorists (Rosenberg, 
1981) maintain that exchange theory is particularly useful for understanding 
retirement from performance while others (Koukouris, 1991) challenge the use of 
exchange theory because in sport, music or dance individuals most often go on to 
develop fully active careers after career  ‘retirement.’  
Thanatological theory offers some transition models that are informative. Social 
death has been used to characterise when one terminates a professional 
performing career as an athlete or musician and experiences loss of contact with 
others (Kalish, 1966; Lerch, 1984). Social awareness (Glaser & Strauss, 1965) 
follows the awareness of family members during the dying process. The well 
known thanatological model of Kübler-Ross (On death and dying, 1969) has 
been used as a template for many transition models.   
1.1.5 Contextual and Pyschometric  models 
There are a range of other approaches to understanding and studying human 
transitions which will not be addressed directly or utilised in the research or 
explanation of the findings as they relate to career transitions and transition 
expertise. However, I will briefly mention the two most common and 
encompassing of these approaches: ecological/contextual and psychometric 
models of human behaviour. 
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1.1.5.1 Ecological/Socially embedded/Contextual models 
The social ‘situatedness’ of human beings has been widely theorised and studied. 
Everett Hughes (1958, 1971) and colleagues such as Becker & Strauss (1956) 
and  Kurtz (1984) were contemporaries of symbolic interactionists Mead (1964) 
and Blumer (1969). Hughes’ Chicago Area Project (CAP) develop “fugue-like 
renditions of career by weaving together four related themes: (a) careers fuse the 
objective and the subjective; (b) careers entail status passages; (c) careers are 
rightfully properties of collectives; and perhaps most importantly (d) careers link 
individuals to the social structure” (Barley, 1989, p. 49). Ecological 
psychologists such as Barker (1968), Bronfenbrenner (1979 and Gibson and Pick, 
(2003) stressed the interpenetration of individual and social institutions that 
embedded human identity, behaviour and careers in their social context in which 
the individual is a “growing dynamic entity” that progressively moves through its 
environment, structuring and being restructured through reciprocity and mutual 
accommodation. Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984) developed his concept of 
structuration to avoid the dualism of the “imperialism of the object” implicit in 
the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and functionalism of Durkheim and Parsons vs. 
the “imperialism of the subject” as characteristic of hermeneutics and 
phenomenology. The logic of an institution’s structures and propositions are 
encoded in modalities which are recurring patterns that contain the knowledge 
for individuals about operating in an institution and so shape the interactions 
amongst the participant in the institution. The process is reversible: via 
structuration individuals recursively shape modalities through their actions which 
in turn influence the institutional structures.  
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An ecological/socially situated approach to studying transitions could make a 
valuable contribution to understanding how humans move through careers and 
manage transitions because one needs to understand how changing contexts 
shape the behaviour of the individual. However, I will not use ecological and 
contextualist models for studying expertise in this dissertation. Rather, I will 
address environmental and contextual factors primarily in terms of how 
individuals use personal abilities and skills to respond to changing contexts and 
to utilise environmental resources to help manage their transitions. 
1.1.5.2 Psychometric personality measures 
There are also a wide range of personality measures that have been used for 
making career decisions and for supporting individuals when they move into new 
roles and positions. These include Cattell’s (1957) 16 Personality Factors 
(16PF); Schutz’s (1958) Fundamental Interpersonal Relations 
Orientation (FIRO-B); Eysenck’s (1990) Intraversion-Extraversion, Neuroticism 
and Psychoticism; the Myer Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) (Myers & Myers, 
1980); Belbin’s (1993) team roles; McCrae and Costa’s (2008) Five Factor 
model; to name some of the more popular.   Many of these largely psychometric 
instruments will include measures of abilities and attributes that might contribute 
to managing transitions.  While they will not be used in this study, they would 
prove useful in future studies. 
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1.2 Career stages and transition processes 
1.2.1 Career stages and transition processes: assessing their 
usefulness for this study 
From the foregoing review it should be evident that there are a plethora of 
models about careers, career stages, and career transitions from which to draw 
frameworks for studying career transitions. I will briefly summarise some of the 
attributes of some of the models that would prove most useful for this purpose.  
1.2.1.1 Career stages vs transitions: Homeostasis vs non-homeostasis  
The first and most obvious conclusion about most career models is that they 
contain a number of stages. The second is that they focus largely on attaining a 
series of stable, homeostatic career states.  
Career stage models such as those of Levinson (Levinson et al., 1978), Schein 
(1978) and Torbert (2004) focus primarily on differentiating the progressive 
stages of careers and identifying the characteristics of the roles in a given stage. 
Transitions are examined in light how they lead to individuals attaining the skills 
required to achieve stable performance in a new position or role, though some 
e.g., Levinson (Levinson et al., 1978)  and Schein (1978) to a lesser extent, make 
transition stages a central part of their model. Vocational and typology models 
like Holland’s (1973) and the Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory (SCII) 
(Hansen & Campbell, 1985) focus on performance in career roles themselves and 
have little to say about the nature of transitions. Models like Schein's Career 
anchors (1990) are of more use for identifying which types of careers individual 
might gravitate toward and how successful they might be in a type of career. 
Almost all work adjustment models (Kuder, 1946, 1966; Crites, 1976) focus on 
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the processes and consequences of conforming to the environment, adjusting 
work expectations, minimising dissonance and attaining stability. They do not 
address the crucial issues involved with the non-homeostatic instability of the 
transition process except in seeking to return to cognitive stability. Most 
gerontological and thanatoloical models focus on psychological coping 
mechanisms for dealing with loss, controlling negative affect and managing 
diminished resources. They do not address career transitions that involve growth, 
enhanced performance, and expanded capabilities  though they may be of use 
for understanding how individuals respond to transition failures. 
1.2.1.2 Transition process models 
Van Gennep’s (1960) rites of passage model is primarily descriptive of a 
socialising process in which individuals are initiated into a new stage of their life 
through a variety of rituals and learning processes that help them fit into their 
new roles. Crites (1976) as always is concerned with adjustment to a career stage 
and Nicholson’s (1984) adjustment and stabilisation stages in his transition 
model are again concerned with reducing person/role misfits and regaining 
homeostasis.  More recent transition process models are less concerned with 
adjustment and congruence and address the non-homeostatic nature of 
transitions. The actual transition process models themselves present relatively 
similar variations on transition stages e.g.:  Bridges (1991) “leaving, neutral zone 
and beginning;” Nicholson’s (1984) “preparation, sense making, adjustment and 
stabilisation;” Elsner and Farrands’ (2006) “leaving, arriving, surviving, 
thriving.” A major focus of these models is on managing ambiguities, 
uncertainties and unknowns and the processes described for managing transitions 
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is often one of controlling what can be controlled and minimising the impact of 
what can’t be controlled.   
Ibarra (2004) addressed a fundamentally different process than most other 
transition models. Her primary focus was not so much on making a transition 
from one stage to another in a career but on the more radical process of changing 
careers and identity redefinition.  The identity transitions she used as the basis for 
her research and resultant model are major career and identity dislocations from 
one field to another, from one possible self to an often completely different 
possible self. Perhaps it is for this reason that of the transition process models, 
hers seems to genuinely embrace the instability and non-predictability of change. 
This may also explains why the processes she described in her “identity in 
practice” cycle are less concerned with managing or containing the unknown and 
more with exploring and elaborating upon it. 
1.2.2 Career Stage and Transition Process models used in 
this study 
1.2.2.1 Career stage model used for this study 
Levinson and Schein’s models were the most useful for identifying major 
transitions as they chart the progress through a series of discreet career stages. 
Also, two of the three types of transitions  functional and inclusion  in 
Schein’s organisational model (Figure 1.2 above) may help identify a number of 
transitions that are not necessarily hierarchical but are nonetheless significant. It 
is quite likely that a career stage model consisting of 5 of 6 stages will apply to 
most of the career cycles of participants in this study and further inter-stage 
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transitions or lateral transitions may be explained in part by Schein’s non-
hierarchical boundary transitions. Such a five-stage model might be as follows: 
1. Student  
2. Performer   
3. Coach/manager/professor   
4. Head (coach, faculty, department)  
5. Leader (CEO, Principal, National Director) 
1.2.2.2 Transition process model used for this study 
Transition process models almost all have three or four stages: a leaving stage 
which may include preparatory work; a transitioning stage which can involve 
various processes and is the main focus of most transition models and of this 
study as well; and an integrating stage which involves performing successfully in 
the new role or function.  It is likely that most participants in this study will pass 
through a similar type of transition process each time they make a transition. 
Because the main emphasise in this dissertation will be on the skills and abilities 
used to manage transitions rather than the cycle that participants go through 
when making transitions,  I will for now  against the advice of some  put new 
wine into old wineskins and use a similar transition process model with three 
stages for simplicity’s sake:  
1. Leaving  
2. Transitioning 
3. Reintegrating   
If in the course of the study it becomes clear that transitions do not conform to 
such a three stage processes, I will address this in the analysis of the data and the 
model will be revised. However, the priority in the dissertation will remain on 
how the participants manage their transitions rather than the stages of the 
transition process.  
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1.3 Transition expertise skills  
1.3.1 Transition Expertise: The cognitive skills and abilities 
to be studied in this dissertation 
Having briefly reviewed models of career development and transitions I will now 
present a succinct overview of the major academic arenas and associated 
research question which will form the substance of this project and will be the 
focus of Chapters 4-7 in this dissertation. 
1.3.1.1 Intelligence  
I will accept the well supported, if controversial, argument that experts will have 
inherent abilities that enable them to perform at high levels in their domain. That 
is, a musician will have the musical abilities, an athlete will have the abilities 
associated with their sport and a business person, such as an energy trader, will 
have the abilities to analyse financial data to make the correct decisions in their 
field.  I will draw from a number of widely recognised models of intelligence 
that support this approach including Binet and Simon (1916), Cattell (1943), 
Thurstone (1947), Guilford (1967), Sternberg (1985, 1988), Gardner (1983, 
1993b), and Carroll (1993). While I will not be seeking to validate these models 
in particular, I will use them as the basis for responding to three initial questions: 
1) Can the primary domain intelligence be generalised to meet role 
requirements in subsequent career stages?  
2) Does the way in which primary domain intelligence is developed 
influence the capacity for the individual to generalise it? 
3) Are there other intelligences than the primary domain ones which are 
transition supportive and may actually be required to make a transition?   
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1.3.1.2 Expertise  
I will focus primarily on three major approaches to expertise: 1) The general 
theory of expertise (Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1993; Richman, Staszewski & 
Simon, 1995; Gobet & Simon, 1996a); 2) The expert performance approach 
(Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch Römer, 1993; Ericsson, 1995, 2003); and 3) 
Knowledge based (mental model) paradigms which include models such as such 
as frames, schemata and MACRs (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; 
Zeitz, 1997). A central issue  perhaps the central issues for this dissertation  
across all these models will be if and how expert knowledge and processes can 
be generalised beyond the expert domain in which they were developed or 
acquired. Many theories take a position on this question which comes close to a 
categorical no: the nature of expertise, expert knowledge, expert processes and 
their associated cognitive structures are said to make them relatively non-
transferable (Chase & Simon, 1973; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Gobet & Simon, 
1996b; etc.); deliberate practice may limit generalisability (Ericsson & Kintsch, 
1995); encoding specificity can limit the ability to access expert knowledge from 
multiple routes (Tulving & Thomson, 1973); and retrieval mechanisms are 
context dependent (Chi, 2006) which would make solutions based on previous 
experience relatively inaccessible in new contexts (Feltovitch & Barrows, 1984). 
A major objective of this dissertation will be to establish if expertise is indeed so 
domain tied and to then establish what characteristics might make it more 
generalisable during transitions. Research questions will focus on: 
1) Can the domain specificity constraints associated with expert 
knowledge and processes be overcome? 
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2) How can expertise be acquired in ways which enable it to be 
generalised? 
3) Are there expert cognitive processes that are non-domain tied and 
hence useful for transition expertise? 
1.3.1.3 Cognitive flexibility  
Cognitive structures and mental models that individuals develop in the 
acquisition of expertise may support or constrain their ability to make transitions. 
Cognitive flexibility will be determined by linkages to previous experience, how 
tied cognitive structures are to existing processes for resolving problems, 
whether individuals can maintain open and unbiased approaches to emerging 
situations during transitions and how individuals are able to adapt to new 
situation. The cognitive flexibility required to respond successfully and 
repeatedly to the challenges faced in transitions will be enhanced if individuals 
can reduce constraints on cognitive retrieval processes (Woods et al., 1994; Chi, 
2006), overcome reductive bias (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1993), interrupt 
automatisation (Sternberg, 1981; Sternberg & Frensch, 1992), and reduce 
functional fixedness (Dunker, 1945; Feltovitch et al., 1984).  Cognitive flexibility 
will be influenced by the ways in which mental models are transformed (Egan & 
Greeno, 1974; Klahr & Wallace, 1976), schemata reorganised (Rumelhart, 1980; 
Glick & Holyoak, 1983) and cognitive bridges built between previous expertise 
and new situations (Sternberg, 1977; 
 
Miller, 1979; Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984; 
etc.). Research questions will include: 
1) How tightly tied are the cognitive structures developed by an expert in a 
domain to exclusive use in that domain? 
  
30 
 
2) What makes cognitive structure more or less flexible and adaptable 
particularly in the case of experts? 
3) What processes enable individuals to generalise expert knowledge, 
processes and cognitive structures from one domain to another? 
1.3.1.4 Inferential intelligence  
Most intelligence models include an array of important mechanisms that would 
enable experts to generalise their knowledge and processes during career 
transitions. These will be the kinds of (generally) cognitive mechanisms that 
operate to produce flexibility in cognitive structures and enable individuals to 
overcome limitations to applying expert knowledge and processes across 
domains. These processes have been described variously as insightful thinking 
(Sternberg, 1981), induction (Cattell, 1943; Carroll, 1993; Sternberg, 1988; etc.), 
eduction (Spearman, 1923), elaborating and mapping, (Cattell, 1943; Sternberg, 
1977), novelty and metaphorical capacity (Gardner, 1983, Sternberg, 1988), 
inductive inference (Carnap, 1962), divergent production abilities (Guilford, 
1967), analogy (Spearman, 1927; Thurstone, 1938; Carnap, 1962; Miller, 1979; 
Sternberg, 1985; etc.), flexibility of use and closure (Carroll, 1993), and so forth. 
Research questions for this study will include:  
1) How do inference, induction and analogy enable individuals to generalise 
expert knowledge and processes from one career stage to another? 
2) How do induction, inference and analogy operate in reformulating and 
restructuring cognitive structures associated with expertise in a domain? 
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1.3.1.5 Personal intelligences: Intrapersonal and Interpersonal 
Personal intelligence skills have been widely recognised as contributing to self 
awareness, self management, use as feedback, responding to environmental 
contexts and generally enabling individuals to adapt and grow in changing 
contexts.  Personal intelligences should play a central role in managing 
transitions and may be less tied to the specific domains under study than some 
other cognitive processes. The study of personal intelligence is central to most 
intelligence theories. Spearman’s (1927) apprehension of one’s own experience, 
Binet and Simon’s (1916) interpretations, Thorndike’s (1920) ability to 
understand and manage people, Vernon’s (1950) insight into the states of other 
people, Guilford’s (1967) self and other behavioural operations, and so forth 
have all positioned identified personal intelligence as a key aspect of intelligence.  
Gardner’s (1983) differentiation of personal intelligences into interpersonal and 
intrapersonal intelligence has gained widespread acceptance and will be used in 
this dissertation to delineate the operation of personal intelligence into these two 
simple categories. Information processing models like metacognition (Flavell, 
1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990) and popular models like emotional intelligences 
(Goleman, 1995; Bar-On, 1997) may contribute to understanding the operation of 
personal intelligence during transitions. Social intelligence theories (Kihlstrom & 
Cantor, 2000) provide a contextual approach. Social learning models like self 
regulation (Schunk, 1982; Schunk & Zimmerman, 2006) may explain how 
personal intelligences might employ a variety of techniques to manage and 
regulate performance. Research questions will include: 
1) How does intrapersonal intelligence enable individuals to use self 
awareness and self management to enhance transitions? 
  
32 
 
2) How does interpersonal intelligence enable individuals to understand the 
contexts into which they move and utilise feedback in ways that enhance 
transitions? 
1.3.1.6 Practical Intelligence: Problem solving and resource 
management  
In the review of the elements of career stage and transition models, problem 
solving and resource management emerged as two distinct areas which 
contributed to transitions. Originally, I considered addressing these as separate 
issues particularly because problem solving has been so widely studied 
(Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960; Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Frensch & 
Sternberg, 1991; etc.). Resource management, on the other hand, is a peculiar 
category but appears in intelligence models within conceptualisations like 
crystallised intelligence (Cattell, 1963), spatial intelligence (Gardner, 1983) and 
acculturated knowledge (Horn & Masunaga, 2006).  However, I have settled on 
combining the examination of problem solving and resource management under 
the useful, if rather awkward, conceptualisation of practical intelligence. This 
composite model generally includes: identifying, formulating and resolving 
problems (Cole & Scribner, 1974; Scribner,1986); application of abstract logic in 
practical way (Ceci & Liker, 1986b); organising, administering and directing the 
execution of plans (Sternberg, 1985, 1996b); using tacit knowledge, (Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg & Wagner, 1986); applying common sense (Gardner, 
1983); operating within a context (Sternberg, 1996b); and using resources, 
people, and materials in appropriate fashion (Goodnow, 1985; Sternberg, 2000b). 
The research questions for this study will include:  
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1) How do individuals use problem formulation and resolution processes in 
ways that move beyond ties to a specific domain and enable them to 
manage transitions? 
2) How does the ability to administer and organise the pragmatics and 
logistics of daily operations enable individuals to manage transitions 
more successfully? 
3) How does the management of social and organisational resources 
contribute to transition expertise? 
1.3.2 Intelligence, Expertise and Performance Confluence 
1.3.2.1 Intelligence models and their multitude of uses 
Intelligence is one of the most extensively studied areas of human psychology 
and behaviour. It will not be surprising, therefore, that, when reviewing some of 
the most important models in Chapter 5, they will often be describing the same 
phenomena in different ways. I will attempt to make clear these overlaps in the 
review of the literature. More problematic is the way in which practical 
intelligence in particular includes many elements somewhat eclectically from 
different intelligence models. These include the operation of crystallised 
intelligence (Cattell, 1963), logical thinking (Gardner, 1983), analytical 
processes (Sternberg, 1988) convergent thinking (Guilford, 1967), quantitative 
and general sequential reasoning (Carroll, 1993) from intelligence models. It also 
includes element of cognitive flexibility such as approaching problems non-
sequentially (Feltovitch, et al 1984) and acculturated knowledge (Horn & 
Masunaga, 2006). Practical intelligence also incorporates parts if Sternberg’s 
contextual intelligence sub theory (1988) as well as some social intelligence 
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theories (Kihlstrom and Cantor, 2000). The fact that practical intelligence 
includes many elements of other intelligence models in a hybridised fashion 
raises the suspicion that it is not a distinct kind of intelligence but rather a 
mongrel aggregation of elements from many theoretically more rigorous and 
internally consistent models. But its primary focus is in addressing how 
individuals apply intelligence in the unpredictable, mutable, non-controlled 
environments of real life. This applied, contextual perspective makes it of use in 
understanding how transition expertise, which also cannot be measured within 
the confines of a laboratory, will operate to apply experience, expertise and 
knowledge in changing circumstances and environments.    
1.3.2.2 Intelligence and Expertise Conflation 
It is not my intention to engage in the nature/nurture debate in this research 
project. As will be clear, and I believe and I think enormous amounts of research 
and data confirm, a balanced perspective that expert performance will usually be 
the product of some combination of innate ability and effective training. That 
extraordinary ability may overcome lack of training or practice and that intense 
and systematic practice may compensate for ordinary abilities is what one might 
expect at the ends of a normal distribute for the intersection between ability and 
training in the production of performance.  Similarly early and systematic 
development of performance abilities may produce precocity in an individual 
while latent abilities and potential may not emerge until late in an individual’s 
development. Again, there is no reason why this should be surprising given the 
normal distribution of human developmental patterns.  
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But through all of this discussion, the distinction between intelligence and 
expertise should be clear. I will be using intelligence to describe innate abilities 
or potential much of which (though not all) can be assessed and measured even if 
full potential may or may not be realised in performance. I will use expertise to 
describe the acquired capacity to perform to high standards within a given 
domain using domain specific knowledge and processes as determined by 
objective standards or experts in the field.      
1.3.3 Correspondences with elements of career and 
transition models 
1.3.3.1 Transition expertise skills in existing models 
Levinson’s model identified a number of transition stages each of which has 
developmental tasks that are primarily concerned with evolving identity rather 
than the pragmatics of transitions.  For example the developmental tasks of the 
mid-life transition include resolving four polarities: 1) Young/Old, 2) 
Destruction/Creation, 3) Masculine/Feminine, 4) Attachment/Separateness 
(Levinson et al., 1978, p. 197). The two intermediate transitions - Age 30 and 
Age 50 - bring developmental tasks that are more concerned with refining the 
current life structure in light of the shortfalls or opportunities that have emerged 
from the previous developmental era. Levinson’s transitions are viewed as major 
stages in the life cycle for a particular period in an individual’s life that last 5 
years on average and involve life identity issues for that transition stage.  
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In Schein’s model development tasks are different for each stage (See Table 1.7).   
Table 1.7 Comparison of career stage tasks. Based on Schein (1978) 
Stage 5 Full membership Stage 7b Late career in leadership role 
1. Choosing a specialty and deciding how 
committed to become to it 
1. Using talents for long- range welfare of 
organization 
2. Remaining technically competent and 
continuing to learn in ones chosen area 
2. Integrating efforts of others and influencing 
broadly 
3. Establishing a clear identity in the 
organisation, becoming visible 
3. Selecting and developing subordinates 
4. Accepting higher levels of responsibility 4.Developing broad perspectives 
5. Becoming a productive person in the 
occupation 
5. Learning how to sell ideas 
6. Developing ones’ long range career plan   
By the contrasting tasks of Full Membership in early career vs. Late Career in 
leadership role some it can be seen that some skills associated with new roles 
may also be used to manage transitions into that role. Also, an individual’s 
abilities evolve over time and skills accrue with this evolution.  Some of Schein’s 
(1990) career anchors might also make individuals more or less adept at 
transitions e.g., individuals who have autonomy/independence or creativity 
anchors might be more comfortable during transitions whereas managerial 
competence and stability/security anchors might incline individuals to stabilise in 
new positions more rapidly. While these transition stages do not really address 
the specific nature of transition expertise itself, they may lend insight into the 
nature of an evolving self concept (Super, 1963) or the development of wisdom 
(Baltes, 2004) over the course of a career. 
Both Elsner and Farrand’s “cycle of inquiry” (2006) and Ibarra’s “identity in 
practice” (2006) processes delineate practices which offer more insight into how 
transitions might be managed. Elsner and Farrands’ process falls into a more 
standard feedback/learning cycle. However, its starting point is reflecting on 
experience (rather than planning) and is followed by reframing understanding 
(which is a sense making process of one’s experience) before actually engaging 
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in the activity of reshaping practices. Ibarra’s transition process examines the 
ways in which individuals break out of former identities and experiment and 
explore. Her conceptualisation of transition moves away from controlling and 
anxiety reduction and from planning and implementing towards genuine 
exploration and experimentation as individuals seek out challenge and 
opportunity rather than try to minimise uncertainty or self doubt.  
1.3.3.2 Correspondences with existing models  
When I began to explore the theoretical approach to this study and dissertation I 
started with the identification of major elements of intelligence and expertise that 
I thought might influence the ability to make career transitions.  During 
subsequent investigation, intelligence and expertise were further delineated into 
areas such as personal intelligences, inferential mechanism and cognitive 
flexibility.  Most career stage and transition process models identify skills and 
abilities associated with transitions but as was also investigating career theory 
and was surprised at the lack of comprehensive or clear cognitive models or 
structures that might help explain transition expertise. This ultimately threw me 
back on my own conceptual resources and led to my identification of these main 
areas of research touched upon in the previous section. In comparison of my 
research into cognitive models of intelligence and expertise on the one hand and 
career theory on the other I identified a variety of common patterns of abilities, 
skills and cognitive processes which have some correspond with the main 
categories my own cognitive conceptualisation of transition expertise developed 
for this dissertation. Table 1.8 identifies some of these correspondences.  
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Table 1.8 Comparison of some expertise and intelligence factors in the major career, transition and 
adjustment models that may contribute to transition skills  
Skills Career Stage models Transition Models Vocational  
Adjustment 
Models 
 Schein Bridges Elsner & 
Farrands 
Ibarra Cites, Holland 
& Others 
 Cognitive Flexibility     
Cognitive 
flexibility 
  Openness to 
personal change 
Reframing 
understanding 
 
Trying out 
new identities 
Discovering 
catalysts for 
change 
Unfreezing 
Stepping back 
 
 Inferential mechanisms     
Generative 
or 
inferential 
thinking  
Creative career anchor 
Substituting wisdom 
based on experience for 
technical skills  
Visioning 
 
Experimenting 
 
Experimenting 
Intuitive 
decisions 
 
 Personal Intelligences     
Inter-
personal 
skills        
Developing 
interpersonal and group 
skills 
Developing key 
subordinates Influencing 
broadly 
Supervisory skills 
 Relationship 
and trust 
building  
Winning 
confidence of 
others 
Developing 
contacts 
Finding role 
models  
Joining peer 
groups 
 
Intra-
personal 
skills             
Dealing with mid-life 
crisis 
Assessing implications 
for one’s career 
Accepting responsibility 
Assess one’s motives, 
talents and values 
 Self Awareness 
Reflecting on 
experience 
Intuitive 
decisions 
Making sense 
Self awareness  
Dissonance 
management 
Sense making 
 Practical Intelligence     
Problem 
analysis 
and 
solving  
 Structured 
processes 
Planning 
Goals 
Planning 
 
Compare and 
contrast 
Rigorous 
investigation 
Preparation 
Task solving 
Tasks and 
problems 
Resource 
manage-
ment  
Managerial competence 
career anchor 
  Safe support 
context 
Guiding 
figures 
Communities 
of practice 
 
 Self concept 
 Levinson’s (1978) and Super’s (1963) models also focus on changing self concept and 
identity 
From this somewhat superficial comparison, it should be apparent that, even 
though most career models do not address career development and career 
transitions in as cognitively structured a way as I intend to do in this dissertation, 
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a number of the cognitive abilities and processes are touched upon in part in 
these models.   
1.4 Evolving transition expertise and Self 
Concept 
One of the questions I hope to address in this dissertation is whether or not 
transition expertise develops and evolves over the course of a career. If it does, it 
would be consistent with many of adult developmental models. Erikson’s (1985) 
epigenic cycle clearly involves an evolution of self identify over the course of the 
life time. Super’s self concept model (1963) is based on the regular revisions of 
self identity over the course of one’s career cycle.  Career stage models such as 
Levinson’s (Levinson et al., 1978)  also reflect an evolving self concept: the 
developmental tasks for his three major transition periods focus on changes to the 
life structure and involve leaving the past behind and defining the future course 
of life. Torbert’s (Torbert & Rooke, 2005) leadership development framework 
can be viewed as an evolving self concept model that tracks progressive 
approaches to leadership issues and the development of corresponding abilities.  
Ibarra’s (2004) working identity addresses the process of changing self concept 
through Markus’ (Marcus, 1977; Marcus & Nurius, 1986; Marcus & Wurf, 1987) 
model of possible selves. Wisdom models of expert performance (Baltes & 
Staudinger, 2000; Sternberg, 2003) may provide insight into how this 
developmental process operates.  What Howard Gardner (1983) calls “the project 
of the self” utilises the personal intelligences and may have parallels with the 
development of the personal intelligences during transitions over the course of a 
career. (A more detailed discussion of self concept development in conjunction 
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with transition expertise will take place in Chapter 8.) Research questions will 
include: 
1) Do different stage transitions use different types of transition expertise? 
2) Do the skills associated with transition expertise develop over time? 
3) Does this development correspond to other adult developmental models? 
1.5 Personality structures: Contributors to the 
transitions but not used in this dissertation 
In the review transition models a further arena emerged that plays an important 
function in career transitions. This encompasses several major personality 
configurations or structures, in particular, motivation, personality resiliency and 
self belief systems. Some illustrations are listed in Table 1.9. 
Table 1.9 Comparison of some personality structure related process in career models 
 Career Stage models Transition Models Vocational and 
Adjustment 
Models 
Skills Schein Levinson Bridges Elsner & 
Farrands 
Ibarra Cites, Holland 
and others 
Motivation Career 
Anchors 
generally 
 
Career 
choices 
   Career Motives 
Vocational 
inventory 
Satisfaction 
Need to attain 
success 
Coping 
and 
Resiliency   
Stability 
career 
anchor 
 Dealing 
with fear 
Dealing with 
ambiguity 
Resiliency 
 
 Dealing with 
frustration 
Anxiety reduction 
Loss management 
Maintaining 
stable patterns 
Cognitive 
beliefs 
Career 
Anchor 
beliefs  
and 
values 
 Dealing 
with self 
doubt 
Self belief Possible 
selves 
 
Factors in all three of these areas were considered to be important contributors to 
career transitions and transition expertise. They were initially investigated and 
researched: theoretical models were reviewed, questions were formulated, 
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participants were asked about them in the data collection process, the data was 
analysed and initial discussion was written up. However the issues and outcomes 
from the research, even when limited to the cognitive factors involved with 
expertise and intelligence, soon outran the scope of this dissertation. In the end it 
was decided to not include an analysis or discussion of these further areas, 
though they may be mentioned intermittently where they are inextricably linked 
with the areas under study.  
1.6 Gender Issues  
It is necessary to discuss gender issues even though this dissertation will not 
address them as they impact on transition expertise.  The main reason for this 
decision is that the research will make the identification of general issues 
involved with transition expertise as its primary focus and draw comparisons 
across expert domains and between the beginning, middle and later stages in a 
career rather than attempting to identify how these might reflect or be influenced 
by gender issues.  The criteria for participation in the study are based primarily 
on success in career transitions rather than gender or other demographic criteria 
because of its exploratory nature. In the end fewer women took part in the study 
than men (only 6 of the 24 participants in the main study were women).  
However, gender like many other issues not examined in this study probably 
influences career development patterns and career transitions and, consequently, 
findings of this study may reflect some gender issues and biases without 
necessarily pinpointing them.  Therefore, I will take a opportunity to 
acknowledge the influence of gender issue in career transitions while not actually 
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seeking to identify in detail what they are or how they might influence career 
transitions or transition expertise. 
In the business world women have generally been more represented in service 
roles, in sectors like nursing, education, and administration as well as professions 
like publishing and media. The domains of banking and engineering, to which 
most of the participants in the business field in this study belonged, typically 
have smaller percentages of women in senior positions (Only 1 of the 8 business 
participants in the main study was a woman). However, in the music profession 
there seems to have been more room for women to play significant roles in senior 
positions (3 of the 8 music participants in the study were women). While women 
have been involved in sport for many decades they have only more recently been 
able to pursue (paying) professions in their sporting field after their performing 
career ends in the form of coaching, academic research and leadership (2 of the 8 
sports participants in the main study were women). It could be proposed (with 
some solipsism) that the proportion of women in the different fields who took 
part in this study might reflect their relative representation in senior positions in 
their fields at the point of time that this study took place.   
Occupational gender segregation (Hurst, 2007) in which gender differentiates the 
kind of work and the roles of women in professions is a well-known 
phenomenon, though this has been changing over the last few decades as 
evolving social values, human rights developments and accesses to higher 
education have enabled women to aspire to and attain roles in occupations 
formerly closed to them. Educationally, the cadre of women to which most 
individuals in this study belonged would have pursued higher education in the 
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1970’s and 80’s when increasingly higher proportions of women entered 
professional education programmes during this period: only 5% of first-year 
students in professional programs were female in 1965, but by 1985 for example, 
there were 40% in law and medicine and 30% in dentistry and business schools 
(Goldin & Katz, 2001).   
The existence of a ‘glass ceiling’ in which highly qualified women are blocked 
from achieving hierarchical positions equal to their male peers due to cultural 
issues and gender discrimination remains very much in evidence in the business 
arena to this date and has been well documented (Cotter, et al., 2001). Gender 
discrimination is still evidenced by men in positions of power in the job economy 
in which their preference for working with other men as peers because they share 
similar characteristics will incline men in positions of power to hire or promote 
other men rather than women (Massey, 2007).  More relevantly for this study, 
gender inequality is often embedded within social hierarchies and culture as well 
as in perceptions of competence and expertise. This affects how women and men 
are perceived in leadership roles and may in turn affect how they are judged to 
have performed during transitions. Generally women are less likely to be 
promoted than males and when promoted they actually have stronger 
performance ratings than males. Women demonstrating expertise equal to that of 
male colleagues can still be viewed as less able than men and different levels of 
abilities ascribed to females when compared to males may be due to selective 
gender-based bias (Ridgeway, 2001). Nor is this attributed lack of skills the only 
reason why women are not deemed worthy of leadership roles.  Women's 
achievements can be attributed to luck or effort rather than ability or skill 
(Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 2004) and consequently devalued. At best, women 
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possessing expertise are simply not viewed as positively as males with 
commensurate abilities (Lyness & Thompson, 1997).
 
At its most perverse, traits 
considered to be positive in males may be viewed negatively in women (Thomas-
Hunt & Phillips, 2004).  It seems, furthermore, that performance ratings are more 
strongly connected to promotions for women than men suggesting biases for 
promotion of men due to factors other than their abilities or performance (Lyness 
& Heilman, 2006).   
1.7 Concluding discussion 
Hopefully, the breadth of factors that might influence career transitions will have 
been made clear in the foregoing review. It should also be clear, consequently, 
why this study will focus on a more narrow range of issues involved with the 
managing of transitions from one career stage to the next. A basic career stage 
model and transition process model will be used as the framework within which 
to study career transitions. The largely cognitive abilities and processes that 
make up transition expertise and enable successful transitions and which will be 
the main focus of this dissertation as presented in Chapters 4 through 7 are: 1) 
generalising expert knowledge and processes and developing cognitive flexibility 
to adapt and apply expert knowledge and processes across domains, 2) using 
inferential intelligence to build bridges between cognitive structures, 3) using 
intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence to help manage transitions, and 4) 
applying expert knowledge and processes in practical ways to resolve problems 
and manage resources in transitions. At the end of this dissertation a further 
discussion of how the development of transition expertise over the course of a 
career may parallel or contribute to the development of self concept and possibly 
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wisdom will be taken up in Chapter 8 and will complete the areas under study in 
this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2. Methodology  
2.1. Qualitative research 
The study of transition expertise in this dissertation will be use qualitative 
research methodology.  Denzin and Lincoln, doyens of qualitative research, 
describe it as “the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials  
case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, 
observational, historical, interactional and visual texts   that describe routine 
and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives” Claude Levi-
Strauss (1962) used the term bricoleur to characterise the job of a qualitative 
researcher as someone who works with their hands to build something from 
whatever materials are available to construct a finished product. Symbolic 
interactionism “recognises that the genuine mark of an empirical science is to 
respect the nature of its empirical world – to fit its problems, it guiding 
conceptions, its procedures of inquiry, its techniques of study, its concepts and its 
theories to that world….by the direct examination of the actual empirical world 
rather than by working with a simulation of that world, or with a preset model of 
that world” (Blumer, 1969, p 48). Glazer and Strauss (1967) bearded the 
“positivistic” research lion in its den with their iconoclastic emergent grounded 
theory which is a “process of data collection for generating theory whereby the 
analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect 
next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, p. 45). Naturalistic research maintains, similarly to grounded 
theory, that “what is salient to us is, first, no manipulation by the inquirer is 
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implied, and, second, the inquirer imposes no a priori units on the outcome" 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.8).  
Symbolic interactionism, grounded theory, and naturalistic research were the 
avant-garde leading the philosophical charge for qualitative research’s place in 
the pantheon of research methodologies. And the battle has largely been won: 
qualitative research data are recognised as  “well-grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations…..qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous findings 
and new theoretical integrations….the findings from qualitative studies have a 
quality of ‘undeniability’ (Miles & Huberman, 1984, p. 13).  
2.2. The methodology used in this thesis 
Most researchers in qualitative data bring with them a particular theoretical or 
paradigmatic bias. Blumer (1969) presented a method for engaging in enquiry as 
a “scientific act”; Miles and Huberman (1984) emphasised the importance of 
how one analyses and presents qualitative data; Sosniak (2006) focused on the 
implementation of a qualitative study; Denzin and Lincoln (2003) worked with 
the intersection of culture and theoretical perspectives. They mostly follow a 
similar sequential process with numerous correspondences (See Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 Comparisons of different qualitative research methodology stages 
Connolly 
(This study) 
Blumer Sozniak Miles and 
Huberman 
Denzin and 
Lincoln 
 a) use of a prior 
picture or 
scheme of the 
empirical world 
  
 
a) researcher as 
multicultural 
subject 
1) define the 
conceptual 
framework 
b) theoretical 
paradigms and 
perspectives 
  b) the asking of 
questions and 
conversion of 
the questions 
into problems 
 
a) choosing a 
process  
2) determine 
methodology 
 
c) determination 
of the data to be 
sought and the 
means to get the 
data 
c) research 
strategies 
3) identify the 
subjects 
b) defining a 
sample 
 c) identifying 
control/compari
son groups  4) collect the data a) data 
collection 
d) Methods of 
collection and 
analysis 
5) analyse the 
data  
d) determination 
of relationships 
between the 
data 
d) identifying 
issues of 
validity 
b) data 
reduction 
 c) data 
display 
6) interpret and 
draw conclusions 
about the data 
e) interpretation 
of the findings 
 e) the art of 
interpretation and 
presentation 
 d) conclusion 
drawing 
 
 Based upon a reviewed of these methodologies, I arrived at a 6-stage approach 
for this study which largely parallels these models while remaining relatively 
devoid of paradigmatic overtones. I will discuss each in turn. 
2.2.1 Defining the conceptual framework 
In Chapter 1 I reviewed the major approaches to careers and career transitions 
and identified common career patterns, transition processes and areas of skills 
and abilities used to manage transitions. These were listed and described in the 
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final section of that chapter and they form the career and transition frameworks 
within which I will operate in the study itself. 
2.2.2 Determining the methodology 
2.2.2.1 Use of Retrospective Interviews 
“If we want to know how people become extraordinary adults, we can start with 
some of the latter….and then try to find out how they came to do it.” (Gruber, 
1982, p. 15). When I first considered studying expertise and elite performance, 
before focussing on transition expertise in particular, I reviewed some of the 
most famous studies investigating expertise, intelligence, talent and career 
cycles.   In these and similar studies the use of retrospective interviews was the 
preferred approach for the study of such individuals. Three of the most 
significant projects in the study of gifted and expert performers have used this 
technique thereby establishing the strong pedigree of retrospective interviews as 
a qualitative research methodology in general and for a study such as the one 
which forms the basis for this dissertation. Anne Roe (The making of a scientist, 
1952) in her seminal study of eminent scientist conducted several retrospective 
interviews with her subjects. Harriet Zuckerman (Scientific Elite: Nobel 
laureates in the United States, 1977) used retrospective interviews with her 
subjects and also conducted interviews with parents, colleagues and friends to 
develop a more encompassing, ecological perspective on how expertise was a 
construction between the individuals and the domain in which they operated. 
Benjamin Bloom (Developing talent in young people, 1985) and his colleagues 
first read biographies of talented individuals, then identified and conducted pilot 
studies with a small number of participants who met their performance criteria. 
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Using these exploratory studies as a basis for their subsequent research, they 
identified individuals who had reached world-class performance levels and 
interviewed them “to get a retrospective picture of the process of talent 
development” (Bloom, 1985, p. 7). The Bloom study also interviewed parents, 
teachers and coaches.  
Studies of careers have also used retrospective interviews. Schein’s (1971, 1978) 
career cycle and career anchors models were initially derived from qualitative 
interviews conducted with MBA students and graduates as a primary source of 
data. Ibarra’s study of career transitions used retrospective interviews in which 
her opening question was “Tell me about your career to date” (Ibarra, 2004, p. 
178). She supplemented her interviews with subsequent phone conversations and 
email exchanges and, where participants were in career transitions, with what she 
called “Change in Progress” interviews. 
Lauren Sosniak, Benjamin Bloom’s main collaborator and research coordinator 
in the Development of Talent Research Project, maintains that “retrospective 
interview studies represent an imperfect but necessary method of investigation 
for this field. These studies allow us to investigate questions about expertise that 
can not be explored with other methods, and they reveal aspects of expertise that 
we would be unlikely to uncover in any other way [...] Studies concerned with 
the development of exceptional talent over time have little choice but to make 
use of retrospective interviews” (Sosniak, 2006, p. 292). Retrospective 
interviews have a strong pedigree as a valid qualitative research methodology for 
studying expertise and careers.  
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2.2.2.1.1 Approaches not used 
There are a range of approaches to collecting data from individuals, both 
qualitative and quantitative, that are utilised in research studies. All have been 
used in the different studies I will site in this project.  It is worth mentioning 
some, but by no means all, of the various methodologies that I did not use. 
 Idiographic studies involve reading about historical figures and were used 
in Blooms (1985) work on talent and Maslow’s (1968) study of self-
actualisation.  
 Interviews with parents, teachers, colleagues or others were used in 
Zuckerman’s (1977) study of Nobel Laureates.  
 Action research, phenomenological research, hermeneutics, ecological 
psychology, and other approaches were briefly investigated and discarded 
as methodologies for this study. 
 Methodologies like narratology and discourse analysis were not 
considered in the preparation of the interview format nor used in the 
analysis of the data. The methodologies of poststructuralism, semiotics, 
etc. are not addressed in the study or utilised in the analysis of the data. 
In addition, I did not use: 
 Psychodynamic tests such as the Thematic Apperception Test that was 
used by McClelland et al (1953) for studying achievement motivation and 
in Roe’s (1952) use of Rorschach in her study eminent scientists. 
 Psychometric tests that were used by Kuder (1946), Super (1963) and 
Holland (1973) for determining interests and vocations adjustment in 
studying career transitions. 
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Finally 
 I have not used controlled laboratory based experiments as cited 
throughout this study and as typified by the work of Ericsson (1995) in 
expertise, Sternberg (1985) in intelligence, Bandura (1997) in self 
efficacy, Zimmerman (2006) in self regulation, Atkinson (1964) in 
motivation, Block & Block (1980) on ego resiliency, etc. 
While most of the research studies cited in this dissertation have conducted 
important and admirable work using these and similar methods, and I have drawn 
upon their findings heavily, I have not used them for this study because I have 
explicitly chosen to use retrospective interviews as the most appropriate vehicle 
for collecting data.  This is because this study involved considerable exploratory 
investigation and, to be candid, the formulation of a specific and focussed 
theoretical hypothesis around which to build more multi-level and targeted data 
collection was not immediately forthcoming at the commencement of this 
project. I preferred to keep the investigation open and retrospective interviews 
allowed this whereas narrower hypothesis might have constrained the collection 
of data and limited the usefulness of the data that was produced. There were also 
constraints on the time of the participants as well: most were very senior people 
in their respective fields and gaining their time to engage in multiple tests or 
interview sessions would have proven difficult. Finally, I did not have the 
personal resources to utilise and analyse multiple data sets. As it was, the data 
collection, transcription and analysis was onerous. 
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2.2.2.2 Formulating the interview questions 
The main tool for data collection used in this study was a semi-structured 
interview in which the interview guide consisted of an informal "grouping of 
topics and questions that the interviewer can ask in different ways for different 
participants" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 195). The questions were theory driven 
(Patton, 1990) in that they used expertise and cognitive intelligence theories as 
the basis their enquiry but at the same time avoided narrowing down to a specific 
theoretical construct e.g., interpersonal intelligence was not conceived as an 
exclusively factor analytic (Carroll, 1993), contextual-componential (Sternberg, 
1985) or social learning (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) construct.   
The preliminary question set would: 
1. Ask the participants about their early abilities, how they acquired 
their expertise in their primary domain, and the context in which they 
acquired their expertise. 
The rest (and largest part) of the interview would consist of iterations of two sets 
of questions: 
2. How they managed their career transition e.g., from studentship to 
performer or from performer to teaching. The questions focussed on 
the continued development of their expertise, how they generalised 
their expertise from one career stage to the next, types of intelligence 
used in transitions, challenges encountered, what additional skills they 
developed, etc. The questions would also address issues of 
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motivation, self belief and self image in transitions though this data 
was not written up as part of this dissertation. 
And then: 
3. Questions about developing their expertise in next career stage or 
domain, asking similar questions as the preliminary stage. 
When the participants exhausted their memory of the transition or no new 
information was emerging, they would then be asked to discuss their next career 
transition and questions within sets 2 and 3 would be asked again. This process 
would be repeated until the interview arrived at the contemporary situation of the 
participant. Individuals would be allowed to describe their experience 
emergently, in their own language and to focus on what was important to them 
rather than follow a strict interview protocol.  The interview question guidelines 
are attached in Appendix 2. 
2.2.3 Defining the Sample and Participants in the study 
2.2.3.1 Populations for study 
It was decided to investigate transition expertise in three very different fields  
sport, music and business. All participants in the study were referred through 
contacts of the researcher in the different fields. Some of the participants of the 
study were known to the researcher on a professional basis through his previous 
work as a consultant.  None were known personally.  There were a total 30 
participants who took part in the study: 
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 Pilot Study: 6 participants took part in the pilot study  2 from each field of 
sport, music and business. 
 Main study: 24 participants took part in the main study  8 from each field of 
sport, music and business.  
Participants were selected on the basis of three primary defining characteristics: 
(a) expertise in a primary domain, (b) career progression mainly within the same 
field as the primary domain and (c) progression to leadership in their field.  
2.2.3.1.1 Expertise in primary domain  
Each participant would be recognised as having attained a high degree of 
expertise or excellence as an individual performer in their field. Musicians would 
have performed to high standards as a soloist or consort performer as recognised 
by peers and the general public. Sports people would have competed at an 
international or Olympic level or as a professional such as a Premiership football 
player.  Business people would have been high achievers in engineering, finance 
and energy trading before moving to management and leadership positions in 
their field. 
1
 
2.2.3.1.2 Progression mainly within the primary domain field 
In order to narrow the range of types of transition under study, it was decided to 
restrict the study to individuals whose career transitions took place primarily in 
the same field as their primary domain i.e. all sports people progressed to senior 
coaching levels or leadership in governing bodies associated with sports; 
                                                 
1
 The business sample was intentionally narrowed to domains where the success as an individual 
was likely to reflect Gardner’s (1983) logical/mathematical intelligence. Choosing participants 
from other fields such as advertising, architecture, law, etc. would complicate the task of 
extracting transition-specific skills from domain skills and abilities. This issue will be addressed 
at more length in Chapter 5. 
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musicians became heads of faculties or principles of music colleges; business 
people progressed to senior leadership in organisations involving expertise in 
their original domain e.g., automotive engineering or finance. Generally, 
individuals who made career transitions to different domains and fields, as was 
the case with Ibarra’s study (2004), were not include in this study, though there 
were some individuals who did make such transitions at periods in their lives 
before returning to the field of their primary domain. 
2.2.3.1.3 Progression to leadership in their field.  
The third criterion for the candidates was that they had attained senior roles 
within their field. Musicians would have attained a position as head of a faculty, 
principal or vice chancellor of an institution associated with music. Sports people 
would have become a national coach, a manager of a professional sporting club 
or CEO of a national organisation. Business people would have progressed from 
being a ‘star trader’ or engineer to senior management of a division, president or 
vice-president within a business, head of design in an engineering company, etc.   
2.2.3.2 Control  
2.2.3.2.1 Cross domain control 
 The main approach to control was to examine populations from three very 
different domains: sport, business and music each of which would have very 
different abilities, skills and training associated with expertise in their primary 
domain. Transitions in different fields might present different challenges and 
have different requirements and participants from different domains might use 
similar or different abilities in managing those transitions. 
2.2.3.2.2 Different levels of career transitions 
  
57 
 
In each domain some individuals would have progressed to more senior 
leadership roles in their field than others.  The different levels of career 
progression would provide further contrast amongst the participants. In addition 
there would be some cases where individuals failed to make important 
transitions.  Comparing individuals who attained higher levels in their field and 
comparing failed transitions with successful ones would also operate as a control. 
2.2.3.2.3 Control issues 
There was no formally constituted control group of ‘failed transitioners’ for this 
study. Individuals who repeatedly failed to make successful transitions were 
generally not willing to take part in such as study.  For reasons of scope as 
mentioned earlier individuals who had made transitions to other fields e.g., into 
business after a sporting career, were not included in this study.  The population 
consisted of 23 male (77%) and 7 female (23%) participants. But generally 
demographics were not the focus of this study so there were no specific 
parameters established to control for sex, family background, education, 
social/economic factors, etc.  
2.2.4 Data collection 
2.2.4.1 Interviewing structure 
The interviews all lasted between 1 hour 45 minutes and 2 hours except for two 
interviews that lasted approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes because they were 
interrupted half way through and recommenced at a subsequent date. All 
interviews were recorded. All participants took part in the study willingly. All 
interviews took place privately in a variety of settings depending up availability 
and location of the participants. Before interviews commenced, participants were 
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informed about the nature of the study, assured of anonymity and ethical 
consideration and gave their permission for their information in this dissertation. 
They were provided with a copy of an ethical permission form, read it and signed 
it (Appendix 1).   
2.2.4.2 The interviewing process 
The interview question protocol was used to assure that the main areas of interest 
for the study were addressed and that the focus remained on career transitions 
rather than career stages The interviewer interventions, interruptions or further 
questions in addition to those in the interview protocol could take several forms: 
(a) to repeat or summarise an understanding of what the interviewee had been 
saying for purposes of clarification to which the interviewee was invited to agree, 
correct or elaborate upon; (b) to ask specific questions about skills, abilities, 
processes, etc. that were developed or used during transitions and how these were 
felt to have operated in making transitions; and  (c) to ask questions which 
encouraged interviewees to add anything they had left out of their input before 
moving on to the next stage. No notes would be collected on observations about 
the individuals or their behaviour during the interview as this would have 
distracted the interviewer from engaging fully with the participants and might 
have reduced the sensitivity and timing of interventions.  
2.2.5 Analysing the data 
Importantly, not all approaches to qualitative research decline − as do the 
grounded theorists or the naturalistic researchers − to utilise a priori principles or 
theories: “What distinguishes the discussion of theory in much of the literature 
on qualitative methods is the emphasis on inductive strategies of theory 
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development in contrast to theory generated by logical deduction from a priori 
assumptions” (Patton, 1990, p 66.). Patton calls this latter approach Orientational 
Qualitative Inquiry which he considers to be a more neutral term than 
ideologically based inquiry.  It constitutes a broad umbrella of qualitative 
research under which one can undertake an inquiry from almost any  theoretical 
perspective: expertise, intelligence, feminist, Marxist, Capitalist, Freudian, 
Maslowian or any other perspective in which theory informs the way that the 
study is constructed and the data identified, organised and analysed. Some of 
these perspectives e.g. Marxist and feminist will often be indicative of a critical 
theory approach which will not be used in this study.  But regardless of their 
philosophical stance almost all “qualitative methods consist of three kinds of data 
collection: (1) in-depth, open-ended interviews; (2) direct observation; and (3) 
written documents” (Patton, 1990, p. 10) and it is the first methodology – open-
ended retrospective interviews − that formed the basis for collecting data in this 
study.  “What is required is that the researcher be very clear about the 
theoretical framework being used and the implications of that perspective on 
study focus, data collection, fieldwork and analysis (Patton, 1990, p. 87, italics in 
original).    
2.2.5.1 Content Analysis: Coding the data 
All interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder and transcribed by 
professional transcriptionists.  These transcriptions were then reviewed by the 
author while listening simultaneously to the recordings so that mis-typing, gaps, 
unintelligible statements could be identified and rectified. There was almost no 
lost data.  Hesitation pauses, clearing of voice, “’ums, errs, ahs” were noted in 
the transcriptions but were not utilised for any purpose in the analysis of the data.  
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Content analysis was the major approach used for analysing the data. Content 
analysis is a “general term covering a variety of methods for analysing a 
discourse, message or document for varying themes, ideas, emotions, opinions, 
etc. Most of such analysis consists of sophisticated counting schemes in which 
the frequency of particular words, phrases, affective expressions and the like are 
determined” (Rhianon, Reber & Reber, 2009, p. 9).  Ochse, a highly regarded 
researcher in expertise and creativity, says that “quantitative research may give 
an impression of exactitude, especially where complicated mathematical 
strategies are employed to control or correct possible errors of measurement.  But 
insistence on quantification may be dangerous.  It may force researchers to 
measure inappropriate quantifiable artificial substitutes instead of the real 
variables of interest. In other word, it may engender invalid operational 
definitions” (Ochse, 1999, p. 45, italics added). One of the challenges of this 
study has been to be clear about what my operational definitions are.  It is for this 
reason that the study, though qualitative, has been a theoretically informed study 
so that what was measured was at least measured against existing operational 
definitions. Where the study is perhaps innovative or stretching the boundaries of 
existing knowledge in the whole field of excellence on the one hand and career 
transition on the other is in its attempt to see how operational definitions 
emerging out of different fields of study like intelligence and expertise are of use 
in identifying or capturing information or perhaps being validated further through 
usefulness as models into which  the self reports of the individuals who were 
studied could be easily fit.   
The analysis of the content of the interviews used the software programme 
NVivo 8, a well-regarded computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
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(CAQDAS) (Gibbs, 2002).  In NVivo a system of “Trees and Nodes” can be set 
up before coding the data to represent the main theoretical categories being used 
in the study. Nodes are base level categories into which statements which reflect 
a particular skill  like use of analogy or intrapersonal awareness  can be 
collected. Trees are sets of hierarchically organised related nodes. For example, 
‘use of analogy’ might be a node under a branch called ‘inferential intelligence’ 
of a tree called ‘intelligence’ which would be a main theoretical category. New 
nodes could be created during the coding if new patterns emerge during the 
analysis.  
Data could be represented in a number of ways: 
 The total number of statements coded under a node could be counted to 
indicate the varying use of skills and abilities used during transitions. 
 The number of times each individual participant described a behaviour 
associated with a node could be counted and extracted. 
 Statements could also be organised and counted by domains of participants 
allowing comparison across domains e.g., how often sports people 
generalised expert knowledge compared to musicians. 
 Matrices could be generated e.g., statements that were indicative of both 
interpersonal intelligence and external resource utilisation could be 
identified. 
Appendix 3 maps the coding hierarchy of trees, branches and nodes.  
Appendix 3 maps the coding hierarchy of trees, branches and nodes.  
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2.2.6 Data display 
The data will be displayed in a number of ways. 
 Verbatim quotations extracted from the interviews were used regularly and 
typically several statements from the data will be used as illustrations of a 
particular aspect of transition expertise.  
 Tables will be used to present the references from the entire population and 
sub-populations indicative of different aspects of transition expertise. 
 Matrices will be used to represent comparisons across domains, interactions 
between different aspects of transition expertise, transition expertise at 
different career transitions, etc. 
Each quotation by a participant was assigned a reference and anonymity of the 
participants was protected A typical reference at the end of a statement by 
participant might be (MUS R3 Robert).  
The reference at the end of the quotation consists of several elements. 1) The 
field/domain (MUS-Music, SPT-Sport-, BSN-Business). 2) The assigned name. 
Sports people were given names beginning with the letter A-H, business people 
J-P and musicians R-Z. 3) In addition a text reference e.g., (R3) was assigned to 
each quotation in case there was a need to find that particular quotation in the 
data. All references to specific individuals, institutions, businesses, organisations, 
etc. were substituted with a generic category e.g., {business}, {colleague} or 
{university}. For example: 
As with everything that I’ve ever done is, I’ve stepped back and said ‘What was 
the goal? How do you do that? And what could happen along the way?’ (SPT 
R3 Claire) 
  
63 
 
Or  
I suddenly thought: “I can do that” and I had visited {college} before so I could 
picture in mind what needed to be done. (MUS R5 Richard) 
2.2.7 Interpretation and conclusion drawing  
The process of interpretation and conclusion drawing will form the main body of 
the dissertation and be presented in Chapters 4-8.  
2.3 Validity 
Dingwall (1992) maintains that the substance of the research, the role of the 
observer, the nature of the interpretation, the audience of the final product and 
ultimately the interpretive style all contribute to how one validates qualitative 
research. Hammersley (1992, p. 62) identifies four general criteria for the quality 
of ethnographic/qualitative research: plausibility, credibility, relevance and 
importance of topic. I believe that my approach to the study of transition 
expertise will meet a number of these foregoing criteria even if it does not meet 
all of the ‘positivistic’ criteria for validity.  
2.3.1 Validity 
The methodology of this study will not meet all the validity criteria of the 
nineteenth century, positivistic models of the physical sciences whereby “actual 
or real events in the world are explained in a deductive fashion by universal laws 
that assert definite and unproblematic relationships.  [However,] how a 
researcher accounts for his or her approach to certain aspects of research, 
including the routine source of problems, is key for evaluating the work 
substantively and methodologically” (Altheide & Johnson, 1998, pp. 287, 295).  
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2.3.1.1Participant feedback 
 The scope and time frame of this project has not allowed for the analysis and 
write-up of the data to be subject to member-checks in the form of participant 
feedback or respondent validation in which the interpretation and report could be 
given to members of the sample in order to check its authenticity. There are plans 
to conduct a follow-up debriefing on the findings in the form of mixed focus 
groups of 6-8 participants in which they are given feedback on the outcomes, 
engage in a focussed discussion of the findings and comment on the validity of 
interpretation. These outputs would be subject to further analysis. 
2.3.1.2 Cross examiner data validity. 
Many studies employ a number of individuals to conduct interviews and code 
data. For these studies, cross-personal validity is essential for consistency of 
coding. Because of the exploratory nature of the study and its being conducted 
solely by myself, it was not readily feasible to ‘educate’ another individual in the 
theoretical and coding criteria in order for them to review the same data for 
cross-coding validity.  Because there were not a specific set of questions closed 
questions with succinct answers, it would have proved difficult to conduct this 
kind of validation. 
2.3.1.3 Confirmability and transferability 
In terms of confirmability it is hoped that this study will form the basis of further 
studies using a variety of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in the near 
future.  Equally the transferability of these findings to settings other than the one 
in which they have been made would seem to bear the seeds of numerous 
applications for further research. 
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2.3.2 The self-reflexive nature of content analysis 
My experience of career transitions will have influenced my own role in 
interpreting the data.  There are three ways in which I think this influence might 
operate. 
1) Previous coaching experience bias. One of the objectives mentioned in the 
preface of this dissertation was to understand better the phenomenon of 
transition expertise in order to be able to coach people in transitions more 
effectively. While I had had experience in coaching individuals in transition, 
I had become less certain as to why some individuals were more successful 
than others in making transitions.  Consequently, I do not think that this 
experience influenced or biased me or my approach. On the contrary it made 
me open to what might emerge. 
2) Personal transition experience bias. A candid reflection on my own 
experience in career transitions would lead me to believe that I myself am not 
as expert in transition expertise as many of the participants in this study: my 
failure to make transitions to the most senior levels in my field may have 
been “in the back of my mind” when undertaking this study.  But a self-
reflective review leads me to conclude that I was not engaging in this study 
as a compensatory process for any lack of success in my own career 
transitions. What could be said is that, having stepped back from working in 
large organisational operations, my motivation was to understand what 
contributed to successful career transitions in order to coach individuals and 
to provide consultancy to organisations rather than to understand how I might 
make further career transitions. 
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3)  Theoretical bias. I no doubt have theoretical biases which informed the 
nature of this study.  I suspect that I am no different than 98% of most 
researches who have chosen certain theoretical contexts within which to 
conduct their research. Experience in the study of social psychology, 
performance psychology and cognitive psychology will have influenced my 
approach.   
However, in spite of these apparent implicit influences, I think that the findings 
of the study will remain relatively free from bias.  Firstly, at the time of 
undertaking this study I had a MA in psychology and had been a practicing 
psychologist for a number of years. I had been trained in basic interviewing and 
questioning skills including: Rogerian (Rogers, 1951), Gestalt Therapy (Polster 
& Polster, 1974), Critical Incident Theory (Gremler, 2004) and Repertory Grid 
(Fransella, 2005) techniques. This training and experience contributed, I hope, to 
some degree of impartiality in my interviewing technique and data analysis.  
Furthermore, while I brought some hypotheses to the interviews concerning the 
major theories I was investigating as to how they might explain transition 
expertise, these hypotheses were contradicted as often as confirmed in the data 
from the study. For example (previewing some of the findings of the study which 
will be discussed at length in the ensuing chapters) I had assumed that 
intrapersonal psychology would play a central role in transition expertise 
throughout a career: this was not borne out by the data. I had started with a 
strong bias towards using a modular and trait conceptualisation of intelligence as 
most clearly captured in Howard Gardner’s (1983) Multiple Intelligence 
framework: however, most of the research focus and data analysis moved away 
from this approach and towards cognitive and developmental models of 
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intelligence and expertise. Having written a master’s degree thesis and books on 
the use of self-regulatory processes in performance enhancement, I had assumed 
that these would also play a key role in transition expertise: as the analysis of the 
outcomes of the study will indicate, this assumption was not borne out. I also had 
a strong resonance with self-actualising models of human development as 
presented in the theories of  Maslow’s (1968) and Rogers’ (1951):  though the 
findings of the study tended to validate the importance of intrinsic motivation 
and self-actualisation as key determinants of career choices, in the end this field 
of motivation was excluded from the study. For these and other reasons, I think it 
is fair to say that for the most part I did not let my own theoretical 
predispositions and beliefs bias my data collecting process. Nor were theoretical 
biases embedded in the findings: I believe the data was subject to a fair scrutiny. 
2.4 Two studies: Pilot and Main study 
Because of the scope of the study, it was decided to run a pilot study in order to 
gauge the suitability of the theoretical models for understanding transition 
expertise, to refine the questioning protocol and to practice the interviewing 
process. The outcomes of the pilot, how they shaped the final form of the main 
study and modifications to the methodology in the main study will be reviewed 
in the following Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 The Pilot and Main 
Study Methods  
When this project was originally developed, the intention was to carry it out as a 
single study. However, as the complexity of the issues emerged first in the 
review career cycles and transitions and then when reviewing the theory on 
intelligence and expertise, it became clear that a pilot would help refine both the 
methodology and theoretical focus of the main study. Firstly, I had not subjected 
many of the issues encountered in the review of the literature or through my 
previous experience to any kind of systematic investigation. A pilot and the 
analysis of its data would enable me to understand better the concepts and their 
operationalisation in careers. Secondly, a pilot would enable me to practice my 
interviewing technique. It would also enable me assess how effective I was at 
eliciting useful data from the participants. Thirdly, the pilot would provide an 
opportunity to revise the questions and interview protocol and to assess the 
accuracy of the coding of the data. Finally, the pilot would enable me to 
determine if I attained the right focus of the theoretical models or if I had 
overemphasised some and neglected others.  While disconfirmation of theory can 
be useful, I wanted to make certain that both confirmation and disconfirmation of 
theory would be based upon as systematic and accurate an elicitation of 
information from the participants as was possible.  
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3.1 The pilot study 
3.1.1 Setting up the pilot 
3.1.1.1 Pilot Study Sample 
There were 6 participants in the pilot study  2 musicians, 2 sports people and 2 
business people  drawn from the same population as described in the previous 
chapter on methodology. They all met criteria of the study.  
3.1.1.2 Outcomes from Pilot 
I will not engage in a detailed analysis of the data of the pilot study  though it is 
of interest, it parallels the data of the main study and all relevant issues will be 
addressed in Chapters 4-7 when reviewing the data of the main study. In this 
chapter I will, however: 
 Identify several inadequacies of the pilot interviewing and coding 
processes that could be modified for the main study.  These changes will 
be discussed more fully in the second half of this chapter addressing the 
main study method. 
 Note further theoretical issues that emerged in the pilot which helped 
redirect some of the subsequent theoretical research and also target the 
main study interviews to elicit the data which will be discussed in the 
ensuing chapters. 
3.1.2 Career and transition models 
The Career Stage, Stage Transition and Transition Process models used as the 
basis for categorising the statements of the participants were refined following 
the pilot. Fuller discussion of these models will be taken up in Chapter 8 and 9. 
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Here, I will only note briefly any revisions to the models that were used in 
collecting and analysing the data  
3.1.2.1 Career Stage Model 
Following my preliminary analysis of career theories I had concluded that there 
would be five career stages in a typical career cycle and that these five stages 
could be used across different domains to differentiate levels of responsibility, 
changes in scope and new expert knowledge and skills required for a the new 
stage. However, the pilot clearly indicated the need for six stages as the original 
fourth stage which proved inadequate for encompassing the range of transitions 
that took place during this period of a career. Consequently, I introduced a new 
stage 5) Divisional lead, department head or strategic lead between 4) Head of 
faculty, head coach, or head of a business unit and 6) Organisational Leader. 
1. Studentship.  Age 5-24. Before any of the individuals in this study 
embarked upon a career they engaged in study and the acquisition of 
expert skills that they would use in their subsequent professional career. 
2:  Performer.  Age 16 to 30. At this stage all of the participants were 
beginning their professional careers, further developing domain expertise 
and also managing their professional life.  
3. Coach/Manager/Professor. Age 26-35. This transition took place at 
varying ages but was marked by a move into managing and directing the 
performance of others.   
4. Head of faculty, head coach, or head of a business unit.  Age 30 to 45. 
At this career stage individuals began to head larger departments within 
their field. 
5. Divisional lead, department head or strategic lead.  Age 35-50. This 
stage involves senior executive roles within an organisation.  
6. Organisational Leader. Age 50 – 65.  This final career stage involves 
becoming a senior vice president or CEO of an organisation. 
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3.1.2.2 Stage Transition 
Between each Career Stages was a Stage Transition. The Stage Transitions are 
the part of the Career Cycle that are the major focus of this study. They are listed 
below including the new transition between Career Stages 5 and 6. 
First Stage Transition: From Student to Performer 
Second Stage Transition: From Performer to Coach, Professor or 
Manager 
Third Stage Transition: From Coach, Manager, Professor to 
Department Head 
Fourth Stage Transition: From Department Head to Division Lead    
Fifth Stage Transition: From Division Head to Organisation Leader 
3.1.2.3 The transition process model 
A Transition Process model discussed in Chapter 1 consisted of three steps as 
indicated in in Figure 3.1. 
1. Leaving 
2. Transitioning 
 
3. Reintegrating 
 
Figure 3.1 Transition Process Steps 
These steps proved adequate for tracking the transition process.  However, it was 
clear from the pilot interviews that most of the participants’ transition processes 
were concerned with transitioning and reintegrating. Most of the skills and 
abilities that make up Transition Expertise were used in the latter two stages. 
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Breaking down the transition process into further sub-stages seemed an artificial 
process at this point in the study and not particularly productive. 
3.1.3 The interview process 
The most important challenge faced in the interviews was keeping the 
participants focused on career transitions rather than career stages and on the 
particular areas of behaviour as characterised by the theoretical models under 
consideration. 
 Participants were very interested in telling their “career story,” usually 
sequentially and in their own way. One of the challenges was for the 
interviewer to keep the individual focussed on the transitions in their 
carer rather than the stable career stages.  
 Even when the interviewer tried to focus questions specifically on 
transitions, participants tended to confound transitions with more general 
discussion on developing their expertise and getting on with their careers. 
 Progressing through the list of questions in a sequential, structured way 
interrupted the flow of the participants and produced less useful data. 
 Generally, the list of questions was too long and too full of technical 
language which did not always convey the intent of the question to the 
participants.   
 The questions about certain theoretical fields – self regulation for 
example – did not elicit very much response and seemed somehow 
inadequately formulated for generating useful data.  
 Generally (as the interviewer) I felt I was falling between two stools: the 
interviews were not structured enough to generate standardised data 
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which might be analysed more quantitatively and not open enough to 
generate information rich qualitative data. 
Revisions to the interview process in response to these challenges will be 
discussed shortly in the second half of this chapter. 
3.1.4 Coding  
3.1.4.1 Latent content analysis 
When first coding the pilot study data using content analysis it became clear that 
relying primarily on manifest content analysis would be inadequate. Manifest 
content analysis identifies the explicit or apparent elements of a text such as 
words or phrases which can be considered to represent the existence of a 
particular phenomenon in the experience of the interviewee (Gottschalk, 1995). 
Using this process with the interview data did not yield very useful information 
and it was necessary to rely primarily on latent content analysis which looks 
beyond specific words or phrases to identify the underlying message of the text. 
Utilising both methods results in a more interpretive approach which has been 
called thematic analysis (Gottschalk, 1995; Smith et al, 1992) which formed the 
approach used to analyse the content of the interviews for coding purposes.   
3.1.4.2 Duplication 
A large number of statements could be coded under a variety of codes.  For 
example, a statement about spending time to plan in advance for a meeting with 
new team members after a career move could be coded as interpersonal 
intelligence, resource management and analytical intelligence. Where possible, 
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duplication was reduced by forcing some of the data into one category or 
another. Still in many cases data was coded under several categories. 
3.1.4.3 Differentiation 
Reducing replication was often achieved through carefully reviewing the context 
in which statements were made. An important typical example was the need to 
differentiate the generalisation of expert processes from that of expert 
knowledge.  The process of differentiating the statements proved very educative. 
3.1.5 Theoretical issues arising from the pilot 
In the analysis of the data from the pilot, several issues involving the 
operationalisation of theory in ‘real life’ had been inadequately addressed in the 
interviewing process. But equally importantly, the effort to resolve the 
methodological questions resulted in the elucidation of the theoretical concepts 
through the constant referencing back to the literature in order to understand 
better what the participants in the study were actually describing so as to code the 
statements more accurately. 
The following theoretical issues arising from the Pilot Study produced some 
changes in the questions and coding structure. 
3.1.5.1 Personal Intelligence  
The overlapping of models of personal, social and emotional intelligences made 
for some confusion which required clarification, particularly when different 
theorists were essentially talking about the same thing or when they used the 
same terminology to mean very different things. In the analysis of the data, a 
number of different subcategories of both intrapersonal and interpersonal 
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intelligence were identified but these were not captured in the coding itself. For 
example the category of self awareness might include statements concerning self 
identity issues, self assessment, or self regulation. However, these were noted 
and their implications addressed in the discussion of the data.  
3.1.5.2 Practical Intelligence 
Practical intelligence proved awkward. Until the data had been fully transcribed 
and coding had taken place, it had proved difficult to differentiate the main 
components of practical intelligence. In addition, analytical intelligence was 
strongly linked to problem solving. In the end, practical intelligence’s 
complicatedness was simplified for purposes of coding and analysis by dividing 
it into three areas: problems solving, administration and resource utilisation.   
3.1.5.3 Expert knowledge and processes 
Expert knowledge and processes are intertwined: the one depends upon the other 
and visa versa. Yet it was felt important to differentiate when individuals were 
generalising a particular type of knowledge e.g., about ball control from 
performing to coaching vs. generalising a process e.g., from how one plans one’s 
performing career to how one organises a faculty of music.  
3.1.5.4 Generalisation of expertise 
I had to reorganise the coding to account for different factors that influenced the 
generalisability of expertise. 
1. Though I had not intended to investigate how the way in which expertise 
was acquire might influence expert generalisability, participants all 
wanted to talk about their early development as an expert and significant 
amounts of data emerged concerning how they acquired their primary 
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domain expertise.  In the end the data was coded so that some conclusions 
could be drawn about the how acquisition of expertise might influence its 
gerealisability.  
2. After the pilot, I decided to differentiate the coding of expert knowledge 
from expert processes.  The two were distinct, though intertwined, and 
they seemed to be different in how they did or did not transfer across 
domains. 
3. Increased theoretical research after the pilot helped clarify the nature of 
cognitive flexibility as a key contributor to expert generalisability.  This 
was subsequently coded as were some of its manifestations in the form of 
non-reductive bias or non-automaticity to help understand better how 
cognitive flexibility operated to enable expert generalisability. 
3.1.5.5 Under-representation of theory 
Some areas that were hypothesised to contribute to transition expertise were 
under-represented in the data.  For example, both metacognition and self 
regulation produced less instances than had been anticipated. This may have been 
due to the structure of the questions or the interviewing process itself. Or maybe 
they operated largely as tacit knowledge and participants simply couldn’t 
verbalise engaging in self regulatory or metacognitive monitoring processes. But 
it might also be the case that these intelligences and expert processes that had 
been hypothesised to contribute to transition expertise did not substantially do so. 
Though I initially considered dropping self regulation and metacognition from 
the study, I decided subsequently that it was important to keep these models in 
the study to consider whether they were or were not major factors in transition 
expertise. 
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3.1.6 Summary of benefits from conducting a pilot 
The pilot study proved invaluable for refining the interview protocol, improving 
interviewing skills, clarifying the application of theoretical models to both 
interviewing and analysing the data, and refining the coding process. While these 
changes discussed in this chapter helped refine the methodology for the 
dissertation as a whole, the method itself was not significantly changed. Rather it 
was refined and made more ‘fit for purpose’ for the study of transition expertise. 
3.2 The main study  
3.2.1 Main study sample 
The Main Study population was drawn from the same population as described in 
Chapter 2 and as took part in the Pilot Study. There were 8 musicians, 8 sports 
people and 8 business people.  
3.2.2 Interviews 
The general structure of the interview protocol was maintained but it was 
modified to reflect the learning from the Pilot Study. The opportunity for the 
interviewer to probe was expanded and samples probes were included in the 
questioning protocol since extended probing is one of the main benefits of semi-
structured interviews (Boyatzis, 1998; Berg, 2004). There was also some shift in 
the content emphasis (Gottschalk, 1995) as discussed in the theoretical 
implications above. 
3.2.2.1 Revised Interview Protocol 
Having tried to ‘force’ the interview process down the structured interview 
protocol in the pilot, the interview approach was modified to follow the narrative 
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of the individual as they composed it and to use questions and interventions to 
investigate their narrative further or steer them toward the areas of interest for the 
study rather than to impose a rigid structure, sequence of questions or timetable 
which the interviewees were compelled to follow. As Roe explains: “I let him go 
ahead and give this to me as fully as he wished, and asked questions only when 
necessary to clarify a point or to remind him of something he had omitted” (Roe, 
1952, p. 33). Consequently, the method of the Main Study evolved from the 
more structured approach of the pilot to a semi-structured process and in some 
cases utilised a quasi-unstructured approach to generate useful data (Lindlof & 
Taylor, 2002). This meant that:  
 The interview protocol was perceived as a general guide and the question 
outline was not always followed in their written sequence.  
 The time dedicated to each question or area of the overall interview varied 
from participant to participant due to the way in which the data emerged 
unevenly from the interviewing process and according to what they stressed 
as important.   
 Participants were allowed to start at the beginning of their career and to then 
progress through the stages of their total career as it unfolded over time. 
Questions were interjected as expeditiously as possible to maintain the focus 
on transitions.   
 If a participant spent more time discussing one transition, this was considered 
to be indicative of that transition’s importance for understanding the nature of 
their transition expertise.  
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 Probes would be used more frequently. They might take the form of “Tell me 
more” or “Could you be more specific?” or “In what way?”  The probes 
could also include more targeted questions derived from some of the 
theoretical models e.g., “Was this way of dealing with the challenge planned 
or more spontaneous?” Where such a probe provoked a relatively minimal or 
non-informative response e.g., “I don’t know, I just did” then a second or 
third probe would be asked e.g., “Did you set goals to achieve an objective 
within a certain time?” If probes continued to produce sparse information, the 
line of questioning was discontinued. 
 The interviewer periodically interject ‘uh-huh’ or ‘hmm’ in order to 
encourage the respondent to go deeper into their experiences.   
 Throughout the interview, the interviewer still maintained a clear objective of 
progressing systematically through the interview process and collecting data 
across all dimensions of the interview protocol.  
3.2.3 Coding 
3.2.3.1 Cleaning the data 
The first completed coding resulted in excessive and sometimes inaccurate 
coding.  When all coding was finished I had attained a substantially better 
understanding of the theory as well as a better knowledge of the data, what it was 
‘saying’ and the coding structure itself. As consequence, when the coding was 
then reviewed, approximately 20% of the preliminary codings were eliminated as 
weak or wrong.  Subsequently, in the process of analysing the data in light of the 
theory and beginning to draw conclusions about the data, there were again a 
number of data which were not clear enough illustrations of the theoretical point 
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so as to be retained or even more importantly which needed to be recoded under 
a different category. This eliminated approximately another 10% of the codings 
and also resulted in at least 10% recoding to another category. In total, the 
process of cleaning and refining the coding resulted in the elimination of 
approximately 35% of the original codings and the recoding of approximately 
20% of the items. 
3.2.3.2 Changes in coding structure 
As the analysis of the data progressed, there were some modifications in coding 
categories, in vivo. Most of these changes were simply reorganising the trees, 
branches and nodes so that they were more logically and tightly grouped. Some 
nodes were incorporated into others and some that were subsumed under others. 
Some branches were collapsed.  However, most of these modifications took 
place between the Pilot and the Main Study where some coding nodes were 
eliminated completely and other new coding nodes introduced.    
3.3 Conclusion discussion 
While the theoretical and methodological approaches for the pilot and the main 
study were largely similar, the pilot proved extremely useful for refining most 
aspects of the methodology of the main study and clarifying a number of 
theoretical issues. Based upon the foregoing refinements in research 
methodology, the collection, coding and analysis of the data of the Main Study 
was conducted and the data that produced was considered to be satisfactory and 
valuable. The next part of this dissertation will now present the main theories of 
the areas under study and the findings of the data in light of these theories as they 
help explain the nature of transition expertise. 
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Chapter 4. Expertise and Expertise 
Generalisability  
Introduction 
Expertise largely consists of the learned knowledge and processes that enable an 
individual to perform in a given domain. The effectiveness in retrieving domain-
related knowledge and using expert processes for performing in a domain will 
further determine the degree of expertise in a particular domain. This chapter is 
divided into three parts. The first part will review some of the major theoretical 
approaches to the study of expertise and important accompanying theoretical 
issues like memory, practice and life-span development.  The theoretical 
discussion will then address issues which concern the generalisability of 
expertise such as cognitive flexibility, domain specificity, and generalisation of 
knowledge and processes. It will also review some of the major impediments to 
expert transitions like functional fixedness, reductive bias, and automatisation 
and how these might be overcome. The second part of this chapter will review 
the data in light of three questions:  How much does the way expertise is 
acquired at an early stage influence its generalisability?  How effectively were 
the participants in the study able to generalise their expert knowledge and 
processes? How cognitively flexible were the participants in circumventing 
cognitive impediments during transitions? The third part of this chapter will 
briefly summarise the conclusions.  
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4.1 Expertise theory 
4.1.1Theories of expertise 
4.1.1.1  A prologue: Information processing models 
To understand the workings of expertise a brief prologue is necessary. 
Information processing models emerged in conjunction with the search for a 
workable model for mental representations in cognitive psychology. Together 
they formed the basis for most expertise theories. Colin Cherry (1953) and David 
Broadbent (1954) developed information processing models in which human 
cognitive processes were viewed as analogous to the operation of computer 
programmes based upon Broadbent’s engineering models and process flow 
diagrams: taking inputs, processing the information, and transforming it into 
outputs.  Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956) proposed that behaviour could be 
explained through the execution of “strategies” which consist of long strings of 
logic or chains of actions in human cognition that are developed over multiple 
trials and refined through feedback on results rather than in response to a 
particular stimulus/response situation. Miller, Galanter and Pribram suggested 
that human cognition could be thought of as a symbol manipulation process in 
which plans operate like computer programmes as a “hierarchical process in the 
organism that can control the order in which a sequence of operations is to be 
performed” (1960, p. 16). Executive programmes could control lower order 
subroutines thereby structuring complex problem solving activities. Their 
collaboration is perhaps most well known for their TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-
Exit) model. Intellectual adaptability and development occurs as plans become 
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more horizontally elongated, vertically elaborated, numerous and efficient 
(Sternberg, 1982).   
Newell and Simon’s (1972) General Problem Solving (GPS) used production 
systems to explain problem solving and decision making processes. Production 
systems consist of a sequence of ordered productions of condition-action 
sequences. An executive is hypothesised to make its way down a list of 
productions and when certain conditions are met, then certain actions are 
performed through use of heuristic searches in which knowledge is represented 
as operating through a series of execution tasks involving production rules 
formulated in a sequence of:  “IF… a pattern exists….THEN….an action 
follows.” The process is repeated until it has worked through the list of 
productions and a problem is resolved. Subsequent models were developed for 
self-modifying production systems in which rules enabled “productions to modify 
other productions” (Waterman, 1975; Langley, 1984). Under the right 
circumstance unsuccessful problems solving strategies can be abandoned or 
modified to enable searches in new directions (Newell et al., 1962).  Different 
mechanisms produce these modifications such as strengthening and 
discriminating mechanisms which tend to reinforce more specific productions 
and generalisation mechanisms which weaken the specific conditions that 
activate a production (Klahr & Wallace, 1976) and allow productions to be 
executed under a wider range of circumstances (Anderson, Kline, & Beasley, 
1976). Production systems were developed over time into sophisticated models 
of learning and development (Klahr, Langley & Neches, 1984). Production 
systems that use self-modifying rules have been applied to solving algebra 
problems, puzzle solving, concept learning, schema abstraction, language 
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acquisition, and other  learning situations (for an overview of this research see 
Langley, Neches, Neves and Anzai, 1981).   
4.1.1.2 General theory of expertise 
Most contemporary research in expertise can trace its roots back to Simon and 
Chase’s seminal General theory of expertise (Simon & Chase, 1973; Chase & 
Simon, 1973). Simon and Chase’s computer based model proposed that  
knowledge and experience are accessed via sensory and semantic cues that are 
used to sort through a discrimination net to an end point or leaf which represents 
a piece or ‘chunk’ of knowledge or experience.  These leaves are linked 
associatively to other information or leaf nodes so that a given leaf can be 
compared with other leaves and new nodes can be created when new stimuli 
cannot be ‘accommodated’ by one of the older leaf nodes. Knowledge and 
experience is organised, stored and subsequently accessed using discrimination 
nets (Richman et al., 1995) and templates (Gobet & Simon, 1996b).  
Discrimination nets grow both quantitatively and associatively and are used to 
store, identify, compare, contrast and organise information in ways that make it 
accessible for use.  This storing, sorting, and information retrieval model is 
complemented by Newell and Simon’s (1972) earlier General Problem Solving 
(GPS) in which expert production systems operate as problems solving and 
decision making processes. Soar (Newell, 1990), another computer based model, 
stored information about the paths followed in previous problem solving 
processes and could recognise recurring patterns and resurrect previous paths 
without the need to duplicate the problem solving process (Richman, Staszewski 
& Simon, 1995).   
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Together these three sets of processes − information acquisition and retrieval 
(discrimination nets, nodes, leaves), pattern recognition (SOAR) and problem 
solving (GPS) − could be said to operate in concert as the comprehensive 
platform for the general theory of expertise (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon & 
Chase, 1973; Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984; Gobet, 1993).  
4.1.1.2 The expert performance approach 
Ericsson collaborated with Chase (Chase & Ericsson, 1981, 1982) in the study of 
memory and retrieval of information to develop early models of a skilled memory 
theory. In numerous subsequent collaborations with colleagues Ericsson 
developed the expert performance approach to the study of expertise “to describe 
the structure of superior performance of experts by reproducing it repeatedly in 
the laboratory and then by applying available methods of process-tracing and 
experiments to assess the mediating mechanisms” (Ericsson, 2003, p. 380).   The 
expert performance approach has reached a number of theoretical positions on 
expertise which are generally agreed upon: (a) expertise and its acquisition are 
domain specific; (b) performance related memory and problem solving abilities 
are domain specific and tied to experience and knowledge in that domain; (c) the 
ways experts organise and represent their knowledge is qualitatively different 
than non experts and much of the way it is organised and used is contextually 
based; (d) the use of this knowledge can be intuitive and not always accessible 
through verbal reports; (e) elite achievements are very much the product of 
superior learning environments. But some positions to which Ericsson’s theory is 
tied are questioned such as: (f) general traits or innate mental and physiological 
capacities are not essential for or predictors of exceptional performance; (g) the 
development of expertise is primarily the product of deliberate practice; and (h) 
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the study of expertise can only be conducted in studies which replicate domain-
specific expert performance in the controlled environment of a research 
laboratory (Ericsson, 2006, pp. 10-14). 
4.1.1.3 Mental construct and reasoning based models of expertise 
Knowledge based paradigms provide a variety of alternative theoretical 
perspectives to describe the cognitive structures which enable expert knowledge 
to be organised and retrieved.  Schemes (Case, 1974) consist of a variety of 
increasingly complex internal representations of information, perceptual 
configurations, functions, rules, and procedures that individuals use to solve 
problems. Schemas or schemata (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) can also be thought 
of as prototypical representations or mental structures of a situation in one’s 
memory that act through pattern matching in which a current situation is 
matched with an existing schema so that an individual can recognise it as 
belonging to a given class of situations. This enables them to recognise and 
respond appropriately to a situation rapidly and with decisions and actions based 
upon previously successful responses. Rumelhart and Norman (1978) propose 
two main modes for the acquisition of knowledge in schemata: accretion which 
assimilates new knowledge into existing structures and restructuring which 
reorganises existing knowledge structures to accommodate new information that 
does not fit into existing knowledge structures. Interestingly, these echo Piaget’s 
proposal that adaptation is “an equilibrium between assimilation and 
accommodation” (Piaget, 1972, p. 7). Schemata include processes that enable an 
individual to expand their application to different situations with different 
content. New schemata are acquired by modifying or combining old schemata.   
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Frames (Minsky, 1975, 1977) like schemata operate as data structures that 
represent stereotyped situations and enable individuals to respond appropriately 
to similar but different situations such as entering one’s own living room to relax 
versus going into some else’s living room for a party.  Moderately Abstracted 
Conceptual Representations or MACRs, enable an expert “to become facile at 
processing information at the appropriate level of abstraction for that domain” 
(Zeitz, 1997, p.44). The schematic nature of these abstract representations not 
only integrates information but can also represent what is important and ignore 
the trivial or non-related and thereby aid in steering a particular course or action. 
This process has been demonstrated (Patel & Groen, 1991) in research on 
forward thinking strategies for problem solving in medical experts and generally 
in providing justification for a course of action (Zeitz, 1997).  
Mental models was used by Endsley (2006) to classify a number of other 
knowledge based paradigms including concepts like scripts (Shank & Abelson 
1977), prototypes (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and trees (Reitman & Rueter 1980). 
These various mental models provide expert performers (a) structures for 
knowing what information is relevant in a given situation, (b) the ability to take 
in information rapidly and classify it appropriately, (c) a mechanism for 
projecting future states and forward thinking from the current situation, and (d) 
the ability to make effective decisions through this knowledge. Such 
“formalisms” are frequently used to represent expert knowledge systems that 
model human performance in computer programmes (Gobet, 1998).  
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4.1.1.4 Expertise: The question of practice vs. ability 
Simon and Chase (1973) first proposed that it took 10 years or more of nearly 
full time practice for an individual to become an expert in chess.  Bloom (1985) 
identified the long period of development required to achieve excellence in his 
talented young people. Ericsson and Crutcher (1990) confirmed this general 
standard of 10 years of intensive practice and preparation required for expertise 
across a range of domains.  There is little doubt that in many ways ‘practice 
makes perfect’ and expertise research has been strongly influenced by the expert 
performance school and its theory of deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe & 
Tesch-Römer, 1993) which distinguishes  work and play from deliberate practice 
in which the latter is said to be the basis for developing the cognitive processing 
mechanisms as well as physiological adaptations that enable individuals to 
perform at elite levels and perform at the extreme range of limitations of 
physiological, psychological and cognitive processes (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). 
There are a number of attributes that together are said to characterise deliberate 
practice (though most of these are generic approaches to skill acquisition and are 
not exclusive to the specific concept of deliberate practice). These include 
“focused, programmatic, carried out over extended periods of time, guided by 
conscious performance monitoring, evaluated by analyses of level of expertise 
reached, identification of errors, and procedures directed at eliminating errors. 
Specific goals are set at successive stages of expertise development” (Horn & 
Masunga, 2006, p. 601).  Through the central role assigned to deliberate practice 
in the acquisition of expertise, Ericsson and his colleagues have challenged the 
notion of the importance or even necessity of giftedness, talent or intelligence as 
a central criterion for the development of expertise (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; 
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Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Romer, 1993; Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson & Lehmann, 
1996). At the very least an extensive range of studies have sought to demonstrate 
the primacy of skill acquisition processes and learning over talent or intelligence 
for achieving expertise as indicated by the research in music (Sloboda, 1991); 
musical pitch (Oakes, 1955); medicine (Norman, Brooks, and Allen, 1989); 
bridge (Charness, 1979); sport and dance (Allard & Starkes, 1991); and generally 
(Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988). 
But deliberate practice theory does not go unchallenged. Sternberg (1996a) 
systematically details the methodological shortcomings of research associated 
with the expert performance/deliberate practice model. These include: 1) 
numerous examples of high performance/low practice results as well as the high 
heritability of practiced skills such as verbal and quantitative abilities; 2) 
rendering itself non-disconfirmable by ruling out as expertise any domain that 
doesn’t depend heavily on  the need for deliberate practice; 3) confounding 
correlation with causation - deliberate practice is not necessarily causally linked 
to expertise; 4) often not including control groups, for example, those that have 
spent equal amounts of deliberate practice time without achieving expertise; 5) 
ignoring dropout effects and the fact that individuals will stop pursuing an 
expertise when they are not doing well, even if they have invested significant 
amounts of deliberate practice; and 6) choosing data that maximises the fit of 
data to theory and ignoring or not studying domains that do not fit its model. 
Abernathy, Farrow and Berry (2003) question whether practice requires “full 
attention and complete concentration.” They maintain that implicit learning can 
play a significant role in expert performance and that implicit knowledge may be 
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acquired by means other than deliberate practice.  Beek (2000) suggests that 
implicit learning rather than explicit learning may in fact be the norm in the 
acquisition of movement skills. Young and Salmela (1998), in their study of 
athletes noted that provincial (lower level) middle distance athletes enjoyed 
practice less than national level athletes, challenging Ericsson’s proposition that 
deliberate practice is by nature not enjoyable. While some real life expertise can 
be measured under standardised conditions e.g., chess, memory, typing and 
mental calculations, there are also a greater number that cannot. Expertise needs 
to be observed in practical applications in order to understand its operation more 
fully (Sternberg, 1996b). Medical diagnosis which is often the subject of expert 
research is not easily reducible to laboratory study or when done so proves 
extremely difficult to standardise and measure (Patel & Groen, 1991). The 
psychomotor skills and tasks associated with playing a sport such as tennis are 
extremely difficult to test and measure in a laboratory since they interact with 
each other synergistically as well as with mental and affective elements of the 
game. Extracting them from an integrated sporting performance is not predictive 
of performance in real life (Abernathy, Farrow & Berry, 2003).  
4.1.2 Expert knowledge:  Memory, storage, access and 
retrieval 
There has been a long history of studying the acquisition and retrieval of domain 
relevant knowledge as an important measure of expertise. Most of this has 
focussed on the use of memory starting with Binet’s (Binet & Simon, 1916) early 
study of memory experts and skilled mental calculators. Classic studies such as 
de Groot’s (1946) study of memory in chess, Chase and Simon’s (1973) studies 
of expertise in chess, and Chase & Ericsson’s (1981; 1982) recall of random 
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numbers have all attempted to elucidate the relationship between memory and 
expertise. Models like Miller’s (1956) conceptualisation of chunking explained 
the capacity to group related information into larger more useful aggregations 
and Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) Long Term Memory (LTM) and Short Term 
Memory (STM) memory differentiated the dichotomous storage capacity of 
memory. Together they provide structures for the operation of memory which 
have gained widespread acceptance. For expertise theory, the mechanisms of 
memory storage, access and retrieval have operated as a forum for discussion of 
the role of knowledge in expertise. So for the purpose of examining how experts 
in transition use their expert knowledge, the discussion of memory is appropriate. 
4.1.2.1 Episodic and semantic memory 
Tulving (1972) differentiated between episodic and semantic memory. Episodic 
memory receives and stores information about specific events e.g., remembering 
what I had for lunch yesterday utilises episodic memory. Semantic memory 
includes processes, rules, algorithms and inferential properties that enable it to be 
used to draw conclusions without necessarily having experienced a specific event 
e.g., though July follows April in the calendar year, one can use semantic rules to 
conclude that April precedes July alphabetically without ever having a specific 
experience of learning this information.  Though the use of episodic and 
semantic memory covers different kinds of operations, nonetheless they are 
interdependent, share content and utilise outputs from each other. This model of 
memory incorporates many elements of Chase and Simon’s production systems. 
For episodic memory the nature of the encoded traces rather than other semantic 
processes will determine whether it is retrieved (Tulving & Osler, 1968). 
Encoding specificity determines that “only that can be retrieved that has been 
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stored, and how it can be retrieved depends on how it was stored” (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). However, the more links an experience has to semantic 
memory, the more readily memory of that experience can be retrieved through a 
variety of routes: when “human memory search is guided by semantic retrieval 
cues, any semantic aspect of a target could potentially provide access to a 
relevant analogy” (Holyoak, 1984, p. 218).  
4.1.2.2 Long Term Working Memory (LT-WM) 
The model of Long Term Working Memory (LT-WM) (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) 
is based upon earlier work on skilled memory theory (Chase & Ericsson, 1982). 
It seeks to bridge the gap between Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) Long Term 
Memory (LTM) and Short Term Memory (STM). LT-WM operates as an 
“efficient extension” of STM which enables an individual to access information 
that has been stored in LTM through the use of associated retrieval cues even 
when cognitive processes are interrupted or a situation requires parallel 
cognitions. Its “mediating mechanisms” are based on Kintsch’s earlier studies in 
discourse comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) and in particular his model 
of Construction-Integration (CI) (Kintsch, 1988) which accounts for how readers 
construct and integrate their comprehension of text through linguistic cognitive 
processes that sustain comprehension of text from sentence to sentence and 
paragraph to paragraph during interruptions or when seeking to unravel the 
general complexity of a text.   
4.1.2.3 Articulatory loops 
Baddeley, (1986, 2003) proposed a model of working memory that consisted of 
an executive control system which is accompanied by two slave processing 
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systems for visuospatial and phonological information.  Working memory utilises 
articulatory loops which can code, store and retrieve information as well as delay 
or hold operations during the manipulation of information and the delays 
accompanying this manipulation.   
4.1.2.4 Template Theory (TT) 
Template Theory (TT) (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) is much more than a memory 
model.  Rather it is a complex schematic structuring process for storing, 
accessing and using expert knowledge. But it is useful for discussing how the 
general theory of expertise addresses memory retrieval. Templates consist of 
core chunks that have been developed and organised in a schematic form and 
give access through association to an extended range of knowledge via 
discrimination nets and retrieval processes in which some nodes evolve into 
more complex data structures or templates. Templates operate as cognitive 
retrieval processes that enable searches to identify stored memory of previously 
observed patterns which conform to or diverge from a new pattern. These pattern 
recognising, strategy-forming and decision making processes enable experts to 
organise knowledge in accessible and useable constellations of information 
(Gobet & Simon, 1996b; Gobet, 1997).  In the case of chess, for example, 
semantic memory can operate as a template that may include references back to 
the opening moves which led to a particular position. According to Template 
Theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996b), expertise is due in part to both the large 
number of chunks in memory which are indexed by discrimination nets and to 
the large knowledge base which is encoded as production systems and schemata. 
Chunks can be developed into templates which are specific to situations in a 
domain and the process slots in the template allow it to be adapted to a given 
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situation and be filled in by non-stable features. Templates present a model for 
how self-modifying productions systems might operate. Using templates, 
potential future moves can emerge from the current position, plans for moves to 
apply to or counter a position can be developed, etc. (Gobet, 1998).  Furthermore 
“nodes in the discrimination net may be accessed through several paths, thus 
adding redundancy to the system” (Gobet, 1998, p. 127).  
4.1.2.5 Expert knowledge: Memory, access and generalisability in 
performance 
Extensive research has demonstrated that experts are superior to novices in 
storing and accessing knowledge in a domain. This includes studies in music 
notation (Sloboda, 1976); go (Reitman, 1976); medicine (Norman, Brooks, & 
Allen, 1989); electronics (Egan & Schwartz, 1979); bridge (Charness, 1979); 
field hockey (Starkes & Deacon, 1985); figure skating ( Deakin & Allard, 1991); 
chess (Chase &Simon, 1973); mental calculations (Staszewski, 1988); and many 
other domains. Overall, there is a strong correspondence between the 
development of expertise and memory (for a summary, see Wilding and 
Valentine, 2006) which could suggest a monotonic relationship between 
memory, performance, and expertise in a domain.  There is also considerable 
debate about how generalisable domain specific knowledge is, how much 
memory storage and retrieval processes contribute to non-generalisability and 
how tightly linked knowledge and memory storage and access processes are. The 
ability to generalise domain specific knowledge for use both during transitions 
and in subsequent domains is important for transitions expertise. 
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4.1.2.5.1 Domain knowledge and memory retrieval non-generalisability 
The knowledge-tied basis of expertise has been well established both through 
‘folk wisdom’ and through repeated research across a wide range of domains. 
The seminal works of de Groot (1978), Newell and Simon (1972) and Simon and 
Chase, (1973) demonstrated that skilled problem solving performance in a 
domain was dependent upon domain specific knowledge. Some expert models 
for memory systems maintain more restrictions than others.  Ericsson and Kintch 
propose that their LT-WM is acquired “in particular domains to meet specific 
demands imposed by a given activity on storage and retrieval [....] and must 
therefore be discussed in the context of specific skilled activities” (1995, p. 221). 
Knowledge retrieval models like long term working memory (LT-WM) 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) and template theory (TT) (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) 
utilise cognitive mechanisms to acquire expertise and subsequently access it 
which are intertwined with the knowledge specific to a given domain.  In the end, 
habits and skills “become relatively inflexible, involuntary, automatic” and when 
over-learned become “almost as resistant to change as if [they] were innate” 
(Miller, et al., 1960, pp. 83, 89).    
Chi (2006) characterises context dependence as the state in which cognitive 
retrieval strategies can be very domain-specific particularly when accessing 
memory: when the context changes, expert predictions and solutions based upon 
previous experience may be inappropriate. Experts rely on contextual clues for 
accessing their stored knowledge, for example about a patient and their history, 
when conducting medical diagnosis, particularly where there are tacit elements to 
that knowledge (Feltovitch & Barrows, 1984).  Voss and colleagues found that 
chemistry professors who took the role of political operatives in the Soviet Union 
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performed similarly to novice political scientist when attempting to implement 
strategies for increased crop production and seemed unable to transfer their 
academic knowledge to ‘real world’ applications (Voss, Tyler, & Yengo 1983). 
4.1.2.5.2 Flexibility of knowledge retrieval  
However, memory management processes like chunking, schemata, and long 
term memory can store and allow access to expert memory from multiple routes 
and in multiple domains (Feltovitch et al., 1984; Hoffman, 1987; Woods et al., 
1994; Gobet, 1998; Chi, 2006; etc.). Ericsson and Kintsch’s hierarchical 
representation of the retrieval structure of LT-WM includes a variety of levels or 
operations such as retrieval cues, associations, encoding processes,  and 
schemata (Figure 4.1) which will contain knowledge and processes that can be 
accessed from multiple routes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Hierarchical representation of retrieval structures. Based on: Ericsson, K.A., & 
Kintsch, W. (1995)  
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Sternberg argues (1996a) that some of the domain-tied constraints identified in 
memory retrieval may be due to the limited kinds of expertise studied in 
laboratories for methodological purposes and they may not apply strictly in real 
life situations or in domains such as expert chefs or gardeners which cannot be 
studied or contained effectively within the laboratory confines.  
Template Theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) allows for a range of access routes to 
expert chess memory: “chunks and templates may be accessed by contextual 
cues, by descriptions of strategic or tactical features, by the moves leading to the 
position, by the name of the opening the position comes from, or by the names of 
players known to often employ that type of position [...] these routes may be 
modelled by discrimination nets” (Gobet, 1998, p. 127).  It is possible that, 
having developed the appropriate “meta-heuristics that are transferable” (Gobet, 
2005), individuals will be able to adapt to changing circumstances. Depending 
upon how discrimination nets are developed to build up templates, they may 
have more or less freedom from their ties to a specific domain because, when the 
nodes in the discrimination net can be accessed through several paths, templates 
can apply to a range of situations depending upon how open their process slots 
are to being filled by non-stable features that will be used adapt them.   
Abstract conceptual knowledge avoids an “overreliance on intact, pre-packaged 
schema-like knowledge structures that will not account for enough of the 
variability in the ill structured domains” (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1997, p. 
139) and is more context-sensitive and adaptable to new or non-habitual 
situations. Maximal cognitive flexibility will be maintained when (a) concepts or 
principles are explored across many diverse cases when learning how to tailor 
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abstractions to accommodate different situations and (b) a variety of actual cases 
are explored to learn how sets of concepts and abstractions actually influence and 
interact with each other in varying contexts (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1997).  
4.1.2.5.3 Non memory based expertise 
Questions have also been raised about the primacy of the role of memory in 
expertise. A range of research has identified non-monotonic relationships 
between memory and expertise, for example when comparing melody recall 
between musicians and non-musicians (Sloboda, 1991); in volleyball (Allard & 
Starkes, 1980) where studies showed mixed results in memory recall of both 
structured and unstructured schematic plays;  and in medical case recall (Patel & 
Groen, 1991) where expertise corresponded more to identifying the relevancy of 
data to medical diagnosis than recall of case detail.  
The centrality of cognitive and semantic approaches to expertise have also been 
questioned: “There has been protracted debate in the motor control and learning 
field as to whether a consolidated theory of movement control and learning 
requires mental representations and other cognitive constructs to be invoked as a 
basis for explanation [….] Issues viewed as particularly problematic relate to the 
use of verbal reports as data, the omission of the role of incidental and especially 
implicit learning in expert performance [...] and the exclusive reliance on 
cognitive mechanisms as the locus of expertise” (Abernathy, Farrow & Berry, 
pp. 364, 369, 2003). Systems-based approaches such as Adams’ (1971) closed 
loop theory, Keele’s (1968) motor programme model, and Schmidt’s (1975) 
schema theory all present expertise models that focus less on memory and more 
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on feedback loops, comparator systems and control systems to explain expert 
behaviour, particularly when addressing the acquisition of motor skills. 
4.1.3 Expert processes:  flexibility and generalisability 
Following this overview, we can address a central issue in this dissertation: is 
expertise generalisable, does cognitive flexibility support this generalisation and 
if so what kind of cognitive flexibility will enable individuals to generalise expert 
knowledge and processes from one domain to another? I shall summarise some 
of the main arguments first against cognitive flexibility and expert 
generalisability and, then, for cognitive flexibility and expert generalisability. 
4.1.3.1 Cognitive inflexibility and the non-generalisability of expertise  
There is a large body of research that shows how expertise is domain specific and 
that experts cannot readily apply expertise from one domain to another.  
4.1.3.1.1 Domain processes tied to domain knowledge 
There are arguments that the cognitive processing abilities developed during the 
acquisition of expertise in a particular domain will be domain-knowledge tied 
and relatively non-transferable (Chase & Simon, 1973; Ericsson & Kintsch, 
1995; Gobet & Simon, 1996; etc.).  As mentioned earlier, most expert models 
utilise memory mechanisms that store and retrieve domain knowledge in context 
dependence ways (Chi, 2006). When the context changes, predictions and 
solutions based upon previous experience may be inappropriate (Feltovitch & 
Barrows, 1984). Encoding specificity can limit the ability to access knowledge 
except through (domain-specific) traces encoded with the knowledge itself 
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Tying expert knowledge to domain specific 
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algorithms and related cognitive processes may enhance expert performance but 
limit its generalisability, reducing flexibility and adaptability (Wiley, 1998; Chi, 
2006). Experts can respond poorly to changes in rules for processes, e.g. 
changing the ground rules in bridge (Frensch & Sternberg, 1989) or chess 
(Simon & Chase, 1973) significantly reduces performance. There would appear 
to be limitations of transfer of expertise even between very similar domains.  For 
example, even though games players in Go and Gomoko use similar pieces and 
boards, there is relatively little transfer of expertise in either direction (Eisenstadt 
& Kareev, 1979). In the domain of medical diagnosis and surgery, expertise does 
not necessarily transfer to related fields (Norman, Eva, Brooks & Hamstra 2006). 
4.1.3.1.2 Domain specific cognitive processing mechanisms 
Experts in different domains within the same field will develop and use different 
kinds of cognitive processing mechanisms which can be very domain specific. 
Salthouse (1991) identified seven types of processing limitations characteristic of 
representative activities in domains where overcoming these limitations 
differentiates experts from non-experts (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Activity domains, by processing limitations. Based on Salthouse (1991) 
Hypothesised processing limitation of non-experts Activity/Domain where 
operative 
1. Not knowing what to expect Planning/managing 
Chess, Music, Sports 
2. Not knowing what to do and when to do it Planning/managing 
Chess, Sports 
3. Lack of knowledge of interrelations among variables Planning/managing 
Decision making, Physics 
4. Not knowing what information is relevant Decision making 
Physics 
5. Difficulty in combining information Decision making 
6. Insensitivity to sensory/perceptual discriminations Music, Sports 
7. Lack of production proficiency Music, Sports 
Ste Marie (2003) proposed that specific cognitive processing limitations could 
also contribute to or even characterise the different expertise-specific 
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requirements or different role requirements of different (sub)domains within the 
same field. She identified four of Salthouse’s cognitive processing limitations 
that could differentiate coaches, referees and players.  
1 Sensitivity to perceptual discriminations in which expert referees were more 
accurate in identifying fouls or infractions than players or coaches  particularly 
in identifying the type of foul. 
2 Knowing what information is relevant which is reflected in expert referees' 
abilities to seek and detect different sources of information than players and to 
attend to information more relevant for penalties, rule infractions, etc. 
3 Knowing what to expect in which expert referees were better at anticipating 
what might happen or be coming than novice referees which in turn reduced their 
processing demands allowing them to focus on other areas of the game. 
4) Knowing the interrelations among variables in which referees knew the rules 
better and were able to articulate and were more effective in using semantic 
representations of them.   
For example, referees were better at stating rules, knowing signals for rules and 
naming fouls whereas coaches were better at recalling accuracy for structured 
game plays.  Coaches are not required to develop the declarative knowledge 
essential for refereeing nor the abilities to access this knowledge. Different kinds 
of knowledge about the same game would be accessed through different sets of 
cues, retrieval systems, or templates that might be tightly tied to the kind of 
processes and knowledge they are accessing.  Knowledge of the content of the 
domain would not be sufficient to make a transition: to move from one domain to 
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another, even within the same field such as from playing to coaching, will 
require training to develop the different cognitive mechanisms specific to the 
type of expertise in the domain.  
4.1.3.1.3 Reductive bias 
The term reductive bias is used to describe the process whereby individuals who 
acquire expertise tend to treat or interpret complex situations and issues as 
simpler than they in fact are (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1993).  In the field of 
medicine and medical diagnosis in particular, there are recurring examples of 
reductive bias operating to limit a medical practitioner’s flexibility in diagnosing 
non-normal cases or cases that present unusual or conflicting symptoms. 
Feltovitch, Spiro and Coulson (1993) identify a number of oppositions between 
reductive bias and non-reductive bias some of which are listed in the Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Reductive bias vs. Non-reductive bias. Based on Feltovitch, Spiro and Coulson (1993) 
Discreetness vs.  
Continuity 
- In which processes can proceed by discreet step or in an unbroken continuity. 
Static vs. 
Dynamic 
- Are the important attributes of a situation capture in fixed “snapshots” or are 
they observable in changes and movement from shot to shot? 
Sequentiality vs. 
 Simultaneity 
- Do processes only occur one at a time or can multiple processes take place at 
the same time? 
Mechanism vs. 
Organism 
- Are cause and effect directly, simply and casually linked or do they need to be 
understood as part of a more systemic, organistic function? 
Universality  vs. 
Conditionality 
- Do principles operate in the same way across different situations or are they 
more context sensitive? 
Separability vs. 
Interactiveness 
- Do processes occur independently (or with weak interaction) or do they have 
interdependence and interaction? 
Regularity vs. 
Irregularity 
- Is the domain (and expert performance) characterised by high routinisation or 
do cases and situations differ even if called by the same name? 
Surface vs.  
Deep 
- Are the important aspects of understanding a situation and guiding action 
apparent on the surface or are they deeper, more covert, abstracted? 
Single vs.  
Multiple 
- Do elements of a situation present single interpretations and functional uses or 
do they provide many or have multiple representations? 
If a practitioner routinely engages in a single point of view when multiple views 
are possible, then cognitive choices become limited (Spiro, Coulson, Feltovich & 
Anderson, 1989).  Where principles are taken to be universal, individuals will not 
make condition-specific adjustments (Spiro, Coulson, Feltovitch & Anderson 
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1988) which over time can become self-reinforcing and lead to a rigidification of 
thinking and acting (Spiro, et al, 1987; Coulson, Feltovich & Anderson, 1989). 
Generally quality of learning can be diminished when issues are viewed in an 
oversimplified manner (Schommer & Walker, 1995). Cognitive generalisability 
can be limited by highly structured training, narrow educational objectives with 
exposure to a single domain, or education focussed on convergent thinking. 
4.1.3.1.4 Routinisation and Automatisation 
Sternberg and Frensch (1992) argue that, when acquiring expertise which leads 
to automaticity, some cognitive resources will be freed up to enhance 
performance. But because the expertise itself becomes automatised or routinised 
it may not be interrupted easily. This routinisation can drive cognitive processes 
down reified pathways to foregone conclusions and limit the ability to approach 
existing problems with a fresh mind.  Automatisation can be inimical to the 
generalisability of information since “automatic information processing is 
preconscious and not under the conscious direction of the individual” (Sternberg, 
1985, p. 93).  Many cognitive schemata, templates, frames, and their associated 
production systems are susceptible to routinisation and automatisation which 
may produce non-conscious and automatic responses to a new or different 
situation that are inappropriate.   
Chi (2006) proposes that another consequences of this automatisation process is 
glossing over in which experts don’t pay attention to details or fail to recall the 
surface features of a situation or information, particularly if it doesn’t fit into 
their framing of the situation or their contextual understanding of what is 
important. This might be reinforced by limitations in cognitive processing 
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mechanisms determined by specialisation within a field as discussed earlier 
(Salthouse, 1991; Ste Marie, 2003). It may lead to ill-considered and 
inappropriate responses to unfamiliar or new situations encountered during 
transitions where non-normal but significant information is ignored or “glossed 
over.”   
4.1.3.1.5 Functional fixedness 
Dunker (1945) first named the phenomenon of functional fixedness following his 
well-known study in which participants were given a hammer, box of tacks and a 
candle and told to fix the candle to the wall so it would burn safely. Few of the 
participants identified the solution which involved emptying the box of tacks and 
then fixing it to the wall with the tacks to operate as a “platform” for the candle 
rather than a “container” for the tacks. Chi (2006) suggests that it is often the 
more knowledgeable participants in problem solving studies who can exhibit 
functional fixedness in their problem solving approaches.  Wiley (1998) has 
identified the similar issue of “mental sets” in which association is constrained 
by expert knowledge in which information is organised according to pre-existing 
sets.  Sternberg (1988) stresses how even the testing of cognitive skills must 
consider contextual factors. Luria (1976) demonstrated this in his classic study in 
which a hammer, saw, hatchet and log are all identified as similar or ‘combined’ 
by central Asian peasants because together they are needed to make a house, 
whereas a Muscovite participant typically identified the first three as ‘tools’ and 
the last as a material. Denzin and Lincoln warn against the implicit contextual 
dependencies overlooked by many research methodologies (2003). 
  
105 
 
4.1.3.2 Cognitive flexibility and expert generalisability 
There is, however, equal amounts of research and evidence supporting expert 
cognitive flexibility and there are a range of ways in which expert cognitive 
processes and experience are generalisable and so not bound to a specific 
domain. The first three points that follow will address the nature of cognitive 
flexibility and how experts may be able to generalise their cognitive processes 
developed in their primary domain of expertise.  The subsequent two points will 
discuss more general cognitive processes that individuals use to manage 
themselves which are not domain specific and may be used during transitions.  
The former are more directly related with expert process generalisability, the 
latter are more concerned with self-management processes that can be used to 
manage transitions but can also contribute to cognitive flexibility.   
4.1.3.2.1 Cognitive Flexibility 
Cognitive Flexibility Theory proposes that individuals can develop a personal 
epistemology (Spiro et al, 1988; Spiro et al, 1989) during the acquisition of 
expertise which recognises that the learning process and knowledge associated 
with the acquisition of expertise are not all neat and tidy: they may be irregular, 
full of exceptions, contradictory, unpredictable and generally messier than 
presented in the abstract. Maladaptive rigidity can be avoided by developing 
multiple perspectives and modes of representation to avoid “fixation errors” 
(Woods et al., 1994). Experts, can even over-ride schema-driven processes and 
engage in reasoning based on deeper “first principles” such as when dealing with 
difficult cases with conflicting data (Hoffman, 1987; Chi, Feltovitch & Glaser, 
1989; Chi, 2006). In studies of cognitive flexibility in medical diagnostics, 
diagnosticians were given a preliminary set of data suggesting a standard 
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diagnosis of a disease  “a garden path route"  but were later given 
contradictory evidence indicating a different or non-traditional diagnosis. 
Novices were less flexible in changing their preliminary conclusion whereas 
experts were able to detect the need for a switch because they had an “extensive, 
rich, differentiated schematization” (Feltovitch et al., 1984).  
The characteristics of the acquisition, learning and practice contexts involved in 
expertise development will make the expert cognitive process and  by  
implication  the utilisation of expert knowledge more or less flexible (Spiro et 
al., 1987).  To deal with ambiguity and complex situations learners can develop a 
variety of adaptable cognitive and interpersonal processes when learning their 
expertise which will enable them to adapt to subsequent variations in problems 
(Woods et al., 1994). These include “multiple ways of representing concepts and 
phenomena [...] multiple languages and other formalisms; multiple connections 
amongst elements of knowledge; the ability to adopt multiple perspectives and 
frames of reference; and the ability to respond from multiple past cases and 
precedents” (Feltovich, Spiro & Coulson, 1997, p. 138). The nature of the 
acquisition of expertise and ongoing expert performance which incorporate the 
process described above will enable an individual to remain more cognitively 
flexible within domains and during transitions.  
4.1.3.2.2 Minimising cognitive processing limitations as transition 
expertise 
Salthouse (1991) suggests that there are three categories of processing limitations 
that affect the ability to acquire and use knowledge and experience generally. 
The success of the strategies that individuals develop for circumventing such 
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processing limitations is a significant contributor to the development of 
expertise. These ‘circumvention’ strategies will also influence how well 
individuals manage transitions and acquiring expertise in a new domain. 1) Some 
types of processing mechanisms are specific to expert tasks as discussed earlier 
in Ste Marie’s (2003) comparison of sport coaches, players and referees. Of the 
three categories, this one is least amenable to generalisation and the limitations 
of these kinds of processing mechanisms will be difficult to circumvent when 
making a transition because new situations and new positions e.g., coaching as 
opposed to performing, may simply require the use of different types of 
processing mechanisms. Individuals will not be able to rely upon applying ‘old’ 
mechanisms in new situations. 2) Some processing limitations are inherent – 
memory constraints being the most common. However, these kind of inherent 
constraints have a long history of being circumvented in the service of expert 
performance (Luria, 1975; de Groot, 1965; Chase & Simon, 1973; Simon & 
Chase, 1973; Wilding & Valentine, 1994). These mechanisms for getting around 
inherent processing limitations, though often applied in a specific domain, are 
not necessarily domain specific and could be applied to deal with processing 
challenges in a new domain or during transitions. Their generalisability will be 
subject to the same considerations as discussed in the sections dealing with 
knowledge retrieval and how closely these mechanisms have become tied to a 
specific domain knowledge through deliberate practice, constrained learning 
objectives, narrow domain application, etc.  (3) Salthouse also maintains that 
there are a number of general cognitive mechanisms and that these mechanisms 
such as situation analysis and problem solving are not domain specific. Experts 
regularly use meta-processes to circumvent these general limitations. Such meta-
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processes include the capacity to see and represent problems in at a deeper, more 
principled level (Hoffman, 1987; Chi, 2006); the ability to abstract information 
into representations such as MACRs (Zeitz, 1997) that enable them to distinguish 
the important from non-important or what is relevant to new situations or during 
transitions; high level executive meta-components that are non-domain specific 
(Sternberg, 1985); and higher level cognitive processes that are also non-domain 
specific (Gardner, 1987).  In both specific and general cognitive mechanisms, the 
way individuals are taught to overcome cognitive limitations in order to attain 
excellence in their performance domain will influence how generalisable they are 
i.e. when developed as non-reductive, non-functionally fixed heuristics or in 
conjunction with other expert domains, they would be more useful during 
transitions. “[T]he best option seems to supplement the teaching of specific 
knowledge with the teaching of meta heuristics that are transferable […] These 
may include strategies about how to learn, how to direct one’s attention in novel 
domains, and how to monitor and regulate one’s limited resources, such as small 
STM capacity and slow learning rates” (Gobet, 2005, p. 194). 
4.1.3.2.3 Domain vs creative relevant skills 
Though this study does not directly address the role of creativity in transition 
expertise, Therese Amabile’s highly regarded study of creative performance 
presents conclusions which further describe the kinds of processes that may 
provide the kind of cognitive flexibility that one could encounter amongst 
experts. The model has three elements: domain relevant skills, creativity relevant 
skills and task motivation (Amabile, 1996). Domain relevant skills are 
synonymous in many ways with expertise and include factual knowledge, 
technical skills and domain-relevant talents encompassing both “innate cognitive, 
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perceptual and motor abilities, as well as formal and informal education in the 
domain of endeavour [and include the] set of cognitive pathways for solving a 
given problem” (Amabile, 1996 p. 85).  Newell and Simon have called these the 
problem solver’s “network of possible wanderings” (1972, p. 82) and they 
represent the potential adaptability of the problem solving/decision making 
processes that are built into discrimination nets and templates. When they have 
been developed in a complex or multifaceted learning environment, they produce 
an enriched network of associations and cues and “the larger the set [of cognitive 
pathways] the more numerous the alternatives available for producing something 
new” (Amabile, 1996 p. 86).   
Amabile’s creativity relevant skills produce a “cognitive style” (Amabile, 1996, 
pp. 88-89) which is congruent with the kind of cognitive flexibility one might 
expect in transition expertise. The incomplete list below has correspondences 
with cognitive flexibility discussed earlier. 
 Breaking perceptual sets which is comparable to avoiding functional 
fixedness (Dunker, 1945) 
 Breaking cognitive sets in which unsuccessful problems solving strategies 
are abandoned to enable searches in new directions (Newell, Shaw & 
Simon, 1962; Klahr,  1984) 
 Understanding complexities in which an individual appreciates and can 
work with complexity (Woods et al., 1994; Spiro et al., 1989) 
 Using wide categories which is similar to non-reductive bias (Feltovitch, 
et al., 1984) 
 Breaking out of performance scripts which reflects schemata 
restructuring (Glick & Holyoak, 1983; Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984) 
These (and other processes) contribute to what Amabile calls “creativity 
heuristics”. While it would be misleading to equate transition expertise with 
creativity, it is entirely probable that a number of the cognitive processes and 
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heuristics that are used to successfully manage transitions are also used in 
creative efforts. 
4.1.3.2.4 Expert abilities that are non-domain specific 
Chi (2006) identified a large number of characteristics of experts, four of which 
are not tied to domain-specific applications or expert theory in particular but 
could be considered to be either general cognitive processes or personality traits.  
Qualitative analysis is used by expert’s to include general as well as domain 
specific approaches to their problem analysis. Individuals can use qualitative 
analysis to consider more general, systemic, contextual, personal, organisational, 
or cultural constraints in defining a problem (Voss et al., 1983). It could be used 
in a musical performance requiring adaptation to a new environment, for 
interrupting football training session to deal with interpersonal team issues, or for 
stopping a business meeting to reassess objectives in light of new data. Self 
monitoring (Flavell, 1979) and self-regulation (Zimmerman, 2006) which 
enables individuals to observe their performance contemporaneously will be 
discussed in Chapter 6 when discussing the role of personal intelligences in 
transitions.  Sternberg’s (1985) meta-cognitive components are executive 
processes that are used by individuals to manage problems solving and decision 
making. They are non-domain specific and are used in expert performance more 
generally to develop new kinds of expertise and manage transitions. Choosing 
appropriate strategies characterises experts, particularly those with more life 
experience in their domain (Chi, Feltovoch & Glaser, 1981; Chi, 2006). Experts 
can base decisions on strategies that go beyond short term objectives and criteria. 
This will also enable them to establish problem solving and decision making 
tactics that extend beyond their expert domain. Opportunism is a personality trait 
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that has been identified in a wide arena of creativity theories (Koestler, 1964; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Amabile, 1996; Sternberg, 2000a; etc.) as well a general 
personality models dealing with personal resilience (Block & Block, 1980; Deci 
& Ryan, 1985; Garmenzy, 1993; etc). It could be said to characterise individuals 
who are able to step out of the constraints of automatisation (Sternberg, 1985).  
4.2 Data analysis 
Based upon the foregoing discussion it is possibly to examine the data to 
consider whether expert knowledge and processes can be generalised and what 
expert cognitive structures will support transition expertise.  I hope to address 
these issues through three main research questions. 
1. How might early cognitive flexibility be developed? 
2. Are experts able to generalise from their primary domain a) expert 
knowledge and b) expert processes during transitions?  
3.  Do individuals continue to remain cognitively adaptive and avoid cognitive 
rigidity subsequently in their career and during transitions?  
4.2.1 Demonstration of early cognitive flexibility 
If an individual is repeatedly successful in career transitions they might 
demonstrate early indications of general cognitive flexibility and adaptability. 
Firstly, there might be indications of general early cognitive flexibility within 
their domain such as development of multiple applications of their expert 
knowledge, reacting to challenges in their professional development with 
adaptive behaviour, and responding quickly to changing circumstances. 
Secondly, they there might be demonstration of early involvement in multiple 
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domains of expertise with different skill sets and intelligences which would make 
their expert process less tied to single domain expertise. 
4.2.1.1 Data: Early cognitive flexibility 
Table 4.3 contains some representative statements by participants indicativeof  
early cognitive flexibility. 
Table 4.3 Some statements indicative early cognitive flexibility 
EALY COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY 
 “I think there’s always been an element of looking at the context within which anything sits” 
“It was natural for me to go across departments and structures” 
“I can abstract things” 
“I’ve always been better at standing back and looking at the bigger picture” 
“This was a way of broadening out” 
“Make my playing deeper and richer” 
“I sort of threw myself into everything” 
“There was a lot of opportunity and space to be entrepreneurial” 
 
As a student, one individual talks about “standing back and looking at the bigger 
picture”: 
I’ve always been better at standing back and looking at the bigger picture than 
the little bits. I think it actually started at University because I remember 
thinking at the time, as I looked at the Finals papers, the day I got to see what 
was in store for me in 3 years time and I noticed that you couldn’t answer any of 
the questions− so if it was a great literature paper or a Roman history paper, 
you couldn’t any answer of the questions based on your Roman history course, 
Greek literature course – you had to put the whole 3 year programme in a great 
big pot and synthesize. (BSN R1 Mark) 
The same individual continued this approach when developing his expertise in 
his primary domain: 
I think also in trading, I was always much better at the sort of 2 to 6 week plays 
– well ‘these differentials are going to compress or this spread is going to blow 
out’, whereas there were others on the team that would day rate and they’d just 
feel – ‘ooh many buyers out and that’s going to go up’ and they’d jump in and 
they’d buy and then sell out. I was never any good at that, so I think there’s 
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always been an element of looking at the context within which anything sits in 
the bigger pictures. (BSN R 2Mark) 
Another cut across structures in his early positions: 
It was natural for me to go across departments and structures, you just go 
wherever you get an answer. (BSN R2 Peter) 
A musician described a non-reductive “broadening out” beyond the constraints of 
his formal educational training: 
This was a way of broadening out to find out what the European approach to 
playing was and make my playing deeper and richer and indeed that happened; 
I suddenly had a completely new view of playing the instrument. (MUS R7 
Richard)  
Several individuals talked about seeing the bigger picture or deeper structure: 
I can abstract things and say well, if you do it like that here, that means for that 
problem over there, there must be generic dynamics which you can create 
maybe out of them. (BSN R 2 Peter) 
Another musician demonstrated non-reductiveness when straddling different 
roles: 
I was the school captain of my school…., so I was consciously thinking ‘how do 
you lead a school of about 1100 boys and stand as a representative of them, yet 
be sufficiently distinguished from the management of the school not to appear to 
be their stooge – how did you do that in academic terms, how did you do that in 
sporting terms, how did you do that in social terms?’ And music also fitted 
within that; I was consciously thinking ‘well what are the strategies if you’re the 
leader of the orchestra as the leading first violinist – how do you actually lead 
in a way that is collaborative – is collegial. (MUS R8 Thomas) 
Another monitored different disciplines within the same field: 
I used to go the piano accompaniment class because I had a very fine teacher 
and I would do my piece – when you get feedback but I would also stay and 
listen to everybody else’s piece, so I might sit there for 2 hours or so… I 
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probably should have been doing my practice, but again it gave me a huge 
repertoire – huge reach. (MUS R 6 Vivian) 
The same individual became involved in multiple arenas within one domain: 
 I sort of threw myself into everything really.  It also had a flourishing amateur 
scene in {city} so I started from the Music Appreciation classes – the lady who 
gave those classes was in the choir which I sang in as well – gifted amateurs – I 
was a singer for a chamber choir so I started singing from that.  From the Youth 
Orchestra I had made all sorts of contacts  even played with the Police band a 
couple of times as a soloist in the park, all sorts of things; it really was a very 
flourishing musical life. (MUS R2 Vivian) 
Sports people applied coaching from another sport to their own: 
 So I had never been coached in sailing, but I’d been coached in Rugby. (SPT R1 
George) 
Many musicians mention being “entrepreneurial” and avoiding functional 
fixedness: 
There was a lot of opportunity and space to be entrepreneurial, to follow one’s 
ideas, to put on concerts.  In a lot of ways then it was a much more stimulating 
environment. (MUS R1 Robert) 
 
4.2.1.2 Data: Multiple domain expertise 
The development of expertise in another domain in parallel with the development 
of one’s primary domain expertise can contribute to cognitive flexibility and 
ultimately the ability to apply knowledge and processes across domains.  
Sport 
 Amongst business people sport frequently emerged as a parallel domain: 
I learnt a lot being a sports captain back to making decisions to who goes to 
open to bowl and who’s going to bat – telling people they’ve got to do things, so 
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it’s nice to learn without knowing you’re learning and I think those early days of 
my sporting life, probably stood me in great stead for what I’ve subsequently 
done in my career because I think I’ve probably behaved the same. (BSN R1 
Lawrence) 
And in amongst musicians as well: 
I used to run races and win them like mad and I now regret that I didn’t go on 
being an athlete because I ran the mile in 4 minutes 28 at 17. That was quite 
important to me at that stage. (MUS R2 Richard)  
Language 
A musician amalgamated multiple perspectives on a problem: 
 Tight linguistic training, tight educational training and tight musicological 
training because my thesis was – as I look back on it later – a perfect 
amalgamation of three tendrils that were hanging; one from each of those fields. 
(MUS R10 Thomas) 
And some sports people, similarly to musicians, developed an academic 
approach to sport in parallel with physical performance: 
So I was in the first cohort that went on to {university}[….] We took an entry 
exam, we were examined orally and because they didn’t know what to do with 
us, they made us take medical-anatomy and neuro-anatomy [….] I did 
psychology, sociology and I wrote a dissertation which you could do instead of a 
paper. (SPT R1 Diane) 
Education 
Teaching is another parallel expertise developed early in a career.  This is 
particularly the case with musicians: 
So when I came out of Cambridge; the other thing I had started to do then and 
that goes back to my teens, was teaching people and I have always really been 
interested in having a child or an adult and simply listening and trying to help 
them interpret a piece of music, do technique – so all that business of imparting 
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and encouraging and being the sort of force behind other people progress has 
also been also hard wired into me. (MUS R3 Richard) 
Sports people, like musicians, developed coaching early in their career: 
 I’m good at sailing and by then I had passed my instructors certificate – just as 
something to do as a teenager – you know a coach at the minimum coaching 
qualification. (SPT R2 George) 
They also took up teaching, in this case in areas not related to sport: 
I was teaching at {school} either side of the second Olympics I had taken the 
role to teach. So I taught A’ Level economics, O’ Level commerce, non-exam, 
RE, basketball, athletics, remedial weight training, photography. (SPT R1 
Harold) 
Other parallel domains 
A sports person trained as a lawyer:    
You know, I remember sitting in exams and you know leaving the exam early so 
I could make the fencing competition or at school doing all my homework at 
lunchtime so I could go fencing at night. So those two always[law and sport]and 
I think as you get later on in life, the fact that they were always there together, 
meant that running a career and fencing or administration and a career, there’s 
always been at least two strands to everything I do. (SPT R1 Claire) 
A sports person trained as a musician: 
I had music lessons on a Friday for piano when I got home from school, I was 
taking cello lessons on a Wednesday morning before school from the age of 7. 
(SPT R 1 Diane) 
 A football player trained as a lift engineer: 
So I then decided that I had to do something else; even though they asked me to 
stay on as an amateur, so what I did do, was, I applied for other apprenticeships 
– mechanical apprenticeships–and I ended doing a 4 year apprenticeships as a 
lift engineer.  (SPT R1 Brian) 
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4.2.1.3 Discussion: Early cognitive flexibility and multiple domain 
expertise contribution to transition expertise 
The interviews in this study were focussed primarily on transitions rather than 
the development of expertise and the data on how the expertise was acquired is 
relatively limited. Nonetheless, participants were given an opportunity to discuss 
their studentship and early stages of their professional career in the preliminary 
stages of the interviewing process.  Their responses (see Table 4.4) suggest that 
most participants demonstrated early cognitive flexibility in their primary 
domain and through acquiring expertise in multiple domains or, indeed through 
both routes.   
Table 4.4 Early expertise in multiple domains and early cognitive flexibility 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Early cognitive  
flexibility 
 
8 41 5.13 8 29 3.63 6 25 4.17 22 95 4.32 
Early Multiple 
Domain 
Expertise 
7 23 3.29 3 8 2.6 3 5 1.67 13 35 2.77 
4.2.1.3.1 Discussion: Early cognitive flexibility 
Of the 24 participants in the study, 22 demonstrated early cognitive flexibility 
averaging 4.32 references per participant. They talked about engaging in 
“entrepreneurial thinking”, “stepping back” from specifics, “looking at the bigger 
picture”, etc. indicating the capacity early on in their career to move beyond 
specific domain content (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1997) and to look for ‘first 
principles’ (Hoffman, 1987; Chi, 2006). Cognitive flexibility can be developed 
when concepts or principles are explored across diverse cases to learn how sets 
of concepts and abstractions actually influence and interact with each other in 
varying contexts (Spiro et al., 1988). This was demonstrated repeatedly when 
participants made conscious choices to assure that they would be exposed to 
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learning experiences which would enhance their flexibility, such as taking on 
different roles within their school, studying multiple disciplines tangential to 
their primary domain, seeking educational experiences that broaden out their 
perspective, and cutting across departments in the early stages of their career. 
This early cognitive flexibility was particularly common amongst musicians 
(5.13 references per participant) in their studentship and early performing career 
in which they adapted, adjusted, took up multiple tracks, and explored multiple 
routes through which they could develop and express their musical potential. 
They seemed to avoid single points of view when multiple views were possible 
(Spiro, et al., 1989).  Business people (4.17 references per participant) and sports 
people (3.63 references per participant) demonstrated this early cognitive 
flexibility as well, though to a lesser degree.  
Almost none of the participants mentioned learning experiences which had the 
characteristics of deliberate practice.  Participants talked about focussing on 
their early skill development and making sure that they organised it 
systematically. They studied hard, “worked like stink,” and in one case became 
exhausted from holding down a full time job, studying for bar exams and training 
in fencing simultaneously. But generally there was little mention of repetition or 
structured practice or issues like dealing with boredom which are said to 
characterise deliberate practice. Rather their descriptions of training were more 
about the engagement, challenge, and excitement in line with Young and 
Salmela’s (1998) study of athletes.  
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4.2.1.3.2 Discussion: early multiple domain expertise 
Another way in which cognitive flexibility could be developed at early career 
stages was through multiple domain expertise developed concurrently. Such 
expertise in a second or third domain was mentioned by 13 of the 24 participants.  
Some sports people (3) develop expertise in completely different domains e.g. 
law, engineering and music. Business people (3) also mentioned secondary 
domain expertise, sport being the most common example. It is noteworthy that 7 
out 8 musicians developed expertise in secondary domain including sport (3) and 
verbal/linguistic skills (4) usually linked to research. They also frequently 
mentioned exploring principles across diverse domains in order to learn how 
concepts and abstractions operated in varying contexts (Feltovitch, Spiro & 
Coulson, 1997). A number of the participants also demonstrated early abilities or 
skills associated with a secondary domain expertise that would support their 
subsequent career development e.g., interpersonal skills as cricket captain would 
be helpful for running an engineering operation; expert performance as a head of 
music faculty contributed to leading a business operation; leading a string section 
in an orchestra enabled one to run an academic faculty;  engineering experience 
contributes to a systemic approach to energy trading. This kind of generalisation 
across different domains reflects the use of inference and analogy as will be 
described in Chapter 5.  
In developing multiple expertises, individuals would developed a wider range of 
types of processing mechanisms (Salthouse, 1991; Ste Marie, 2003), avoiding 
starting all over again when making a transition e.g., from player to coach or 
from performer to department head because they had already developed the kinds 
of processing mechanisms appropriate to their new expert task when they were a 
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student or early performer. It also broadened the possible application of the 
operation of templates (Gobet, 1998) beyond a specific domain. Maybe the 
process slots in a template can be accessed through paths in the discrimination 
net that link them to other knowledge or other cues.  In developing parallel 
expertise at an early age a larger number of process slots will be fillable by non-
stable features. If a number of templates used in a specific domain are accessible 
via different routes, have many non-stable features or can be activated by a broad 
range of semantic cues, then they may not be nearly as tied to a domain and its 
specific knowledge as would otherwise be the case. It possible that redundancy 
in the system is precisely the attribute of templates that make then applicable 
beyond their domain. It also seem that most of the participants in the study, 
through exposure to various other domains of expertise in their studentship and 
early performance career developed some of Feltovitch’s adaptive cognitive 
processes such as “multiple languages and other formalisms; multiple 
connections amongst elements of knowledge; the ability to adopt multiple 
perspectives and frames of reference; and the ability to respond from multiple 
past cases and precedents” (Feltovich, Spiro & Coulson, 1997, p. 138).  
4.2.2 Cognitive flexibility during transitions 
We now move to the discussion of indications of the operation of cognitive 
flexibility in career transitions themselves in which one would hope to see 
repeated and explicit examples of cognitive flexibility in a variety of forms. The 
data indicative of cognitive flexibility has been organised into three sections: 1) 
indications of general cognitive flexibility and adaptivity; 2) indications of 
individuals breaking out of reductive-bias and functionally fixed cognition; and 
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3) indications of individuals interrupting automatic or habitual patterns of 
thinking and behaviour (See Table 4.5.) 
Table 4.5  Some statements indicative career cognitive flexibility  
GENERAL COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY 
“That entrepreneurial streak was always there” 
“You can contribute better because you’ve come without the baggage” 
“I adapted” 
“Instinct - the history of my life – instinct” 
“You can have an eight carriage motorway and the art is how you sneak in and out of your 
carriageways” 
NON-FUNCTIONAL FIXEDNESS OR REDUCTIVE BIAS 
“Taking away the labels” 
“I was starting to think about the game more from a contribution point of view, a tactical point of 
view” 
“Then there is no strategy - It all needs to be revalidated” 
“When you’re managing managers as opposed to managing teams of people, it’s a totally 
different set of skills” 
“I do not see how you would ever be able to lead a large entity in your own country without 
having left your country” 
NON-AUTOMATISATION 
“I’ve taken one step backwards before I’ve gone forwards” 
“There is always ‘The more you know the less you know’” 
“Let a year run so you watch how your horse performs before you start pulling the reins too 
hard” 
“So I thought no, you take the time to learn” 
 
4.2.2.1General cognitive flexibility during transitions  
General cognitive flexibility was described as important in transitions by a 
number of participants. 
Musicians talked about having an “entrepreneurial streak”: 
I was the person who wrote the letters saying ‘dear so and so, would you like the 
ensemble to come’… I am still doing it actually. And then that lead to in the 
1980’s, I was a founder partner of a music agency; we actually formally set up a 
music agency and we were managing 60/70 artists worldwide, so that 
entrepreneurial streak was always there and I think that took me away from 
being this narrow thing that I started with. (MUS R1 Richard)  
A business person spoke about being “quick on the uptake” and “without the 
baggage”:  
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And I have the ability to be relatively quick on the uptake, so if I go to a meeting 
on which I don’t know much background, I listen for a long time and eventually 
you hear it all and then you find you can contribute as if you’d been in it for 
years or as if you’d read it all and often you can contribute better because 
you’ve come without the baggage. So the ability to listen and take on what the 
salient points are quite quickly saved a lot of unnecessary work. (BSN R1 
Michael) 
A sports person adapted: 
I adapted. I adapted because it was a club I wanted to be at; there were 
frustrations but I think maybe my personality allows me to adjust and allows me 
to perhaps accept to a degree. That’s how it is - I’ve taken a job under them 
conditions; if I don’t want a job under their conditions then it’s time to move on 
elsewhere. So I consciously used what I had then to better myself, further myself 
and further my knowledge as a coach.  (SPT R6 Brian)  
One individual described their cognitive flexibility as “instinct”: 
‘How would you characterise your ability to identify those next….?’ Instinct. 
Instinct. The history of my life, instinct.  I think I’ve got fantastic instinct. I mean 
that’s what keeps me going in this place. I kind of know what to do. (MSN R1 
William)  
Another talked of running his life as it were on a “eight carriage motorway”: 
 I worked out early on, that you don’t just need to do that… you can have an 
eight carriage motorway and you can run all sorts of things in your life and the 
art is how you sneak in and out of your carriageways and achieve what you 
want to do and get out of life…..going all over the world with them as well as 
with my ensembles, and then the teaching began in 1984, so the {conservatoire} 
approached me in 1984 to go in and fill for somebody and then I stayed on staff 
and I did nearly 10 years at the {conservatoire}; it was my double Academy 
decade. And we were pretty busy and also running this music agency. (MSN R3 
Richard)  
Cognitive flexibility supported taking on whatever jobs, tasks, duties one can to 
continue to develop as a coach: 
  
123 
 
I found that I had far more other responsibilities – not just on the training pitch, 
so I had other responsibilities …. I welcomed that….I found in that period of 
time that I was throwing myself into other things and taking on other 
responsibilities.  Players, the club secretary would come to me regarding any 
player appearances, the liaison between the commercial and players and other 
departments, sponsorship and players, and so I found it became a far more 
rounded person. (SPT R8 Brian)  
4.2.2.2 Non functional fixedness or reductive bias 
Non-functional fixedness was in evidence during transitions as when this 
business person merged two teams: 
I also had to manage these two teams that had become one and so the most 
development aspect of that – apart from the technical side – was the leadership 
needed to say to two sets of people from two different internal cultures ‘you’re 
now one… you know you guys in finance you don’t look down on these people as 
if they’re not very clever anymore and you guys in operations, you don’t look at 
them as if they’re nerds’… there was a very strong cultural divide and my 
mission and my aim which was successful – the thing I’m most proud of at that 
time – was taking away the labels and making people no longer have… you 
couldn’t tell where they were from; it’s like a merger. (BSN  R2 Nicola)  
Performers avoided functional fixedness, developing a capacity to think about 
tactics from a coaching perspective: 
I was starting to think about the game more from a contribution point of view, a 
tactical point of view….heightened my desire to think more about the game, to 
get involved in more coaching and to sort of try and improve my knowledge of 
the game. (SPT R1 Brian) 
Breaking out of functional fixedness was necessary to adapt strategy to changing 
circumstances: 
I suddenly realised that we were taken over. I observed that for about 3, or 4 
days and then realised that if you’re working on a strategy and you’re taken 
over, then there is no strategy. It all needs to be revalidated and so I wrote the 
‘wallpaper’ I called it; so I took 3, or 4 of my guys and I said, ‘look what we 
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need to do now, we need to put our thoughts down on this paper and send it to 
the top people in the bank and see if they believe there is value in that thinking’. 
And within 2 days somebody was there and wanted to know and that’s how I 
turned out to be Head of IT. (BSN  R2 Peter) 
Recognising cultural contextualism and consciously moving into different 
environments broadened perspectives: 
The fact that I’ve lived abroad and have had to lead a high performance 
environment in a completely foreign set up has helped me tremendously… I 
mean I do not see how you would ever be able to lead a large entity in your own 
country without having left your country – I mean I would say you’re not fit to 
do so.  The insight it has given me into myself but also into what is the culture of 
the country that I’m from has been – at times –mind-blowing and I’m really 
grateful for that part of experience; I find it’s a very important one. (SPT R8 
Hendricks) 
 Another individual changed his style to suit a more senior advisory position: 
I’m no longer the executioner; I’m the guy who influences others, but they can 
decide what they want and what they don’t want to do [….] So work with those 
people to make sure it’s non-threatening and invite them to participate. (BSN R2 
Peter) 
 “Managing managers” required cognitive flexibility in use of skills: 
I think the main breakthrough for me in management was recognising that when 
you’re managing managers as opposed to managing teams of people, it’s a 
totally different set of skills.  You can’t just kind of talk to someone, find out 
what they’re doing and say ‘do this differently or you need that’ context. You’ve 
got to work through other leaders that then have to inspire those people. (BSN 
R4 Mark) 
4.2.2.3 Interrupting automatisation 
Interrupting automatisation was also indicative of transition expertise. 
 For example taking a step back to consider if you are “doing the right thing”:  
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I think, whenever I’ve gone in a new role – as I think many people do – I’ve 
taken one step backwards before I’ve gone forwards so it’s the old bath tub 
analogy.  And I probably do – each time I’ve changed job, I go through a 
transitional phase where I do question ‘am I doing the right things? Am I 
contributing as much as I was before? (BSN R1 Lawrence) 
Resisting the inclination to act automatically based on assumptions from existing 
knowledge: 
There is always “the more you know the less you know” because you suddenly 
see all these various options that exist and the probability of not addressing the 
right thing. (BSN R4 Peter) 
A musician at senior levels interrupted the tendency to act and instead consulted 
and assessed a situation before moving ahead: 
Let a year run so you watch how your horse performs before you start pulling 
the reins too hard and – I think – so you consult widely with colleagues don’t 
you? You observe the rhythm and pattern of an Institution that’s already under 
momentum and start to make analysis of who’s strong, who isn’t strong and 
what is strong and what’s weak, what attributes need changing? (MUS R8 
Richard) 
Non-automatisation can take the form of consciously taking time to develop 
longer term career plans: 
I also knew I had a skills deficit in a whole lot of areas which I believed I had 
the aptitude for – in other words I could do it, but I needed to learn.  So 
although I could perhaps have jumped into a higher position more readily, I’d 
seen how many people failed in high management positions – let’s put it bluntly: 
most of them fail – some fail tragically… I mean so tragically they even die in 
office. So I thought no, you take the time to learn so that you build the skill set so 
that you can be a very efficient really senior leader; you could say took nearly 
10 years to do that. (MUS R2 Thomas) 
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4.2.2.4 Discussion: Cognitive flexibility during transitions 
Most studies of expertise focus on the acquisition and continued refinement of 
elite performance ability in a particular domain in order to develop stable expert 
states.  Transitions on the other hand can be characterised as dynamic states 
which require more cognitive flexibility and even change oriented heuristics. 
General cognitive flexibility as well as non-reductive heuristics were 
demonstrated across all domains. All 8 musicians and 8 business people 
demonstrated cognitive flexibility during transitions averaging a total of 4.63 
references to cognitive flexibility for each individual. Only 5 of the sports people 
made references to cognitive flexibility and their average was less, only 3.2 
references per individual (See Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6. Cognitive flexibility in transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
General 
cognitive 
flexibility 
6 14 2.83 1 2 2 5 8 1.43 16 24 1.5 
Non-fixedness 
or non-
reductive bias 
7 21 3.14 4 6 1.75 7 15 2.14 18 42 2.44 
Non-
automaticity 
2 2 1 3 8 2.33 7 14 2 12 24 2 
             
Totals 8 37 4.63 5 16 3.2 8 37 4.63 21 90 4.26 
There were repeated references amongst participants to going to deeper levels or 
returning to first principles, trying to understand what was happening, seeking 
more information, knowing what you don’t know, seeing the bigger picture, and 
so forth which are all indicative of non-reductive heuristics (Feltovitch, et al., 
1993; Chi, 2006). Participants in the study were concerned with understanding 
new role requirements, business situations, stakeholder requirements, and new 
decision-making processes, which required conscious assessment of 
contemporary contexts to assure that courses of action during transitions were 
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appropriate (Sternberg, 1988). Such conditionality and a context sensitive 
approaches to situations are indicative of non-functional fixedness (Dunker, 
1945; Luria, 1976). General cognitive flexibility was also demonstrated through 
simultaneity and multiple representation (Feltovich, Spiro & Coulson, 1993), e.g.  
“travelling on an eight lane highway” which not only enabled individuals to keep 
multiple options and career streams open at earlier career but also gave them the 
flexibility to meet the multiple demands of more senior roles. The high level 
heuristics used by expert may have been developed and used in multiple 
applications even if they had been developed to optimise their performance 
within their primary domain.    
Interruptions of automaticity went beyond simply stopping habitual behaviour: 
the participants interrupted automatic algorithmic processes and mechanical 
decision making in order to look for patterns across situations and time and 
avoided “mental sets” (Wiley, 1998) that limited their options or choices.  
Business people mentioned this more than the other two domains and in fact 
business people regularly take part in training programmes designed to teach 
them to interrupt automaticity such as brainstorming (Osborn, 1963) and lateral 
thinking (de Bono, 1970). Experts need not always be constrained to standard 
algorithms when confronted with new or non-conforming situations (Patel & 
Groen, 1991). From a perspective of production systems, when individuals 
interrupted automaticity e.g., the business person who stated “the more you know 
the less you know,” they are operating self-modify productions (Klahr, 1984) 
which utilise processes like discrimination and generalisation. Interrupting 
automatisation avoids Chi’s (2006) glossing over: when something doesn’t fit, 
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they stop and consider it. “You observe the rhythm and pattern of an institution” 
before you act on your experience. 
It is noteworthy that only two musicians made reference to non-automaticity as 
opposed to 7 of the business people.  Musicians seemed less inclined to step back 
and interrupt their approach or consider their options before pursuing a course of 
action.  One explanation for this could be that they already maintained a broader, 
non-reductive perspective consistent with their early development of cognitive 
flexibility (Table 4.4).  This non-closure of approaches and search for broad 
perspectives (Feltovitch et al., 1997) would contribute to their general cognitive 
flexibility during transitions: there might have been less need to interrupt 
automatic responses consciously because they had operated with higher levels of 
non-functional fixedness which enhanced their ability to pursue a broader range 
of actions without being ‘boxed’ in.  Another indication of this non-fixedness 
was in what individuals called ‘radar’ (sport) or ‘instinct’ (music) which enabled 
them to identify what was not apparent in the surface details of a situation and to 
formulate responses which would address emergent or implicit issues. Though 
business people used such non-analytical processes also, these references were 
more characteristic of sport people and musicians in this study.  
When setting up the parameters for data coding, the category of early cognitive 
flexibility was by definition limited to periods of studentship and early 
professional career stages whereas coding for more general cognitive flexibility 
during transitions was more in evidence in statements about transitions in the 
middle and later stages of a career.  However, if we compile early and later 
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cognitive flexibility, then cognitive flexibility is in evidence throughout the 
careers of all 24 participants in the study (See Table 4.7).   
Table 4.7 Cognitive flexibility  
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Early cognitive  
flexibility 
 
8 41 5.13 8 29 3.63 6 25 4.17 22 95 4.32 
Cognitive 
flexibility 
during 
transitions 
8 37 4.63 5 16 3.2 8 37 4.63 21 90 4.26 
             
TOTAL 8 77 9.63 8 45 5.63 8 62 7.75 24 185 7.71 
However, the application of cognitive flexibility seems to be different between 
the earlier and later career stages. The earlier mentions of cognitive flexibility 
and multiple domain expertise more often involved interrupting early tendencies 
toward automaticity, avoiding domain limiting algorithms even in their area of 
expertise, resisting functional fixedness, or even breaking perceptual and 
cognitive sets (Amabile, 1996). Mentions during later career stage transitions 
tended to focus more on generalising from their early expertise to emerging 
situations, applying previous experience to new domains and developing 
different types of expertise within their general fields.  This progression from 
developing cognitive flexibility in earlier career stages to applying it in later 
stages seems, on reflection, to be a reasonable progression and one which may 
also reflect the development of expertise. The early stages of an expert career 
focuses on developing one’s expertise, in this case cognitive flexibility and 
expertise generalisability. The latter stages of an expert’s career are more focused 
on applying expertise and adapting it to the range of situations and opportunities 
that emerge throughout the course of a career. 
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4.2.3 Domain expertise generalisability 
The next issue to address is whether expertise itself can be generalised. A useful 
differentiation within expertise has been to divide it into “factual (declarative) 
knowledge” and “procedural knowledge” (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). Though 
they are interdependent and intertwined (Tulving & Thomson, 1973 Chase & 
Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 1996b), they are not synonymous. Consequently, 
the following review of data indicative of generalising expertise will address two 
areas: 1) the generalisation of expert knowledge using domain specific 
information and accumulated expert knowledge in new situations during 
transitions; and 2) generalising expert processes such as assessment of situations, 
problem solving, and decision making that have developed in conjunction with 
their primary domain expertise to a new situation (See Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8 Some statements indicative of knowledge and process generalisation 
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE GENERALISATION 
“A specific remit to be somebody with performance experience [to] help  the board make 
investment decisions” 
“So spoke to coaches from other sports and took a real interest in how other sports did it” 
“Wrote stuff from sport that could be used in management which is now being used in the 
schools” 
“The thing that’s really excited me intellectually through my whole career has been taking from 
one field and applying to another” 
“I think I’m quite a strategic person, but also being a lawyer I’m into the details [...] if I’ve got to 
get to the Commonwealth Games, got to make the Scottish team” 
EXPERT PROCESS GENERALISATION 
“I had developed physical and then cultural capital and I converted it into professional capital” 
“All the time using research and politics together” 
“The actual trading bit […] I thought there was almost a more engineering piece” 
“So instead of being a coach, I got involved in running a pressure group for women’s sports” 
“For me, even being a manager is always a bit of a performance”  
“Just dealing with more money and bigger decisions and ‘I’m going to close that factory’ instead 
of ‘I’m going to shut this door’ 
4.2.3.1 Generalising expert domain knowledge  
In sport individuals can move from being a performance leader in one’s own 
sport to being an expert in performance development for all sports: 
[I was] asked to go on the {national institution} Board with a specific remit to 
be somebody with performance experience – they had different people with 
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different competencies and they wanted somebody with performance experience 
who would help the Board make investment decision and institute a performance 
management programme with the governing bodies that would lead to us 
coming fourth in the medal table in 2012. (SPT R5George) 
Some sports people moved out of their sport and became expert consultants to 
different sports: 
I’m now this kind of pretty established independent expert in my sport and in the 
field of I guess effective applied sports science, so my first real engagement with 
this isn’t the cycling − it’s actually {national institution} who were the 
distributor at the time getting on the phone saying ‘We want to pay you to be an 
expert advisor to evaluate these plans that are coming in’.  So my first encounter 
with world-class investment across all sports, was being invited to review the 
canoeing plan or to advise whichever sport that was going to write the plan.  
(SPT R2 Edward)  
Conversely one individual drew upon knowledge from other sports and applied it 
back to his own sport: 
So I spoke to coaches from other sports and took a real interest in how other 
sports did it, that had got a longer tradition of coaching than we had and then 
spent a lot of time thinking about which bits of it were relevant and what their 
proportional importance was in our sport.  (SPT R3 George)  
Business people brought their expert knowledge to bear in a different division: 
There was a transition of different jobs and although I had this big managerial 
role in the lab, they asked me if I would become Director of Research for one of 
the business areas - the refinery marketing business – so I moved to that job 
which was a smaller people management job, but a very complex in terms of the 
interface between the business and research so I started working in different 
circles and working, understanding business problems in a different way etc. 
(BSN R1 Oliver) 
Musicians generalised from teaching to accrediting teachers: 
I became an Associated Board Examiner for the Associated Board of Royal 
Schools of Music and I'd always wanted to do that as well because I enjoy, you 
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know, the examining thing […] So I qualified as an examiner at thirty and I 
started to do a lot of work for them and again, that was another parallel that ran 
with my academy growing and my playing growing. (MUS R3 Yvonne)  
One person applied knowledge from sport coaching to business management 
training and then back to sporting education for children: 
[I]wrote stuff that could be used in management which is now being used in the 
schools so that the body, mind, emotion, spirit elements are valued based 
leadership can go right into the life development journal for the kids – same 
thing: it’s just a human being whether they are a senior executive or a teenager. 
(SPT R8 Harold)  
A sports person cross-fertilised from academia in music to academia in sport: 
I suppose the thing that’s really excited me intellectually through my whole 
career has been taking from one field and applying to another. I’ll give you one 
example that’s been very important to me and that’s music notation. I developed 
sport notation in the ‘80’s − I developed a written notational stave and I 
analysed positions on the field and every passing pattern and so I could read it 
like a piece of music. (SPT R4 Diane) 
Another sports person took knowledge from her legal training back into 
managing her personal training strategy: 
I think I’m quite a strategic person, but also being a lawyer I’m into the details, 
so when somebody that can work out what the bigger picture is – work the path 
through – saying if I’ve got to get the Commonwealth, got to make the 
{national} team, how am I going to do that and work back. (SPT R3 Claire) 
4.2.3.2 Generalising expert domain processes  
It seems important that individuals would be able to generalise their expert 
processes developed in their primary domain to subsequent domains and career 
stages.  Generalising these processes will be important during transitions and in 
for successful performance in subsequent career stages. There were in fact 
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numerous illustrations of applying general processes acquired in the primary 
domain expertise to a different field. 
Generalising problem solving process from engineering to energy trading: 
The actual trading bit of deciding when to hedge, how to hedge, did you want to 
be long shot with the market going up / down − that was all new. So I thought 
there was almost a more engineering piece which was which crudes will be the 
best crudes to deliver at the most value.  I kind of find that much easier − that 
was more of a puzzle − the kind of figuring out which way to market was going 
how best to take advantage of that. I mean that was another puzzle but one that 
did seem to follow engineering rules: if you ran a model you could predict these 
things and you put these inputs in and you’ve these outputs. (BSN R1 John)  
Moving from performing and coaching to lobbying and running a business: 
We talk about physical capital in sport that you can actually cash it on, but I 
had developed physical and then cultural capital and I converted it into 
professional capital.  (SPT R7 Diane)    
Moving from sporting performance to education and government policy: 
What I’ve been doing with the 21st century legacy I see as being utterly 
congruent with sport and participation, the health of the nation and the 
wellbeing of the nation sits with [….] empowering the children to make choices 
of a healthy intent in your future.  So it’s only just an extension of the same 
values and intent. (SPT R10 Harold) 
From managing swimmers and musicians to managing businessmen: 
I was leading a group of men who were all senior to me in their respective 
institutions and I realised quite quickly on – a bit like the swimming – ‘I have a 
natural feel for this.’  It’s not that I’m going to get it right all the time but I’m 
going to be able to keep them motivated, keep them happy with the 
programme….it was a bit like when I discovered I was a really, really good 
actress which I’d never known until I started doing it; I suddenly realised I can 
do this stuff – I can do this leadership. (MUS R2 Susan) 
Generalisation from sport to political and social arenas: 
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So instead of being a coach, I got involved in running a pressure group for 
women’s sports and became an active feminist by this point; I’d brought those 
two interests together. So I took my feminist awareness and consciousness into 
lobbying for discrimination and a better situation for women in sports and 
helped to set a pressure group called {institution} in 1984 and ten years later set 
up an international version.  (SPT R2 Diane) 
Musicians applied process used to manage their careers to manage a department: 
I think that sense of being able to work progressively and logically and you 
know, when one practises, one sets oneself milestones and one continually 
evaluates what one does and then one manages one’s work in order to reach the 
next milestone, one does all of that subconsciously when you practise and yet 
those are exactly the sort of skills that you need when you are then in a 
managerial position. (MUS R3 Stephen) 
Being a “performer” in a management situation:  
And the other thing is that willingness and that ability even to express oneself, to 
be sort of naked in public, if you like…. For me, even being a manager is always 
a bit of a performance. (MUS R6 Stephen) 
There were a number of illustrations of individuals generalising from different 
domains back into their original domain. One individual generalises from other 
educational domains back to music: 
I was suddenly directly relating to the highest nationals of Government and the 
research community and I learnt from some wonderful people there – fellow 
heads of academies, other people who we would employ as consultants; I learnt 
a lot of the skills that I would never have learnt as even a Dean of a faculty of 
arts, let alone the faculty of music. So that gave me a huge… again learning 
opportunity from people who were really world leaders in their fields and gave 
me light understandings of issues in medical sciences and technology and 
natural sciences which often then became role models for things you could take 
back to areas of humanities and social sciences. (MUS R4 Thomas) 
This same musician generalised from his personal experience of how he 
successfully developed his career to a philosophy of education in general: 
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And so hence it’s not surprising I’m a big proponent of people studying more 
than one subject at undergraduate level or having a breadth of fundamental and 
professional application and not being locked into a programme which some 
other people determine.  In other words not letting your career be run because 
someone thinks that they know exactly what you will need in the next 50 years of 
your life. (MUS R2 Thomas) 
One businessman explained how he generalised from decision making processes 
about engineering technicalities to broad corporate business decisions:  
Even when you’re running a company you still sit down with people and decide 
what you’re going to do and it happens at every level and you’re just dealing 
with more money and bigger decisions and ‘I’m going to close that factory’ 
instead of ‘I’m going to shut this door’, but in a sense it’s just people making 
decisions; it’s not, it isn’t radically different[only]the time you’ve got to spend 
doing it and the expertise you need to have around you to make the right 
decision gets to be of a different order. (BSN R4 Michael)  
4.2.3.3 Discussion: Generalising expert domain knowledge and 
processes during transitions 
The data supports the proposal that both expert knowledge and processes are 
generalisable (See Table 4.9).   
Table 4.9  Domain process and knowledge generalisability 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Domain Process 
Generalisability 
8 23 2.88 4 12 2.6 4 12 3 16 47 2.94 
Domain 
Knowledge 
Generalisability 
8 18 2.25 7 20 2.86 3 8 2.67 18 46 2.56 
             
TOTAL 8 41 5.13 7 32 4.57 4 20 5 19 93 4.89 
Of the 24 participants, 16 (66%) mentioned generalising expert domain processes 
and 18 (75%) mentioned generalising expert domain knowledge. In total 19 
(79%) mentioned one or the other.  All 8 musicians made references to 
generalising both domain processes and knowledge. Of the sports people, 4 
mentioned domain process generalisation and 7 knowledge generalisation, 
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though only 4 mentioned knowledge generalisation more than once. Only 4 
(50%) business people mentioned knowledge or process generalisability and with 
less frequent references (20) than those by sports people (32) or musicians (41).  
Eliminating cases where mentions were singular, i.e. only one mention of domain 
knowledge or process generalisability, the data indicates that (16) 66% of the 
participants regularly generalised domain specific knowledge or processes during 
career transitions. These generalisations of expert processes and knowledge 
operated in one of three modes: (1) early expertise generalised to subsequent 
stages of a career in the same field, e.g. from performing to coaching to 
development of a curriculum for the same sport; (2) primary domain expertise 
generalised to a different domain, e.g. from leading a string section in an 
orchestra to a running business; and (3) expert knowledge from a different 
domain generalised back to the primary domain, e.g. from being a lawyer to 
running a sports training programme. This third type of generalisation is, strictly 
speaking, not from primary domain expertise to a secondary domain expertise 
but its reverse. However, this type of generalisation will use the same 
mechanisms and it is one more way in which the participants generalised expert 
processes to bridge expertise between domains. 
On the simplest level, expert knowledge generalised across domains would 
conform with Tulving’s proposition that the more links an experience has in 
semantic memory, the more that memory can be retrieved through a variety of 
routes (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and be applied in a variety of domain specific 
episodes. Memory management processes like schemata can access expert 
memory from multiple routes and under the right conditions in multiple domains 
(Hoffman, 1987; Woods et al., 1994; Chi, 2006; etc.) for example from sports 
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coaching to business coaching or from musical notation to sports notation. On 
another level, generalising knowledge from one domain to another by participant 
e.g., generalising principles from teaching to accrediting teachers or from cycling 
to other sports, often involves more abstract conceptual knowledge which might 
be less domain tied avoiding “intact, pre-packaged schema-like knowledge 
structures” (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1997). 
The mechanisms for generalising expert processes may reflect higher order 
structures less tied to domain expertise (Gardner, 1983) or the broader non-
domain processes associated with high levels of expert performance (Krampe & 
Charness, 2006). If templates used in a specific situation have many non-stable 
features and can be activated by a broad range of semantic cues or via different 
routes, then they are not necessarily tied to a domain and its specific knowledge 
as would otherwise be the case, particularly if this flexibility is built in at an early 
stage of developing expertise. Development of broader discrimination nets or 
retrieval structures beyond the domain where they were originally applied 
(Gobet, 1998) may build in process slots that may be open to broader 
associations beyond domain expertise. The redundancy in the system is an 
attribute of templates that would make them generalisable beyond their domain.
2
  
All 8 musicians demonstrated the ability to generalise from their primary domain 
knowledge and processes. This might also reflect the longer performing career of 
                                                 
2
 It is also possible that some of this generalising capability may reflect the operation of more 
general meta-cognitive self-management processes, e.g. Sternberg’s (1996) meta-components or 
Zimmerman’s (2006) self-regulation that are not generally domain linked as will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. These permutations in the operation of templates and schemata in general could also 
be similar to those used to minimise decline in memory (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000) or manage 
expert performance at later career stages (Horn & Masunaga, 2006) and will be discussed further 
in Chapter 8.  
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musicians (of the three domains only musicians were continuing to perform at 
high levels in their primary domain when interviewed in this study). It might also 
be a contributor to the criteria for promotion to the most senior levels in music 
which often requires that the individual continue to perform publicly and be able 
to demonstrate up-to-date expert knowledge about the performance challenges 
facing young musicians. Their primary domain performance knowledge and 
expert processes would be maintained and developed throughout progressive 
career stages e.g., they may be making a budget decision in the morning, 
managing a faculty meeting in the afternoon and then performing a concert in the 
eventing. Those business people who explicitly mentioned direct domain process 
or knowledge generalisabilty were more likely to have remained  in touch with 
the expert knowledge of their primary domain even as they progressed to senior 
levels e.g., a Chief Scientist in an oil company, a head of design for an 
automotive manufacturer, and a senior risks analyst in banking. It is reasonable 
to conclude that the further away from primary domain experience one moves, 
the less accessible previous processes and particular knowledge become for use 
in subsequent situations. The cognitive processes used for generalisation from 
primary domain expertise will be “stretched” farther as the current career 
situation and performance becomes more different and contextually remote than 
their earlier career as an expert performer. 
4.3 Concluding discussion 
Analysis of participants’ discussion of their studentship and early professional 
careers indicated that most of the participants acquired their expertise in ways 
which contributed to its generalisability. They developed expert performance in 
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contiguous domains, becoming singers as well as pianists, dancers as well as 
lacrosse players, computer analysts as well as risk analysts. They also developed 
high levels of expertise in different domains: sports women were lawyers, 
musicians were swimmers, business men were linguists. The early development 
of broad expertise and multiple types of expertise helped create general and 
expert knowledge and processes that were less domain tied, less-rigid, less 
reductive, more open to variation and combination, more accessible from a 
multiple routes and generally more flexible. There was little mention of 
deliberate practice contributing to their acquisition of primary domain expertise. 
Participants used various higher level heuristics to make successful transitions. 
These included non-reductive bias, non-functional fixedness, and non-
automaticity. They could revert to first principles not limited to domain specific 
applications and use deeper levels of meaning to gain insight into new situations 
and arrive at new courses of action during transitions. These higher level 
cognitive approaches enabled them to analyse data, consider alternatives, make 
decisions, seek out new knowledge, and utilise existing knowledge in new 
contexts and during transitions. 
There were clear examples of individuals applying previously acquired expert 
knowledge and processes to new domains. However, it seems likely, and almost 
common sensible, that the closer a subsequent career stage is to the primary 
domain, the more likely it is that the individual will be able to generalise both 
domain knowledge and processes.  
To conclude, the combination of adaptable early learning contexts, exposure to 
multiple expert domains, avoidance of automaticity and reductiveness, 
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application of expert knowledge and processes across domains, and the general 
use and development of cognitive flexibility will contribute to how effectively 
individuals will manage transitions from one career stage to another.   
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Chapter 5. Intelligence: Inductive, 
Inferential, and Analogical 
Mechanisms   
Introduction 
This chapter will be organised into four parts.  The first part will briefly review 
general theories of intelligence as they identify elements that relate to transition 
expertise. The second part will review how certain common elements of many 
theories of intelligence  generally called inference, induction, and analogy  can 
operate in conjunction with cognitive flexibility to support generalisation of 
expert knowledge and processes during transitions.  The third part will analyse 
the data and discuss it in light of the theory to show where and how participants 
in this study used these mechanisms to apply the processes and knowledge 
developed in their primary expert domain to perform successfully in a variety of 
transition situations and other domains.  The fourth part will present conclusions.  
5.1 Intelligence and cognitive generalising 
abilities 
Intelligence has been studied for centuries but in the last 150 years almost 
exclusively through differentiating it into (often numerous) measureable sub-
components. Most models of intelligence  regardless of the apparent divergence 
amongst the measures and measured  include certain fundamental elements or 
abilities that are usually identified as inference, induction, and analogy which 
enable individuals to apply knowledge and experience to changing situations and 
which would enable experts to make transitions from one domain to another and 
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progress from one career stage to a subsequent one.  I will first review a number 
of the better-known intelligence models and will then discuss how induction, 
inference and analogy are central in the operation of most of them. 
5.1.1 Trait and factorial models 
5.1.1.1 Simple sensory or complex cognitive processes: Galton vs. Binet 
Francis Galton (1869) focused on measuring relatively simple sensory processes 
like auditory reaction times, visual discrimination abilities, reaction times, etc. 
which reflected his belief derived from British empiricist philosophers that 
complex cognitive processes were based upon knowledge derived from more 
simple sensations.  J. Mc. Cattell (1890), a protégé of Galton, identified 10 
psychological functions such as tactile discrimination, thresholds for pain, 
reaction time for auditory stimuli, etc. that were correlated to intellectual 
performance. Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon (1908), on the other hand, 
contended that individual differences in intelligence reflected complex cognitive 
processes that were themselves measurable and which they initially divided into 
four major categories direction, comprehension, adaptation and autocriticism. 
Galton and Binet represent a philosophical/methodological divide for measuring 
intelligence with implications for transition expertise: 1) how linked are 
cognitive processes to specific sensory functions and domain knowledge and 2) 
does this linkage make them more or less generalisable during transitions?  
5.1.1.2 Factorial analysis and traits: Spearman, Thurstone,  & Carroll  
Charles Spearman, like Galton, maintained that that the “common and essential 
element in the Intelligences coincides with the common and essential element in 
the Sensory Functions” (Spearman, 1923. p. 37).  Spearman (1927) developed 
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factor analysis to identify positive correlations between measures of these 
sensory functions and more general measures of academic achievement 
commonly associated with intelligence. Spearman maintained that all intellectual 
activity had in common one fundamental function (or group of functions) called 
‘g’ or general intelligence. Certain specific cognitive skills and abilities such as 
arithmetic computations or vocabulary were associated with distinct measures 
which he called ‘s’ or specific communities of domain specific factors which 
were organised subsequently into groups (Holzinger, 1938). Intelligence operated 
in accordance with three noegenic laws and associated processes: “(1) The 
apprehension of one’s own experience [….] that a person has more or less power 
to observe what goes on in his own mind [….]. (2) The eduction of relations that 
when a person has in mind any two or more ideas [.…] he has more or less power 
to bring to mind any relation that essentially holds between them [….]. (3) The 
eduction of correlates [.…] that when a person has in mind any idea together 
with a relation, he has more or less power to bring into mind the correlative idea” 
(Spearman, 1923, pp. 162-166).  
Louis Thurstone (1938, 1947) like Thorndike (1903) promoted a more 
heterarchical organisation of intelligence in which he maintained that there was 
no overriding general intelligence factor ‘g’ as proposed by Spearman.  He used 
a different factor analytic procedure than Spearman to analyse 57 different 
variables eventually arriving at 7 (possibly 8) relatively independent and equally 
important primary mental faculties which made up intelligence consisting of: 
verbal comprehension, verbal fluency, numerical fluency, spatial visualisation, 
associative memory, perceptual speed and inductive reasoning.  
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Raymond Cattell (1957, 1963) subsequently proposed that g could be 
differentiated into fluid intelligence (gf) which involves abstract reasoning, 
creativity, dealing with novelty, inductive reasoning, etc. and crystallised 
intelligence (gc), which involves accumulated knowledge, deduction from 
existing knowledge and the control of procedures. Burt (1949) proposed a similar 
hierarchical structure and Vernon (1950) identified a tiered approach as well with 
a broad g at the most general level and then v:ed (verbal-educational) and  k:m 
(practical-mechanical) at the next level under which further subdivisions could 
be identified. Horn collaborated with Cattell (1966) to further define gf as a 
relational/inferential ability to perceive relations between stimuli, draw 
inferences and understand implications wheras gc was considered to be more 
educationally derived and consist of abilities acquired (or at least optimised) 
throughout a lifetime such as verbal comprehension and semantic relationships. 
Horn and Masunga (2006) subsequently renamed gc Acculturation Knowledge 
because it included culturally-tied knowledge and was highly correlated to 
performance on standard IQ test like Stanford-Binet (SB5) (Roid & Barram, 
2004) and Wechsler (WAIS-III) (Weschler, 1997). Gf was viewed as biologically 
and genetically influenced, declining from age 40 onwards.  Gc was more 
determined by cultural and educational exposure and did not begin to decline 
until age 70 (Baltes & Baltes, 1986). Subsequent research demonstrated that both 
gc and gf have distinct cultural and hereditable attributes (Horn, 1994). 
Guilford (1956, 1967) did not posit the existence of a general ‘g’. Nor did he rely 
explicitly on factor analysis in the development his Structure of Intellect (SI) 
model. Rather he generated factors morphologically using the intersection of 
three dimensions: operations with five subcategories of cognition, memory, 
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divergent production, convergent production and evaluation; contents with four 
subcategories of figural, symbolic, semantic and behavioural; and product with 
six subcategories of units, classes, relations, systems, transformations and 
implications. The intersection of these three dimensions identified the possible 
existence of up to 150 factors contributing to intelligence (See Figure 5.1). He 
fitted existing data from previous research in intelligence into his model and then 
isolated and measured factors that would fit into his empty categories.  
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Figure 5.1 Guilford’s structure of intellect model. Based on Guilford (1967) 
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Carroll’s (1976, 1993) highly regarded meta-analysis of 477 data sets delineated 
intelligence into a three stratum hierarchical structure (see Figure 5.2). There 
were 40 Stratum I, narrow first order abilities (which incorporated and 
reformulated most of Thurstone’s factors). These were then organised into eight 
Stratum II or second-order factors which, when ranked from highest to lowest 
loading of Spearman’s g, were: fluid intelligence, crystallised intelligence, 
general memory and learning, broad visual perception, broad auditory 
perception, broad retrieval ability, broad cognitive speediness and processing 
speed. These were all then subsumed under a single Stratum III General 
Intelligence (G or G3) higher order factor which corresponded roughly with 
Spearman’s g.  In many ways Carroll’s work integrated the best of his three most 
well known predecessors incorporating Spearman’s two factor conceptualisation 
of a general intelligence ‘g’ and specific communities of factors ‘s’, Cattell’s 
hierarchical ordering of Spearman’s work and his differentiation of gf and gc, 
and Thurstone’s differentiation of  factors into broader groups of sub-factors. 
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Figure 5.2 Human cognitive abilities. Based upon Carroll (1993) 
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5.1.1.3 Common elements for transition expertise in factorial models 
In all of these models intelligence is differentiated into a variety or sub-factors or 
categories of factors, a number of which could operate as the cognitive 
mechanisms for generalising experience from one domain to another.  These 
include adaptation, associative memory, inductive reasoning, eduction of 
relations, eduction of correlates, cognitive flexibility, the production of creative 
answers, fluid intelligence, relational/inferential ability, flexibility of closure, 
originality/creativity, and associational fluency. Even the most recent 
Stanford/Binet measure, the SB5 (Roid & Barram, 2004) includes element like 
toleration of ambiguity, pattern recognition, synthesis of information, cognitive 
flexibility, visualisation of whole from its parts and the production of creative 
answers.  
5.1.2 Modularity and intelligence  
There are a number of theorists who maintain that intelligence needs to be 
understood as a modular phenomenon that consists of a number of relatively 
discrete faculties as opposed to categories of factors or abilities.
3
 Jerry Fodor 
(1975, 1983) is one such theorist who is of interest because he sought to 
reconcile a faculty or modular conception of intelligence with information 
theories and cognitive science which form the basis of most theories of expertise. 
He organised cognitive processes and structures into three primary categories. 
(i) Complied transducers are equivalent with perceptual systems such as seeing, 
hearing and touch  though some are not strictly speaking perceptual.   
                                                 
3
 They often have theoretical associations with structuralists like Binet and Simon (1916), Piaget 
(1954),and  Levi-Strauss (1962). 
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 (ii) Input systems mediate between transducer inputs and central (or general) 
cognitive mechanism. Their characteristics include: (a) domain specificity which 
makes input systems essentially modular so that even within the domain of 
language there are different types of input systems such as phonology versus 
semantics e.g., the difference between hearing the  word “cow” versus talking 
about a cow; (b) shallow outputs which do not deliver abstract information or 
categorisations to the central systems; and (c) information encapsulation which 
ties them to the information they process making them “cognitively 
impenetrable” (Pylyshyn, 1980, 1986) and preventing them from being broken 
down into components. 
(iii) Central systems are not informationally encapsulated and not necessarily 
modular. They are “relatively non-denominational” (i.e. non-domain specific) 
cognitive systems typified by mental processes such problem solving.  More 
complex central systems might utilise inference whereas more fundamental 
inputs systems may inform behaviour directly (Ullman, 1980).  
If processes and operations are not content blind and are informationally 
encapsulated, then mental representations, propositional structures, processes, 
schemas, central systems, etc. may be tied to a domain and differ from domain to 
domain and so not be readily accessible for generalisation during transitions.   
For example, there are obvious content-binding distinctions amongst Carroll’s 
(1993) Stratum III factors such as semantic processing speed, numerical fluency, 
musical discrimination and spatial relations. Each of Guilford’s (1967) five 
operations, when utilised with his five kinds of content would be a different type 
of operation e.g., evaluation operations on semantic content would be different 
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than evaluation operations on figural or visual content. Content ties would tend 
to make the operations less generalisable. However, cognitive scientists have 
developed models that operated with a content-blind bias i.e. the cognitive 
processes are considered to be general and consistent regardless of content which 
would make them adaptable and supportive of transitions (e.g., Miller, Gallanter 
& Pribram, 1960; Newell & Simon, 1973; Rumelhart, 1980) 
5.1.2.1 Modularity and transition expertise 
Fodor (1983) identified several cognitive and neuropsychological issues 
involving content blindness/boundedness that may influence cognitive 
generalisability and transition expertise specifically.  
1) How neurologically bound or sensorily tied are cognitive processes?  
2) How much is domain knowledge encapsulated and how tacit is this 
knowledge? 
3) What is the nature of the experience, knowledge, cognitive process and 
structures that are more easily generisable?  
4) Are the processes which tie experience, knowledge and cognition into 
fixed architecture reversible or malleable and if so how?  
5) How much the generisability of cognitive processes might be due to the 
nature of how cognition is acquired or learned?  
6) What kinds of acquisition processes would help mitigate some of the 
considerations in the previous questions?   
These questions will be borne in mind when discussion the following models of 
intelligence. 
5.1.3 Componential theory of intelligence 
5.1.3.1  Sternberg’s  Triarchic Mind  
Robert Sternberg’s (1977) Triarchic Theory of Intelligence was developed as a 
componential model which sought to incorporate the best of factor analytic and 
information processing models.  Sternberg (1985) organised his components into 
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three subtheories  componential, experiential and contextual – each with 
multiple sub categories.  
5.1.3.1.1 Componential aspects subtheory 
The componential subtheory has three further sub elements: Metacomponents, 
Performance Components and Knowledge Acquisition Components.  
i. Metacomponents (Sternberg, 1988, p. 59) are processes used to plan, monitor 
and evaluate problem solving. There are several sequential sub-categories: 
a. decision as to what the problem is   that needs to be solved  
b. selection of optimal lower order components - for solution of a problem  
c. selection of representations or organisations for information  such as 
linguistic or spatial and which allow appropriate analogic processes 
d. selection of a strategy for combining lower order components  including 
global ( macro and strategic)  or local ( micro and specific) strategies 
e. allocation of attentional resources  for short and long term 
f. solution monitoring  keeping track of actions, modifying goals appropriately 
g. sensitivity to external feedback   understanding feedback and acting upon it.  
Meta-components have an agentic or executive function and operate as control 
processes for intelligence in human behaviour. Sternberg maintains that they are 
also an indicator of a general intelligence factor like ‘g’ because they “have a 
much higher proportion of general components among them than do any of the 
other kinds of components, presumably because the executive routines need to 
plan, monitor and possibly re-plan performance are highly overlapping across 
widely differing tasks” (Sternberg, 1985, p. 119). This would make them non 
domain specific and of use for generalising knowledge and processes. 
ii. Performance components like encoding, inferring, mapping, applying, 
justifying, and responding are “lower order” and used to implement the 
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commands of the metacomponents (Sternberg, 1988, p. 59). Several of these are 
clearly components of intelligence that will contribute to generalisability. 
iii. Knowledge Acquisition components are used to learn how to solve problems. 
Selective encoding involves perceiving in a stimulus features that had previously 
been non-obvious so that information originally viewed as being non-relevant 
now becomes relevant. Selective combination involves putting together parts of a 
situation in ways that had previously been non-obvious that can lead to a change 
in the mental representation of the problem.  Selective comparison involves 
comparing past and new information, thereby discovering a non-obvious 
relationship which leads to the solution of a problem (Sternberg, 1988, pp. 170-
205).  Knowledge-acquisition processes can operate separately or together to 
enable what Sternberg calls insightful learning whereby new ideas are developed.  
5.1.3.1.2 Experiential subtheory 
Sternberg’s experiential aspects of intelligence operate along a continuum from 
automatisation to novelty. Automatisation frees up cognitive capacity from more 
familiar tasks to deal with more complex or unresolved issues. Novelty enables 
individuals to respond to new and emerging situations. Insight during knowledge 
acquisition processes enables an individual to move from automatised conceptual 
systems to novel ones: selective encoding insight sifts out relevant from 
irrelevant information; selective combination insight includes what initially 
might be irrelevant information into a unified and usable whole; and selective 
comparison insight relates newly acquired information to information acquired in 
the past (Sternberg, 1981).   
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5.1.3.1.3 The contextual subtheory 
The Contextual aspect of intelligence is Sternberg’s third sub-theory and 
concerns how intelligence operates in relationship to the environment. “In the 
triarchic theory, intelligence in everyday life is defined as the purposive 
adaptation to, selection of, and shaping of real-world environments relevant to 
one’s life and abilities” (Sternberg, 1988, p. 65).  The contextual aspects of 
Sternberg’s model will be addressed in more depth in Chapter 7 when discussing 
Practical Intelligence. 
5.1.3.2 Componential theory and transition expertise 
Sternberg makes a strong argument for the plasticity and non-domain specificity 
of cognition. Unlike Fodor, he does not link intelligence to domain knowledge or 
information specific representational systems. Many of his components have 
been associated with measures of fluid intelligence (gf) (Cattell, 1943).  His 
inclusion of processes like induction, elaborating, inferring, mapping, 
combining, comparing, insight, etc. provides a comprehensive and systematic 
organisation for how cognitive processes could operate during transitions to 
generalise from one domain’s experience and knowledge to applications in 
another domain. 
5.1.4 Multiple Intelligences 
While intelligence has usually been organised into specific cagtegories of traits, 
abilities, and cognitive processes, it has also been organised into typologies. 
Gross (1974) developed a model of intelligence based on five modes of 
communication: lexical, social-gestural, iconic, logico-mathematical and 
musical. Hirst (1974) suggested seven forms of knowledge as the basis for an 
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intelligence typology: mathematics, physical sciences, interpersonal 
understanding, religion, literature and the fine arts, morals and philosophy. Case 
(1992) identified six domains  quantities, space, social behaviour, narrative, 
music, and motor behaviour  each of which had “central conceptual structures” 
with core processes used to organise and represent experiences within these 
domains and executive control structures used to regulate performance within 
each domain. Demetriou (1998) proposed six environmentally oriented systems: 
(1) the categorical system deals with similarity/difference relations;  (2) the 
quantitative system deals with quantitative variations and relations; (3) 
the causal system deals with cause and effect relations; (4) the spatial system 
deals with orientation in space; (5) the propositional system addresses the 
validity of representations about the environment; (6) the social system concerns 
understanding social interactions.  
5.1.4.1 Gardner’s Multiple Intelligences 
Howard Gardner’s well known Multiple Intelligence (MI) (1983, 1993, 1999) 
model identified seven distinct kinds of intelligence:  Linguistic, Musical, 
Logical-Mathematical, Bodily-Kinaesthetic, Spatial, Intrapersonal and 
Interpersonal.  I will address what I am calling the five ‘domain’ intelligences in 
Gardner’s model in this chapter. The two ‘personal’ intelligences will be 
addressed in Chapter 6 on Personal Intelligence.  
5.1.4.1.1 Logical/Mathematical Intelligence  
This intelligence is the ability to handle skilfully long chains of reasoning 
(Gardner, 1983, p. 139) and has had an overweaning influence on the study of 
intelligence because it is used so frequently and is easily measured. It is linked to 
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performance in the businesses domains under study in this dissertation, 
particularly those fields that include mathematical or scientific subject matter 
such as energy traders, engineers, and scientists. This intelligence figures in most 
models of intelligence such as Binet and Simon’s mathematical measures (1916), 
Spearman’s eduction of relations (1927), Thurstone’s numerical fluency (1938),  
Carroll’s quantitative reasoning (1993), the plans and strategies of Miller, 
Gallanter and Pribram’s (1960), Bruner. Goodnow and Austin’s (1956) long 
strings of logic, and Newell and Simon’s (1972) human problem solving. 
Gardner contends that Piaget’s four developmental stages are a closer fit to the 
development of this particular intelligence than to the general development of 
cognitive processes in human children. Carroll (1993, p. 641) associates 
Gardner’s logical/mathematical intelligence with his own Fluid Intelligence (2F).  
5.1.4.1.2 Musical Intelligence 
Musical intelligence is not generally assessed as a primary component of 
intelligence in ‘g’. Developmentally, it is one of the earliest intelligences: infants 
as young as two months are able to match pitch, loudness and melodic contours 
of their mother’s songs (Papouŝek, 1982). Gardner’s research (1983) with 
composers suggests that musical intelligence is not dependent on other 
intelligences and does not use language as an intermediate function: composers 
use tonal memory, sounds, rhythms, aural imagination, etc. Carroll (1993) links 
musical abilities to Stratum II broad auditory perception (2U). 
5.1.4.1.3 Bodily Kinaesthetic intelligence  
Kinaesthetic intelligence is the ability to use one’s body in highly differentiated, 
skilled ways for expressive and goal-directed purposes (Gardner, 1983, p. 207). 
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It is the basis of expertise in the third population in this study, athletes. Revesz 
and Berkeley (1950) identified a combination of tacile and kinaesthetic 
perception called “haptics” which develop independently of visual and auditory 
content. Guilford (1967, p. 94-95) included kinaesthetic systems in the figural 
content of his cognitive abilities. Bodily kinaesthetic intelligence does not 
conform to standard definitions of intelligence and most cognitive models “don’t 
measure psychomotor abilities” (Carroll, 1993, p. 641). 
The two remaining domain-related intelligences are not addressed directly in this 
study but may be associated with performance in the domains under study. 
5.1.4.1.4 Spatial Intelligence  
This is a discrete intelligence (Gardner, 1983, pp. 170-205), though it is often 
linked operationally with other intelligences e.g., dance combines bodily 
kinaesthetic and spatial intelligence, architecture combining logical-
mathematical intelligence with spatial intelligence. Lohman (2000) says most 
experimental work with spatial intelligence has focussed on four attributes: (a) 
the ability to conduct analog transformations such as rotation tasks (Lohman, 
1986); (b) the capacity to generate and maintain mental representations in 
transformations and storage (Guilford, 1967; Ekstrom et al., 1976); (c) the ability 
to remember systematically structured stimuli which enhances the amount and 
complexity of spatial information that can be maintained (Pellegrino & Kail, 
1982); and (d) the use of sophisticated and flexible strategies for solving spatial 
tasks (Lohman, 1988; Carroll, 1993; Guilford, 1967).   
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5.1.4.1.5 Linguistic Intelligence 
Linguistic intelligence along with mathematical intelligence is one of the 
intelligences most subject to measurement in models of intelligences such as ‘g’. 
It utilises the predominant cultural symbolisation system and is evident in the 
domain expertise of academic scholars, poets, writers, and political orators.  The 
overlap with other models of intelligence is extensive e.g., Thurstone’s (1938) 
verbal comprehension and verbal fluency; the use of verbal measures for all five 
categories of the Stanford Binet cognitive abilities (Roid & Barram, 2004); and 
Carroll’s (1993) language development, verbal language comprehension, etc. 
5.1.4.2 Gardner’s criteria for an intelligence and critical thinking 
Gardner says that intelligence is a “biopsychological potential” (Gardner, 1993b) 
and he criticises models such as those of Gross (1974) or Hirst (1974) that use a 
priori categorisations of abilities and understanding.  He identified 8 criteria for 
observing and measuring his intelligences to determine whether they were an 
“empirically grounded set of faculties.” Three or these criteria concern cognitive 
generalisability. 1) Identifiable core operations are the “basic information 
processing operations or mechanisms” that deal with the specific kinds of input 
utilised by an intelligence e.g., sensitivity to pitch for musicians or the ability to 
imitate movement for sports people. These will differ from intelligence to 
intelligence and their domain and knowledge ties will affect their 
generalisability.  2) Susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system implies that 
different domain specific symbolisation systems such as language, picturing, or 
mathematics symbols will be used by different intelligences. These “culturally 
contrived systems of meaning” could tie the cognitive processes and domain 
knowledge of an expertise to a specific intelligence limiting its generalisability. 
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3) A distinct developmental history with a definable set of expert ‘end state’ 
performances implies that the developmental history and training systems used to 
‘channel’ intelligence into performance in an expert domain could influence the 
generalisability of the domain expertise.  
Gardner also maintains that specific domains of human competence utilise their 
own non-generalisable type of critical thinking. “The kind of thinking required to 
analyse a fugue is simply different from that involved in observing and 
categorizing different animal species, or scrutinizing a poem, or debugging a 
program, or choreographing and analysing a new dance”  (Gardner, 1993, p. 44). 
This modular/faculties view (Fodor, 1983) of the operation of intelligence would 
limit the ability to generalise from expertise. 
5.1.4.3 Higher level cognitive operations 
Gardner is contradictory. On the one hand he presents a faculties-oriented model 
of intelligence in which the core processes of his different intelligences are tied 
to their intelligence-specific critical thinking which is tied to unique 
symbolisation systems. On the other hand, he identifies four higher level 
cognitive operations that are non-domain specific and do not fit into his seven 
intelligences and operate with processes that are not linked to a specific 
intelligence. These are common sense, novelty or innovation, metaphorical 
capacity and wisdom (Gardner, 1983). They are aggregations of motivation, 
personality factors, domain specific cognitive abilities, and non-domain specific 
cognitive abilities. But Gardner ignores these higher level operations for the most 
part even though they contain many of the inferring, inducing and analogising 
functions which are central to many intelligence models and which are precisely 
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the kinds of processes that would enable generalisation across specific 
intelligences and domains during transitions. This segregation and 
marginalisation of these higher-level processes in his exposition is, in the opinion 
of the writer, an inadequacy. 
5.2 Induction, inference, analogy and the 
generalising  processes of intelligence  
The common threads of induction, inference, and analogy run throughout almost 
all models of intelligence. These multifaceted, inter-related, largely cognitive 
processes are the primary mechanisms through which intelligence can generalise 
processes, knowledge and information from one domain or experience to another 
during transitions. I will first describe these cognitive processes briefly. I will 
then revisit the main theories of intelligence discussed above and to examine how 
these three types of mechanisms are represented in them.  
5.2.1 Induction 
Induction is generally defined as the generation of a more universal principle 
from specific or particular instance.  If swan ‘a’ is white, swan ‘b’ is 
white,….swan ‘x’ is white,  then it is possible to make an inference that all swans 
are white. Green et al. (1953) proposed that induction could be divided into 3 
factors: “eduction of perceptual factors,” “eduction of conceptual relationships” 
and “eduction of conceptual patterns.” Adkins and Lyerly (1952) proposed three 
factors that combined to produce eduction or induction: perception of abstract 
similarities, concept formation and hypothesis verification.  Induction is 
frequently measured in analogy tests and is sometime wrongly equated with 
inference which uses induction.    
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5.2.2 Inference 
Inference is the process whereby individuals apply properties, rules, propositions 
or other characteristics of experiences, sets or collection of sets to draw 
conclusions about different sets  or experiences that may share some of the same 
attributes. “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man.  Therefore Socrates is mortal.” 
is a classical inferential syllogism. Carnap’s (1962) five categories of inductive 
inferences presents the main forms through which inference operates. 
1. “Direct inference typically infers the relative frequency of a trait in a 
sample from its relative frequency in the population from which the 
sample is drawn.” E.g., if most musicians who practice 4 hours a day will 
be  successful, then students who practice 4 hours a day will succeed. 
2. “Predictive inference is inference from one sample to another sample 
not overlapping the first.”  E.g., if members of an athletic team respond 
positively to praise, then members of a management team will respond 
positively to praise. 
3. “Inference by analogy is the inference from the traits of one individual 
to those of another on the basis of the traits that they share.” E.g., if 
shipping of oil has certain types of bottlenecks, then shipping soybeans 
may encounter similar bottlenecks 
4. “Inverse inference infers something about a population on the basis of 
premises about a sample from that population.” E.g., if football players 
from one’s own team performed well under certain circumstances, then it 
is likely that players from a team that one manages will perform similarly 
under similar circumstances. 
5. “Universal inference is inference from a sample to a hypothesis of 
universal form.”  E.g., if involving stakeholders in a strategic plan for 
development of a policy on inclusion of women in sport is essential for 
success, then inclusion of stakeholders in development of all strategic 
plans is essential.  (Vickers, 2010, pp. 19-20. Comments in quotation 
marks are by Vickers. Subsequent illustrative examples are by this writer) 
The accuracy of inferences cannot be assured because the validity of the 
inferential process is different than the accuracy of the premises e.g., “All apples 
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are blue, a banana is an apple, therefore bananas are blue” is a valid inference but 
based upon false premises. Inference is implicit in most cognitive processes in 
which individuals draw conclusions about the future based upon previous 
experience.  
The capacity to engage in inferential and inductive thinking will be the major 
cognitive mechanisms through which experience and knowledge are generalised 
throughout career transitions.  In the foregoing overview of factor analytic 
models of intelligence cognitive processes like generative thinking, cognitive 
flexibility, and analogical reasoning all use inferential processes. It is the use of 
inference in various cognitive abilities that would enable individuals to 
generalise knowledge and experience from primary domain expertise to 
subsequent domains in support of successful transitions.  Fodor (1983) suggests 
that his inputs systems are the “aboriginal prototypes of inference-making 
psychological systems. Cognitive evolution would thus have been in the 
direction of gradually freeing certain sorts of problem-solving systems from the 
constraints under which input analysers labor – hence of producing, as a 
relatively late achievement, the comparatively domain-free inferential capacities 
which apparently mediate the higher flights of cognition” (Fodor, 1983, p. 43, 
Italics inserted).  
5.2.3 Analogy 
Analogical thinking is a specific type of inferential process in which “the 
function of analogy is to allow transfer of knowledge from a known situation to a 
novel one, even if the two situations are superficially dissimilar” (Holyoak, 1984, 
p. 200-201).  Polya (1965) argued the case for analogy in mathematics. Bruner, 
  
162 
 
Goodnow and Austin (1956) studied the role of analogy in the acquisition of 
knowledge in the classroom. Openheimer (1956) and Hesse (1966) argued for the 
role that analogy played in science. Scientific discovery is “isotropy in the purest 
form: a process which depends precisely upon the transfer of information among 
cognitive domains previously assumed to be mutually irrelevant” (Fodor, 1983, 
p. 107). Generally problem solving is also isotropic and non-modular: “there 
seems to be no way to delimit the sorts of informational resources which may 
affect, or be affected by, central processes of problem solving” (Fodor, 1983, p. 
112).
4
   
5.2.4 Induction, inference and analogy in trait and factorial 
models 
The next discussion will review how induction, inference and analogy are 
evident in most trait models of intelligence. 
5.2.4.1 Guilford 
Guilford defined induction as “going from the particular to the general.” Though 
it is not one of his operation categories itself, it was applied to his classificatory, 
relational, systemic and implicational categories in which the products derived 
from induction are transposable. “This is the generalising aspect of induction 
[…] Every experienced product has general as well as specific aspects, the 
former aspects being transferable and having transfer effects and the latter not” 
(Guilford, 1967, p. 206). The operation category of divergent production abilities 
is of particular interest when an individual is required to apply existing 
                                                 
4
 Fodor suggests this may reflect the neurology of the brain: “computational isotropy comports 
naturally with neural isotropy” (Fodor, 1983, p. 118). However, neurophysiological issues such 
as isotropy, equipotentiality and neuroplasticity (Lashley, 1950) will not be addressed in this 
dissertation. 
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experience or knowledge to a new situation during transitions. It includes 
originality and elaboration as well as fluency and flexibility of thinking: “abilities 
concerned with the ready flow of idea and with readiness to change direction or 
to modify information” (Guilford, 1967, p. 139). For example divergent 
production in classes within Guilford’s morphology is illustrated by a classic test 
concerning the use bricks (Wilson et al., 1954). Fluency would be indicated by 
rapidly generating multiple uses for bricks such as building a house, barn, silo, 
school, bank, or a wall. Flexibility of thinking was indicated by divergent 
answers such as building a house, throwing at a cat, making a doorstop, writing a 
message, or making a tombstone for a bird. Similarly in divergent production of 
systems he uses the illustration of a student (Guilford, 1967, p. 148) who is given 
the task of determining the height of a building using a barometer. Contrary to 
expectations the student first proposes going to the top of the building, tying the 
barometer to a rope, lowering it to the ground and then measuring the length of 
the rope needed to reach the ground; then he proposes dropping the barometer 
from the top of the building and measuring the time it takes to hit the ground and 
using the formula S= ½ gt
2
 to determine the building height; then taking the 
barometer out on a sunny day measuring its shadow and that of the building and 
using simple ratios; and finally taking the barometer to the superintendent of the 
building and offering to exchange it for information about the height of the 
building. Divergent production abilities such as flexibility, elaboration, 
induction, originality, transposing, etc. would characterise the cognitive process 
of individuals who demonstrate transition expertise. 
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5.2.4.2 Thurstone and Spearman 
Thurstone (1938) used a variety of analogies test amongst his measures. He 
found loadings of .44 for pattern analogies on the primary factor for perceptual 
speed (P), a loading of .60 for verbal analogies on his verbal comprehension 
factor (V) and a .39 loading for pattern analogies on his inductive reasoning (I) 
factor. A number of abilities associated with Spearman’s ‘g’ involve cognitive 
processes such as “generalisation” and “analogies” (Spearman 1927, pp. 165-
181); the operation of “imagination” and “creativity” including the generation of 
“new mental content” (ibid, p. 186-189); the use of “association” and 
“adaptability to new situations” as ways in which memory and information can 
be accessed for utilisation (ibid, p. 271-281). Spearman identified 11 relations 
that might be found specifically in the operation of analogies: attribution, 
identity, time, space, cause, objectivity, constitution, likeness, evidence, 
conjunction and intermixture.  
5.2.4.3 Carroll 
One of the Stratum I factors in Carroll’s Stratum II Fluid Intelligence (2F) is 
Induction (I). Inductive tasks “are those that require subjects to inspect a class of 
stimulus materials and infer (induce, educe) a common characteristic underlying 
these materials – a concept, a class membership, a rule, a process, a trend, or a 
causal relation, for example” (Carroll, 1993, p. 238).  Stratum II General 
Learning and Memory (2Y) includes the Stratum I factors Associative Memory 
(MA) and Meaningful Memory (MM) (Carroll, 1993, pp. 266-274). These 
encompass the ability to recall one side of a paired association. Their operation 
will reflect how closely and exclusively two halves of an associated pair are tied 
to each other. Tight dyadic or unidirectional links may reduce ability to make 
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associations outside of the pairing and limit generalisabilty during transitions 
whereas the retrieval of memories, ideas, processes or representations which are 
linked to a number of partners will offer more adaptability and would contribute 
to the ability to generalise from prior knowledge and experience to a variety of 
situations. Gobet’s (Gobet & Simon, 1996b) Templates would probably use 
Carroll’s Associate Memory (MA) and Meaningful Memory (MM) Stratum I 
factors to adapt to different situations (Carroll, 1993). 
Stratum II Broad Visual Perception (2V) includes Flexibility of Closure (CF) 
which is “the ability to keep one or more definite configurations in mind so as to 
disembed it from other well-defined perceptual material” (French et al., 1976, p. 
19). This would allow an individual to hold parallel thoughts and conclusions 
that arise from simultaneously comparing options, information and experience 
from multiple domains and would free them from a closed associative pathway 
and enable them to develop a course of action appropriate for a new situation.  
Stratum II Broad Retrieval Ability (Gr or 2r) has also been described as 
“Abilities in the Domain of Idea Production” (Carroll, 1993, p. 394) and includes 
Flexibility of Use (FX) as measured by tests such as the brick test (Wilson et al., 
1954) or barometer test (Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971) mentioned earlier. It also 
includes Cleverness (FC). Flexibility of use was measured by test performance 
such as combining objects, substitute uses, making groups, and different uses all 
of which would prove useful during transitions
5
. Figural Flexibility (FX) is 
another Stratum I factor derived from tests in Guilford’s laboratory which 
measured the ability to deal with figural tasks that require a variety of approaches 
                                                 
5
 The FX and FC categories were subsequently collapsed into the Originality/Creativity (FO) 
category by Carroll. 
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to achieve a solution to a problem (Carroll, 1993, pp. 612-613). Several factors in 
the Stratum II category of Broad Retrieval Abilities will enable individuals to 
deal appropriately with ambiguity, uncertainty and challenges during transitions. 
 
5.2.5 Induction, inference and analogy in Sternberg and 
Gardner 
5.2.5.1 Sternberg 
Sternberg’s meta-components are neither knowledge encapsulated nor modular 
(to use Fodor’s taxonomy). Consequently they are not necessarily tied to a 
specific intelligence or knowledge base and can operate in and potentially across 
any expert domain. Amongst his performance components (Sternberg, 1988), 
inference is probably the most important because it enables individuals to discern 
relationships between objects or events and to draw conclusions about these 
relationships.  Sternberg identified at least 13 types of inferences drawn from his 
work with the Millers Analogies Test and a further 19 different types of 
inferential fallacies (Sternberg, 1977).
 
Mapping involves recognising the 
relationship between two relationships and using this to connect higher order 
relationships. Application involves applying a relationship that has already been 
inferred to a different situation, for example when mapping relationships derived 
from lower order domain-specific inferences either to a higher order situation in 
the same domain or possibly across to another domain. These three performance 
component categories – inferring, mapping and application – are parallel to 
Goldman and Pellegrino’s (1984) stages of the analogic process – discovery, 
comparison, and evaluation.  Amongst his knowledge acquisition components, 
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selective comparison could enable individuals to respond during transitions and 
in post-transition situations with innovative ideas and insightful thinking. 
Sternberg’s knowledge acquisition components often use metaphor and analogy 
(Sternberg, 1988; Davidson, Deuser & Sternberg, 1994) which contribute to 
comparing knowledge and experience across domains. 
5.2.5.2 Gardner 
All of Gardner’s higher level cognitive processes  novelty, originality, common 
sense and wisdom  operate outside the constraints of the domain specific 
modularity of the intelligences of his model.
6
 Gardner (1983, p. 289-291) 
maintains that novelty is usually displayed in an expert domain associated with 
an intelligence: an individual is an original dancer, musician, mathematician or 
poet. In part this is because genuine innovation requires a fairly high degree of 
expertise or at least knowledge in a domain before it can generate innovation or 
novel solutions.  However originality  while drawing from domain knowledge  
can also ignore boundaries, is not fixed to a specific function and is not restricted 
by requirements for a single interpretation of a problem. Furthermore, 
inconsistencies or departures from convention are not a problem for original 
thinking. There are correspondences with Guilford’s (1967) divergent production 
operations which include originality, elaboration, fluency and flexibility. 
Sternberg (1985) also used originality to describe responses to new situations 
that require non-automatisation. 
                                                 
6
 Common sense and wisdom are also higher level cognitive functions that are not tied to one of 
Gardner’s intelligences nor to specific domains and can be used to generalise experience across 
boundaries and domains.  Both have implications for transition expertise.  Common sense will be 
addressed at more length in the Chapter 7 and wisdom in Chapter 9.  
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Gardner says that metaphorical capacity (1983, pp. 291-294) is characterised by 
its ability to see beyond content or knowledge limitations and to form 
“illuminating connections.”  Gardner does assert that  like novelty  the 
preferred locus from which to  metaphorise will be in the domain in which one 
has the deepest knowledge and experience: a football player will develop 
kinaesthetic analogies for a management situation, a scientist will develop 
metaphors drawn from the domain of science or a musician will develop 
performance based metaphors. Metaphorising operates directionally by inferring 
from one set of knowledge to develop cognitive constructs in other sets of 
knowledge in ways similar to schemata induction (Holyoak, 1984), rule 
induction (Egan & Greeno, 1974), mapping with performance components 
(Sternberg, 1977), and conceptual isotropy (Fodor, 1983) transfer knowledge.  
5.2.6 Generalising operation of intelligence  
5.2.6.1 Constraints on generalisability 
Despite the foregoing discussion, the literature on intelligence contains numerous 
constraints on the generalisability of experience, knowledge and cognitive 
processes. For example, the content elements  figural, symbolic, semantic, and 
behavioural  of Guilford’s tri-part morphology (1956; 1967) will mean that one 
type of cognition will differ from other cognitions even though they may share a 
common operation and product.  Case (1992) maintains that the executive central 
structures of his six domains do not generalise across to other domains. Fodor 
(1983) limits the generalisability of information attained through his modular 
input systems. Gardner (1983, 1985) maintains that the different representational 
systems used by different intelligences restrict inference across domains and his 
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critical thinking is domain specific. A number of Carroll’s (1993) Stratum I 
factors such as quantitative reasoning, lexical knowledge, grammatical 
sensitivity, spatial scanning, speech/sound discrimination, musical 
discrimination, absolute pitch, word fluency, semantic processing speed, etc. are 
domain specific and non-conducive to generalising. Inference and metaphor 
themselves may still be limited by their basis in domain experience and 
knowledge. A football player may be able to infer the third pass in a goal scoring 
sequence based upon the previous two passes but they may not be able to infer 
the third note of a musical chord progression.  Nor will inferential ability 
necessarily ensure that a football player will predict the behaviours of teammates 
or understand the management accounts of a club.  
5.2.6.2 Generalisability. 
On the other hand there are numerous arguments from the foregoing review of 
literature that support the non-domain specific nature of intelligence and its 
generalising potential. Spearman’s (1923) noegenic laws of “eduction of 
correlates” and “eduction of relations” lay clear foundations for the 
generalisation of intelligence. Thurstone (1938) found strong correlations 
between the use of analogy and most of his measures of primary mental faculties. 
Guilford’s (1967) divergent production category included fluency, flexibility, 
elaboration, induction, transposability.  Carroll’s (1993) flexibility of closure 
enables individual to keep multiple configurations in mind to help disembed 
them from domain knowledge constraints and his generative flexibility enables 
individuals to make associations not explicit in previous experience. All three of 
Sternberg’s (1987) sub-theories use processes that are neither knowledge 
encapsulated nor modular and so not innately tied to a specific type of 
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Gardnerian intelligence or knowledge base. Holyoak (1984) maintains that 
individuals utilise a range of analogical processes such as mapping, comparative 
analysis and metaphor to generalise rules and propositions from their previous 
performance to make new combinations with underlying schemata from previous 
experience in association with their current situation. Gardner’s (1983) 
metaphorising and novelty are composites of inference, induction and analogy 
that enable individuals to generalise expertise. 
5.2.7 Expert reasoning and information processing: The use 
of inference, induction and analogy for generalisation 
Most cognitive models of reasoning identify a range of inferential mechanisms 
which contribute to the ability to generalise cognitive processes across problems 
and enable individuals to adapt to and respond successfully to change. This is 
also true of information processing and schemata and models of intelligence. 
Pellegrino and Glazer (1979) maintain that to understand the operation of 
intelligence it is necessary to study inductive reasoning tasks. Egan and Greeno 
(1974) identify rule induction as a key process for how analogical reasoning 
operates in problem solving and concept formation when developing 
interconnections between the nodes of a network structure.  Goldman and 
Pellegrino’s (1984) divide analogy into performance and process components 
and identify three types of processes used in analogy: (1) attribute discovery or 
encoding processes in which the important components of the problem are 
labelled and internally represented; (2) attribution comparison processes between 
pairs of terms in which inference attributes relationships,  mapping compares 
possible correspondences and application applies the specific rules inferred from 
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the foregoing two processes;  and (3) evaluation components which determine 
the adequacy of the completion of the analogic process.  
Schemata (Rumelhart, 1980) position analogy and induction centrally in memory 
retrieval processes used in human problem solving. Glick and Holyoak (1983) 
contend that analogical cognition works because, though the two bases of an 
analogy may have very different domain knowledge, they can have a shared 
schema (usually including a shared propositional structure) even when the 
analogues themselves aren’t highly convergent in terms of content. They give as 
an example of the use of analogy to compare a military problem involving 
assaulting a fortress with a medical problem involving the use of radiation to 
attack a cancerous tumour in which each problem is from a different domain and 
involves very different knowledge and experience (Figure 5.3). 
 
Military Problem 
 Initial State 
  Goal: Use army troops to capture fortress 
  Resources: Sufficiently large army 
  Constraint: Unable to send entire army along one road 
 Solution plan: Send small groups along multiple roads simultaneously 
Outcome: Fortress captured by army 
 
Radiation Problem 
 Initial State 
  Goal: Use rays to destroy tumour 
  Resources: Sufficiently powerful rays 
  Constraint: Unable to administer high-intensity rays from one direction 
 Solution Plan: Administer low intensity rays from multiple directions simultaneously 
 Outcome: Tumour destroyed by rays 
 
Convergent Schema 
Initial State 
  Goal: Use force to overcome a central target 
  Resources: Sufficiently great force 
  Constraint: Unable to apply full forces along one path 
 Solution Plan: Apply dispersed forces along multiple paths simultaneously 
 Outcome: Central target is overcome by force 
 
Figure 5.3 Example of correspondences among convergent problems and their schema. Based on 
Glick and Holyoak (1983) 
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Both face analogous problems with different content: the risk of concentrating 
and using power from one direction. Attacking a fortress with all one’s resources 
from one direction will lead to a heavy attrition due to the ability of the defence 
to concentrate their forces. Destroying a tumour using radiation through directing 
x rays from one direction at full force will destroy the surrounding tissues.  
Analogy addresses the similar process rather than content leading to a solution: 
divide the attack forces into smaller groups and attack simultaneously or reduce 
the intensity of the x-rays and then direct them from multiple directions 
simultaneously.  
When information is retrieved from the memory, schemata are vehicles for 
potential analogies and they operate as an interface between otherwise passive 
memory storage and the generation of new ideas. Analogical reasoning relies on 
“eliminative induction” to minimise non-relevant content and “schema 
induction” to identify and build the shared bridge for analogic transfer of 
knowledge and experience.  It is noteworthy that failure to identify a potential 
analogy can occur when “the problem solver fails to encode elements of the 
schema, in either the base or the target” (Holyoak, 1984, p. 212) which suggests 
that the ways in which expertise is acquired and elements of expert schema are 
encoded and subsequently enriched will influence their generalisability as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Cognitive processes aligned with models of intelligence such as inference 
induction, analogy, and  metaphor can explain how cognitive representations, 
memory, schemata, mental models, and expert systems in general can be 
modified and adapted to changing situations through processes like production 
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system modification (Klahr, 1984), schema restructuring (Rumelhart & Norman, 
1978) or schema induction (Holyoak, 1984) which explain how individuals can 
adapt existing expertise to domains other than their primary domain. 
Mechanisms in information processing models like elaboration, elongation, 
strengthening, discriminating, generalisation, accretion and restructuring will 
enable individuals to adapt and modify knowledge and processes from one expert 
domain to another in transitions. Repeated generalising from existing structures 
to new ones could make these various mental models and their processes more 
‘transition-friendly.’ 
5.3 Data Analysis 
The review of data will show how the inductive and inferential mechanisms 
discussed above operated to generalise expert knowledge and processes across 
domains during transitions. Three research questions were considered: 
1) How does intelligence used in the primary domain transfer to similar or 
like-for-like situations at later career stages? 
2) How does are inference and induction used to generalise to situations 
significantly different than those encountered during performance in the 
primary domain? 
3) How does the use of analogy and metaphor enable individuals to bridge 
wider knowledge and process gaps between domains?  
5.3.1.1 General transfer of knowledge and experience 
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There was transfer of general knowledge and experience during transitions from 
earlier to subsequent work stages.  (See Table 5.1 for some indicative 
statements.) 
Table 5.1 Some statements indicative of the ways in which intelligence transfers domain 
knowledge through induction and inference 
GENERALISATION THROUGH TRANSFER 
 “I had through all of these working assignments a front to back experience 
a lot of generic type skills” 
“It just sort of happened because I had the experience and expertise” 
“I suppose there isn’t a huge transition between teaching somebody a set of mechanical 
skills to actually the tactical knowledge about sailing” 
“Be an expert advisor to evaluate these plans” 
“I’d brought those two interests together” 
Simple transfer: like for like 
Generalising from previous knowledge 
I had through all of these working assignments a front to back experience and 
again the desire to have an impact for the bank in a way that I can explore all 
those ‘learning’s’ but even learn more on top of it. (BSN R7 Peter)  
  And: 
There is another time when I was going to come into something which I had less 
technical knowledge on, but a lot of generic type skills.  Probably again would 
be seen more generalist skills in terms of people, process, some of the 
interaction with IT, technology projects which I have been doing. Those were 
transportable. (BSN R3 Nicola) 
Generalising from running an operation to building an organisational structure: 
Nobody had any experience of running derivative operations which is what I 
had been doing for some of the time and even when I wasn’t directly in that 
field, it’s related in finance. So there was a lot of - there was just total freedom 
for me really as far as designing organisational structures, designing 
technology concepts. I wasn’t doing the technology work but ‘the architecture 
should look like this’. (BSN R1Nicola) 
And again: 
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I suppose there isn’t a huge transition between teaching somebody a set of 
mechanical skills to actually the tactical knowledge about sailing. You could say 
that it is just one step from a ladder and all the rest, but I found that I was, 
without thinking about it, I was reasonably articulate. (SPT R1 George)  
And from running a research department to running a small business: 
So I moved to that job which was a smaller people management job, but a very 
complex in terms of the interface between the business and research so I started 
working in different circles and working, understanding business problems in a 
different way etc., so I became much more involved in the business side and kind 
of structuring the research programme of this business. (BSN R1 Oliver)   
Moving up in an organisation: 
And then I managed to get the Chief Programme Engineer job and again I went 
backwards before going forwards.  “I am in charge of this car now.” But that 
transition didn’t take long actually as I had been a programme manager and 
was now a CPE and I haven’t really looked back since then. (BSN R1 Lawrence) 
Moving from running one operation to consulting a variety of operations: 
I continue to evolve.  I do a mixture of business things, government advisory 
things and educational charitable roles and some of them have more people 
management and some have more business and strategy and policy (BSN R3 
Oliver)  
5.3.1.2 Intelligence generalising through inference and induction   
There were a number of illustrations of participants using induction and analogy 
to apply expertise from their primary domain to subsequent work and 
professional situations. (See Table 5.2 for some indicative statements.) 
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Table 5.2 Some statements indicative of the ways in which domain intelligence is 
generalised through transfer of processes 
INDUCTION AND INFERENCE 
“I can abstract things” 
“Therefore derive from there what kind of logic is implied in order to translate it” 
“It’s a bit like teaching really, I find organising departments the same kind of skill that 
you need” 
“I used the same skills” 
“In order to teach well I need to be playing seriously” 
“I was asked to go on the UK Sports board with a specific remit to be somebody with 
performance experience” 
Abstracting from the specific to the general 
Abstracting from specifics to general principles: 
I can abstract things and say well, ‘If you do it like that here, that means for that 
problem over there’ there must be generic dynamics which you can create 
maybe out of them. (BSN R1 Peter) 
And: 
I think I started to realise that and because as I realised the limitations of what 
exercise physiology could ever tell me about my sport, I started to understand 
better I think the rules of science and it’s real power (SPT R 2 Edward) 
Applying systems and models from primary domain such as computer 
programming to tracking trading performance: 
I used the same skills for doing accounting, basically position maintenance you 
had to be on top for P&L calculations and positions. I used Lotus 123 and 
spreadsheets – the very first one and I did it and again it was very magic for 
these people. (BSN R1 Peter)  
From specific performance to management  
From teaching to running a department: 
I feel quite, yes, it’s something I've developed myself, but I feel that I'm, it’s a bit 
like teaching really, I find organising departments the same kind of skill that you 
need.  (MUS R1 Yvonne) 
And: 
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I mean it’s this whole transferable skills thing and I think that sense of being 
able to work progressively and logically and you know, when one practises, one 
sets oneself milestones and one continually evaluates what one does and then 
one manages one’s work in order to reach the next milestone, one does all of 
that subconsciously when you practise and yet those are exactly the sort of skills 
that you need when you are then in a managerial position. (MUS R1 Stephen)  
And: 
So you need to be in a position to structure working patterns and therefore 
derive from there what kind of logic is implied in order to translate it into a 
developing programme structure (BSN R1 Peter) 
From self managing to running a performance department: 
I ended up landing the job there of head of strings at {conservatoire}.  But even 
though I’d had to have a degree of management and administrative ability to 
run the outreach project, they sort of took me on board there on the basis of my, 
if you like, practitioner’s experience…..And I think, you know, there’s a sense 
that musicians at their best, because of the way that they have to learn, and the 
way the commitment, the discipline, but the way that they have to be very self-
aware and self-analytical, are capable of being very adaptive. (MUS R3 
Stephen)  
Generalising from performance to teaching: 
I found that even from the point of view of teaching, in order to teach well I need 
to be playing seriously – not necessarily playing a lot, but I couldn’t teach well 
if I just let it go, so there is that sort of inter-connection. (MUS R6 Robert)  
And: 
You know I went from being responsible for 20 to 30 full-time equivalents to 80-
90 full-time staff and the budget in those days… probably £11m.  And looking 
after the recreation side of the sport… so it was cruising, motor boating… the 
whole thing – legal, membership, marketing, publishing (SPT R 2 George)  
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From specific domain experience to developing policy in the field 
Becoming an intellectual leader in their field: 
And I don’t know, I just took to it and I was able to provide to the people like 
me, I was able to provide scientific leadership to the group, I went around and 
talked to people in other groups we had got on so I was accepted as a good 
scientist by them (BSN R4 Oliver)  
From running a sport to setting policy for sport nationwide: 
In 2005 I was asked to go on the {National} Board with a specific remit to be 
somebody with performance experience – they had different people with 
different competencies - and they wanted somebody with performance 
experience who would help the Board make investment decision and institute a 
performance management programme with the governing bodies that would 
lead to us coming fourth in the medal table in 2012. (SPT R5 George)    
Leading negotiations in one’s area of expertise: 
He wanted me to lead for the company on the European scene.  That this was 
big negotiations; it had big implications and they needed somebody and I was 
the person who could do it both technically and managerially (BSN R6 Oliver) 
From winning an Olympic Gold medal to delivering an Olympic Games legacy 
in sport education: 
Well our intention for the legacy programme for 2012 … from 2012 is to teach 
those skills to young people so they would get, I hope integrated into the 
national curriculum to have them become peer mentoring skills (SPT R1 
Harold)  
And: 
You know Vice Chancellors some are more managers, some are more leaders 
and ultimately these really senior positions like the conductor or the Vice 
Chancellor demand both leadership and management (MUS R2 Thomas) 
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5.3.1.3 Intelligence using analogy and metaphorising to make large 
leaps in generalisation of expert processes and knowledge 
Of particular interest are the examples where individuals generalise from primary 
domain intelligence and expertise to different application domains other than 
their original performance domains.  Here the cognitive bridge that has to be 
crossed is more substantive and the use of metaphorising and analogy is more 
explicit and larger scale. (See Table 5.3 for some indicative statements.) 
Table 5.3 Some statements indicative of the ways in which domain intelligence is 
generalised through analogy and metaphorising 
GENERALISATION THROUGH ANALOGY AND METAPHORISING 
“Now you learn that through being part of any musical texture; you don’t learn that in 
management school it seems to me” 
“I sort of used to present them in a very performance orientated way” 
“I often do use music in artistic analogies as a way to confronting an issue” 
“For me, even being a manager is always a bit of a performance” 
“I realised quite quickly on – a bit like the swimming – ‘I have a natural feel for this’ “ 
“I would have said everyday – the musical training is being activated countless times” 
“I developed a written notational stave and I analysed positions on the field and every 
passing pattern and so I could read it like a piece of music” 
“I think your brain becomes quite like a flow diagram if you do Latin and Greek”. 
“Another puzzle but one that did seem to follow engineering rules: if you ran a model you 
could predict these things” 
“Borrow ideas from one discipline or field of science if you like and apply them in a useful 
way to another field of science” 
“You’re just dealing with more money and bigger decisions and ‘I’m going to close that 
factory’.. instead of ‘I’m going to shut this door’, but in a sense it’s just people making 
decisions; it’s not… it isn’t radically different” 
Analogies from one domain’s  processes to another domain 
Generalising from systemic engineering models to financial trading models: 
The kind of figuring out which way to market was going how best to take 
advantage of that. I mean that was another puzzle but one that did seem to 
follow engineering rules: if you ran a model you could predict these things and 
you put these inputs in and you’ve these outputs. (BSN R1John) 
Intelligence identifies correspondence between the study of classical language 
and mathematical intelligence used in trading: 
Maths was quite interesting because a large part of me likes logic and actually I 
believe if you do Latin and Greek your brain is trained in logic because you 
can’t translate without a continual process of elimination of looking at word 
  
180 
 
endings to work out what words go with what and I think your brain becomes 
quite like a flow diagram if you do Latin and Greek. (BSN R4 Mark) 
And: 
I often do use music in artistic analogies as a way to confronting an issue….I am 
coming at it from a view point of whether I hear things and see things which I 
can trust or which appear to me to have a chance through the working of 
normal human systems to work out or not work out and that it is down to 
musical training, so I would have said everyday – the musical training is being 
activated countless times. (MUS R8 Thomas)  
Generalising from engineering decisions to business decisions: 
Even when you’re running a company you still sit down with people and decide 
what you’re going to do and it happens at every level and you’re just dealing 
with more money and bigger decisions and ‘I’m going to close that factory’.. 
instead of ‘I’m going to shut this door’ But in a sense it’s just people making 
decisions; it’s not, it isn’t radically different. Now the consequences of the 
piston not working could be you have to recall thousands of vehicles, but that’s 
a lowly kind of decision. Deciding when you’re going to close a factory or buy 
{company} and {company}, or sell {company} and {company} – still just people 
sitting there and deciding. (BSN R7Michael) 
Analogies from one domain’s expert knowledge to another 
Intelligence uses analogical correspondences to transfer knowledge acquired in 
one domain to another. From music to sport: 
Music notation. I developed sport notation in the ‘80’s and at that time - I mean 
it’s a huge industry now, we’re driven by the computing world – but at that time, 
we only just had the very first BBC computers; they were almost steam driven 
old things […] I developed a written notational stave and I analysed positions 
on the field and every passing pattern and so I could read it like a piece of 
music.  (SPT R2 Diane) 
Intelligence transfers knowledge acquired as a coach to run an interest group: 
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So instead of being a coach, I got involved in running a pressure group for 
women’s sports and became an active feminist by this point; I’d brought those 
two interests together. (SPT R2 Diane)   
Intelligence generalised knowledge from sport to business to education: 
Wrote stuff that could be used in management which is now being used in the 
schools so that the body, mind, emotion, spirit elements are valued based 
leadership can go right into the life development journal for the kids – same 
thing. (SPT R1 Harold) 
Using the mechanics of engines to think about a body as a machine: 
Now that started off as a real curiosity with what appeared to be a really simple 
science, you know there’s an engine here - some are bigger than others, some 
are better tuned than others. So understand engine, answered question, move 
on.  So we got some figures and some stuff from the lab and the lab was pretty 
crude at the time, but I really wanted to know what these figures meant. (SPT R1 
Edward) 
Analogous thinking from performing to leading in a field 
Generalising from roles taken in an orchestra to roles taken in an organisation: 
Fascinatingly I think, fascinating in a complex way – you get that through the 
roles you have to play but same in an orchestra.  You’re playing a tune for one 
minute; you’re the second violinist the next and I played the viola for a number 
of years – you’re filling in a third of the chord of the ensemble and then all of 
the next minute you’re in fact completely silent while other people have their 
role.  Now you learn that through being part of any musical texture; you don’t 
learn that in management school it seems to me. (MUS R1 Richard) 
Using performance skills developed as a professional musician to making 
presentations to a board:  
The governing body loved me because I sort of used to present them in a very 
performance orientated way [….] and generally I seemed to get away with it. 
(MUS R2 William) 
Generalising from musical aesthetics to how one approaches a work situation: 
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Above all, it colours the way I see the world [...] I often do use music in artistic 
analogies as a way to confronting an issue and sometimes will be exceedingly 
trusting or exceedingly rigid on an issue because I’m not coming in from text 
book management 101, I am coming at it from a view point of whether I hear 
things and see things which I can trust or which appear to me to have a chance 
through the working of normal human systems to work out or not work out and 
that it is down to musical training, so I would have said everyday – the musical 
training is being activated countless times. (MUS R2 Richard) 
From a swimming team to a business department: 
 I was completely untried - and I was leading a group of men who were all 
senior to me in their respective institutions. And I realised quite quickly on – a 
bit like the swimming – ‘I have a natural feel for this.’ It’s not that I’m going to 
get it right all the time but I’m going to be able to keep the motivated, keep them 
happy with the programme, I’m going to be able to be tough when I need to be 
but not a harridan. I suddenly realised I can do this stuff. I can do this 
leadership. (MUS R2 Susan) 
The correspondence between a conductor and manager: 
What role do I play in this leader/manager role which gets the best out of that 
like the orchestra gets the best out of the ensemble? [That] is done by a 
conductor who actually doesn’t say a word, doesn’t play anything, doesn’t even 
make a sound but gets that ensemble playing best. And that’s the kind of model 
that I do consciously think about.  How can something by a deft appointment by 
a deft invitation by a particularly well turned word of encouragement, get the 
ensemble playing better. (MUS R3 Thomas)  
And across sports: 
I’m now this kind of pretty established independent expert in my sport and in the 
field of I guess effective applied sports science, so my first real engagement with 
this isn’t the {his sport} saying to me ‘Bloody hell, { Edward }, we need to get 
you on board to help us create our World class programme’ It’s actually Sport 
{Counry} who were the distributor at the time get the phone saying ‘We want to 
pay you to be an expert advisor to evaluate these plans that are coming in’.   
(SPT R2 Edward) 
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And generalising from creativity in music to creativity in management: 
Be creative, in music anyway and that’s not just musically creative but creative 
within your managerial ways that you deal with people, how you use people, 
how you get them to work for you. You know, lots of thinking.  (MUS R5 Yvonne)  
5.3.2 Discussion: Intelligence used in the generalisation of 
knowledge and cognitive processes 
Table 5.4 shows the number of statements by participants indicating  inferential 
mechanisms used to generalise experience and expertise during transitions.  
Table 5.4 Intelligence generalised during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
General 
experience 
transferred  
7 17 2.43 4 7 1.75 6 19 3.17 17 43 2.53 
Generalising 
through 
induction  &  
inference 
8 19 2.36 5 18 3.6 5 17 3.4 18 54 3 
Analogies & 
metaphor 
5 11 2.2 5 5 1 6 11 1.83 16 27 1.69 
TOTAL 8 47 5.88 7 27 3.86 8 47 5.89 23 124 5.4 
5.3.2.1 Discussion: General experience transfer 
As one would expect, individuals were able to apply the intelligences they had 
developed during the acquisition of primary domain expertise to a subsequent 
career stage.  More musicians (7) and business people (6) did this than sports 
people (4) and more often. Musicians made decisions based upon what they had 
learned managing their career as a performer to managing a faculty of music; 
business people who had run a small department in a larger division, widened 
their management scope to cover all aspects of leading a small regional business; 
sports people jumped from regional coaching operations to running national 
organisations bringing management skills to bear in a larger arena. This type of 
inference might fall under Carroll’s (1993) substitution of uses factor in his 
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category of Flexibility of Use or what Sternberg (1977) called inference 
application, particularly where knowledge and experience is transferred across 
domains or applications. In their transitions it is possible to see direct and 
predictive inference (Carnap, 1962). 
5.3.2.2 Discussion: Domain specific intelligence and knowledge 
generalisation 
There were also numerous examples amongst the participants of generalisation of 
domain specific intelligence from their performing career stage to divergent 
applications in subsequent career stages. These usually involved induction or 
inferential analogy. All 8 musicians, 5 sports people and 5 business people 
mentioned generalising their primary domain intelligence, averaging 3.5 times 
per individual.  Applications of previous knowledge to broader contexts are 
characteristic of Guilford’s cognitive generativity (1967). Most used induction 
(Carroll, 1993) to open possibilities from previous experience to subsequent 
generalisation. In the earlier transitions to career stages two or three e.g., from 
performer to coach, individuals often applied direct inferences (Carnap, 1962) 
from their experiences as a performer to coaching or teaching individual and 
teams. Later career transitions might use predictive inference (Carnap, 1962; 
Vickers, 2010) to enable wider generalisations e.g., predicting performance from 
members of an energy futures team based upon experience as an oil trader From 
a production system perspective this could be explained by rule induction (Egan 
& Greeno, 1974) used to modify production systems (Klahr & Wallace, 1976) 
from one domain to apply them to another.  Lateral transfer of knowledge or 
experience involves a higher degree of generalisation e.g., from coaching a 
national sports team to running a research consultancy or from running an 
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academic research department to running a research division in an organisation.  
Those individuals who made lateral transfers to a different field e.g., from 
academic research to business, from coaching to academic research, or from 
music conservatoire to an academic university, frequently had developed a high 
level of expertise previously in a parallel domain, though often associated with 
academic research.   Attribute comparison (Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984) would 
operate during such transfer of knowledge and such generalisations are indicative 
of Carroll’s (1993) cognitive flexibility rather than cognitive fluidity: it is not the 
quantity of ideas that are important so much as how knowledge is adapted to 
meet changing circumstances.  This wider generalisation might reflect Carroll’s 
different uses category within his Flexibility of Use category (1993).  
A number of individuals, most often musicians,  referred to experiences acquired 
in career stages one and two as the basis for generalisation to very different 
requirements at career stages five and six e.g., from leading a string section of an 
orchestra to leading a management committee. Carnap’s (1962) inference by 
analogy and universal inference are the types of inference in which individuals 
might generalise from principles and rules of a specific expertise to transitions to 
broader arenas. Sternberg (1988) might suggest that this would involve selective 
comparison and selective application leading to insight. Goldman and Pellegrino 
(1984) called such processes mapping.  
5.3.2.3 Discussion: Cross domain analogising and metaphorising 
While 16 out of the 24 participants gave illustrations of using metaphor to 
generalise domain knowledge, they only averaged 1.69 mentions per individual 
and the 5 sports people only mentioned metaphorising 1 time per person. 
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However, where individuals used metaphor to generalise experience during 
transitions, they were clear and striking: they included metaphors like guiding 
academic teams as if they were string sections in an orchestra, dealing with the 
logic of a business operation in the same way they used logic in Greek grammar, 
or recognising trends in energy trading through how engineering systems 
operated.   
Metaphor relies on flexibility of closure to “keep one or more definite 
configurations in mind” (Carroll, 1993) so as to help disembed (Ekstrom et al., 
1976) mental concepts or configurations from previously well-defined contexts. 
It could incorporate most of Guilford’s various “divergent production abilities” 
(Guilford, 1967) such as flexibility, elaboration, induction, originality and 
transposing to achieve more radical generalisations from primary domain 
experience to new situations. Individuals frequently juxtaposed knowledge from 
previous experiences with outcome requirements from new situations with 
different content and different contexts (Holyoak, 1984). In some cases this 
process would be more analogous e.g., from dance notation to sporting notation. 
In other cases it is more metaphorical e.g., from deciding on a piston finish to 
deciding whether to keep a manufacturing plant open.  When the analogies or 
metaphors are quite close the individual could use attribute comparison 
(Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984) or selective comparison (Davidson, 1986). When 
the two domains of applications are quite far apart, then processes like Guilford’s 
transposing (1967) might operate.  All of these cognitive processes would enable 
individuals to enrich their schema and mental models (Rumelhart, 1980) and 
would contribute to schema sharing (Glick & Holyoak, 1974) and schema 
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restructuring (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978) so as to build stage-appropriate 
expertise and knowledge throughout their careers. 
5.4 Concluding discussion 
Individuals who were successful in career transitions seemed to be able to use a 
range of cognitive processes to generalise knowledge and experience developed 
during the acquisition of their primary domain expertise. Inference was the 
fundamental cognitive process that was repeatedly used in a multitude of ways to 
transfer knowledge and processes from previous experience to later career stages 
particularly during transitions where individuals were able to bring forward 
previous experience to apply to new situations. Inductive inference allowed an 
individual to generate new ideas and possible applications of existing knowledge 
whether this was a straight forward like-for-like transfer, from one domain 
intelligence to another, or from one type of situation to a completely different 
one. Associative memory retrieval enabled past experience to be generalised to 
current situations. Cognitive flexibility enabled individuals to remain open to a 
variety of new approaches when encountering uncertainty or new challenges. 
Analogical processes enable individuals to generalise laws and propositional 
structures from experience in one domain to experience in another.  Metaphor 
and broad analogy bridged the largest domain divisions. Rules, propositions, 
production processes, and schema could all be adapted to operate in new and 
emergent situations. Both process and rule induction seemed particularly useful.  
Gardner’s argument that originality and metaphor draw upon a antecedent 
development of specific intelligence (or expertise) seems to be generally borne 
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out as most individuals who used metaphor and wide analogies drew upon early 
experience in their primary domain.  
Sternberg’s Triarchic Intelligence model and Carroll’s Human Cognitive 
Abilities provided a comprehensive and systematic compilation of cognitive and 
inferential processes that could operate to generalise knowledge and expertise. 
However, it was not readily apparent that there were common patterns of usage 
of cognitive inferential mechanisms amongst all the participants.  Rather they 
seemed to pick and choose their cognitive generalisation processes according to 
predilections which were not readily identifiable: some matched past experience 
closely with new situations, others generalised more broadly from knowledge or 
processes, some were almost profligate with their use of analogy, others more 
targeted and specific, some stayed more within their domain and others used 
knowledge from an array of domains or experience transferring it quite readily 
across domain boundaries.  
Generalisations from specific Gardnerian intelligences beyond their domains of 
application were often used despite the theoretical constraints placed by Gardner 
(1983) on how domain specific symbolisation systems, critical thinking, and 
modular processes would limit general application. While there may be some 
validity in his conceptualisation, individuals seemed to constantly ‘over-ride’ or 
circumvent these constraints. It seems likely that there must be some 
permeability between his higher-level cognitive processes and his specific 
intelligences. Nor were there indications that participants were highly reliant on 
Sternberg’s meta-component process or that they followed then in the linear, 
sequential way prescribed by Sternberg. Cognition probably does not operate so 
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logically and sequentially in real life, though it may also be that these processes 
and their missing stages are tacit or unconscious to varying degrees and therefore 
not readily accessible to the interview process.    Participants did not necessarily 
following a linear process or logical structures often imposed by cognitive 
scientists seeking to order the workings of the mind. Nor did they range 
randomly or indiscriminately over the full range of cognitive inferential 
mechanisms. What seemed apparent is that each person developed and refined 
their personal repertoire of mechanisms through repeated and systematic 
experimentation to arrive at their own internally validated constellation of 
protocols and heuristics which they would apply and repeatedly adapt to manage 
career transitions as they emerged.  
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Chapter 6. Personal Intelligences 
in Support of Transition Expertise 
Introduction 
Most theories of intelligence include personal intelligence in the arena of human 
performance even if linguistic/semantic and mathematical/logical symbolisation 
systems are not always up to the job of measuring it. Personal intelligences are 
important for transition expertise because, as a person makes transitions beyond 
their career stages as an individual performer, they generally move into arenas 
where the need for personal intelligence suddenly pushes to the foreground. The 
role that personal intelligences play in transitions will be approached in this 
chapter in three parts. The first part will review personal, metacognitive, self-
regulatory and social-learning theories associated with personal intelligences. 
They will be compared using the simple dichotomy of intrapersonal and 
interpersonal intelligence and their implications for transition expertise will be 
assessed.  The second part of the chapter will analyse and discuss the data as it 
relates to the theories, first addressing intrapersonal intelligence and then 
interpersonal intelligences followed by summaries of the findings.  The final part 
will present a brief discussion of the findings. 
6.1 Personal Intelligences theory 
I will attempt to address the very different perspectives on the nature of personal 
intelligence in this chapter, reviewing a number of approaches to understanding 
the operation of personal intelligences in light of models which can be broadly 
organised under the categories of 1) trait and abilities, 2) 
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intrapersonal/interpersonal differentiation, 3) metacognition and self regulation, 
4) social intelligence and 5) emotional intelligence models. 
6.1.1 Trait theories 
Within most trait theories of intelligence (See Chapter 5) there are personal 
intelligence elements. These are more substantive than one might initially 
conclude. The first of Spearman’s three “noegenic” laws is “the apprehension of 
one’s own experience [.…] that a person has more or less power to observe what 
goes on in his own mind.” Spearman also included what he called “the 
psychological relation” amongst the processes associated with ‘g’ which 
addressed how individual responded to interpersonal situations (Spearman, 1927, 
pp. 162, 179-181). Spearman believed that it was possible for an individual to 
know the mental states of others and this ability could be measured in tests like 
Binet’s Interpretations, Decroly’s Sequence, and Healy’s Pictorial Completion. 
In Spearman’s laboratory, Wedeck (1947) conducted studies focussed on the 
ability to judge feelings, moods and motivations of individuals  what he called 
“the psychological ability.” Carroll’s reanalysis of data sets from Wedeck’s 
studies divided the findings into a “factor concerned with ability to choose 
appropriate verbal characterisations of personalities from verbal descriptions” 
and “a factor concerned with ability to recognise feelings and emotions portrayed 
by pictures of facial expression, poses and the like” (Carroll, 1993 p. 527).  
Thorndike (1920) divided intelligence into the ability to understand and manage 
ideas, concrete objects and people. Vernon (1950) identified insight into the 
states and traits of others as one of his human abilities. Guilford (1967) included 
elements of personal intelligence in his Structure of Intelligence model through 
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the area of behavioural operations which he thought were reflected in 
Thorndike’s third category, the ability to understand and manage people.  
Amongst his four categories of figural, behavioural, symbolic and semantic 
content, he subdivided information in his behavioural content category into 
behavioural (other) − “the kind of information involving the awareness and 
management of others” − and behavioural (self) − “information concerned with 
the awareness and management of ourselves.  We not only know, but we know 
that we know, and we know that we have feelings, emotions, intentions and 
actions” (Guilford, 1967, p. 238. See figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Early psychometric instruments such as the George Washington Social 
Intelligence Test (Hunt, 1928) were developed to measure social intelligence. 
The GWSIT was composed of seven subtests: judgement in social situations, 
memory of names and faces, observation of human behaviour, recognition of 
mental states from facial expression, recognition of mental states behind words, 
social information and sense of humour (Moss, 1930). Even Wechsler (1958) 
who rejected the idea of personal intelligence per se still identified the facility in 
Semantic 
Behavioural 
(other) 
Figural 
Behavioural 
(self) 
Symbolic 
Figure 6.1 Informational tetrahedron. Based on Guilford (1967) 
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dealing with human beings as an important part of human intelligence, though he 
considered it to be general intelligence applied to a social situation.  
Personal intelligence makes up an important part of most trait based intelligence 
models, almost all of which contained two common elements: intrapersonal 
awareness of self in the form of “apprehension of one’s own experience” and 
“knowing that we know” and interpersonal awareness of others for the purpose 
of “psychological relations” and “managing others”. 
6.1.2 Intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences 
In his Multiple Intelligence (MI) theory Howard Gardner (1983) identified two 
personal intelligences - Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Intelligence - to which 
he gave equal stature with the other five domain intelligences. Though he 
suggests that the personal intelligences are developed together, in co-dependent 
ways and more interlinked than his other intelligences, they pass the same 
criteria that he used to identify the first five of his intelligences e.g., unique core 
operations, susceptibility to encoding in a symbolic system, developmental 
histories, etc. Gardner considers the personal intelligences to be ‘information 
processing capabilities”  one directed inwardly and the other outwardly 
(Gardner, 1983, p. 253). He maintained that both intrapersonal and interpersonal 
intelligence have their own unique “biopsychological potency” (Gardner, 1993b). 
Jerison, for example, presents biopsychological evidence for the differential 
between the perception of others and perception of self in the brain (Jerison, 
1973). Without conceding the trait nature of personal intelligences, Gardner 
acknowledges the contribution of social construction to the development of 
  
194 
 
personal intelligences as described in the work of mediationists like Vygotsky 
(1978) and Luria (1976).  
6.1.2.1   Intrapersonal intelligence 
Intrapersonal intelligence from Gardner’s perspective is “access to one’s own 
feeling life – one’s range of affects or emotions: the capacity instantly to effect 
discriminations among these feelings and, eventually, to label them, to enmesh 
them in symbolic cues, to draw upon them as a means of understanding and 
guiding one’s behaviour” (Gardner, 1983, p. 240).   Gardner proposes that 
intrapersonal intelligence is active when an individual is charting a life course 
and making decisions about the next direction that they will take in their 
development. As such, one would expect it to play a central role in transition 
expertise as individuals plan and choose course of action leading through major 
transitions.  Gardner identifies intrapersonal intelligence in particular as the basis 
of or predicate for the conceptualisation of a sense of self, a concept which he 
prefers to that of an executive function represented in Sternberg’s (1988) meta-
components or Flavell’s (1979) metacognitive feedback system: “The 
phenomenal experience of an executive sense of self may make sense in our 
society, but it does not appear to be an imperative of successful human 
functioning” (Gardner, 1993b, p. 43). 
6.1.2.2 Interpersonal intelligence  
Gardner describes interpersonal intelligence as:  “the ability to notice and make 
distinctions among other individuals and, in particular among their moods, 
temperaments, motivations, and intentions” (Gardner, 1983, p. 239-240).  This is 
consistent with Guilford’s Structure of Intellect model in which tests were 
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developed for the cognitive abilities that might affect an individual’s social 
behaviour including “feelings, thoughts, intentions, attitudes as well as 
psychological dispositions in which expressive behaviour, more particularly 
facial expressions, vocal inflections, postures, and gestures, [which] are the cues 
from which intentional states are inferred” (O’Sullivan, Guilford & deMillle, 
1965, p. 6). Guilford’s six behavioural/product categories encompass the ability 
to identify the internal mental states of individuals, group other people’s mental 
states on the basis of similarity, interpret meaningful connections among 
behavioural acts, interpret sequences of social behaviour, respond flexibly in 
interpreting changes in social behaviour, and predict what will happen in an 
interpersonal situation (O’Sullivan, Guilford & deMille, 1965). Normative 
studies and factorial analysis of the tests developed for each of these abilities 
indicated that these main categories were not contaminated by semantic and 
spatial abilities.  Though subsequent studies (Shanley, Walker & Foley, 1971) 
found correlations between scores on more general IQ tests and the subtests 
developed by O’Sullivan  and her colleagues, these correlations were not strong 
enough  − contrary to Wechsler’s assertions (1958) − to characterise 
interpersonal intelligence  as merely the application of general intelligence in the 
social arena. 
6.1.3 Metacognition  
6.1.3.1 Metacognition 
Metacognitive theory presents a different perspective on the nature of personal 
intelligence. Research on metacognition draws heavily on information processing 
and systems theories. Nelson and Narens (1990) cite, amongst others, Hilbert’s 
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(1927) ‘metamathematics,’ Carnap’s (1934) ‘metalanguage’, and Bateson’s 
(1972) systems theory in their discussion of the nature of metacognition. 
Metacognition theory covers the operations and interactions of four types of 
phenomena.  Metacognitive knowledge is an individual’s "stored world 
knowledge," particularly relating to people as "cognitive creatures." It is stored in 
Long Term Memory (LTM) and like most other knowledge is activated by 
retrieval cues. (2) Metacognitive experiences are “conscious cognitive or 
affective experiences” that accompany "intellectual enterprises." Metacognitive 
experiences can occur before, during or after an enterprise and are cognitive or 
affective responses to those enterprises. (3) Goals are the “objectives of a 
cognitive enterprise.” (4) Actions are the “cognitions or behaviours” initiated to 
achieve the goals. “Cognitive strategies are invoked to make cognitive progress, 
metacognitive strategies to monitor it” (Flavell, 1979, p. 907, 909) and they form 
the basis for learning, development and adaptation. Most research in 
metacognitive theory has focussed primarily on metacognitive knowledge and 
experience which actually align closely with concepts of personal intelligence. 
The operation of goals and actions are addressed primarily through 
metacognitive knowledge and experience. Flavell suggests that even when 
activated, metacognitive knowledge does not necessarily enter into 
consciousness, as is the case with tacit knowledge (Sternberg & Horvath, 1999). 
6.1.3.2 Metacognitive Monitoring and Control 
The metacognitive model is essentially a feedback model in which introspection 
and self awareness in the form of metacognitions contribute to self-regulation 
and learning adaptation (Nelson, Gerler, & Narens, 1984; Nelson & Leonesio, 
1988; Butterfield, Nelson & Peck, 1988; Shimamura & Squire, 1986; Leonesio & 
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Nelson, 1990, Bjork, 1996). Cognitive process are divided into two inter-related 
levels: the object level, which is involved in activities like answering a question, 
and the meta-level, which is the cognition about the object level cognitive 
process such as being aware of how the answer was recalled (Nelson & Narens, 
1990, 1996).  This meta-level is further divided into control and monitoring 
functions which together help regulate behaviour as individuals adapt and modify 
their cognitions about persons, environment and tasks through feedback.  Many 
researchers in metacognition − not unlike intelligence and expertise researchers – 
have focussed on the operation of human memory because it is a measurable, 
‘model-able’ component of cognitive processes. They have studied meta-
memory in the form of the controlling and monitoring cognitive processes 
associated with each of the three memory stages  acquisition, retention and 
retrieval.  Controlling processes include processes such as selection of strategy, 
allocation of time, selection of search and termination of search. Monitoring 
processes include subjective evaluations such as Ease of Learning judgements 
(EOL), Judgments of Learning (JOL) and Feeling of Knowing judgements (FOK) 
such as Tip of the Tongue’ phenomena, ‘warmth’ or closeness to solutions 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990).  Metcalfe (1996) used the CHARMS computer based 
model to study human episodic memory retrieval. Metacognitive theory uses 
studies of memory retrieval, self reflection, self reports on test performance, etc. 
and considers introspection to be informative, predictive and heuristic in its 
function (Lieberman, 1979). In monitoring and control, we see a clear 
differentiation of intrapersonal intelligence into self-awareness and execution. 
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6.1.4 Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation theory, like metacognition, is often conceptualised in terms of a 
systems model of human behaviour but differentiates itself from metacognition 
in its inclusion of subjective, non-cognitive factors such as doubts, fears and 
beliefs about performance situations which influence the sense of personal 
agency and which are viewed as different from the knowledge states and 
reasoning process which are the main characteristics of metacognition 
(Zimmerman, 1995). The main feedback loops in this systems model are 
behavioural self-regulation, which involves self observing and strategically 
adjusting performance processes, environmental self-regulation, which involves 
observing and adjusting performance processes to respond to different or 
changing environments, and covert self-regulation, which is a recursive form of 
self-monitoring and adjustment of cognitive and affective states to maintain the 
systems stability or change of direction as required (Demetriou, 2000, p. 209). 
The self regulation model considers itself to be an open loop system which can 
incorporate proactive increasing of discrepancies through elevating goals or 
seeking more challenging tasks (Zimmerman, 2000; Kuhl, 2000).  Self regulation 
is often formulated as a circular, three stage  before, during and after – model. 
Forethought sets the stage for performing and includes processes which 
influence and motivate efforts to act; performance or volitional control operates 
during action or effort and influences attention and action; and self-reflection 
occur after performance in response to one’s experience and also feeds back into 
the first stage, forethought (Figure 6.2).  
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The three stages of the self regulation model (Zimmerman, 2000) give some 
indications of how intrapersonal intelligence might be used to develop a career 
and ultimately to manage transitions. Each stage has a number of different 
processes which help individual sustain performance or adapt their behaviour to 
enhance performance. While they stray into territories like motivation, goal 
setting, use of imagery, environmental structures, attribution and defence 
strategies, they could be viewed as a comprehensive approach to delineating how 
personal intelligence is operationalised in performance (See Table 6.1).   
Table 6.1 Cyclical self-regulatory phase. Based on Zimmerman (2006) 
Forethought Performance/volitional control Self Reflection 
Task Analysis Self-Control Self-Judgement 
Goal Setting 
Strategic Planning 
Task Strategies 
Self-instruction 
Imagery 
Time Management 
Environmental structuring 
Help Seeking 
Self-Evaluation 
Causal attribution 
Self-Motivation Beliefs Self-Observation Self-Reaction 
Self-efficacy 
Outcome expectation 
Intrinsic interest/value 
Goal Orientation 
Metacognitive self monitoring 
Self-Experimentation 
Self-satisfaction/affect 
Adaptive-defensive 
 
Forethought 
Performance or 
volition control 
Self-Reflection 
Figure 6.2 Cyclical phases of self regulation. Base on Schunk and Zimmerman (1998) 
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6.1.4.1 Goals and multifinality 
While all elements of the three stages of the self-regulation cycle have been 
elaborated upon at length (See Zimmerman, 2006), it is worthwhile investigating 
one area, by way of illustration for how the model operates in more depth. Task 
analysis in the forethought phase, which includes goal setting and strategic 
planning, is of interest because the processes involve issues similar to those 
addressed previously when discussing cognitive flexibility. In self-regulation 
theory, goals and strategies help implement decisions and motivationally based 
choices (Eccles et al., 1983; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  Goals are described as 
“motivational symbolisations” or “cognitive constructs” rather than primary 
sources of behavioural motivation.  Strategies are the “purposive personal 
processes and actions directed at acquiring or displaying a skill….by aiding 
cognition, controlling affect and directing motoric execution” (Zimmerman, 
2000, p. 17). One can see links to earlier models of information processing, 
problem solving, planning and strategies (Newell & Simon, 1972; Miller, 
Galanter & Pribram, 1960).  Goals can have the properties of equifinality i.e. 
they can be attained by any number of combinations of lower order actions and 
multifinality i.e. any one means can serve more than one goal (Shah & 
Kruglanski, 2000). For example, the goal of keeping stakeholders informed in 
business can operate with multi-finality in that it will please one’s superiors at 
work, manage relations with other parts of the business, deliver accurate 
decisions, build connections for future work opportunities, etc. The equifinal 
goal of moving a football down the field to set up a scoring opportunity can be 
achieved by dribbling the ball, kicking a ball past opponents, kicking the ball to a 
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fellow player, kicking the ball at length across the pitch; etc. If one were to 
continue the illustration, it is possible to say that a multi-final goal of developing 
a computerised data system could be used to apply to sport performance training 
programmes, musician performance in changing environments or future trends in 
energy stocks.  An equifinal goal of enhancing sporting performance could be 
attained by using business coaching strategies, musical notation systems or sports 
exercise physiology information.  
The more means available for attaining an objective, the less strong are the 
dyadic ties between a particular means and goal. The more a means or goal can 
be used for different purposes, the more adaptable it will be to changing 
circumstances. This is important for transition expertise because both a variety of 
alternative means to achieve a goal (equifinality) and a variety of goals that can 
be achieved by the same means (multi-finality) would contribute to more flexible 
use and generalisability of knowledge and cognitive processes. Associations 
between goals and means form complex networks that are not fixed: they can 
evolve, change and adapt to experience and learning, which is what happens 
when individuals make transitions to coaching or teaching or administering an 
organisation. Highly stabilised, tightly linked goal network routes might limit 
one’s ability to respond flexibly to new or challenging situations during 
transitions. Deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993) is one 
way in which such means/goals networks might be developed. Such self-
regulatory processes, while potentially enhancing performance, would contribute 
to reductive bias (Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1993), domain knowledge 
specificity (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon & Chase, 1973), automatisation 
(Sternberg & Frensch, 1992),  functional fixedness (Chi, 2006),  and so forth.   
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6.1.5 Social Intelligences 
More recent study has attempted to understand personal intelligences as social 
intelligence. Kosmitzki and John (1993) identified seven categories of social 
intelligence which included four cognitive elements (perspective taking, 
understanding people, knowing social rules and openness to others) and three 
behavioural elements (ability to deal with people, social adaptability and 
interpersonal warmth).  Wong, Day, Maxwell and Meara (1995) developed a 
model of social intelligence which included three groups of factors: academic 
intelligence, a combined social perception/social insight element and a general 
social knowledge. They were able to differentiate both the behavioural and 
cognitive aspects of social intelligence from more general academic intelligence. 
Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987, 2000) − whose work is founded in the social 
cognitive theories of Rotter (1954), Kelly (1963), Michel (1970), and Bandura 
(1997) − maintain that while social intelligence includes cognitive processes such 
as reasoning, memory, and perception, actual psychometric measures of the 
processes are inadequate for measuring social intelligence.  They suggest that the 
successful measurement of social intelligence should include the different kinds 
of strategies utilised by individuals to accomplish social tasks and the ways in 
which individuals make plans, monitor progress and evaluate the outcomes of 
their plans (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). Self regulation models like 
Zimmerman’s (2004) attempt to map out the mechanisms of such processes.  
While social intelligence is thought to be distinct from academic abilities, many 
measures of social intelligence still utilise both verbal ability and general 
reasoning abilities (for summary see Brown & Anthony, 1990) and a number of 
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studies suggest that there are strong correlations between social and academic 
intelligences putting into question, as Weschler maintained, the existence of 
personal intelligence as separate from other general measures of intelligences. In 
order to confirm the validity of the behavioural components of social intelligence 
as separate from measures of verbal and academic abilities, tests were developed 
that used more nonverbal measures in an attempt to delink social intelligence 
from more general measures of intelligence efforts. Sternberg’s Social 
Competence Scale (Sternberg et.al., 1981) is typical of such measures of non-
verbal skills used to assess social intelligence. In this test participants are asked 
to use non-verbal techniques to judge relationships in two pictures, one picture 
showing a man and a woman and another an academic supervisor and his/her 
supervisee. Non-verbal responses were measured and decoded and then 
compared against a variety of verbally-based social intelligence measures such as 
the Social Interpretation Test (SIT) (Archer & Akert, 1980), the George 
Washington Social Intelligence Test (GWSIT) (Moss et al., 1955), Empathy 
Scales (Hogan, 1969), the PONS Test (Rosenthal et al.,1979) and Self 
Monitoring Scales (Snyder, 1974).  From the findings of their studies, Sternberg 
and Smith (1985) concluded that social intelligence could be measured 
accurately through decoding non-verbal communication. The findings also 
confirmed that the high accuracy of non-verbal decoding of social situations did 
not necessarily correlate with high scores in more general intelligence tests 
(Barnes & Sternberg, 1989).  However, the study required repeated efforts to 
refine the non-verbal encoding process and required the inclusion of a more 
elaborate set of measures in which participants evaluated their responses to their 
choices before the researchers could claim with conviction that their non-verbal 
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measures accurately measured social intelligence in ways that were not linked to 
verbal and other cognitive intelligence measures.  Ten years after these and other 
earlier studies, Sternberg and colleagues (Sternberg et al., 2000) 
comprehensively reviewed the research on social intelligence and its 
methodological issues and concluded that, while the initial conceptualisation of 
and research into social intelligences looked fruitful, researchers continued to 
find “little evidence of convergent validity among the measures of social 
intelligence, which likely reflects the complexity of the construct and the various 
ways it has been operationalised in the literature” (Sternberg et al., 2000, p. 80).  
Social intelligence suffers from its attempt to establish a unitary construct (Ford 
& Tisak, 1983) that is made up of so many divergent components: some 
intelligence and others skills, some inherent and others the product of social 
interaction, some structuralist and others mediationist based.  
6.1.6 Emotional Intelligence 
Emotional intelligence (EI) is a popularised hybrid concept. It is probably a 
misnomer as its scope far exceeds the realm of emotions and it is not clear that 
the theory is actually proposing the existence of an ‘emotional intelligence’ but 
rather the capacity to respond to and use emotions rationally.  It includes many 
personality factors amongst which personal intelligence figures prominently. 
Goleman (1995) utilised Gardner’s concept of personal intelligences as the core 
of his EI model. He also included some of Sternberg’s practical intelligence as 
well as other non-intelligence factors such as being able “to motivate oneself and 
persist in the face of frustrations; to control impulses and delay gratification; to 
regulate ones’ moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to 
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empathise and to hope” (Sternberg et al., 2000, pp. 88-89). Bar-On (1997) also 
mixed affective, cognitive and personality elements into five general categories 
of emotionally intelligent behaviour which consisted of intrapersonal skills, 
interpersonal skills, adaptability, stress management, and general mood which he 
measured in his Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQi). Mayer, Caruso and 
Salovey (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2000) defined 
emotional intelligences as a constellation of abilities which do not incorporate 
personality factors. Their four main categories of abilities are: (a) accurate 
perception of emotion in others and the accurate expression of one’s own 
emotions; (b) assimilation of emotional experience into one’s cognition for future 
use; (c) understanding and reasoning appropriately about emotions; and (d) 
managing one’s emotions and adapting to emotions in oneself and to emotions of 
others. They developed a Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS), 
which has 12 measures of ability subsumed into these four general categories.   
A comparison in Table 6.2 of the three models suggests that Goleman, Bar-On 
and Mayer & Salovey are addressing similar factors and also that Gardner’s 
intrapersonal and interpersonal categories remain a useful differentiation.  
Table 6.2 Comparison of three emotional intelligence models and the personal intelligences 
 Intrapersonal Interpersonal 
Mayer and  
Salovey 
(1997) 
 Identifying perception and expression 
of emotion in (a)oneself  
 Assimilating emotion in thought 
 Understanding and analysing emotion 
 Reflective regulation of emotions 
 Identifying 
perception and 
expression of 
emotion in 
(b)others 
Barr-On 
(1997) 
 Intrapersonal skills 
 Stress-management scales 
 General mood 
 
 Interpersonal 
Skills 
 Adaptability  
Goleman 
(1995) 
 Knowing one’s emotions 
 Management of emotions 
 Motivating oneself 
 Recognising 
emotions in 
others  
 Handling 
relationships 
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6.1.7 Personal Intelligences and Transition Expertise 
6.1.7.1 Use of Gardner’s Personal Intelligences Model 
 At the outset of this dissertation, Howard Gardner’s intrapersonal and 
interpersonal intelligence was chosen as a simple dichotomy for the analysis of 
the data. Gardner and his colleagues have not developed a substantive body of 
research to support his conception of personal intelligences which might have 
reduced the usefulness of his model for this study. But the review of the research 
in the field indicated that most approaches to personal intelligence incorporate 
intrapersonal and interpersonal formulations even when they include other 
cognitive, affective, personality and socially constructed elements.  
Table 6.3 Some representative intelligence models and their  correspond with intrapersonal and 
interpersonal intelligence 
 Intrapersonal Intelligence Interpersonal Intelligence 
Trait Models 
Spearman (1927)  The apprehension of one’s 
own experience 
 
 The psychological relation 
 
Thorndike (1920)  The ability to manage and 
understand ideas 
 The ability to understand and 
manage people 
 
Guilford (1967)   Behavioural operations (self)  Behavioural operations (other) 
Emotional Intelligence Models 
Mayer & Salovey  
(1997) 
 Identifying perception and 
expression of emotion in self  
 Identifying perception and 
expression of emotion in others 
Barr-On (1997) 
 
 Intrapersonal skills 
 
 Interpersonal Skills 
 
Goleman (1995)  Management of emotions  Handling relationships 
Social intelligence models 
Kihlstrom & Cantor  
(2000) 
 Planning & monitoring 
progress 
 
 Social strategies 
Kozmitski & John   
(1993) 
 Perspective taking 
 
 Ability to deal with people 
 
Self Regulation Models 
Zimmerman (2000) 
 
 Covert self-regulation  Environmental self-regulation 
Flavell   (1979)  Metacognitive self-
monitoring 
 
Table 6.3 shows the representation of intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence 
in some of the major theories. Together these models bring a more extensive 
  
207 
 
understanding to how personal intelligence operates in the world and during 
performance. They often provided a more operational and detailed approach to 
analysing the data in this study than was available through the research of 
Gardner and his colleagues.  So Gardner’s intrapersonal/interpersonal division 
was retained as an organising structure under which to investigate the role of 
personal intelligences during transition and to incorporate elements of other 
models that conformed to his bi-part model. 
6.1.7.2 Intrapersonal intelligence: Self awareness and self reflection 
Spearman’s (1927) first noegenic law, “the apprehension of one’s own 
experience,” and Guilford’s (1967) behavioural content category of “information 
concerned with the awareness and management of ourselves [...] we know that 
we know” capture the essence of intrapersonal intelligence. Gardner maintains 
that there are personal intelligence experts: politicians, psychotherapists, etc. who 
develop these intelligences into expertise. If that is the case, then one would 
expect to identify a range of knowledge and processes that could be developed to 
produce intrapersonal expertise just as expertise in sport and business, music and 
sport is developed based upon other Gardnerian intelligences. Self awareness 
should enable individuals to know themselves better both in terms of their 
abilities for planning action and in terms of their identity for making decisions 
about career changes and transitions. Metacognitive monitoring operates as a 
kind of intrapersonal intelligence that is contemporaneous with experience and 
action. Metacognitive knowledge about oneself can be accessed and then 
monitored through metacognitive experiences to understand more about how one 
is operating in one’s expert domain (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990.)  
This self-knowledge would be the basis for adapting and responding to changes 
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encountered during transitions. Many of the processes and plans of 
Zimmerman’s self regulation (2006) model such as ‘metacognitive self 
monitoring’, 'self evaluation',  and 'self satisfaction' would all rely upon self 
awareness as a basis for utilising self knowledge in ways which would enhance 
performance. It is in this way that intrapersonal intelligence generally and 
metacognitive experience specifically could be used by self regulation processes 
to enhance performance.  This kind of self regulation may contribute to transition 
expertise. 
Emotional intelligence places particular emphasis on intrapersonal intelligence as 
it relates to emotional management e.g., “identifying, assimilating, understanding 
and reflecting” on emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) or stress management and 
general mood management (Barr-On, 1997). Much of emotional intelligence 
theory is focussed on ‘managing’ or controlling emotional states with a view to 
responding appropriately to situations in life. Again, intrapersonal intelligence 
would give one the awareness, though not necessarily the skills, to manage 
emotional states.  
On reflection, it seems that self awareness as a function of intrapersonal 
intelligence will enable an individual to manage transitions in one of three ways: 
1) being aware of one’s own motivation, values, self concept and using this as a 
basis for deciding and acting; 2) being aware of one’s abilities and skills so as to 
utilise them effectively or understand what one needs to do to develop or 
compensate for them; and 3) managing affective states so that they either support 
a transition process or at least containing unproductive states so that their 
deleterious impact is minimised. 
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6.1.7.3 Intrapersonal intelligence: Self regulation and execution 
Individuals may also use self awareness and self knowledge for successfully 
executing strategies and assuring that their strategies and actions are in line with 
motivation. Guilford (1967) particularly emphasised “knowing that we know” 
that we have not only feelings and emotions, but intentions and actions as well. 
While trait models for intrapersonal intelligence have not focussed in particular 
on the regulation of states and actions, information and system models have 
integrated intrapersonal intelligence into executive and implementation 
processes. Metacognitive goals and actions are self-referencing executive 
processes for implementing behaviour based upon self knowledge and 
experience (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive control includes processes like 
strategy selection, control of time, selection of search, etc. Zimmerman’s self 
regulation theories (1995, 2006) build on metacognitive theory foundation by 
focussing on the cognitive processes and structures used for the maintenance or 
improvement of performance. Many performance control processes such as 
metacognitive self monitoring, self instruction, and self experimentation are all 
structured cognitive processes for controlling oneself during performance. Most 
elements of the third self reflection stage in self regulation theory include 
intrapersonal components, primarily in support of feedback mechanisms to feed 
forward information into planning and goal setting for future action. One would 
expect to see participants in the study using self-regulatory forethought, 
contemporary performance control and post event self reflection in the 
acquisition of expert skills, for example recognising one’s weaknesses and 
focussing on them as a musician, knowing when one has trained enough as an 
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athlete to avoid injury, etc.  Whether these processes will be used to manage 
oneself during transitions will be addressed in the analysis of the data.  
While self regulation and metacognitive theory tend to avoid the issue of 
intelligence per se, such explicit self-observation throughout the recursive self-
regulation cycle would seem to be representative of intrapersonal intelligence as 
defined by Gardner (1983). It is worth noting that the neo-Piagetian post formal 
operational stage identifies the development of life-experience based structures 
that synthesise the personal and emotional experiences into mental structures in 
ways which enable them to operate more effectively in the world (Blanchard-
Fields, 1994). 
One could tentatively conclude that the operationalisation of intrapersonal 
intelligence in the management and regulation of goals and actions would play a 
role in transitions expertise.  This process would most likely take the form of 1) 
consciously collecting information from the world and integrating it into an 
understanding of oneself and one’s performance and 2) using intrapersonal 
awareness to steer and direct courses of action in the world 
6.1.7.4 Interpersonal intelligence: Self, others and environment 
Interpersonal intelligence by definition concerns awareness and understanding of 
others.  It is noteworthy that most trait models seem to place more emphasis on 
interpersonal intelligence than intrapersonal intelligence.  Spearman’s (1927) 
“psychological relation” is very much concerned with how individuals responded 
to interpersonal situations; Guilford’s (1967) “other” behaviour content category 
includes information about awareness and management of others; Thorndike’s 
(1920) ability to “understand and manage people” and Vernon’s (1950) “insight 
  
211 
 
into the states and traits of others” place emphasis on this understanding of 
others. Social intelligence models also deal almost exclusively with interpersonal 
intelligence. Interpersonal intelligence as characterised by social intelligence 
encompasses more than just interpersonal relations: it includes understanding the 
social context, stakeholder issues, and organisational climate (Kozmitski & John, 
1993).  Social intelligence makes people sensitive to the social environment in 
ways that contribute to the development of their social strategies (Kihlstrom & 
Cantor, 2000). Understanding, operating within and adjusting to the social 
context is emphasised by self regulation theory (Zimmerman, 1995) which 
includes environmental regulation as one of its three main feedback loops.  
Torbert’s (2004) leadership development framework (LDF) discussed in the 
Chapter 1 is based upon four territories all of which have interpersonal and 
intrapersonal elements: either one is self assessing ones state and reflecting or 
one is garnering feedback from the environment (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 Leadership development territories.  Based upon Torbert  (2004)  
Territory 1 :  
Outside events 
Results, assessments, observed behavioural 
consequences, environmental effects. 
Territory 2:  
One’s sensed performance 
Behaviour, skills, patterns of activity, deeds, as 
sensed in the process of enactment. 
Territory 3:   
Action logics 
Strategies, schemes, ploys, game plans, typical 
modes of reflecting on experience. 
Territory 4:  
Intentional attention 
Presencing awareness, vision, intuition, aims. 
On reviewing the theories, it seems that interpersonal intelligence operates in 
three areas of application. 1) Through interpersonal intelligence individuals 
garner feedback and information about themselves which allows them to learn 
and adapt their behaviour. 2) Individuals learn to understand other people, their 
  
212 
 
moods and their states through interpersonal intelligence. This enables them to 
manage their relationships with other people to mutual advantage, to understand 
people more senior than them and to influence or develop other people who work 
with them. 3) Individuals understand the environmental and social context in 
which they operate through interpersonal intelligence. This enables them to 
operate more effectively within a given organisational context, to manage 
stakeholders, to be sensitive to organisational climate and ultimately to manage 
their behaviour to optimise their performance within the wider context. 
6.1.7.5 Emotions 
When emotions are addressed in intelligence models they are usually situated in 
the personal intelligences: Goleman’s (1995) "knowing and managing one’s 
emotions"; Mayer and Salovey’s (1997)" identifying the perception and 
expression of emotion in oneself an others"; Zimmerman’s "covert self-
regulation which involves adjusting affective states" (Zimmerman, 1995; 
Demetriou, 2000); Guilford’s (1967) "knowing that we have feelings and 
emotions"; Spearman’s (Wedeck, 1947) "ability to judge feelings and moods in 
others"; Gardner’s (1983) "access to one’s own feelings";  and so forth. 
Awareness of one’s own and other’s emotions are undoubtedly important for 
managing oneself and relationships with others. But it is not clear that emotional 
processes are primarily explicable in terms of intelligence or cognitive processes. 
Nor are the kinds of processes generally associated with intelligence necessarily 
the most appropriate ones for understanding the expression of and management 
of emotions. Consequently, where emotional expression arises and is managed 
by participants in this study it will be noted, but this study will not focus 
extensively on emotional management and expression. 
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6.2 Data analysis 
For purposes of analysing the data, the Gardnerian division of the personal 
intelligences into intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence will be maintained.  
6.2.1 Intrapersonal intelligences data analysis  
The data will be used to examine how intrapersonal intelligence contributes to 
transitions in three ways: 
 How do people use self awareness to understand themselves in 
transitions? 
 How do people use intrapersonal intelligence to make decisions and 
execute plans during transitions? 
 How do people use self regulation and metacognition to manage 
themselves during transitions? 
6.2.1.1 Intrapersonal intelligence as self awareness during transitions 
Intrapersonal intelligence includes general self awareness and the ability to self-
reflect, without necessarily having a target or goal in mind. Table 6.5 indicates 
the kinds of statements made by participants of the study that were identified as 
indicative of self awareness. 
Table 6.5 Statements indicative of intrapersonal intelligence as self awareness 
“I knew what I had was valuable” 
“I knew that I was always going to be able to” 
“Being very adaptable and willing to change and learn” 
“I suddenly thought I can do that” 
“It was that amount of passion about it in my own mind” 
“It’s the question I keep asking myself” 
“I think I felt very sort of self confidence” 
“I have over time realised” 
“You struggle and it feels a bit like turmoil at the moment” 
“I recognise my faults and that’s the way to mitigate them.” 
“Confident in my faults and my strengths and my person” 
“I try and solicit, seek out areas of potential weakness or areas for improvement” 
“So that’s a lot of conscious effort” 
  
214 
 
Self Awareness and identity 
Self awareness can make identity accessible and explicit: 
I remember thinking then; just standing there going ‘I am going to be a 
musician’.  It was that amount of passion about it in my own mind that… (MUS 
R1 Richard) 
Self awareness assures that goals and choices reflect identity: 
It’s the question I keep asking myself – I never set myself the really big hairy 
goal of winning the Gold medal because that would have meant giving up all my 
career to do it and I’ve always been somebody that’s wanted my career and my 
sport. I’ve never wanted to be somebody that’s wanted just sport or just a 
career. (SPT R1Claire) 
Self Awareness and accurate self assessment 
Self awareness enables individuals to develop an accurate assessment of their 
actual abilities, temperament and standing in their field. This can contribute to 
making realistic assessments of their opportunities and courses of action, 
particularly during early career transitions: 
I knew what I had was valuable, but I also was so unhappy to be in a place 
where I was made to feel initially bad about what was going, to be basically 
vastly more marketable than many of the singers that they trained MUS R1 
(Susan) 
And: 
I knew that I was always going to be able to make a living because I knew I had 
my backdrop of my academic, you know, my A levels, I had A levels so I knew I 
could do something or I knew that I could, this was at the age of eighteen, but I 
knew that I could teach and even at that stage, so I knew that I'd got a 
foundation there so in a way I suppose, it wasn’t so worrying that I didn’t think 
that I wouldn’t be able to work. (MUS R1 Yvonne) 
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Self Awareness and recognising limitations 
Recognition of one’s limitations seems to be an important function of self 
awareness when making career transitions: 
One of the upsides  and in a funny sort of way it seems like a negative but it 
wasn’t   is that I came out of the {conservatoire} with no pride, if you like, 
because as I say, you see these students who are really feted by the institution 
and they come out with a certain sort of, arrogance is the wrong word, but they 
perceive themselves as being at a certain level and of course as soon as you get 
out into the real world or better off you're in there at the bottom of the food 
chain again.  So I went out there and I was prepared to do anything, absolutely 
anything, not because I was prepared to do anything to earn money but actually 
because I was, I really love music, because at the end of the day, I do this job 
because music is just the most fantastic job in the world. (MUS R2 Stephen) 
And: 
It did take quite a lot of self-belief to really feel that one had something because 
there were competitions I tried and didn’t get anywhere in and I realised quite 
soon that I wasn’t really a competition animal, that I sort of thrived under those 
circumstances, but I would do better by the gradual accretion, rather than 
meteoric. (MUS R1 Robert) 
Self Awareness and self acceptance 
Self awareness allows individuals to accept or be more comfortable with their 
situation and to not deny problems or challenges: 
I think to show a bit of humility and to be human about these things and be 
personable; it’s okay. You struggle and it feels a bit like turmoil at the moment. 
(BSN R5 Lawrence)  
But also to then find ways to “mitigate” faults and not resist feedback: 
I think that’s because I recognise my faults and that’s the way to mitigate them. 
(BSN R5 Mark) 
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And: 
 Confident in my faults and my strengths and my person…. not feeling 
vulnerable necessarily. (BSN R3 Nicola) 
Self Awareness and adaptability 
Awareness of limitations – in this case of the risks of emotional attachment to 
theories and dogma – leads to being adaptable and flexible: 
You can’t really do that and not start to appreciate the real limitations on it in 
the sense of the real risks in science and becoming attached emotionally to your 
own theories or lines of enquiry, the dogma that can come with that – that’s 
dangerous stuff. And I think that links into being very adaptable and willing to 
change and learn and if something is no longer working, leave it and move on. 
(SPT R3 Edward) 
Self awareness supports the capacity to try “some different ways” to achieve 
what you want: 
Trying some different ways and some of the things that I have over time realised 
I may have to give up in order to achieve what I want, was quite a major 
learning because I guess is started out by straightforward. (BSN R7 John) 
Self Awareness and self confidence 
Self confidence is a composite structure that involves a combination of 
experience, personality and self awareness.  In the development of self 
confidence intrapersonal intelligence often plays a role:  
I think I felt very sort of self confidence having been given the role and I 
suddenly sort of felt ‘wow I do a really interesting job here’ [...] yeah it was a 
huge career satisfaction, combined with a bit of sort of terror - you know – 
would you mess up, what is expected, what is the quality that’s expected which 
was high, how am I going to deliver that quality of work? (BSN R3 Ware) 
Confidently stating one’s position is important as you “move up the hierarchy:”  
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And with the self-confidence and with my character I probably also was 
standing on my own two feet and let them know in an explicit way when they did 
a mistake and not to overstate the mistake, which created some tension, but I 
would call it in a positive way because at the end of the day it allowed me to 
move up the hierarchy. (BSN R1 Peter)  
Self Awareness and feedback 
Self awareness, often in combination with a degree of self confidence, enables 
individual to seek and receive feedback: 
Some people can perceive asking for feedback like that is a weakness because it 
is like saying ‘am you doing alright?’  I’m not frightened in doing that. So I try 
and solicit, seek out areas of potential weakness or areas for improvement and 
then (BSN R2 Lawrence)  
And: 
But if I’m wrong I say, ‘Well yes, I always have the option I’m wrong.’  Actually 
if somebody tells me you’re wrong, I’m always listening. I’m not deny them or 
ignoring them. (BSN R6 Peter) 
There are clear examples where self confidence and feedback go hand in hand 
whereby self confidence, usually developed through positive feedback over 
periods of time, enables an individual to be comfortable with and seek feedback: 
There’s probably times when I’m feeling the best that I’d sought feedback more 
– not best as in I’m doing a good job, but I’m just feeling strong and confident 
and ‘Help me out team, give me some feedback’ […] Whatever you tell me can’t 
be worse than what I’ve had before; I’m strong now and I know it helps. So 
that’s a lot of conscious effort and some, I think, some degree of maturity as 
well.  (BSN R4 Nicola) 
6.2.1.2 Intrapersonal intelligence in execution 
An important element of transition expertise is the capacity to make appropriate 
decisions. There were clear examples where individuals were self reflective in 
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ways that had a direct impact on their decision to proceed with a transition (See 
Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 Statements indicative of intrapersonal intelligence in execution 
“I wrote down ‘This I can do, this I can’t do’ and wrote it out and you know - this is 
achievable, this isn’t achievable. Eventually I decided, yeah, I could do enough here to 
change things.” 
“I never had any doubts that I could do this job.  “ 
“This was definitely a lifestyle choice, I decided that I really would like to” 
“But it’s absolutely clear in my mind that what my passion was, what drove me” 
“Right I’m literally going to be, in effect, master of my destiny here” 
“I felt by that time ‘Who was going to take that responsibility?’ ” 
“It wasn’t being out of my comfort zone … I kind of thought I knew how to do that” 
“I suddenly thought I can do that and I had visited here before so I could picture in 
mind” 
“Do I really want to do this/ do I not want to do?” 
Decision making reflecting self awareness  
One recurring theme at the initiation of transitions involved deciding whether or 
not to make a transition.  Participants talked about a certain degree of 
intrapersonal soul searching in which they examined their motivation and 
considered their future career directions: 
I had a personal fight inside, you know, I had to really, it was quite tough, I 
remember having this sort of conflict of “Do I really want to do this/ do I not 
want to do?” and so I kept putting myself in for these competitions, still keep 
playing, still keep doing and any time, I used to win them as well which was 
always good for the ego, so I suppose I kept believing in myself really even 
though there was this slight doubt that I wasn’t going to be as good as other 
people. (MUS R1 Yvonne) 
And: 
 I felt by that time “who was going to take that responsibility and as it were 
conduct this orchestra, as opposed to doing the front line of coaching.” I 
decided to do that, my talents would be best spent doing that management 
conducting type of role, rather than being at the front goal posts with the sailors 
trying to improve their performance and that’s what… that’s what I decided to 
do. (SPT R2 George) 
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Decision making and self confidence 
Being self aware and self confident in that awareness enables transition decisions 
to be made: 
It wasn’t being out of my comfort zone when made the Programme Director… I 
kind of thought I knew how to do that… that I was right and others weren’t! 
(BSN R3 Michael) 
A musician reflects on her decision to make a transition and arrives at a 
confirmation of her choice: 
I sat down on a train journey and I wrote down ‘this I can do, this I can’t do’ 
and wrote it out and you know - this is achievable, this isn’t achievable and 
looked at it all.  Eventually I decided, yeah, I could do enough here to change 
things. (MUS R1 Vivian) 
Knowing one’s experience and competency enables a transition: 
It was, it’s funny, I never had any doubts that I could do this job.  It was getting 
taken seriously that was the hard part because essentially the job that I did 
before was this job in a sort of microcosm and without the kudos.  But I knew 
that the experiences that I had as a player, the experiences that I had as an 
outreach projects manager and effectively doing this job in {conservatoire} 
meant that I could do the job. (MUS R1 Stephen) 
And: 
I suddenly thought I can do that and I had visited here before so I could picture 
in min. (MUS R2 Richard)  
Choice and motivation 
Intrapersonal intelligence operates in conjunction with motivation when an 
individual is aware and clear as to why they are making a career transition.  The 
choice is not just reactive and opportunistic but considered and reflective: 
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This was definitely a lifestyle choice; I decided that I really would like to head a 
department.  I'm basically a very bossy person and I like being in charge - it’s 
horrible isn’t it - a horrible thing to say, but I do like having, I enjoy the being 
able to have a team. (MUS R2 Yvonne) 
And: 
It was the first time I’ve actually said ‘Right I’m literally going to be in effect 
master of my destiny here’ (SPT R 4 Edward) 
One comment is particularly indicative of how intrapersonal intelligence operates 
when making a transition: 
I think whenever I’ve gone in a new role – as I think many people do – I’ve 
taken one step backwards before I’ve gone forwards so it’s the old bath tub 
analogy.  And I probably do – each time I’ve changed job, I go through a 
transitional phase where I do question ‘am I doing the right things? Am I 
contributing as much as I was before?’  (BSN R1 Lawrence) 
6.2.1.3 Intrapersonal intelligence and self regulation  
Self regulation and metacognition are special applications of intrapersonal 
intelligence used to organise behaviour through recursive patterns of planning, 
self monitoring and post event reflection for the purpose of refining future 
behaviour. Statements indicative of self regulation are shown in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7 Statements indicative of intrapersonal intelligence as self regulation 
“By analysing if you like, by setting up a series of races and then analysing each race 
and each condition” 
“I’ve stepped back and said ‘What was the goal? How do you do that? What could 
happen along the way?” 
“Then I worked a route, whereby I could” 
“I remember coming out of that meeting and thinking ‘That’s why you are where you 
are doing that – Boy this Guy, this was wise” 
“Yeah, the important work is conscious, right” 
“So when I failed it was a conscious failure; therefore you’re in a position to learn.” 
“I enjoyed entering competitions – I took the view that if I win some, lose some – 
didn’t expect to do anything, but was pleased if I did” 
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General self regulation 
Learning from failure through planning and post-event reflection indicates how 
some business people self regulate:  
Yeah, the important work is conscious right and not just get in, try it and then 
see what happens. There was a plan right, I mean the plan doesn’t need to be 
sophisticated or thought through, but you know clearly understood; ‘that’s 
where we want to be and these are the four things we have to do to get from A to 
B. Over time it gets more balanced, rounded; soft factors, hard factors 
considered but it’s not like ‘Oh let’s try this and let’s try that and see how it 
goes’. So when I failed it was a conscious failure; therefore you’re in a position 
to learn. (BSN R2 Peter)  
Self regulation can be a conscious process but need not be rigid: 
 I was always doing concerts so it was always just another concert – I was 
always entering competitions. I enjoyed entering competitions – I took the view 
that if I win some, lose some – didn’t expect to do anything, but was pleased if I 
did and you know… it’s not so cut throat as it is now I suppose. (MUS R1Vivian) 
Forethought 
Forethought is a process of setting goals and planning how to meet them: 
As with everything that I’ve ever done is, I’ve stepped back and said ‘What was 
the goal? How do you do that? And what could happen along the way?’ (SPT 
R2 Claire) 
And: 
Because I’d had a year where I’ve lost ….you have to have two years of points 
to qualify for an Olympics, so I had to sit down with a points scheme that July 
and work out if it was possible for me to qualify on half the number of 
competitions before I went for it and then I worked a route, whereby I could 
(SPT R4 Claire) 
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Performance Review 
One sports individual mentioned using forethought and performance review as 
part of their strategy for preparing for competition: 
How did you self-learn or enhance your performance? By analysing if you like, 
by setting up a series of races and then analysing each race and each condition, 
working with the sail maker as well – and a mast maker and a boat builder – to 
develop all the equipment so you had better speed; which is what sailing is a lot 
about. (SPT R1 Alan) 
A business person used post-event self judgement to understand his situation: 
Then I went’ to see my Chinese boss and did the same thing.  And again I will 
never forget this; he said ‘hang on a minute’ - and I was convinced he was 
going to try to talk me out of it - and he said ‘just think this through’.  And I 
remember coming out of that meeting and thinking ‘That’s why you are where 
you are doing that – Boy this guy, this was wise in a Chinese way; this was all 
part of what Sun Yat Sun’s art of war, this was-’. I just remember being 
massively impressed; that’s what we did and the whole thing got nicked, so it 
was kinda this - I mean for me it was a very interesting lesson in how to do 
things, rather than just always naturally go at it kinda like a bull in a game. 
(BSN R2 John) 
6.2.1.4 Discussion: Intrapersonal intelligence in transitions 
 
6.2.1.4.1 Discussion: Self Awareness and intrapersonal 
intelligence generally 
Is intrapersonal intelligence a contributor to transition expertise? Are individuals 
who are more self aware able to make better transitions, better transition choices 
and manage those choices better. There are clear indications from the analysis of 
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statements from the participants that they did use intrapersonal intelligence 
during transitions (See Table 6.8).  
Table 6.8 Intrapersonal intelligence during transition 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
During 
Transition 
 
8 21 2.63 7 39 5.57 7 56 8 22 116 5.27 
Total  21   39   56   116  
Of the total 24 participants, 22 mentioned using intrapersonal intelligence during 
transitions with an average of 5.27 references per individual.  Participants 
described how they were consciously aware of internal factors like their feelings, 
their strengths and weaknesses, motivation, how confident they were in their 
response to a situation, what impact decisions would have on them and their 
future, etc. This awareness reflects the first of Spearman’s (1927) noegenic laws: 
“the apprehension of one’s own experience.” The individuals were not simply 
working through various information processing or analogic components of 
intelligence (Sternberg, 1977). They were actively involved in the “awareness 
and management of themselves” (Guilford, 1967). Intrapersonal intelligence 
informed and helped initiate and steer the utilisation of Sternberg type executive 
meta-components. Gardner’s description of intrapersonal intelligence as the 
ability to access one’s feelings and affect and draw upon them “as a means of 
understanding and guiding one’s behaviour” (Gardner, 1983, p. 240) suggests 
that intrapersonal intelligence may be a predicate for mobilising executive 
cognitive processes like Sternberg’s. 
Business people mentioned intrapersonal intelligence more often than either 
sports people or musicians. One explanation is that the career paths of business 
people can often move rapidly away from performance into management of other 
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people.  When business people become less able to rely on domain knowledge or 
domain expert processes as a basis for their performance as managers they might 
need to utilise intrapersonal intelligence more to understand themselves, their 
strengths and weaknesses with regards to their changing functions, and to 
develop new skills in response to the demands of transitions and new positions. 
Another possible reason is that many of the business people involved in this 
study attended various internal and external programmes which included training 
in intrapersonal intelligence. They would have been subject to and subsequently 
utilised personality measures like the MBTI, 16PF, EQ-Is, etc. all of which tend 
to develop intrapersonal awareness.  They would use this knowledge to enhance 
their performance in their everyday work; their annual feedback will include 
performance on interpersonal skills; they will give similar feedback to their 
direct reports; they will organise their planning and frame annual performance 
and development goals based upon this information. These measures operate as a 
form ‘institutional’ metacognitive knowledge (Flavell, 1979). Furthermore, it is 
probable that, through this exposure, they would have developed a facility with 
this kind of self knowledge and language so that when discussing their transitions 
in the interview process their metacognitive knowledge would be explicit not 
implicit.   
Sports people mentioned intrapersonal awareness more often than musicians. 
Sports, like business people, when making a transition to coaching positions are 
more likely to have gone through training programmes in which they may be the 
subject of personality tests and feedback. Most sports coaches were required to 
continue attending training programmes periodically throughout their career and 
many of these training programmes have borrowed heavily from business 
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personal development models. On the other hand, some of the sports individuals 
in this study were instrumental in setting up these programmes rather than taking 
part in them.  This may reflect a high degree of existing intrapersonal intelligence 
in recognising the importance of training and development programmes for 
future coaches that they themselves never attended. For example 5 of the 8 sports 
participants mentioned using other fields of expertise (See Chapter 4) to enhance 
their own and their team’s performance. Interpersonal intelligence enabled them 
to look beyond their own field and to recognise knowledge and expertise which 
would enhance performance in their domain experts.  
Musicians made references to self awareness less than 3 times per individual. Yet 
their domain requires high levels of self awareness to excel. Perhaps this self-
awareness is focussed on physiological and interpretive abilities rather than self 
concept or identity issues. However, where they did mention self-awareness it 
was usually acute and penetrating. Of the three domain populations in the study, 
only musicians are not generally required to undertake training in coaching or 
management skills.  Rather these skills  and the accompanying development of 
intrapersonal intelligence – are acquired serendipitously or through vicariously 
modelling of mentors and other role models. Perhaps intrapersonal self 
awareness is more tacit and implicit and not normally accessed through verbal 
descriptions. 
There were indications of using intrapersonal intelligence for being receptive to 
and adapting to feedback which suggests the operation of self regulation 
(Zimmerman, 2000) processes and metacognitive control (Nelson & Narens, 
1990). But it is noteworthy most of the self awareness statements were made 
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about self identity, self confidence, and self acceptance: intrapersonal 
intelligence amongst the participants seemed to concern issues beyond the 
primarily performance focus of self regulation theory. This data provides fairly 
strong indications that uses of intrapersonal intelligence by the participants were 
often concerned with Gardner’s ‘project of the self’ (1983). Similarly, where self 
awareness contributed to decision-making processes, it often involved 
individuals confirming to themselves that their goals were line with personal 
aspirations and motivation.   
6.2.1.4.2 Discussion: Self regulation and metacognition 
There were some statements about the use of self regulation processes, but self 
regulation as delineated in the three stage process in particular was not nearly as 
evident in the data as had been anticipated (See Table 6.9).  
Table 6.9 Metacognition & self regulation  during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Cases Ref Cases Ref Cases Ref 
SELF REGULATION 
Forethought  3 6 2 3 6 13 11 22 
Performance  Control 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 5 
Self Reflection 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 
General Self 
Regulation 
7 16 8 18 6 14 21 48 
META COGNITION 
Controlling 2 2 1 1 4 6 7 9 
Monitoring 1 1 1 1 4 6 6 8 
General Metacognition 2 2 2 4 3 7 7 13 
Total  29  29  49  107 
 
 
To the extent that different elements of self regulation were used by participants, 
forethought seemed to be used slightly more often amongst the participants, with 
22 mentions amongst 11 participants. Such skills could be associated with the 
early steps in the stages of Sternberg’s meta-componential sub-theory (1988) or 
analytical intelligence (1996) such as “decision as to what the problem is” or 
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“selection of strategy for combining lower order components.” However, a closer 
scrutiny of the individual references indicated that the use of forethought 
processes such as planning, setting goals, etc. were mostly addressing 
performance issues related to career stages that impacted on transitions rather 
than explicitly during transitions. 21 of the participants did mention self 
regulation as a general process, but conflated two or three of the self regulation 
stages.  
Perhaps most striking is how seldom meta-cognitive cognitive processes that take 
place simultaneously with performance such as performance control, 
metacognitive controlling and metacognitive monitoring were mentioned. Yet 
the literature in sport is full of research into self regulation techniques and in 
acquiring expertise (For a full review see Starkes & Ericsson, 2003; Williams & 
Hodges, 2004).  There was an average of less than one mention per individual 
(22 mentions across all three domains) and of these over half (13) were by 
business people.  Amongst 16 sports people and musicians, there were only 9 
mentions. This was surprising as almost certainly the demands of elite 
performance upon sports people and musicians would lead one to anticipate that 
they would rely on such processes. When pressed for more information about 
how they self-managed during transitions, participants often said that they just 
“got on with it” without describing any kind of structured self regulatory or 
metacognitive processes.  
There could be several reasons for the lack of evidence of these processes in the 
data. Maybe the use of these processes can be viewed as metacognitive 
knowledge and Flavell’s (1979) assertion that metacognitive knowledge does not 
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necessarily enter into consciousness even when in operation may be operating 
here. Perhaps this kind of intrapersonal intelligence during transitions operates in 
ways similar to tacit knowledge (Sternberg & Horvath, 1999) and is not readily 
accessible to describe. Or perhaps domain specific self regulation processes are 
not easily generalised from personal performance to subsequent career stages. 
But even musicians, who talked about generalising other aspects of their 
performance career like organising chamber groups to organising faculties of 
music and many of whom continue to perform throughout their career, did not 
mention generalising self regulation. Alternatively, methodological issues might 
have contributed to this absence: the process of retrospective recall used in the 
interviews may not be an appropriate methodology for identifying metacognitive 
processes that take place simultaneously with performance. Think aloud 
protocols during performance, diary keeping, after event interviews might 
produce more data. Nonetheless, the paucity of mentions and the closer links in 
many of these mentions to managing performance or stabilising in a new 
positions rather than to transitions themselves would indicate that despite 
characterisations of self regulation as a process that produces change 
(Zimmerman, 2000; Shah & Kruglanski, 2000), it actually is a largely 
homeostatic process more closely associated with maintaining stable 
performance and hence not particularly amenable to managing transitions. 
Herminia Ibarra’s (2004) proposition that transitions do not operate in the linear 
process of plan, test, study, act which is so favoured by business consultants and 
self regulation theorist would seem to be validated. 
There were a few indications of emotional self regulatory processes such as 
persisting in the face of frustrations and regulating moods which are said by 
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Goleman (1995) to characterise emotional intelligence. But Bar-On’s (1997) 
stress management was not mentioned as part of the participants’ self regulation 
during transitions. On the few occasions where emotionally intelligence types of 
behaviour were mentioned, participants’ reflections took the form of cognitions 
about their emotional/affective experiences in ways indicative of Mayer and 
Salovey’s (1997) identifying, assimilating, understanding and reflecting on 
emotions. But generally it seems that emotional self regulatory processes were 
not central to managing career transitions. 
6.2.2 Interpersonal intelligence 
Interpersonal intelligence, while paired developmentally with intrapersonal 
intelligence in Gardner’s model, can be identified in ways that are operationally 
very different during transition.  The analysis of the data has been divided into 
two categories.   
1) How interpersonal intelligence operate generally in transitions.  
2) How interpersonal intelligence operates in three specific arenas to 
support transitions: 
(1) understanding oneself and garnering feedback from other people; 
(2) understanding others to influence them and help them develop; 
(3) understanding one’s environment in order to be most effective in 
one’s organisational context.  
 
6.2.2.1 Interpersonal intelligence generally throughout a career 
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Table 6.10 indicates how individuals identified interpersonal intelligence as an 
important contributor to their career successes and an enabler of transitions. 
Table 6.10 Statements indicative of interpersonal intelligence 
GENERALLY 
“I’ve always had pretty good relationships” 
“I’ve always had an ability to put people together” 
“Understanding where they are and being more in tune with them and 
understanding what it is that every person can give” 
“I get and deliver confidence to those so they’ve got trust in me” 
“Throughout careers it is about relationships and it’s about building 
relationships 
“Reaching out to  people”  
“So work with those people to make sure it’s non-threatening and invite them to 
participate” 
“From quite a long way back I’ve viewed the job as managing people” 
“Being the sort of force behind other people’s progress” 
“The interaction with the people was more appealing and more different and a 
bigger challenge” 
“Reaching out to those people” 
 
Sometimes interpersonal intelligence was characterised as simply being able to 
“get on with most people:” 
And I would say one of my strengths all the way through my career has been my 
relationships; I’ve always had pretty good relationships with pretty much 
anybody – I mean probably not everybody but certainly on an 80 / 20 type of 
rule. You know I can get on with most people and I’m very straightforward by 
nature and therefore if there’s an issue and people aren’t happy with stuff then 
that’s fine – okay, let’s deal it; let’s figure out what the issue is and figure out 
what we can do about it. (BSN R9 John) 
For one person it is retrospectively linked to their ability to manage transitions 
into positions requiring leadership, making decisions and managing people:  
When I was a young boy same age as my son; he’s 12 as a child, I played loads 
of sport – absolutely loved, loved sport and I was quite … never going to be a 
professional but I was always Captain; I’ve always been the Captain of the 
cricket team; from the age of 9 I was a Captain, and when I was 16, a Captain 
of first eleven for a few months so you know being adult twenties, thirties and 
probably in forties I was Captain and perhaps subconsciously I learnt a lot 
being a sports Captain back to making decisions to who goes to open to bowl 
and who’s going to bat – telling people they’ve got to do things.. so it’s nice to 
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learn without knowing you’re learning and I think those early days of my 
sporting life, probably stood me in great stead for what I’ve subsequently done 
in my career because I think I’ve probably behaved the same.  (BSN R4 
Lawrence)  
A musician reflected on the importance of his ability to “put people together:” 
I’ve always had an ability to put people together I think, so in other words, the 
organising of ensembles eventually I remember I was the person who wrote the 
letters saying ‘dear so and so, would you like the ensemble to come’… I am still 
doing it actually and then that lead to in the 1980’s, I was a founder partner of a 
music agency; we actually formally set up a music agency and we were 
managing 60/70 artists worldwide, so that entrepreneurial streak was always 
there and I think that took me away from being this narrow thing that I started 
with. (MUS R1 Richard)   
For a sports person interpersonal intelligence skills seem to develop over time 
whereas kinaesthetic skills had been developed at an early age: 
When I won my first medal, I wasn’t really in touch with the guys I won it with. 
But I was so strong in certain areas that they still were able to kind of follow me 
and we kind of went in the same direction – energy has a lot to do with that I 
think.  Now I’m probably better at understanding where they are and being 
more in tune with them and understanding what it is that every person can give.  
I’m definitely better at using people around me to achieve the same thing, so 
people in my staff. But I got there the other way as well, so I mean it’s not like 
there is now all of a sudden I have this insight in leadership. (SPT R4 Frank)    
Participants repeatedly talk about “building relationships:” 
And really throughout careers and in particular the further you go up the tree it 
is about relationships and it’s about building relationships and I think I do have 
a good ability to build relationships.  I think I can see who to trust and not to 
trust; that’s the trick isn’t it? You can’t believe everybody and hopefully I get 
and deliver confidence to those so they’ve got trust in me. (BSN R10 Lawrence)  
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6.2.2.2 Interpersonal intelligence: self, others, context 
Interpersonal intelligence was divided into three arenas of operation. The first 
arena involved people using interpersonal intelligence to manage themselves.  
They actively seek feedback and then respond to it and adapt their behaviour in 
accordance with what they have learned from the feedback. The second arena 
involved understanding and developing others. During transitions, individuals 
took time to understand people, their motivations and needs. They also took time 
to support and develop them.  The third arena used interpersonal intelligence to 
understand the environment and context within which they operate. It involved 
influencing stakeholders and peers as well as understanding the organisational 
climate and seeing situational opportunities. Table 6.11 indicates statements 
indicative of interpersonal intelligence operating in each of these arenas. 
Table 6.11 Some statements indicative of the ways in which interpersonal intelligence 
operates in different levels 
PERSONAL: SEEKING FEEDBACK AND ADAPTING 
“Where I’ve got a shortfall in my skill set then I’ll listen to somebody who appears to have 
more knowledge” 
“Try and interpret what they’re telling” 
“So you hold more communication sessions” 
“You need to fit in with what people expect if you want to get very far” 
“Seeing how am I doing, seeking feedback” 
INTERPERSONAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPING PEOPLE 
“Instilling confidence in others and the performance kick you get out of them by boosting their 
confidence” 
“Giving him the leadership that he needed” 
“So if you see what they’re wanting, what makes their career better” 
“Making sure they understood exactly what the conductor was trying to achieve” 
“The fact that I’ve got a good team round me is more by judgement than by luck” 
“Talking to students as if their concerns are important”“ 
“Being the sort of force behind other people’s progress” 
ORGANISATIONAL: ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS AND INFLUENCING 
“You know where the people are and are very conscious about the interaction between those 
individuals” 
“I will know about them through formal or those less formal ways” 
 “I think it goes back to the fact that I have a sensitive radar” 
“You’ve got to persuade people actually” 
“How do I achieve goals and everybody still has their original benefit” 
“I went around and talked to people in other groups” 
“Reaching out to those people”  
“When you’re interacting with people you’re very conscious of style and evaluating staff 
“Find out where their interests are and make sure that their interests are represented” 
  
233 
 
Self: Seeking feedback and adapting behaviour 
The need to utilise interpersonal intelligence often grows from intrapersonal 
recognition of shortcomings. Where there is shortfall in one’s skill set, 
interpersonally intelligence people seek out and listen to people:   
 I think I’ve said to you that I have subconsciously been listening more than 
perhaps I thought I was and so back to - where I’ve got a shortfall in my skill set 
then I’ll listen to somebody who appears to have more knowledge and then try 
and interpret what they’re telling. (BSN R10 Lawrence)  
In moving into a management position an individual holds “more communication 
sessions […] seeing how I am doing”: 
So you hold more communication sessions or when you’re interacting with 
people you’re very conscious of style and evaluating staff, seeing how am I 
doing, seeking feedback […]Whatever you tell me can’t be worse than what I’ve 
had before; I’m strong now and I know it helps. So that a lot of conscious effort 
and some… I think some degree of maturity as well. I think you know ten years 
of working and observing others and understanding that making mistakes isn’t 
going to end the world. (BSN R3 Nicola)  
Individuals acknowledge taking feedback, assessing it and then acting on it: 
I think I was the first person who had come along and actually wanted to run 
things and listen to people but at the end of the day had the confidence to put 
down to say ‘well I’ve listened to everyone and this is what we are going to do.’ 
(MUS R1 Robert) 
And adapting behaviour: 
I agree with this bit, I disagree with that bit, as opposed to being an enquiry and 
just kind of letting it be what it’s going to be sort of thing and one of the things – 
again one of the things that I’ve kind of learnt in that sometimes I have to give 
up in order to get what I want is being right. (BSN R6 John)  
And getting support from a mentor and acting on it: 
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{Colleague} also said “You must go for it.  Don’t want to lose you but you must 
go.  A) You're an ex-student so it’s ideal ‘cos you’re going back to your roots in 
a way and B) I've got another five years” ‘cos he was sixty at the time “I’m still 
here for another five years maybe a little bit more and time’s rolling on for you” 
you know[…] So I suppose he saw that, he supported me, and he was very sweet, 
he took me to breakfast one morning, we went through all the stuff for the 
interview, very supportive and now of course, I'm his opposition, we’re in…but 
we’re also friendly so it’s very helpful. (MUS R5 Yvonne) 
And evolving in response to feedback: 
It had been almost an evolution from that point because [it] has changed over 
time to now I’m a filter on what’s coming down that translates it into what I 
think is relevant for the team (BSN R1 John) 
Others: Understanding and developing people 
Most business managers see the development of their people – an important 
interpersonal product - as a key function of their job in the same way that sports 
people coach their budding athletes and musicians develop their students. In 
involves “instilling confidence:” 
What took me a while to learn was instilling confidence in others and the 
performance kick you get out of them by boosting their confidence [...] And I 
think just on learning that concept and putting that into practice and seeing the 
impact of how your managers will step up a few steps when you do spend the 
time to boost their confidence. (BSN R6 Mark) 
And enabling an inexperienced team member by “giving him the leadership he 
needed:” 
I had one guy who was a new member of the team and didn’t know – he was 
very inexperienced and I was leading him in the same way I was leading the 
others and not getting results and I was getting increasingly frustrated […] I got 
the guy and took him into a meeting room and I kind of apologised for the fact 
that I hadn’t been giving him the leadership that he needed, that it was now 
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much clearer I hadn’t been doing it on purpose, and that I kinda now had a 
much clearer view in my mind of what leadership was.(BSN R7 (John)  
Building a good team − one of the clearest examples of interpersonal intelligence 
at work − “is more by judgement than by luck:” 
I haven’t got the depth of knowledge but what I’ll do is I’ll listen to what people 
say to me and again throughout my career – without trying to exploit - I’ve tried 
to get the right people around me and not to the point of ‘I must have the best 
guys’.  It just ‘he’s got good expertise which compliments my skills’– I got 
thrown back at me a number of times ‘You’ve got a better team than 
{company}’s got’… ‘Your team is much stronger’. And I said ‘The fact that I’ve 
got a good team round me is more by judgement than by luck’. (BSN R2 
Lawrence)   
People establish programmes to develop people: 
So I wrote a proposal – ‘Why don’t we start a programme for women who have 
degrees in science but haven’t been working and want to return and we convert 
them… you know in a year into scientists and engineers in a certain area.’  We 
did that kind of thing. (BSN R1 Oliver) 
They listen to people: 
I’ve only ever simply worked with people in the way that you would naturally 
work with them… listen to them, try to be supportive, try to be able to intercept 
within something within them to make the dynamics of our conversation more 
than the two of us being isolated. (MUS R1 Susan)   
The use of interpersonal intelligence motivated leaders: 
What motivated me about and still motivates me about the coaching and 
management side and two melded into one whatever people say – there are 
elements of both in there… it’s all about people  you know and my job’s still 
about that… it’s all about attracting the right team, creating the right climate, to 
have commonly agreed goals.  I know this is like truisms and they come from all 
sorts of places, but it’s absolutely vital. (SPT R3 GEORGE) 
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Context: Environmental sensitivity and stakeholder 
management 
Environmental and contextual sensitivity is something which takes time to 
develop and tends to be more operative at later career stages.  One of the most 
common ways it operates is through sensitivity to people around you and being 
very “conscious about the interaction between those individuals:” 
There are some people they are on the same agenda, but they don’t like the way 
it’s being done because it can put them into an awkward situation. So work with 
those people to make sure it’s non-threatening and invite them to participate. 
There is, clearly, if you look at this we have established a stakeholder map. You 
know where the people are there and be very conscious about the interaction 
between those individuals (BSN R4 Peter)  
It is used to gain information about the environment into which an individual is 
moving so that they can base their behaviour on correct assumptions and make 
appropriate decisions.  For example when moving into a vice-chancellorship, 
interpersonal intelligence was used to gain information from the “intellectual 
leaders of the area regardless of their title, regardless of their rank”: 
A tremendous number of meetings which I conduct in situ, so I go to the area – I 
don’t summon people here and I sit and I listen and it is pretty relaxed; it’s 
pretty informal.  What I am doing is collecting my information.  [.…]  I’m also 
looking for the people who are the intellectual leaders of the area regardless of 
their title, regardless of their rank – it could be a junior Lecturer, it could be a 
senior Professor, it could be someone who works in the office – but the person 
who is seen to be the most reliable pair of hands and the one to whom people 
would turn if there was a fire, an earthquake or an academic disaster – they are 
often quite different and I quite consciously think of those in the crossed-meshed 
system then of me trying to establish the fact that, if things needed to be known, I 
will know about them through formal  or those less formal ways. (MUS R5 
Thomas)  
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The other side of this sensitivity is knowing how to influence and shape people 
and situation without using force or power: 
In higher education there is a big gap between asking somebody to do 
something and giving them the sack. You’ve got to persuade people actually. 
(MUS R6 William) 
And: 
I wish to look and particularly to listen to the local environment so I can then 
think ‘Well how do we actually tie up people’s skills best and therefore what 
role do I play in this leader/manager role which gets the best out of that like the 
orchestra gets the best out of the ensemble’. (MUS R1 Thomas)  
Leaders reflected on how to get people to do what is required and communicated 
in ways that “will allow people to hear the message”: 
I mean from quite a long way back I’ve kind of viewed the job as managing 
people; now that doesn’t mean you don’t have to do strategy and stuff like that 
but by and large the day to day stuff gets done by other people – it never gets 
done by me and therefore you’re kind of continually working on ‘So how can I 
get from people what I want them to do?’ basically and ‘What do I do when it’s 
not clear what I want them to do?’ and ‘What do I do if they clearly don’t want 
to do what I want them to do?’ […]Actually getting more sophisticated at 
dealing with the areas where maybe I’m not that clear or they’re not able to 
hear it if I say it that way – are there different ways that I can say it that will 
allow them to hear the message and not get lost in the delivery. (BSN R7 John)  
Dealing with “politics” − in this case people’s differing expectations − reflects 
interpersonal intelligence: 
And here again I had then to learn how to deal with politics; it was no longer 
just a matter of facts it was really a matter of mobilising, you know, talking 
through. I had more senior management engagements and there was a certain 
effect of not the rationale of, ‘let’s find the quickest route to the problem’, it was 
more about – it’s like politics. How do I achieve goals and everybody still has 
their original benefit. Nobody wants to give up. Do we want to do this? (BSN R2 
Peter)   
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Interpersonal intelligence is required to be aware of the context into which one is 
moving: 
So it was the first time I had to understand the context, what people are doing, 
why they are doing stuff and how can I help them to provide the solution. And 
that very first experience really helps me still today, to learn and to adapt to a 
new situation. I think that was the very first one. (BSN R2 Peter) 
Being interpersonally aware of the impact one has on an organisation was 
expressed in what one individual called the “shadow of the leader”:  
I call it the ‘shadow of the leader’ – and the shadow that you cast as a leader.  
[…] And my first big job – I probably only learnt the first stage of it – the first 
one is finding out that you’ve got one, which is you find out that people come up 
to you and say ‘I hear you think X or I hear you think Y… or you don’t like this, 
or you don’t like that’ and you think ‘well why on earth would you think that?’ 
‘Well someone told me, and…”  (BSN R1 MARK) 
Or as a sports person puts it succinctly – having “a sensitive radar:" 
I think it goes back to the fact that I have a sensitive radar. (SPT R8 Frank) 
6.2.2.3 Discussion: Interpersonal intelligence 
6.2.2.3.1 Discussion: interpersonal intelligence generally 
A number of participants mentioned using interpersonal intelligence frequently 
during transitions (See Table 6.12). 
Table 6.12 Interpersonal intelligence during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
EARLY  
Interpersonal 
intelligence  
3 4 1.33 3 4 1.33 5 9 1.8 11 17 1.56 
DURING TRANSTION 
Interpersonal 
Intelligence  
7 22 3.14 8 28 3.5 8 59 7.38 23 109 4.74 
POST TRANSITION 
Interpersonal  
Intelligence 
8 21 2.65 6 17 2.83 6 20 3.33 20 58 2.9 
TOTAL 8 47 5.88 8 49 6.13 8 88 11.0 24 184 7.67 
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All 24 participants mentioned using interpersonal intelligence in transitions 
averaging 4.74 mentions per individual specifically during transitions and 7.67 
mentions per individual if early and post transition mentions were included. On a 
basic level this is Gardner’s “ability to notice and make distinctions among other 
individuals” (Gardner, 1983, p. 240). While a number of people mentioned that 
they always seemed to have had interpersonal intelligence and had relied upon it 
throughout their career, there were an equal number of cases where it only began 
to emerge in the transitions from performance to coaching or managing and then 
grew both in importance and in the development of skills associated with it. This 
is consistent with one of Gardner’s (1983) criteria for an intelligence that it have 
a “distinctive developmental history along with a definable set of expert ‘end set’ 
performances.” But this developmental history extends into careers often past the 
time when individuals are performing as a domain expert. This would tend to 
confirm neo-Piagetian thinking (Labouvie-Vief, 1992) and lifespan learning 
models (Laipple, 1992) in which interpersonal intelligence is more fully 
developed at later stages of a career. 
As with intrapersonal intelligence, it is the business people who speak most often 
about interpersonal intelligence during transitions, averaging over 7 mentions per 
individual and more than twice as often as either sports people or musicians. 
They mention leading individuals, managing teams, and managing relationship 
amongst peers and stakeholders as central to their performance in their more 
senior positions.  
Aside from the progressive development of interpersonal expertise throughout a 
career, there seems to be no predominant pattern or way in which it is developed. 
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Skills associated with interpersonal intelligence were developed through training, 
through association with others who demonstrate it, informally through finding 
oneself in a role requiring it, through mentoring, or through self reflection and 
constant personal review.  
6.2.2.3.2 Discussion: Interpersonal intelligence in specific arenas. 
When data for interpersonal intelligence were organised into categories of self, 
others and organisation some further subcategories emerged. (See Table 6.13)  
Table 6.13 Interpersonal intelligence during transitions in specific arenas 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave Case
s 
Ref 
Ave 
SELF             
Openness to 
Feedback 
1 1 1 4 6 1.50 6 34 5.67 11 41 3.73 
OTHERS             
Supporting 
Others 
6 12 2.0 5 16 3.20 5 15 3.0 16 43 2.69 
Motivating 
Others 
6 7 1.17 3 7 2.33 5 12 2.40 14 26 1.86 
Giving 
Autonomy 
2 5 2.50 3 11 3.67 6 22 3.67 11 38 3.45 
Subtotal 
 
8 24  7 34  8 49  23 107 4.65 
CONTEXT             
Corporate & 
Stakeholder 
3 4 1.33 0 0 0 5 14 2.8 9 18 2.0 
TOTAL 8 29 3.63 8 40 5.0 8 97 12.13 24 166 6.92 
 
In the first arena of relationship to oneself, interpersonal intelligence mainly took 
the form of seeking out feedback. This is not surprising in itself, but it is 
noteworthy that 34 of the 41 references were by business people and there was 
only 1 reference by a musician and only 6 by sports people.  This is a clear 
differentiation across domains.  This may be attributable to the business culture 
  
241 
 
in which structured giving and receiving feedback are built into almost all 
aspects of performance and are considered crucial during transition periods. 
In the second arena of others, one would expect to see interpersonal intelligence 
in most evidence. The data bear this out: 23 of the 24 participants mentioned 
using interpersonal intelligence in this way. This is consistent with most models 
of interpersonal intelligence. Guilford’s behavioural/product category includes 
“responding flexibly in interpreting changes in social behaviour” (O’Sullivan, 
Guilford & deMille, 1965). Thorndike’s (1920) third category encompassed 
behaviours for “understanding and managing people”. One can also see elements 
of emotional intelligence as individuals deploy “interpersonal skills” and “handle 
relationships” (Barr-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995). Interestingly while supporting 
others through help, feedback, and advice was common (43 mentions), 
motivating others (26 mentions) and giving autonomy (38 mentions) also played 
important roles.   
In the third, context/organisational arena participants drew upon interpersonal 
intelligence to mobilise support amongst key stakeholder, to shape the context in 
which decision were made or to support the implementation of their actions. This 
use of interpersonal intelligence was less frequent than the other arenas but was 
more in evidence during the later stages of career transitions when the roles and 
responsibilities of individuals often encompassed the development and direction 
of their institution rather than just their own career.  Social cognitive theorists 
such as Cantor and Khilstrom (2000) maintain that social intelligence includes 
the social strategies people use to accomplish social tasks. Giddens’ structuration 
process describes the embeddedness of individuals within their institutions as the 
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“specifically reflexive form of the knowledgeability of human agents that is most 
deeply involved in the recursive ordering of social practices” (Giddens, 1984, p. 
3).  Barley (1989) might say that individuals are “fashioned” by their social 
context but they can also modify the modalities of an organisation through 
“enacting” which in turn will “constitute” organisational structures and 
institutions. 
In reviewing the overall patterns of the data, it seemed that interpersonal 
intelligence operated in what could broadly be described as either receptive ways 
in which people were open to information and feedback from their interpersonal 
environment, or in responsive ways in which they were also able to adapt or 
influence their interpersonal environment in ways which contributed to their 
ability to perform in general and during transitions. This differentiation is 
indicated in Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14  How interpersonal intelligence is utilised during transitions 
 Receptive Responsive 
Personal Context Gather information 
about oneself 
Adapting one’s 
behaviour 
Interpersonal 
Context 
Gathering information 
about others 
Developing others 
Organisational 
Context 
Sensitivity to 
Environment 
Influencing/politics 
Receptively, interpersonal intelligences was used to generate information about 
oneself, usually through soliciting feedback, to understand the interests and 
motivations of others or, in the broader organisational context, to gather 
information through awareness of others about the environment or context in 
which one is operating. Responsively, it was used to adapt and change one’s 
behaviour in accordance with feedback, to develop people through coaching, 
dialogue, etc. or to shape the environment in which they found themselves. The 
receptive/responsive dichotomy in this arena is similar to Kosmitzki and John’s 
  
243 
 
(1993) dichotomisation of social intelligence into cognitive (more receptive) and 
behavioural (more responsive) elements. For example their cognitive 
“perspective taking” vs. behavioural “social adaptability” would be illustrative of 
the receptive/responsive dichotomy at the personal level. Their cognitive 
“understanding people” vs. their behavioural “ability to deal with others” is 
illustrative of the receptive/responsive interpersonal level.  
Finally it is important to mention that there were three cases where apparent lack 
of personal intelligence led to failed transitions.  In the first case a sports person 
progressed to the level of a senior coach within his sport but never moved into a 
more senior management or leadership capacity.  Over the course of the 
interview it became clear that he could not understand what was required of him 
to make this transition or indeed that he needed to be more socially astute. This 
lack of intrapersonal self awareness and inability to utilise negative feedback 
contributed to his career peaking at the level of senior coach. In the second case 
an individual became the performance director (CEO) for a national sporting 
association.  But after a few years in this position, he realised that he did not have 
the interpersonal skills to manage the organisation nor in fact did he have the 
motivation to engage in the kinds of personal and ‘political’ processes required to 
lead his management team.  He resigned his position to return to a more 
performance/research function which was his true passion. Lack of interpersonal 
intelligence in managing relationship with others contributed to this lateral move 
in his career.  In a third case, an individual reached group vice-president level 
within an organisation but, when the organisational climate and leadership mood 
changed, he found himself wrong footed and eventually ushered out from senior 
management position within the company. While personally and interpersonally 
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aware, the individual did not sense the shifting winds of the corporate climate 
and ended up on the wrong side of a corporate reshuffle. All three individuals, 
one consciously, two unconsciously, were not able to use personal intelligences 
in a way that enabled them to manage a progressive career transition.    
6.3 Concluding discussion 
Personal intelligence seems to be a key contributor to transition expertise. It is 
the main intelligence for understanding how to contextualise ones performance in 
the changing environments into which individuals move as they make career 
transitions. While it may be possible to attain elite performance in one’s expert 
domain, it seems unlikely that individuals will progress beyond individual 
performance to coaching, managing and leading other unless they have 
developed their personal intelligences.  
6.3.1 Intrapersonal intelligence 
Intrapersonal intelligence was used by all of the participants at varying times in 
their career transitions. Mentions of intrapersonal intelligence, metacognition and 
self regulation combined to average almost 10 references per individual (See 
Table 6.15). 
Table 6.15 Intrapersonal intelligence, metacognition & self regulation  during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Cases Ref Cases Ref Cases Ref 
INTRAPERSONAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
8 25 8 31 8 52 24 108 
SELF REGULATION 7 24 8 23 8 30 23 77 
META COGNITION 4 5 2 6 5 19 11 30 
Total  54  60  101 24 215 
 
Intrapersonal intelligence operated in an essentially twofold process. On the one 
hand, through self awareness people accessed self knowledge of their abilities, 
intelligences, emotions, previous experiences of personal intelligence, self 
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concept and cognitive states. They did this in order to understand themselves 
better, to know their motivations, to measure their strengths and weakness, to 
identify personal goals and objectives, to draw upon their accumulated 
knowledge of people and ultimately to determine the direction of their 
performance. On the other hand, individuals also used intrapersonal intelligence 
to manage themselves, to use feedback, build on their performance and 
continuously adapt their behaviours to emerging situations.  
Business people made significantly more references to intrapersonal intelligence 
during transitions than sports people or musicians. This is attributable primarily 
to two factors. 1) There is a greater need for self awareness amongst business 
people during transitions because they tend to leave their primary domain at an 
earlier age and move further away from the explicit use of domain knowledge.  
2) Business people are exposed to explicit training in intrapersonal awareness 
techniques to help compensate for less developed self-awareness in their domain 
whereas musicians and sports people need to be much more self aware and 
introspective in developing their expertise. For business people intrapersonal 
intelligence is explicit. For sports people and musicians in particular it may be 
much more tacit. 
Surprisingly, self regulation, performance control and metacognitive monitoring 
were mentioned far less than had been hypothesised.  And mentions of these 
processes taking place simultaneously with performance or transition situations 
were rare.  Nor were there many generalisations of self-regulating cognitive 
processes from earlier performance stages. When self regulation processes were 
used in transitions, they involved planning beforehand and occasionally 
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reviewing activities. Self regulation during transitions might be viewed as a 
composite of intrapersonal intelligence and analytical cognitive processes as 
typified by Sternberg’s meta-components. It is possible that self regulation is an 
inappropriately structured self management process for transitions because it is 
designed fundamentally to maintain homeostasis and stable states. There may be 
open-loop elements in the system which enable individuals to enhance 
performance, but it is essentially a linear, incremental change model which may 
not suit the nature of career transitions. 
A number of individuals just “got on with it” and did not explicitly rely heavily 
on intrapersonal processes during transitions. This was particularly the case with 
musicians. In part this may be because these intrapersonal processes became tacit 
through years of training and self regulation during their earlier career. Or it 
might be due to their non-suitability for generalisation to subsequent career stage 
requirements: the kind of self regulation processes used to enhance performance 
may not be useful to apply during transitions or to subsequent career stages.  
Emotional intelligence as a model for intrapersonal (and interpersonal) 
intelligence had limited usefulness. Because emotional intelligence models are 
formulated as composite concepts that incorporate a number of factors including 
motivation, self image, self beliefs, coping strategies, affective self regulation, 
etc. they are not synonymous with personal intelligence. Where they are 
formulated primarily as models for cognitive management of affective states it 
might have been useful. But emotional self management per-se was not widely 
mentioned by the participants in the study and to attempt to apply the disparate 
elements of most models in this study would have led to confusion.  
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6.3.2 Interpersonal intelligence  
The data suggest that interpersonal intelligence is more evident and more 
relevant for transition expertise than intrapersonal intelligence. This is contrary 
to the initial hypotheses at the beginning of this study that intrapersonal 
intelligence would be more central to transitions expertise. There were more 
mentions of interpersonal intelligence (275) (Table 6.16) than intrapersonal 
intelligence (215) (Table 6.15) by participants and. while both were used for very 
different purposes, the use of interpersonal intelligence may be more explicitly at 
work in transitions. 
Table 6.16 Interpersonal intelligence with self, others and stakeholders during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
GENERAL 7 22 3.14 8 28 3.5 8 59 7.38 23 109 4.74 
SELF 1 1 1 4 6 1.5 7 34 4.86 12 41 3.42 
OTHERS 7 24 3.43 6 34 5.67 8 49 6.13 21 107 5.10 
STAKE-
HOLDERS  
3 4 1.33 0 0 0 5 14 2.8 9 18 2 
TOTAL 8 51 6.35 8 68 8.50 8 156 19.5 24 275 11.46 
             
Unlike primary domain expertise which is often highly developed by the early 
career stages, interpersonal expertise seems to develop over the years and 
decades of a professional career.  Some participants demonstrated strong 
indications of interpersonal intelligence early on in their careers and for others it 
only emerged at later stages in response to job requirement. But almost all of the 
participants continued to develop the skills associated with interpersonal 
intelligence progressively throughout their career transitions as they took on 
higher degrees of responsibility in their field.   
Interpersonal intelligence was generally used to be aware of and understand how 
best to act in relationship to others. In addition to the main focus for 
understanding and managing their relations with others, individuals used 
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interpersonal intelligence to refine themselves through use of feedback from 
interpersonal sources and to understand and respond to organisational dynamics 
and corporate climate issues.  
The division of interpersonal intelligence into reflective processes which take 
information in from the outside and responsive processes which are directed 
externally towards execution proved useful for understanding how interpersonal 
intelligence operates in relationship to oneself, others and the environmental  
context. 
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Chapter 7. Practical Intelligence in 
Transition Expertise 
Introduction 
Practical intelligence is another formulation of intelligence which may play an 
important role in successful career transitions. However, it is a composite model 
with a multitude of elements, some of which are clearly elements of intelligence 
and others which may not be.  This chapter will first attempt to untangle the 
concept of practical intelligence through examining several of its most well 
known models in order to identify how the elements of it most associated with 
the application of intelligence might operate to enable individuals to make 
successful sanctions. The second part of the chapter will analyse and discuss the 
data as it is indicative of practical intelligence in operation during transitions.  
The third part will present a brief summary and conclusion. 
7.1 The Practical Intelligences 
This first part of this chapter, the theoretical review, will consist of four sections: 
1) a brief introduction to contextualist approaches to intelligence which underlie 
many of the practical intelligence models and which view intelligence as a social 
construct that is inextricable from the environment; 2) a review of the most  
useful and important practical intelligence models including those of Sternberg, 
Scribner, and Goodnow; 3) some key issue in practical intelligence, in particular 
testing, problem solving, tacit knowledge and common sense; and 4) some areas 
that the various models have in common which will be used as the basis for 
analysis of the data.  
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7.1.1 The contextualist context  
To understand the role practical intelligence plays in transition expertise, it is 
necessary to appreciate contextualised approaches to theories of intelligence.  
Mercer and her colleagues distinguish between what they call decontextualised 
trait models that “lean heavily on the conceptual model developed to measure 
academic intelligence [...] which has dominated the thinking of measurement 
theorists” versus contextualised behavioural models that “do not postulate the 
existence of a construct or trait that is a general characteristic of the individual” 
(Mercer, Gomez-Palacio & Padilla, 1986, pp. 309- 310).  Contextualism’s roots 
can be traced through various predecessors which include functionalism 
(William James, 1890), pragmatism (John Dewey, 1896; Charles Peirce, 1934), 
and symbolic interactionism (George Herbert Mead, 1984; Herbert Blumer, 
1969).   
Dixon and Baltes lucidly summarise the contextualist approaches to 
psychological development which are closely linked to models of social and 
practical intelligence: 
Insofar as contextualism has been a tangible sponsor of an approach to 
psychology, that approach has portrayed psychological development as 
an active, continuing, adaptive lifelong process, related to other ‘internal’ 
or mental processes, and interacting with biological processes, external 
activities, and sociohistorical processes. In this way, a contextual 
psychology is related to (and occasionally identified with) psychologies 
derived from pragmatism, dialecticism, and functionalism, but it is not 
entirely disjunctive with psychologies derived from mechanism and 
organicism (Dixon & Baltes, 1986, pp. 207-206). 
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This paradigm shift away from trait and behaviourist models towards socially 
constructed models of intelligence amongst psychologists is also clearly 
evidenced in early cognitive approaches to human behaviour. In A Study of 
Thinking (1956), the seminal work of Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, subjects 
were viewed (and engaged) as proactive, constructive problem-solvers. 
Concurrently, the longstanding language/cognition debate had been further 
stimulated by the ‘Whorfian Hypothesis’ (Whorf, 1956) which proposed that not 
only was there linguistic relativity in which the world is experienced and 
conceived differently in different linguistic communities but that language 
actually causes these differences though linguistic determinism. Cole and 
Scribner (1974) and Charlesworth (1979) addressed how culture shapes thought 
and determines performance in a specific domain. Cross-cultural approaches 
(Goodnow, 1976) developed a socially defined notion of intelligence. Radical 
cultural relativists like John Berry (1974) insisted that only indigenous notions of 
intelligence were valid. The works of Neisser (1976) and Gibson (1986) 
developed an ecological conceptualisation of intelligence. “Adaptive behaviour” 
was widely researched using terms like “skills training”, “adaptability to the 
environment”, and “the power of fending for oneself in life” (Numara et al., 
1969; Lambert et al., 1975; Mercer, 1978). These wide-ranging theories with 
varying elements of contextualism contributed to the development of a more-or-
less socially constructed concept of intelligence (For a summary see Coulter & 
Morrow, 1978).  
Ceci and Liker (1986b) suggested that intelligence generally – and practical 
intelligence in particular – may be better understood in terms of a hierarchy of 
cognitive skills from the simple to the complex in which complexity will reflect 
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the contextual aspects of intelligence. While this linear contextualist hierarchy 
has its limitations − performing a Beethoven sonata or judging market trends 
using mathematical modelling are very complex cognitive operations but they 
may have no more or less contextualist determinants than using a knife to eat 
peas at a dinner party − it is fair to say that contextual aspects add another 
dimension of complexity to cognitive skills.    
In their highly regarded four-year study of race track handicappers, Ceci and 
Liker (1986b) studied individuals with relatively low scores on standard IQ tests 
who were able to perform complex, multilevel calculations to accurately predict 
the performance of race horses. Handicappers based their decisions on 
information in a pre-race programme which contained between twenty to thirty 
different categories of information about each horse ranging from track size of 
previous races which had four levels, to lifetime speed which had 29 levels, to 
performances in different track conditions, to previous performances of the 
jockey, etc.  These were integrated through complex cognitive process in which 
the handicappers went “beyond the raw data in their racing program, assigning 
‘weights’ to each variable, systematically combining the various variables in 
complex, non-additive ways, and computing a rough odds/probability 
equivalence for each horse” (Ceci & Liker, 1986a, p. 132).  
The intersections between these kinds of contextualist concepts of practical 
intelligence and expertise theory are noteworthy.  When compared to trait 
models, practical intelligence has some correlations with crystallised intelligence 
(gc) which can continue to develop as one increases in age while fluid 
intelligence's (gf) function declines (Dixon & Baltes, 1986; Baltes & Staudinger, 
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2000).  The correlations are also reflected in Horn and Masunaga’s (2006) 
subsequent redefining of crystallised intelligence (gc) as Acculturation 
Knowledge (Gc) because it includes culturally-tied knowledge, is considered to 
be more educationally derived and consists of abilities acquired (or at least 
optimised) throughout a lifetime: “Whereas intelligence sets the limit on how 
much can be acquired in a particular cognitive domain, the environmental 
challenges and opportunities that one faces during their development determines 
what shall be acquire” (Ceci & Liker, 1986a, p. 119).     
7.1.2 Practical intelligence:  3 theories 
For Dixon and Baltes the study of practical intelligence − particularly from a 
functionalist perspective − portrays “(1) knowledge (or knowing) as practical, (2) 
intelligence as instrumental, (3) reason as efficacious, and (4) experience as 
being future oriented” (1986, p. 208).  These are probably good criteria to bear in 
mind when reviewing the three theories of practical intelligence below. 
7.1.2.1 Sternberg’s contextual subtheory 
Robert Sternberg proposes simply that practical intelligence “is needed to use 
ideas and their analysis in an effective way in one’s everyday life” (Sternberg, 
1996b, pp. 127-128). His contextual intelligence subtheory − which he calls 
mental self management − operates in ever day life as the “purposive adaptation 
to, selection of, and shaping of real-world environments relevant to one’s life 
and abilities” (Sternberg, 1988, p. 65).  In this subtheory an individual has three 
options for responding to experience in the world:  
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(1) one can adapt to one’s environment though the skills that enable one 
to adapt may not be measured by standard intelligence tests; 
(2) one can change the context in which one operates and select a more 
appropriate environment for one’s skills and abilities; or 
(3) one can shape or modify one’s environment because it is not possible 
to select a different environment or one is unwilling to adapt to the 
environment in which one is operating (Sternberg, 1988, pp. 65-69).  
Sternberg’s contextual intelligence subtheory provides cognitive substance 
otherwise missing from many of the career transition models discussed in 
Chapter 1 because in it he identifies specific cognitive abilities in it, many of 
which are amenable to psychometric measures (Sternberg, 1985, 1988). While he 
might react unkindly to characterising his contextual subtheory as ‘practical 
intelligence’, Sternberg uses it himself as the basis of his operating definitions of 
practical intelligence: “Practical intelligence is a construct that is distinct from 
general intelligence […] it is the ability to adapt to, shape and select everyday 
environments” (Sternberg et al., 2000, p. xi). 
All three elements of Sternberg’s contextual intelligence can be seen to operate at 
various times in a transition e.g.,  selecting a new position into which one moves, 
adapting during transitions to the new climate into which one has moved and 
shaping one’s environment during later stages of the transition process. 
Adaptation in particular is commonly deployed in transitions: musicians adapt to 
new orchestras to which they move, engineers adapt to mergers and company 
take-overs, football players adapt to new clubs they join. However, while many 
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career adjustment models that explain how individuals adapt to the 
environment(e.g., Crites, 1976; Osipow, 1983), they most often do not explain 
how individuals shape their environment as addressed in Sternberg’s contextual 
subtheory. This subtheory also provides cognitive mechanisms which might 
further explicate how Giddens’ structuration (Giddens, 1984; Barley, 1989) 
operates in the individual. Adaptation (encoding and fashioning) would be more 
in evidence during early stages of a transition and shaping (enacting and 
constituting) would take place subsequently during the later stages of the 
transition process and stabilisation in the new career stages.   
7.1.2.2 Scribner’s practical intelligence 
Sylvia Scribner’s (1986) rigorous study of dairy workers  whose domain is 
admittedly distant from thosed under study in this project  provides a clear 
delineation of practical intelligence. According to her, there are five main 
characteristics of practical intelligence. Perhaps not surprisingly, each of these 
characteristics includes elements that involve issues of expertise and cognitive 
flexibility.  
1. Skilled problem formation is as important as problem solving abilities.  The 
ability to formulate or reformulate/redefine an initial problem is an important 
element of practical intelligence. While this might include elements of 
Sternberg’s Analytical Intelligence (1996)  one of the three elements of his 
successful intelligence  it is perhaps more readily captured by his concept of 
encoding information through insightful learning (Sternberg, 1988) (See Chapter 
5). This capacity to represent problems in a variety of ways (Woods et al., 1994) 
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is a characteristic of cognitive flexibility amongst experts (Feltovitch, Spiro, & 
Coulson, 1997). 
2. Flexibility in problem solving that solves the “same problem” in different 
ways fitted to changing circumstances. Consistency across situations may in fact 
be maladaptive (Mischel, 1984) whereas ingenuity in devising shortcuts is also 
an element of practical intelligence (Schön, 1983). This flexibility in problem 
solving is similar to the avoidance of functional fixedness (Feltovitch, Spiro & 
Coulson, 1997) and the use of novelty to avoid automaticity (Sternberg, 1988).  
Almost certainly this kind of adaptability evidenced in practical intelligence 
would be indicative of schema restructuring (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978). It 
would benefit from an expert’s “extensive, rich, differentiated schematization” 
(Feltovitch et al., 1984).  
3. Practical intelligence incorporates features of the task environment such as 
people, things, information, etc. into the problem solving system. Practical 
intelligence operates almost inextricably with the environment, using “social, 
symbolic and material resources outside the head of the individual” (Scribner, 
1986, p. 25). These include colleagues, knowledge experts, data, etc. This is the 
most explicitly socially constructed (Lambert et al., 1975) aspect of Scribner’s 
practical intelligence model. The environment clearly shapes what will be 
acquired and used (Ceci & Liker, 1986a) and practical intelligence reflects 
acculturation knowledge (Gc) (Horn & Masunaga, 2006) on a mundane level. It 
is might also use elements of Sternberg’s contextual subtheory to adapt to the 
environment. 
  
257 
 
4. Practical intelligence involves searching for “least-effort” solutions that 
reflect the environment.  Practically intelligent people “fit means” to the situation 
(Welford, 1976).  “If least-effort strategies represent conscious constructions, 
their investigation requires going beyond the formal requirement of problems and 
the objective conditions of the environment to the larger institutional and cultural 
context in which individual tasks and purposes take shape” (Scribner, 1986, p. 
26). There is clear correspondence with both of Sternberg’s adapting and shaping 
processes. Templates which have “nodes in the discrimination net [that] may be 
accessed through several paths” (Gobet, 1998) would support the search for 
least-effort solutions. Mental models like MACR’s (Zeitz, 1997) might enable 
individuals to select and choose the most appropriate strategies. These kinds of 
fitting means to situation operations could readily be described by models of self-
modifying production systems (Langley et al., 1981). 
5. Practical intelligence involves the acquisition and use of situation specific 
knowledge. Scribner found that where “knowledge-strategy relationships are so 
complex [...] that generalisations are limited [and] functional requirements have 
an important role in structuring these relationships” (Scribner, 1986, p. 28). 
Individuals remained “extraordinarily selective” in areas of their working 
knowledge which suggests that practical intelligence  for all its flexibility and 
contextual sensitivity  might still be knowledge tied and domain specific. This 
fifth point of Scribner’s could have non-flexible implications for practical 
intelligence depending upon how domain specifically it is developed. One would 
expect that the high knowledge selectivity would use mental schemata like 
templates (Gobet, 1998) that can be tightly tied to domain knowledge.  Generally 
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tight links to domain specific knowledge would reduce generalisability as many 
expert theorists would contend (e.g., Ericsson, 2006; Chi, 2006). Strong links to a 
domain might also be accompanied by development of role or function-specific 
cognitive processes (Salthouse, 1991; Ste Marie, 2003) which might not be 
applicable outside of the domain. Gardner’s (1983) statement that critical 
thinking remains domain specific due to the domain’s “own particular logic of 
implications” would suggest that practical intelligence can be very domain 
specific. Onew might conclude that the situation-specific knowledge which is an 
important aspect of practical intelligence could contribute to its non-
generalisability.  
7.1.2.3 Goodnow’s organising and reorganising 
Goodnow chose the seeming simple phenomena of what she calls organising and 
reorganising to represent how practical intelligence might operate.  Some people 
are better organisers and reorganisers than other people, which she calls “locating 
the moveable and squeezable pieces” (Goodnow & Burns, 1985).  This includes 
“changing the order of various segments, cutting down the time for one and 
expanding the time for another, shifting a task from one person to another, re-
ordering priorities, deferring or abandoning all but the essentials” (Goodnow, 
1985, pp. 148-149).  Goodnow cites Peter Berger’s (1977) analysis of 
socialisation that includes learning which domains or arenas of behaviour will 
permit innovation or change and which domains tend to forbid or constrain 
innovation or change. Such socialised learning will help individuals in the 
organising and reorganising of the operational units of their life and by 
implication will contribute to practical intelligence. Though superficially simple, 
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Goodnow presents a powerful dissection of the main attributes of practical 
intelligence. 
Firstly, practical intelligence involves dealing with physical constraints. Units 
with which one is dealing can be combinable or incompatible e.g., one can 
combine preparation for a meeting with organising work priorities for members 
of one’s team but practicing cello and managing one’s diary commitments are 
incompatible. Units of practical performance can be more or less malleable e.g., 
performing a piece of music by Mozart may not be very malleable whereas 
changing the focus of a meeting in order to get a fuller briefing on an issue would 
be. This has associations with the variety of ways in which productions systems 
may or may not be modifiable through mechanisms such as discrimination or 
composition (Klahr, 1984). Constraints can also be managed by planning that is 
shaped by “world knowledge” and is subject to the “perception of segments as 
having particular features or qualities.” For Goodnow, perception significantly 
influences whether or not plans are cognitively accessible, available for change, 
fixed, cognitively embedded, or unavailable for separation (Bruner, Goodnow & 
Austin, 1956).  
Secondly, practical intelligence has social aspects. This is not so much social 
intelligence as the ability to manage and utilise the social environment for 
practical reasons. For example, other people provide you with different types of 
experiences which can be modelled; you can respond to ways that people point 
out for you to change; you may need other people to give you approval for what 
can be “moved or squeezed”; or you can alter someone else’s pattern of work, 
change their schedule, delegate tasks to them, etc. (Oerter, 1981; Fikes 1982; 
  
260 
 
Goodnow & Burns, 1985; Goffman, 1974; Bandura, 1982). These social aspects 
of practical intelligence reflect Goodnow’s (1976) early work on developing 
socially defined notions of intelligence and more general connections with social 
constructed concepts of intelligence (Lambert et al., 1975). 
Thirdly, situations in which practical intelligence operates can have varying 
degrees of facilitating conditions. Goodnow suggests that three things influence 
how much a situation is “facilitative” to being reorganised: (1) there is a clear 
value to moving pieces; (2) there are relatively few social constraints; and (3) 
there are a variety of models for how something might be reorganised. 
Differences amongst situations are of importance because they “alter the 
likelihood of intelligent behaviour being displayed at a particular time, but also 
because they provide a way of breaking down those mysterious variables: 
‘experience’ or ‘social context’” (Goodnow, 1986, p. 157). This has parallels 
with Scribner’s last practical intelligence attribute  “least effort solutions.” One 
can see the “shaping” element Sternberg’s contextual subthoery in the operation 
of Goodnow’s model of practical intelligence. 
7.1.3 Practical intelligence issues 
7.1.3.1 Testing of intelligence vs. performance in real life 
The validity of measuring intelligence that has been removed from performance 
in real life has been repeatedly challenged. While correlations between 
intelligence tests e.g., Stanford Binet (Roid, 2003), Wechsler (1997) and 
Woodcock-Johnson (1989), can be quite high, correlations between performance 
on these intelligence tests and performance in real life situations can often be 
quite low. For example: correlation between occupational performance and 
  
261 
 
performance on IQ or employment tests fell to the .2 level in Ghiselli’s 
comparative study (1966, 1973); expert psychologists’ performance is reflective 
more of sophisticated cognitive process than high scores on IQ tests (Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1985);  IQ scores of CEO’s do not predict their real-world expertise 
and performance (Streufert & Streufert, 1978); specific job related knowledge 
has a higher correlation to performance on a job than does IQ, memory or speed 
of processing (Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1982; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Wagner 
and Sternberg (1990) have identified ‘street smarts’ amongst young leaders that 
do not conform to measures of intelligence. Dörner and colleagues have 
repeatedly found low correlations between an individual’s performance on real 
world tasks and their IQ scores (Dörner & Kreuzig, 1983). They maintain that 
successful real-life performance  which they characterise as “complex systems” 
 is the result of paying “close attention to the relative configuration of the facts 
at a given time, aiming all the while at adapting current behaviour to the 
changing environment and constraints.” They call this “doing the right thing at 
the right time” or “grandmother’s know-how” (Dörner & Schölkopf, 1991, pp. 
219, 233). Cole and Scribner (1974) showed that even micro level cognitive 
processes such as memory strategies are influenced by contextual variables such 
as the nature of the task, sex role expectations, and setting (e.g., home versus 
laboratory). Children who appear deficient in micro level cognitive strategies in 
one context will demonstrate high levels of these cognitive abilities in another 
context or with a different task (Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985). This is equally 
the case with adults as demonstrated in Ceci and Liker’s (1986a) study of race 
track handicappers who scored low on IQ tests but could perform complex 
mathematical calculations.  
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Neisser (1976) critiqued the tasks of most intelligence tests as 1) being 
formulated by other people, 2) having little or no intrinsic interest to the person 
taking the test, 3) having all needed information available from the beginning, 
and 4) being disembedded from an individual’s ordinary experience. Sternberg 
(1996), a prolific tester, maintains that most IQ tests are inadequate for predicting 
performance in life because they usually measure well-structured problems 
whereas practical intelligence is particularly suitable for working with poorly 
structured problems that are typical of life situations that require flexibility in 
response in the context in which one is working, performing, and living. Reviews 
of the literature consistently conclude that applied, practical intelligence cannot 
be measured by standard tests of intelligence (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1981; 
Sternberg & Wagner, 1986; Voss, Perkins & Segal, 1991; Sternberg et al., 2000; 
and others). 
Goodnow suggested that combining intelligence tests, problem solving in the 
laboratory and assessment of everyday behaviours might be a more integrated 
and useful approach to measuring intelligence.  She maintains that such an 
approach would:  1) evoke individual differences and should be observable at 
several ages and several skill levels; 2) focus on intelligence which is observable 
in everyday live and in several types of everyday situation; 3) probably involve 
some aspects of social intelligence; and 4) ensure that the observable behaviours 
would also be amenable to some form of formal study so that naturalistic and 
experimental approaches can be brought together (Goodnow, 1986).   
Where practical intelligence has been measured, the results generally suggest a 
contextualist basis.  Howard Gardner developed a model with colleagues for 
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assessing practical intelligence in schools called Practical Intelligence For 
Schools (PIFS) (Krechevsky & Gardner, 1990).  In spite of his strong links to 
both structuralist and trait schools of thought in the study of human intelligence 
and development (Gardner, 1973), Gardner’s general conclusions were that:  
 practical intelligence skills are most fruitfully nurtured in domain-specific 
contexts;  
 concepts are most effectively implemented when used in the service of a 
particular purpose;  
 individuals acquire knowledge best when it is related to their own sets of 
abilities and interests;  
 practical intelligence skills are most powerfully integrated when 
presented in both scholastic and real-world contexts;  
 individuals benefit from a focus on process as well as product;  
 self-monitoring that takes responsibility for one’s own learning helps 
develop practical intelligence (Gardner, et al., 1994). 
7.1.3.2 Problem solving  
A common theme amongst practical intelligence theorist is that people with 
practical intelligence are good, pragmatic problem solvers: they can take 
knowledge and experience and apply them in real life situations to arrive at good, 
viable solutions to problems. The study of problem solving has produced a 
multitude of approaches that includes economic models, utility models, bounded 
rationality, game theory models, means-ends analysis, root cause analysis, 
domain expertise, etc (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Simon, 1957; Rapoport 
& Chamah, 1965; Kepner & Tregoe, 1965; Newell & Simon, 1972; Chi, 
Feltovich & Glaser,1981; Axelrod, 1984; Frensch & Sternberg, 1991;  etc). Most 
such models rely upon the human being to act more or less rationally. Early 
problem solving models discussed as prototypes for expertise are based upon 
rational models of problem solving. Newell, Shaw and Simon’s GPS – General 
Problem Solver  (1959) is an early model of rational problem solving. Miller, 
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Galanter and Pribram’s  (1960) famous TOTE – Test, Operate, Test, Exit – 
problem solving stages seems to be the basis for Deming’s analytical (1986) 
PDCA - Plan Do Check Act - process which is a commonly adopted form 
problem solving and process improvement in industry. Sternberg’s analytical 
thinking “involves conscious direction of our mental processes to find a 
thoughtful solution to a problem” (Sternberg, 1996, p. 155) and has a series of 
sequential stages: 1) problem recognition, 2) problem definition, 3) formulating a 
strategy for problem solving, 4) representing information, 5) allocating resources, 
6) monitoring, and 7) evaluation which are largely a reformulation of his 
metacomponent sub-theory.
 
 
However, problem solving theories and problem solving in real life are often 
quite far apart.  This is due in large part to attempts by problem solving theorists 
to formulate problems solving into rational, linear models that make sense in 
theory but may not map how people actually solve problems. Even Sternberg 
(1996b) maintains that it is quite easy, even normal, for rational models of 
intelligence to be confounded with other issues such as needs, motivation, self 
belief, and personality traits. He proposes that use of analytical types of 
intelligence may enable people to manage these or other non-rational factors that 
might otherwise suborn their thought processes or lead them to faulty judgement. 
While these analytical factors are important in most theories of intelligence, 
human problem solving regularly diverges from rational and linear processes. In 
fact, human problem solving is often characterised by starts and stops, delays, 
interruptions, restarts, and recursive processes (deGroot, 1965; Mintzberg, 
Raisinhani & Theoret, 1976).  Problem solving which takes place over 
significant lengths of time is characterised by “convoluted action” that is not 
  
265 
 
sequential or linear but turns back on itself and strikes out in many directions, 
particularly when the problems are important as would be the case with most 
career transitions (McCall & Kaplan, 1985). Edgar Schein (1992) distinguishes 
between “planned change” and “managed learning,” saying that the latter is what 
often occurs even when the former is what one aspires to. Herminia Ibarra talks 
about what she calls testing and learning during transitions, a circular and 
iterative process in which we “take action, one step at a time, and respond to the 
consequences of those actions such that an intelligence pattern eventually begins 
to form” (Ibarra, 2004, p. 32). Mintzberg distinguishes between “planning” and 
“crafting” strategies in which the latter “is not so much thinking and reason as 
involvement, a feeling of intimacy and harmony with the materials at hand, 
developed through long experience and commitment” (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 69). 
Many of the foregoing examples of divergence from linear rational approaches to 
problem solving will be characteristic of the operation of practical intelligence in 
different circumstances. While one of the key components of practical 
intelligence is the ability for skilled problem formulation, much of the problem 
solving capabilities of practical intelligence – which can be formidable – are non-
linear, iterative, associative and non-rational. The way in which race track 
handicappers arrived at their odds in Ceci and Liker’s (1986b) study or 
Scribner’s dairy workers (1986) decided what percentages of their products to 
stock in their delivery vans is not dissimilar to how energy futures traders make 
their calls about market trends or football managers select their teams. Is problem 
solving an important element of practical intelligence? Almost certainly. Are 
linear, analytical, rational processes the most common approach to problem 
solving in practical intelligence? The answer is much less definitive. 
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7.1.3.3 Tacit Knowledge 
Polyani initially developed a concept of tacit knowledge in which “we can know 
more than we can tell” (Polyani, 1966, p. 4).  Wagner and Sternberg (Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1985; Wagner 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1990; Sternberg et al., 
2000; Wagner, 2000) link practical intelligence to tacit knowledge – which they 
view as knowledge that is acquired through experience, observation, modelling, 
following examples, as well as practice.  They cite high correlations between 
tacit knowledge and performance in organisations, for example between levels of 
tacit knowledge and salary (.48), personal management capability (.29), and 
ratings of ability to implement policy (.39) (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Tan and 
Libby (1997) found that amongst auditors tacit knowledge became more 
important for success as individuals moved away from technical job demands to 
developing more general skills and solving more complex practical problems 
such as career management. Like practical intelligence, tacit knowledge is 
positively correlated with performance in the real world, but does not necessarily 
have a high correlation with measures of traditional IQ tests (Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1985; Wagner, 1987). However, while practical intelligence may 
include tacit knowledge, they are not synonymous.   
7.1.3.4 Common Sense 
“Practical intelligence is what most people call common sense” says Sternberg 
(Sternberg et al., 2000, p. xi). Howard Gardner identified common sense as “the 
ability to deal with problems in an intuitive, rapid, and perhaps unexpectedly 
accurate manner” (Gardner, 1983, pp. 288-289). Common sense is one of 
Gardner’s four higher order cognitive processes that is not tied to his seven 
specific intelligences. It includes the processes that enable an individual to plan 
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ahead, exploit opportunities, foresee consequences, plan multiple lines of activity 
and guide their and other’s destinies in a “prudent way.” Gardner suggests that 
using one’s own life experience and knowing the impact that one’s behaviour 
will have on others (which are indicative of personal intelligences) are also 
elements of common sense. Gardner also maintains that common sense includes 
elements of choice, intention and motivation. Common sense then is a composite 
construct − like practical intelligence. There are numerous overlaps with 
practical intelligence but again they are not synonymous. 
7.1.4 Practical intelligence and transition expertise 
The foregoing review reveals practical intelligence to be a rich but rather 
awkward mixture of intelligence, cognitive psychology, social learning, expertise 
and personality theories. Each of the models that have been discussed have 
different strengths and weaknesses for use in this study.  Scribner’s model at first 
seemed to be most useful, but its focus on a problem solving process largely 
shaped by domain expertise that was limited in scope and knowledge would not 
be comprehensive enough to use with the participants of the study. Sternberg’s 
(1996b) over reliance on analytical rational processes with its close links to 
Gardner’s logical/mathematical intelligence and elements of his own 
metacomponential subtheory (Sternberg, 1985) did not seem to capture either the 
pragmatics or the non-linear nature of practical intelligence. Wagner’s (Wagner 
& Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg & Wagner, 1986) attempted synonymy of practical 
intelligence with tacit intelligence simply did not work and failed to encompass 
many of the conscious and explicit operations of practical intelligence. Gardner’s 
model of common sense (1983), in contrast, covered a wide range of practical 
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intelligence operations but included too many non-intelligence factors like 
motivation and “guiding others’ destinies”. It was also too undeveloped to utilise 
effectively for analysing the data from the participants. Goodnow’s (1986) model 
of “movable squeezable” proved particularly useful in organising the pragmatics 
of practical intelligence into simple categories that actually had more subtle 
analytical depths than initially assumed.  But it too, like Gardner’s model, had 
not been developed. 
Fortunately, the different models overlapped in a number of areas and, if 
excluding personality factors and tacit processes, three common categories 
emerged which encompass most of the important facets of practical intelligence. 
These are: 1) Problem formulation and resolution; 2) Organising and 
administering; and 3) Managing social and organisational resources (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 Practical intelligence models compared 
 1. Problem 
formulation and 
resolution  
2. Administration and 
organisation 
3.Managing  social 
and organisational 
resources 
Sternberg 
(1985,1996) 
Contextual/ 
Successful 
Analytical thinking   
(a,b,c) 
Shaping 
Analytical thinking 
(d,e,f,g) 
Adapting 
Shaping 
Shaping  
Selection 
Scribner  
(1986a, b)  
Practical 
Skilled problem 
formulation 
Flexibility in problem 
solving 
Situation specific 
knowledge  
Situation specific 
knowledge  
Flexibility in problem 
solving 
Searching for least 
effort solution 
Incorporating features 
of the task environment 
Searching for least 
effort solution 
Goodnow (1986)  
Organising and 
reorganising 
 Dealing with physical 
constraints 
Social aspects 
Facilitating conditions 
Gardner (1983)  
Common Sense 
Use of logical 
process 
Capacity to implement 
actions 
Strategies and resources 
Implications on others 
Wagner (1985)  
Tacit Knowledge 
Use of experience Ability to implement 
policy 
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These headings have the additional advantage of focussing on three progressively 
expansive levels at which practical intelligence operates. At the first level, 
problem formulation and solution is a largely subjective process in which 
individuals utilise their knowledge, experience and problem solving abilities to 
arrive at well-formed and practical solutions. At the second level, organising and 
administrating involve the ability to utilise and manipulate the immediate 
environment and implement short-term actions many of which may arise from 
the solutions derived from the first level.  At the third level, managing social and 
organisational resources enables an individual to reach out beyond their 
immediate operating arena and utilise the extended resources of their 
environment to arrive at practical solutions for a broader context.  
7.1.4.1 Problem formulation and resolution 
Problem formulation and resolution is central to practical intelligence. Problem 
formulation is the first of Scribner (1986) five characteristics of practical 
intelligence and involves the ability to formulate, reformulate or redefine 
problems.  This reformulation ability is followed by her second characteristic 
which is the capacity to be flexible and solving similar problems in different 
ways.  Gardner’s (1983) common sense includes exploiting opportunities and 
planning multiple lines of activity. Goodnow (1985) is very much concerned 
with a pragmatic approach to problem solving that involves changing order, 
cutting down time or expanding it, re-ordering priorities, and deferring or 
abandoning non-essentials. In her approach we see practical intelligence 
operating at a very different level than analytic approaches to problem solving. 
Practical intelligence is the third of Sternberg’s (1996b) three successful 
intelligences  analytical, creative and practical  in which problem formulation 
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and redefinition fall under analytical and creative intelligences respectively. 
While Sternberg’s approach offers a more granular understanding of what 
practical intelligence might be, it remains tied to its analytical structuring even 
when dealing with creativity. The earlier listing  of human approaches to 
problem solving raises too many caveats against subsuming human problem 
solving under an analytical framework, though practical intelligence might use 
Sternberg’s (1985) “insightful learning” to modify automatic processes. But what 
makes practical intelligence practical  rather than mathematical/logical 
(Gardner, 1983) or metacomponential (Sternberg, 1988)  is its non-linear 
approach to problems solving that has been described variously above as 
“turning back on itself”, “striking out in many directions”, “convoluted action”, 
“crafting rather than planning” and “allowing an intelligent pattern to emerge” 
rather than forcing it through a structured process. Many of the researchers (e.g., 
Mintzberg, 1987; Schein, 1990; Ibarra, 2004) who propose these non-linear 
attributes of practical intelligence derive their data from studying how practical 
intelligence operates in the world, with managers and leaders rather than in 
controlled laboratory conditions. They have also relied on interviews and 
qualitative approaches to gather data. Problem formulation and resolution in 
practical intelligence, while including analytical elements primarily at the 
problem formulation stages, will follow non-linear, intuitive, flexible approaches 
to problem solving that are more concerned with getting to the right solution than 
following the right process.  
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7.1.4.2 Administration and organisation 
Administration and organisation are important elements of practical intelligence. 
Scribner (1984) identifies how incorporating features of the environment such as 
people, things, and information into one’s problem solving system are an 
important aspect of practical intelligence. Goodnow’s (1986) manipulation of 
“moveable and squeezable” parts “within the constraints of existing structures 
and processes” is representative of the operational and administrative functions 
in any organisation. Gardner’s (1983) common sense is focussed on successful 
implementation that is dependent upon “life experience.” The domain specific 
knowledge associated with Wagner’s (1987) tacit knowledge is typical of this 
kind of administrative practical intelligence that knows how to get day-to-day 
results in running any kind of operation. The latter part of Sternberg’s (1988) 
analytical thinking/metacomponential processes i.e. strategy formulation, 
allocation of resources, and monitoring would all require administrative practical 
intelligence to implement potentially “good ideas” into successful actions. His 
metacomponents could be thought of as operating in support of practical 
intelligence rather than practical intelligence following submissively in their 
sequential footsteps.  Gardner’s study of practical intelligence in the classroom 
(Gardner et al., 1994) made it clear that “concepts are most effectively 
implemented when used in the service of a particular purpose.” Reason is 
efficacious say Dixon and Baltes (1986) and in practical intelligence 
“intelligence is instrumental”.  
7.1.4.3 Managing social and organisational resources  
Mobilising social and organisational resources is different than the administrative 
abilities that are associated with more pragmatic daily. Resource utilisation is the 
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ability to reach out beyond the daily operational constraints of a situation and 
mobilise more extensive resources and people in order to achieve success.  
Scribner says practical intelligence utilises “social, symbolic and material 
resources outside the head of the individual” (Scribner, 1986, p. 25). Her “least 
effort solutions” are closely tied to understanding and situating tasks in “the 
larger institutional and cultural context.” Gardner’s common sense includes the 
ability “to plan ahead, to exploit opportunities, to guide their destinies and those 
of others” (Gardner, 1983, p. 289). Goodnow (1986) stresses the importance of 
understanding the different situations in which one finds oneself. Tests of 
practical intelligence, she says, should focus on understanding how individuals 
deal with that “mysterious variable” social context. Sternberg says that practical 
intelligence includes the ability “to shape or modify one’s environment” 
(Sternberg et al., 2000). The success of individuals in implementing larger scale 
strategies will depend on how they mobilise resources. 
7.2 Data Analysis 
The analysis of the data that corresponded to practical intelligence was 
challenging. Practical intelligence seemed to bleed over into a variety of 
contextual arenas e.g.,  practical use of education, practical use of team members, 
practical use of previous expertise in new domains, practical use of interpersonal 
skills to mobilise resources, etc.  In the end four criteria were established for 
identifying a statement as indicative of practical intelligence. By definition they 
involved praxis, or activity in the world:  
 Practical intelligence had to involve the application in the world of some 
kind of knowledge, intelligence or experience. 
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 Practical intelligence had to be applied to a real situation.  Abstraction did 
not qualify, but application of abstract ideas in practice did. 
 Practical intelligence had to involve some "movable/squeezable" 
component.  It manipulates things, objects, people, structures, etc. 
 Practical intelligence had to involve doing something or achieving 
something. 
The data review is organised into three arenas as identified previously: 
1. Problem formulation and solution resolution 
2. Administration and organisation 
3. Managing social and organisational resources.   
7.2.1 Problem resolution 
Problem solving in has been divided into two halves: problem formulation and 
solution resolution. Statements indicative of practical intelligence in the form of 
problem formulation and solution resolution are indicated in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Some statements indicative of the ways in which practical intelligence 
operates in problem resolution 
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE: PROBLEM FORMULATION 
‘I analysed it quickly: what goes wrong here’  
‘I just applied what I learned in theory into practice’ 
‘It’s about cutting to the quick of what it really is, rather than the whole 
peripheral stuff’ 
‘Make analysis of who’s strong, who isn’t strong and what is strong and what’s 
weak, what attributes need changing’ 
‘You’ve sort of disestablished the whole skill set into various elements’ 
‘What would that actually look like? What would the ingredients be?’   
 
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE: SOLUTION RESOLUTION 
‘I was able to enable things myself in a much more proactive kind of way’ 
‘Designing organisational structures’ 
‘The architecture should look like this’ 
‘So I wrote a proposal’ 
‘I set up a research centre’ 
‘I like to create something that is then able to run itself and doesn’t need […] 
me personally’ 
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7.2.1.1 Problem formulation 
Practical intelligence is often in evidence in an individual’s ability to formulate 
the nature of a situation, to identify crucial issues, to define a problem clearly, to 
follow a process to get to root causes, etc.  
Moving from general or abstract concepts to practical applications of knowledge 
is indicative of practical intelligence: 
So basically when I saw the situation I analysed it quickly, what goes wrong 
here right? Where are all the process deficits, right? Where are the 
communication gaps? And where are personality issues? And I just applied 
what I learned in theory into practice, because it was kind of obvious, but it 
maybe was not very - so that was the learning how to apply it into practice.  
(BSN R6 Peter)   
One musician when moving into a management positions described it as 
clarifying the ‘blindingly obvious’: 
You're sitting round a meeting and you see something blindingly obvious and 
you say it and everybody says “I never thought of that before”. (MUS R5 
Stephen)  
Problem formulation during transitions often includes stepping back to observe: 
Well managerially what you do and I would advise anybody to do that, is let a 
year run so you watch how your horse performs before you start pulling the 
reins too hard and I think… so you consult widely with colleagues don’t you? 
You observe the rhythm and pattern of an institution that’s already under 
momentum and start to make analysis of who’s strong, who isn’t strong and 
what is strong and what’s weak, what attributes need changing. (MUS R1 
Richard)  
Analysis can also be applied to knowledge/skill situations through 
“disestablishing” skills as in this sporting example: 
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We knew by then because we were starting to construct syllabi’s and 
programmes by then and they all had to do that because you are going out to 
somebody and you’re saying ‘Well are you a coach ?’  ‘Oh yeah’ they say. ‘Well 
why are you a coach?  Just ‘cause you put your hands up?’  ‘Well, yeah’ ‘Right 
what are you going to deliver to us?’ So at the stage where you have that 
conversation you have to know and that means you’ve sort of disestablished the 
whole skill set into various elements that you think are important and then 
isolate those down and train typical things. (SPT R2 George)   
At a senior level problem formulation involves envisioning a future state and 
then figuring out how to actually realise its implementation: 
Once I’d made that statement, it becomes a lot easier to say, well you know:  
‘What would that actually look like? What would the ingredients be?’  ‘Well it’s 
got to have a home; it’s got to have a place. What would that place work like? 
Who’s going to have to be there? What’s the basic configuration of the working 
units within it and then ‘okay who have I got to hire? And what is the job I’m 
giving them?’ But it’s no use if you can’t crystallise that into something that’s 
really quite visible in your mind’s eye and then ultimately there is a whole series 
of steps you are prepared to take and obstacles that you know you’ve got to 
overcome […] in a sense an awful of lot of what’s happened at cycling since has 
been a whole set of experiments with some reasonable hypotheses to start with. 
(SPT R7 Edward) 
7.2.1.2 Solution resolution 
The other side of practical problem solving is resolving a solution through to 
implementation.  While good solution resolution is dependent upon good 
problem formulation, this second phase of problem solving is indicative of 
practical intelligence in that the individual manipulates forms, structures, 
resources, assets, and people to implement a course of action. 
Solution resolution can operate at a very basic level when setting up one’s 
professional career: 
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I mean just as a sort of indicator – instead of sitting by the phoning hoping that 
the BBC would phone and offer me something which they did from time to time, 
I would start phoning producers, I would start thinking of programmes, having 
ideas and bouncing them off producers and they would say ‘Great, come in and 
do it.’ So I felt that I was in a much … I was able to enable things myself in a 
much more proactive kind of way really. (MUS R4 Robert)  
Or reaching out to a larger arena and engaging in “politicking”: 
I set up a research centre which was subsequently very successful, began to 
publish lots and lots more papers, got more data, did a lot more politicking 
around the need for children protection and welfare in sport and all the time 
using research and politics together. (SPT R3 Diane)   
Practical intelligence often involves putting into place structures and processes 
(as distinguished from running them) which resolve organisational problems: 
It was like being given a green field when I got here. Nobody had any 
experience of running derivative operations which is what I had been doing – 
for some of the time – even when I wasn’t directly in that field, it’s related in 
finance. So there was a lot of, there was just total freedom for me really as far 
as designing organisational structures, designing technology concepts. I wasn’t 
doing the technology work but ‘the architecture should look like this’ (BSN R1 
Nicola)  
Practical intelligence is also operational when the move to more senior 
management levels may involve setting up programmes and processes which 
bring visions or ideals into organisational reality: 
I did teaching like things so for example I wrote a proposal to do - the National 
Science Foundation was at that time moving to do something major for women 
in science and so I wrote a proposal: ‘Why don’t we start a programme for 
women who have degrees in science but haven’t been working and want to 
return and we convert them, you know, in a year into scientists and engineers in 
a certain area. (BSN R2 Oliver)  
And: 
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I've sort of, put on a […] a keyboard day where everybody plays in the concert 
hall and it lasts all day Sunday.  They play a piece with a theme, last year it was 
Salon de Paris, hence this poster here.  This year we’re doing Songs Without 
Words where they play any of them and it includes, it’s all inclusive, 
harpsichord, organist, keyboard, pianist and things and it’s really exciting 
because last year we had fifteen hundred people through the door on a Sunday 
for that and the director said we’ve never had such an event which has attracted 
so many people from the street.  So that’s my mission here, to bring, to show our 
students to the outside world. (MUS R1 Yvonne)  
Ultimately practically intelligence people formulate and implement a strategy: 
It’s what I set out to do  - so I like to create something that is then able to run 
itself and doesn’t need,  either doesn’t need me personally or doesn’t need 
somebody doing my job at all and we’re nearly there. (BSN R3 Nicola) 
7.2.1.3 Summary 
While there were some clear examples of problem formulation and solution 
resolution amongst the participants in this study, they were not nearly as in 
evidence as one might have thought as is indicated in Table 7.3: 
Table 7.3 Practical intelligence and problem solving during transition   
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Problem 
formulation 
2 2 1 6 13 2.17 4 12 3.0 12 27 2.25 
Problem 
resolution 
3 7 2.33 3 3 1 7 16 2.29 13 26 2 
 
Total 
4 9 2.25 6 16 2.67 8 28 3.5 18 53 2.94 
Only half (12) of the participants mentioned using problem formulation, 
averaging only 2.25 references per individual. While 75% (6) of the sports 
people mentioned problem formulation as a contributor to managing their 
transitions, they only did so a little over an average of twice per person. Perhaps 
the analytical/logical process nature of problem solving might be more indicative 
of Gardner’s (1983) logical/mathematical intelligence and might correspond 
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more to the business domain? But while there were slightly higher averages of 
references by business people (3.0), surprisingly only 50% (4) of the business 
people mentioned problem formulation as contributing to transitions even though 
their fields of engineering and finance require a higher degree of Gardner’s 
logical/mathematical intelligence. There were almost no references to this kind 
of practical intelligence by musicians: only 25% (2) of the musicians mentioned 
it and then only on 1 occasion each.  
While problem formulation when it was implemented was clear and contributed 
to transitions, as the examples from the data indicate, it did not seem to 
contribute extensively to transition expertise.  The lack of analytical sequential 
problem formulation during the transition of most of the participants in the study 
would suggest that a different approach to problem formulation is operating in 
transition expertise which was not readily identified. Perhaps non-linear, 
approaches as characterised by McCall and Kaplan (1985), Mintzberg (1987), 
and Ibarra (2004) were used. Possibly it might operate as tacit knowledge? 
 Solution resolution would correspond to Scribner’s (1986) “flexibility in 
problem solving.” However, there were again relatively few mentions of solution 
resolution in transitions  roughly the same number of times (26) as problem 
formulation (27). However, the distribution amongst participants was slightly 
different. Roughly the same number of musicians (3 out of 8) mentioned it but 
with a higher average mention of 3 times per person. In the business domain, 7 
out of 8 individuals mention generating solutions for problems averaging more 
than two times per person. However, sports people lagged in this measure with 
only 3 out of the 8 participants mentioning it, averaging only one time per 
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person. Again one is left with the conclusion that, while solution resolution as the 
explicit implementation of problem formulation outcomes may be effective when 
used, it does not seem to be a central element of transition expertise.  
It is of some interest that on closer scrutiny, where participants took a structured 
approach that broke situations down into more manageable steps or pieces, this 
tended to be done by more senior individuals at later career stages and was 
applied to larger scale and longer term issues rather than at the day to day 
practical things. This suggests that these kinds of sequential linear process might 
contribute to issues involving more strategic thinking.  However this kind of use 
of intelligence seems to be too ‘large’ and global to be reduced to practical 
intelligence as typified by Scribner’s (1986) dairy workers or Ceci and Liker’s 
(1986a) race track handicappers. Some of the illustrations used for practical 
intelligence may be compounded with strategic thinking skills. But practical 
intelligence at the senior organisational level seems to take the form of stepping 
back and looking at the bigger picture. This would suggest the use of inductive 
cognitive mechanisms in which practical intelligence is generalised from earlier 
specific experiences to broader strategic applications. 
If one combines statements indicating both problem formulation and solution 
resolution kinds of behaviour, then 18 of the 24 participants averaged 3 mentions 
each. This suggests that some forms of problem solving and resolution are 
operative in career transitions. But the relatively modest amount of mentions 
would also seem to indicate that problem resolution per se is not the primary 
application of practical intelligence in transition expertise. 
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7.2.2 Administrative intelligence 
Table 7.4 gives some indicative statements of administrative intelligence: 
Table 7.4 Some statements indicative of the ways in which practical intelligence 
operates in administrative intelligence 
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE: ADMINISTRATIVE  
‘We laid in a structure that was an effective administrative structure.’ 
‘Everybody understood what the objectives were and that wasn’t going to be micro 
managed by anybody else.’ 
‘The registrar said to me ‘It’s been marvellous having you as an administrator here.’ 
‘I’ve always been quite well organised but I became even more sharply organised.’ 
‘That’s just the way that my brain works.’ 
‘As a performing musician is actually really useful here, it’s really useful in terms of 
actually applying it in other situations.’ 
‘It’s a bit like teaching really, I find organising departments the same kind of skill that 
you need.’   
‘It’s just a thing, I’m quite a practical person, so, I’m quite well organised.’ 
‘I just really tried hard to get then engaged as opposed to sitting on the side.’ 
Administrative intelligence goes beyond setting up a structure to actually 
implementing and running that structure: 
Actually, mostly it was, in those days, of setting out a structure of competition 
and support – that was the first thing I did; I sorted out the politics, sorted out 
the structure of the competition so that we didn’t waste time doing competitions 
either in the UK or abroad that weren’t productive and thirdly a system of 
support to the things like moving their boats around – it sounds really simple, 
but sailing is not really simple – so the admin, all the admin side we laid in a 
structure that was an effective administrative structure, where everybody 
understood what the objectives were and that wasn’t going to be micro managed 
by anybody else. (SPT R4 George)  
Musicians demonstrate a range of ‘administrative’ skills for management 
positions when they move to head of faculty, administering an orchestra, etc. : 
Unbelievable.  I had no training whatsoever to be an administrator and I had 
never thought of myself particularly organised, but in fact I think I was quite a 
good administrator and when I left {institution}, the registrar said to me ‘it’s 
been marvellous having you as an administrator here’. Even if I hadn’t done any 
administration, you know, but I think I was reasonably good at it – I was 
interested in it you know, so I wasn’t sitting there thinking ‘I should be playing 
the clarinet’. (MUS R2 Vivian) 
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A sports person talks about how making a lateral transition from being national 
coach to setting up her own consulting business was supported by her being 
“quite well organised”:  
I’ve always been quite well organised but I became even more sharply 
organised; I wrote my own business plan, I had my own objectives, I started 
building my client base, I did everything you have to do to run a successful 
business and really I knew that eventually I would want to go back into a 
university and I saw this as a five year project probably being in the private 
sector. I made quite a healthy profit. (SPT R2 Diane)   
Amongst musicians, when they transitioned to career stages that involved 
managing musical faculties, several mentioned that they generalised practical 
intelligence capabilities developed in their performing career: 
When I got the job at {instiution}, I was presented with this sort of list of tasks 
and list of responsibilities and list of, if you like, my own list of possibilities and 
you sort of get on and do them really. And it’s only afterwards when people say 
to you “You’re very efficient at this” or “You're very good at this” it’s then that 
you begin to think, actually, yes, the way that my brain works, because of the 
discipline that I had to go through to get to where I was as a performing 
musician is actually really useful here, it’s really useful in terms of actually 
applying it in other situations. (MUS R5 Stephen)  
Another musician identified several situations such as teaching, running her 
career, and being a board examiner as examples of ‘training’ to administer a 
department:  
It’s a bit like teaching really, I find organising departments the same kind of 
skill that you need.  It’s just a thing, I’m quite a practical person, so, I’m quite 
well organised although you’d never think so looking at my desk.  No I just see 
that as another aspect of teaching in a way.  I guess having to organise my own 
career from an early age and having to run, even be my own agent at one point, 
you know, I had to be organised at home with phoning people back or sending 
them CVs, in those days, nothing on the computer, sending it on paper, you 
know, so I had to be quite disciplined in that area so that was training for that.  
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But I think my Associated Board training was the best training I had. (MUS R8 
Yvonne)  
A similar level of administrative practical intelligence emerged in sport when 
individuals talked about generalising from their experience acquired at a local 
coaching level during their transition to running a National Association: 
I’d managed budgets, not big budgets, but you had to be accountable, you had 
to work within your budget and so on   it was good training; I was relatively… 
I had lots of responsible in areas which, of course not big in themselves, were 
wide. So wide responsibilities for a number of small areas which was lucky. 
(SPT R1 George)   
Whereas musicians and sports people talk about using administrative intelligence 
during transitions generalised from self management in their performance career, 
business people seem to accrue administrative capabilities incrementally during 
the course of their management career: 
But I grew a lot as a manager as well in the time I was there – I learned a lot 
about how to deal with difficult situations, more process, more management 
process – we have, and not at the University  a more rigorous criteria for 
thinking about promotions and grades and appraisals and objective setting; all 
of those things which you don’t do much up at the University. (BUS R2 Oliver) 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that administrative intelligence can operate in 
conjunction with other intelligences, particularly interpersonal intelligence: 
The first thing I had to do was go along to the head and say ‘Would your school 
be interested in sailing?’ and they’d say ‘What?’  ‘You know, sailing.’ ‘Oh yeah 
– sailing.’ ‘Yes but’ was their answer.  ‘Yes but transport.’ ‘Yes but time.’ ‘Yes 
but safety.’ ‘Yes but competence of our teachers to take it there.’ There was 
always a whole load of ‘Yes buts’ and I just said, ‘Well okay, if I got out of the 
yes buts what would you say?’  ‘Oh, yeah, okay’.  And so we got a mini bus from 
the transport service, we got qualified instructors. ‘It’s only down the road – did 
you know there was a reservoir down the road?’ ‘Oh no.’ ‘Okay fine.’ ‘Well 
there is, and it’s up to school or they can take it as an option instead of doing 
  
283 
 
cricket or soccer in their double period etc., etc.’ Okay so they came.  And then 
we got a teacher and every teacher that came, I just really tried hard to get then 
engaged as opposed to sitting on the side and many of them did and then we ran 
free after-school training for teachers to try and build the instructor base, which 
we did.  (SPT R2 George) 
7.2.2.1 Summary 
Administration is indicative of Goodnow’s (1986) “moving and squeezing” in 
which people manipulate processes, procedures, and immediate resources to 
manage their daily work on an ongoing basis. Administration can also be seen as 
the operationalising of Scribner’s (1986a) “incorporating features of the task 
environment.”  There are indications that administration is an element of 
practical intelligence used during transition in all of the domains in this study as 
indicated in Table 7.5.   
Table 7.5 Practical intelligence during transition 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Administra-
tion 
Intelligence 
7 18 2.57 5 20 4 4 9 2.25 16 47 2.94 
             
Administrative intelligence was mentioned by 16 of the 24 (66%) participants 
with an average of almost 3 mentions per person.  Surprisingly, business people 
were under represented with only 50% mentioning it and even then only 
averaging slightly over 2 mentions per individual, even though most business 
people are subject to quite intensive training in administrative skills.  
Furthermore upon reviewing the context of the references in the interviews for 
business people, administrative intelligence was most often mentioned during the 
latter stages of a transition and as leading to an incremental development of 
administrative intelligence in dealing with more and larger quantities of work. 
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Amongst musicians, on the other hand, 7 out of 8 (88%) participants mentioned 
administrative practical intelligence as contributing to successful transitions. 
Interestingly, they did not mention administrative intelligence during their 
transitions from performer to becoming a professor. Rather, it ‘resurfaced’ during 
their subsequent stage transition from professor to heading up a department or 
faculty within an institution when they generalised from their self management to 
managing a department. This is further evidence of practical intelligence being 
generalised inductively from their earlier good practice in successfully managing 
themselves e.g., planning, booking events, correspondence, invoicing, and so 
forth, to dealing with the wider arena of managing a department. The general 
lack of training in skills associated with practical administrative intelligence 
amongst musicians (unlike business people who are highly trained in these 
matters) suggests that the ability to generalise these skills from earlier to later 
career stages will be an indicator of transition expertise. 
Sports people were not dissimilar to musicians: at a certain point their change in 
career levels required that they increasingly administer and run areas with greater 
responsibilities, such as a national association or a research department.  Their 
practical intelligence in these transitions often seemed to involve getting around 
problems or what Goodnow (1986) calls “dealing with physical constraints” as 
indicated by the “Yes, but” litany of one participant. However sports people, 
unlike musicians, did not seem to express surprise at their development of 
administrative intelligence: it arose when they needed it to make transitions 
because the job required it. Also, administrative intelligence emerged earlier 
amongst sports people than musicians when they made transition from performer 
to coach. 
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7.2.4 Resource management 
Resource management encompasses a variety of ways in which individuals 
mobilise resources and apply them pragmatically to achieve certain objectives.  
Table 7.6  Some statements indicative of the ways in which practical intelligence operates in 
resource management 
DRAWING ON KNOWLEDGE EXPERTS 
“I was lucky to meet one particular guy” 
“Friends I knew who worked in business to read and give me critical feedback” 
“I found somebody who […] is absolutely fascinated by human dynamics” 
“I was in a position to bring all of these people together” 
“I’ve had the right people on the bus” 
“So within the organisation, we’ve just got an enormous amount of intellectual knowledge 
and perspective” 
“Learning opportunity from people who were really world leaders in their fields and gave 
me light understandings of issues” 
DRAWING ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT 
“And again you know the head of the firm comes down and he said ‘We completely trust 
you; you’ve got to qualify’” 
“There was a lot of opportunity and space to be entrepreneurial, to follow one’s ideas”   
“It was deliberately an exercise to say how much can you learn and how can you start 
applying that” 
“It was the environment…it was the culture, the challenge and the way people worked 
together” 
 
APPLYING EDUCATION AND LEARNING 
“I had a very good private student who[…]put me through the ropes for the next time 
round” 
“So when I got into the school, everything I learned I was able to apply the next day” 
“But at the same time, I was doing my MBA dissertation and so I decided to do my 
dissertation in trading opportunities” 
“After each week, I’d come in and try stuff out in the office and see how it worked” 
“I did the theory and I did the practice and matched them together and wrote the 
programmes and all that stuff” 
 
7.2.4.1 Drawing upon right network of knowledge experts 
When making the transition into elite performance in sport, one individual first 
used problem formulation to identify the best route to qualify for the Olympics 
and then sought out expert knowledge to support her in achieving her objective: 
I had to sit down with a points scheme that July and work out if it was possible 
for me to qualify on half the number of competitions before I went for it and then 
I worked a route, whereby I could you know and I found a nutrients, I found a 
guy who did a sport degree where his thesis had on fencing in New Zealand and 
got him to all my physical training and I said ‘you have to fit this in and around 
my job’. And then I found a sports psychologist as well.  And I went to my bank 
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manager and said ‘I’m going to need an overdraft’ and he said ‘I’ve never had 
anybody come to me and said they wanted an overdraft for the Olympic Games 
and waived all the charges and gave me a really low interest rate. (MUS R1 
Claire)  
One individual making a transition to running a sporting consulting/research 
business drew upon knowledge experts: 
Yeah. It’s selling the deal, having to survive by learning all about tax – oh my 
God.  Having a tax audit, VAT, dealing with accountants; I used to send my 
business plan out to colleagues, friends I knew who worked in business to read 
and give me critical feedback on whether I was going in the right direction. 
(SPT R3 Diane)   
Another individual, who didn’t have management knowledge in an area himself, 
got knowledgeable people onto his team: 
It doesn’t fascinate me as much as it fascinates the people who are very good at 
it, so I found in {person} somebody who I’d initially hired to do some deals for 
me basically to generate funding and partnership sport. I found somebody who 
over time it became clear to me is absolutely fascinated by human dynamics.  
(SPT R1 Edward)  
And: 
So clearly by the formula you know that I’m now starting to advocate to people 
in terms of my understanding of what seems to work in pursuing excellence; 
there’s a very clear vision that evolved from a daydream of what I could 
contribute to and be a part of. I’m in the right place to be pursuing it; I’m lucky 
enough to have a whole team or people around me and with me who I think 
compliment and add to that which is nice. (SPT R2 Edward) 
And: 
I’ve had the right people on the bus. (BSN R2 Lawrence)  
And: 
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There is another one in terms of the knowledge management to reach out to all 
these knowledge experts and acquire this knowledge by a need to use and make 
sure they are eager to participate as well. (BSN R4 Peter) 
And: 
I’ve got a damn good Director of Finance now, that’s the difference. (MUS R4 
William)  
7.2.4.2 Drawing on environmental support 
Knowledge experts are a particular kind of environmental resource which 
practical intelligence can draw upon.  
This ‘resourcefulness’ is in evidence in the way one individual uses her business 
environment to enable her to transition from student to elite performer: 
I’m sneaking out every lunchtime with my fencing school to have lessons and 
one of the partners stopped me and said ‘Claire, I notice you’re going off for 
your fencing lessons and what are you trying to do?’ And I said ‘I’m trying to 
make the Olympics team’ and we sort of sat down and discussed and he said 
‘What do you need?’ I said ‘I just need a bit of flexibility on time’. And again 
you know the head of the firm comes down, you know, later that week and he 
said ‘We completely trust you; you’ve got to qualify’. (SPT R2 Claire)  
‘Entrepreneurial’ use of the environment is an indication of practical intelligence 
that enables an individual to make the transition from student to performer: 
There was a lot of opportunity and space to be entrepreneurial, to follow one’s 
ideas, to put on concerts.  (MUS R2 Robert)  
One individual decided to make a transition to a different academic institution for 
the precise purpose of discovering and learning cutting edge practices that he 
could apply back in his ‘home’ environment. 
It allowed me to look at activities that went on in a great American University – 
compare it with what I knew from my British training and my Australian career 
and so it was deliberately an exercise to say how much can you learn and how 
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can you start applying that to the real benefit of my employer. (MUS R3 
Thomas) 
This is an example of a conscious application of practical intelligence at a ‘meta-
level’ to plan for and acquire the skills necessary to make transitions. 
7.2.4.3 Applying learning and education 
Education and learning can be consciously mobilised by practical intelligence to 
draw upon knowledge which is then brought back to the workplace for pragmatic 
testing and application. 
Some educational applications are more immediate and involve short-term 
training that is work targeted: 
So that when I got into the school, everything I learned I was able to apply the 
next day and I think one of my natural strengths is to recognise opportunities all 
the time. I see 2 points and I can connect them, where maybe others have a 
bigger struggle (BSN R3 Peter)  
One individual consciously trained for the next career position having failed 
initially to land a similar job: 
After that my husband said ‘Right next time a job comes up, we’re going to make 
sure that’ – he’s a businessman – ‘We’ll make sure you get yourself practised at 
interview techniques’. So I had a very good private student who was a head of 
personnel for {business}, HR person, and she put me through the ropes for the 
next time round because {person} only lasted two years in that job and gave up, 
so that job was advertised again. (MUS R1 Yvonne) 
Practical intelligence enables an individual to choose the most expeditious 
educational process to acquire skills and knowledge for their transition: 
I ticked the place where they were known to get really good exam results, where 
they basically spoon fed you for the exam, so again there were lots of different 
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courses but you know it was like ‘How am I going to get through this exam in a 
year?’ (SPT R2 Claire) 
And: 
After each week, I’d come in and try stuff out in the office and see how it worked 
and of course sometimes it went cataclysmically wrong and it was fine and 
sometimes it was a serious improvement on what I’d done before. (BSN R7 
John) 
Sometimes higher levels of education can be the position into which one is 
transitioning and work applications are brought into the study: 
I did the theory and I did the practice and matched them together and wrote the 
programmes and all that stuff, and so in that sense it was a good way to do a 
PhD. (BSN R1 Michael)  
And: 
But at the same time, I was doing my MBA dissertation and so I decided to do 
my dissertation in trading opportunities. I’d just moved into my next job which 
was business development or origination we would now call it, so basically 
trying to do trading business. So trying to deal with Eastern Europe as that was 
opening up and North Africa – that was kinda my patch.  So then for my MBA 
dissertation I did trading opportunities within Turkey. (BSN R3 John)  
One individual used the reverse process, taking experience and translating it into 
academic qualifications in preparation for subsequent transitions: 
 And while I was there I suddenly got wind of the fact that the M.MUS 
regulations were going to change and it was going to get more difficult to get 
one and I had put all my life work into one which was quite a lot by that time 
into   disks and books and got it done and I got a DMus while I was a member of 
London University and that turned out to be very useful. (MUS R1 William)  
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7.2.4.4 Summary of resource management 
Practical intelligence during transitions is evident in the way that participants in 
the study mobilised resources (Table 7.7).  
Table 7.7 Practical intelligence and resource management during transition 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Knowledge  
expertise  
3 8 2.57 7 17 2.43 5 10 2 15 35 2.33 
Environment 
Support 
7 14 2 7 14 2 5 10 2 19 38 2 
Education 
and training 
3 3 1 7 15 2.14 4 18 4.5 14 36 2.57 
 
Total 
7 25 3.57 8 44 5.5 8 38 4.75 23 107 4.65 
23 out of the 24 participants mentioned using practical intelligence for an 
average of 4.65 times per person to mobilise resources external to themselves. 
These uses of the environment in one form or another are indicative of Scribner’s 
(1984) “social, symbolic and material resources” and what Goodnow (1986) calls 
the ‘facilitating conditions’ of practical intelligence. While taking part in an 
educational programme to raise one’s own knowledge base is different than 
calling on external resources to deploy their knowledge for you, they are not so 
very different in terms of practical intelligence.  In the educational case, an 
individual decides to internalise knowledge from the environment. In the use of 
knowledge experts, individuals decide to leave the knowledge stored in the 
environment in the form of knowledge experts just as one might use an computer 
server or ‘cloud storage’.  
Educational training e.g., short term leadership courses to enhance leadership 
capabilities, MA’s to enhance expert knowledge in international economic trends 
or PhD’s in engineering design or baroque instruments, was pursued in direct 
response to transitions in which the individual needed to acquire new knowledge 
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or expertise. But they could also be developed in anticipation of a career 
transition, enabling the individual to become competent before undertaking the 
next phase of their career. However, it is noteworthy that amongst musicians 
education was an underutilised transition resource: only 3 musicians mentioned it 
on 1 occasion each. This may be due to the ‘culture’ of music academies and 
conservatoires which doesn’t often foster continuing education in leadership and 
management skills: this is something that is more often acquired through 
experience and apprenticeship in ways not dissimilar to more traditional models 
of musical education.  Surprisingly, only 50% of the business participants 
mentioned education in conjunction with transitions even though training in the 
business community can be “up to the gills” to quote one participant. 
Most formal education such as post graduate research, MA’s and PhDs was 
undertaken at earlier stages (other than studentship) in a career and contributed to 
transitions in management positions e.g., to heading up music facility, leading an 
engineering team or heading up a performance programme in sport. After 
individuals reached higher-level management positions, it was more common for 
them to simply draw upon knowledge experts to complement lack of knowledge 
e.g., hiring the services of a financial officer, a psychologist/consultant, an 
exercise physiologist, etc.  Knowing how to choose between these alternative 
routes to the acquisition of expert knowledge may also be indicative of practical 
intelligence i.e., knowing when you need to know something yourself and when 
you need to utilise external resources to complement your own knowledge.  
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7.3 Concluding discussion 
Table 7.8 summarises the main statements from the participants in the study 
concerning practical intelligence. 
Table 7.8 Practical intelligence during transition: Conclusions  
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
General 
Practical 
Intelligence 
 
7 20 3.14 8 23 3.13 8 29 4.38 23 72 3.13 
Problem 
Formulation 
 
2 2 1 6 13 2.17 4 12 3 12 27 2.25 
Problem 
resolution 
 
3 7 2.33 3 3 1 7 16 2.29 13 26 2 
Admini-
strative 
Intelligence 
 
7 18 2.57 5 20 4 4 9 2.25 21 47 2.24 
Knowledge  
expertise  
 
3 8 2.57 7 17 2.43 5 10 2 15 35 2.33 
Environment 
Support 
 
7 14 2 7 14 2 5 10 2 19 38 2 
Education 
and training 
 
3 3 1 7 15 2.14 4 18 4.5 14 36 2.57 
Total 8 74 9.25 8 107 13.34 8 110 13.75 24 281 11.71 
 
Based upon the data, generally, it is possible to conclude that practical 
intelligence supports transitions.  All 24 participants mentioned using practical 
intelligence during transitions, with an average of nearly 11.71 references per 
individual. The variations in the types of practical intelligence used have 
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implications for the both the differences amongst the domains and the nature of 
their transitions. Where problem solving and solution resolution were used they 
seemed to operate in the early part of a transition as an inquiry or experiment 
which was subsequently tested and then implemented into structures and 
strategies. This supports Ibarra’s (2004) “testing and learning” process during 
transitions. For business people practical intelligence during transitions can take 
the form of initiating processes and procedures during the early stages of a 
transition following up by “crafting strategies” (Mintzberg, 1985) and steering a 
team or project into implementing them.  
But there were significantly fewer illustrations of analytical processes used in 
practical intelligence during transitions than would have been predicted by some 
intelligence theorist, most notably Sternberg (1985, 1988, 1996b), and some 
career transition theorists (Bridge, 1991; Elsner & Farrands, 2006). Yet this is 
consistent with the discussion in Chapter 5 of the importance of the operation of 
inferential intelligence during transitions in which inductive, inferential and 
analogy mechanisms (e.g., Guilford, 1967; Sternberg, 1977; Carroll, 1993) were 
found to be more important for generalising experience during transitions than 
factors associated with planning and problem solving. Nor is it likely that 
analytical thinking might fall under tacit knowledge and simply not be mentioned 
in the interviews. Business people with regular explicit training in analytical 
problem solving techniques didn’t mention analytical thinking as contributing 
significantly to their transition expertise. One can conclude that, while problem 
formulation and solution resolution may play a supporting role, they are not the 
main practical intelligence functions which participants use to manage their 
transitions. 
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Musicians and sports people regularly mentioned using the administrative kinds 
of practical intelligence that they developed in their performance stages to 
support their transitions into managing a team or to heading up a faculty.  This 
practical intelligence had become almost tacit during their 
coaching/professorship career stages only to re-emerge and be generalised 
consciously at a higher level of complexity when it was needed during their 
transition to managing a larger operation. Business people seemed to develop this 
type of practical intelligence through incremental exposure to and acquisition of 
its associated skills, though it was more often mentioned in association with 
performing in a position rather than managing a transition. 
While strategic planning might not be classified as practical intelligence, some of 
the divergent/convergent cognitive processes used to solve smaller problems 
were also used to generate strategic plans and then implement them. A pattern 
emerged in the data which suggested that practical intelligence, like expert 
knowledge and processes, can be generalised during transitions through 
induction from performance specific applications to increasingly broader 
management and strategic planning applications. At the very least, maintaining a 
practical intelligence ‘mind set’ when determining plans for longer-term 
strategies is important for the ultimate success of those strategies. In transitions 
to more senior careers career positions some sort of combination of visioning and 
pragmatics seemed to be in evidence in all three domains. 
Career transitions involve moving into new or unfamiliar contexts that require 
individuals to apply their previous knowledge and expertise in new ways. This 
includes how they generalise their ability to use real world environmental 
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resources. The data clearly indicates that during transitions individuals do “adapt 
to and shape” their environment, they do “squeeze it and move it” around, they 
do draw upon “facilitating conditions”, they do identify “least-effort” solutions, 
they do “fit means” to situations. Where additional expert knowledge is required 
this can involve internalising knowledge through training or accessing it 
externally through knowledge experts. Because practical intelligence is 
concerned with the manipulation of the environment, it operates contextually 
(Sternberg, 1988) and is amenable to both ecological (Gibson, 1986; Neisser, 
1976) and social cognitive (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) explication.   
Practical intelligence is a complex, composite structure encompassing a range of 
intelligence components, expert knowledge and learned abilities which are 
variously inherent within an individual and developed and refined through their 
repeated use in the environmental contexts. At the same time, practical 
intelligence requires good domain knowledge in order to operate effectively. It is 
a key enabler of the generalisation of most domain specific expert knowledge 
and processes to broader contexts during transitions. It is itself also readily 
generalised through inductive cognitive mechanisms from early career 
management skills to broader strategic applications during career transitions. 
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Chapter 8. Transition Expertise 
Development Over the Career  
During the analysis of the data it became clear that transition expertise developed 
and evolved over the course of a career. These changes occurred in conjunction 
with a variety of external factors like changing characteristics of careers stages, 
different environments and new role requirements. They may also reflect 
emergent properties of intelligence and expertise over the life span in response to 
transitions. This chapter will first revisit some of the theories of career, expertise 
and intelligence to review how they address issues of lifetime development and 
specifically over the course of a career. It will then review the data to see how 
intelligence and expertise and their use were developed and adapted in response 
to the major career stage transitions. It will conclude with an overview of some 
of these major developmental patterns and how the different elements of 
transition expertise evolve over the course of the career cycle. 
8.1 Self concept, expertise and intelligence 
over time 
 
8.1.1 Development of self concept over time 
 
8.1.1.1 An evolving self concept 
A number of the career development theories discussed in Chapter 1 incorporate 
the idea of a self concept that develops over the course of a career. While these 
ideas go by various names such self identity, self concept, project of the self, 
working identity and life structure, I will use the term self concept as a general 
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title for these often similar conceptualisations.  Erikson’s (1959, 1985) epigenic 
cycle clearly involves an evolution of self identify over the course of the lifetime. 
Super’s self concept model (1957, 1963) is predicated on the regular revisions of 
self concept over the course of a career. Torbert’s (2004) leadership development 
framework can be viewed as an evolving model of leadership abilities and issues. 
Ibarra’s (2004) working identity theory addresses identity change through the 
choosing from multiple selves over time. Gardner’s (1983) project of the self is 
an evolving and developing process. Levinson’s life stage model incorporates a 
life structure concept that evolves over one’s career in which “the primary tasks 
of every transition period are to question and reappraise the existing structure, to 
explore various possibilities for change in self and world, and to move toward 
commitment to the crucial choices that form the basis for a new life structure in 
the ensuing stable period” (Levinson, et.al., 1978, p. 49).   
Models of an emerging and evolving sense of self have long been supported by 
the symbolic interactionism school (e.g., Mead, 1964; Blumer 1969) in which the 
self is defined as a process rather than an object and the study of self is merged 
with the study of social interaction: humans create the worlds in which they live, 
meaning is arrived at within a social context and the self is developed through a 
reflexive and recursive process of interpretations and ascribed meanings based 
upon an individual’s experience (Denzin, 1992).  
Super’s model is illustrative of how identity might evolve as individuals progress 
through their career stages, revising their self concept based upon their success in 
making transitions at the major stages of their career  (See Table 8.1).  
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Table 8.1 Self concept stages from Super, 1963 
1.Growth stage   to approximately 
age 14 
in which self concept develops through 
identification processes with family and 
school 
2.Exploratory stage up to about age 25 where through reality testing an individual 
keeps the appropriate and modifies the non-
appropriate elements of self concept 
3.Establishment 
stage 
to about age 45 in which, having found the right field and 
career direction, the individual fashions a 
permanent place in it and a relatively stable 
self concept 
4. Maintenance 
stage 
up to retirement in which an individual holds onto what they 
have achieved with fewer changes to self 
concept 
5. Decline stage from retirement to 
death 
in which an individual balances work and 
leisure and seeks final self realisation 
Hall (1976) maintained that successful transitions enhance self esteem and 
produce a more competent self identity as individuals progress repeatedly 
through a virtuous circle from psychological success to increased self esteem to 
more competent identity (Figure 8.1). 
 
 
 
 
One could conclude that self concept, life structure and working identity do 
evolve over time and that they will shape and be shaped during career transitions. 
8.1.1.2 Constraints on evolving self concept and their mitigation 
It is also the case that the underdevelopment of self awareness and cognitive 
flexibility can lead to a narrow or overly constrained identity which may make 
transitioning difficult. Identity foreclosure has been described as a state in which 
individuals arrive at an identity and commitments to roles without engaging in 
Choice of 
Challenging 
Goal 
Independent 
Effort 
Goal Attainment 
Increased Career 
Involvement 
More Competent 
Identity Increased Self 
Esteem 
Psychological Success 
Figure 8.1 The transition process  and self esteem from Hall, 1976, p. 31 
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substantive exploration of their identity or the possibility of different self 
concepts (Petitpas, 1978). Linville (1985, 1987) describes how individuals who 
organise their information about themselves in ways that are non-diversified are 
more likely to suffer from dysphoria, depression or disease when faced with 
stressful situations. Limited self-schemata or social-cognitive self images have 
been shown to contribute to depression and inefficacy during transitions (Dance 
& Kuiper, 1987; Oatley & Bolton, 1985). Studies of collegiate athletes (Werthner 
& Orlick, 1986; Kleiber et al., 1987) show that individuals who have been 
developing parallel identities through coursework, social activities and other 
fields of study during their academic career are more successful in making career 
transitions after their university sporting career than those students whose 
primary focus and identity has been on sport to the exclusion of other activities. 
(For a full review of theories associated with transitions in sporting careers, see 
Lavallee & Wylleman, 2000). 
Coping strategies describe how individuals deal with the situations over which 
they have relatively little control. Coping strategies for dealing with changing 
environments and stages of career (Taylor & Olgilvie, 1994) have been seen to 
be effective when they include adaptability. However, Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) have demonstrated that individuals with more limited identities have more 
difficulties in coping with the unknown. Defensiveness and lack of adaptation 
can lead to reification of ego structure and identity (Block & Block, 1980) and 
can contribute to difficulty in adapting to changing circumstances that arise 
during career transitions in the same way that cognitive inflexibility might 
contribute to the lack of generalisability of expertise. In contrast, Super’s (1980) 
self concept theory includes career adaptability which is the capacity to deal with 
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changing work and life conditions. Ibarra (2004) emphasises the importance of 
trial activities, relationships and narratives while “trying out” a new or different 
identity.  Coping strategies have been mentioned in a number of transition 
models (Bridges, 1991; Elsner & Farrands, 2006) as one of the mechanisms for 
dealing with uncertainty and anxiety during transitions. It seems likely that 
coping strategies may be helpful during transitions when they are used to 
mitigate abrupt surprise or shock rather than if they are used as the main, and 
largely defensive, reactions to the unknown or unpredicted. 
8.1.2 Expertise and intelligence over time 
8.1.2.1 Expertise over time  
Considerable research has been dedicated to the acquisition and use of expertise 
as discussed in Chapter 4. But there is also considerable research dedicated to the 
study of how expert performance is maintained over time. Expert performance 
can be maintained well into adulthood and late adulthood through a range of 
cognitive mechanisms: expert musicians retain high levels of performance well 
into their 50’s and 60’s through continuing to selectively train existing skills 
(Krampe & Ericsson, 1996); chess players continue to perform at championship 
levels into their middle age through engaging in less extensive searches than 
younger players and through move selection based on more refined knowledge-
based processes than the more rapid but ‘wasteful’ search processes of younger 
players (Charness, 1981); typists compensate for age related declines through 
longer eye-hand spans (Salthouse 1991); master athletes tend to selectively 
sustain those proportions of training and routines that they utilised more 
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effectively as younger players to achieve elite performance levels (Starkes, Weir 
& Young, 2003; Starkes, Cullen & MacMahon, 2004).   
Some of these kinds of mechanisms that can extend the performing life of 
experts can be relatively ‘free’ from domain-specific bindings even when 
developed to enhance domain expertise. They might: (a) incorporate general 
meta-cognitive processes not tied to the original processes for acquisition of 
expertise (Flavell, 1979; Sternberg, 1985); (b) include discrimination nets or 
retrieval structures which have become ‘broader based’ than the domain in which 
they were originally applied (Gobet, 1998); (c) be more associated with the 
overall self-management rather than skill or content acquisition and as such 
avoid domain specificity (Sternberg, 1996); and (d) operate with higher level 
cognitive processes not tied to sensory input or content (Fodor, 1983; Gardner, 
1983). These and other processes and structures would not only contribute to 
expert performance but may operate as elements of transition expertise itself. 
8.1.2.2 Intelligence over time 
Crystallised intelligence (gc) can continue to develop as one increases in age 
while fluid intelligence's (gf) functions begin to decline as early as the 30’s 
(Dixon & Baltes, 1986; Baltes, 1987; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000).  For example, 
performance on traditional problem solving tasks measured by cognitively based 
tests may begin to decline in terms of both accuracy and speed whereas 
performance on practical problems solving tasks tends to increase to peaks 
around 40-50 years and then only begin to decline gradually around age 70 (Berg 
& Klaczynski, 1996). When comparing extensive research in the area of 
cognitive development over time, Baltes and Staudinger (2000) concluded that, 
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while the cognitive mechanics that are associated with normal tests of academic 
intelligence do show a gradual decline starting in early adulthood, cognitive 
pragmatics do not show such signs of deterioration. Practical intelligence 
theories, such as those of Scribner (1986) and Goodnow (1986), incorporate 
many of these cognitive pragmatics.  
Studies in lifespan learning suggest that personal intelligences continue to 
develop over time or at least are more operative as life progresses. Older adults 
are more likely to consider the social and interpersonal aspects of a problem 
when defining the problem itself (Laipple, 1992). They will be more 
interpersonally sensitive to the actual nature of the problem compared to young 
adults who will more likely use a logical problem solving orientation (Sinnott, 
1989). Middle-aged adults tend to set more interpersonal and affective goals than 
pre-adolescents (Strough, Berg & Sansone, 1996). Labouvie-Vief (1990) 
proposed that, over time, metacognitive abilities are developed that help an 
individual to integrate their cognitive capacities and emotional experiences into 
interpersonal intelligences so that one has a more synthetic understanding of 
oneself, one’s experience in the world and one’s relationship with others. This 
neo-Piagetian approach proposes that a  fifth post-formal operational stage 
emerges by middle adulthood in which the formal-operational reasoning 
associated with late adolescence is transformed or augmented by more 
sophisticated  or at least more life-experience based  mental structures that are 
more relativistic in their logic/reasoning. Such adult cognitive processes allow 
the individual to synthesise and incorporate personal, emotional and non-rational 
experience into their mental structures (Blanchard-Fields, 1994). Howard 
Gardner (1983) states that ultimately the key role of the personal intelligences is 
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“the project of the self."  This project is not a static thing; the self grows and 
evolves throughout a career. 
8.1.3 Wisdom over time 
The developmental process of transition expertise may mirror that of wisdom. 
Wisdom is Gardner’s fourth non-domain specific higher level cognitive ability 
which he calls a “general synthesizing power” (Gardner, 1983, p. 295) that is not 
parochial or domain specific: it transcends intelligence, domain and expert 
boundaries. Wisdom develops over time. It is not implicit in the potential of a 
child and, like other higher level abilities of Gardner such as common sense or 
creativity, it is a composite ability. Wisdom has been studied extensively. It is 
viewed as a type of life span learning expertise with specific knowledge and 
processes, acquisition and retrieval techniques, and representational systems that 
are developed over time (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005). Studies of life cycles 
(Erikson, 1985; Levinson et al., 1978; Levinson & Levinson, 1996) and work and 
career cycles (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Super, 1980) as discussed in the 
introductory chapter have incorporated the development of wisdom in their 
models. Robert Sternberg also developed a Wisdom, Intelligence, and Creativity 
Synthesised (WICS) model (Sternberg, 2003, 2005) that incorporates elements of 
his triarchic intelligence (Sternberg, 1985), successful intelligence (Sternberg, 
1997) and creativity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996, 1999).   
Baltes and Staudinger have defined wisdom as “an expert system dealing with 
the meaning and conduct of life” (Staudinger & Baltes, 1994, p.144). They 
maintain that wisdom cannot be explained solely by the emergence of a 
constellation of personality dispositions (e.g., Erikson, 1959) in later life nor by a 
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neo-Piagetian developmental conceptualisations of post-formal thought (e.g., 
Labouvie-Vief, 1990). Their Berlin wisdom paradigm (Baltes & Staudinger, 
2000; Baltes, 2004)  identifies two general wisdom criteria: 1) rich factual 
(declarative) knowledge which concerns “interpersonal relations, social norms, 
critical events in life and their possible constellations, as well as knowledge 
about the coordination of the well-being of oneself and that of others” and 2) rich 
procedural knowledge which involves “strategies and heuristics for dealing with 
the meaning and conduct of life” (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000, p. 125). These are 
similar to the knowledge and process distinction in most expertise theories. 
Baltes and colleagues further identified three meta-heuristics that are derived 
substantively from life-span psychology (Alexander & Langer, 1990; Baltes, 
1997): (a) lifespan contextualisation that includes contextual, cultural and 
temporal perspectives; (b) relativism of values and priorities that includes 
tolerance for differences; and (c) recognition and management of uncertainty that 
acknowledges the limitations of human processing ability and the inability to 
know fully the future in advance (Staudinger & Baltes, 1996; Baltes & 
Staudinger, 2000).  They also found that there was no significant age gradient in 
measures of wisdom in adulthood from 25 to 75 years of age, disconfirming the 
idea that higher-level performance in wisdom related tasks only emerges from 
midlife onwards (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). 
8.1.4 The Career Cycle over time revisited 
Though the original focus of this dissertation did not include a developmental 
conceptualisation of transition expertise, several patterns emerged in both the 
theories and data which required that this issue be addressed if the operation of 
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transition expertise were to be understood properly.  Table 8.2 revisits the major 
career cycle models first presented in Chapter 1 and includes for comparison   
eponymously and immodestly  the Connolly Career Transition Cycle. 
Table 8.2 Composite career stage and transition  cycle 
Connolly                
Career Transition 
Cycle 
Levinson   
Seasons of a 
Man’s Life 
Torbert 
Leadership 
Development 
Framework 
Schein   Career 
Cycle 
Super     
Self-Concept 
Adjustment 
Stage 1: Studentship 
Age 5-24 
Pre-adulthood   
Age 8-22 
 Growth, fantasy 
exploration   
Age 0-21 
Growth Stage 
First Stage Transition: 
Student to professional 
Early adult 
transition          
Age 17-22 
 Entry into world 
of work         
Age 16-25 
Stage 2: 
Professionalism     Age 
16-30 
Entry Life 
Structure for early 
adulthood         
Age 22-28 
Action Logic 
1: Opportunist 
Basic training 
Age 16-25 
Exploratory 
Stage 
Second  Stage 
Transition:  Professional 
to manager/coach 
Age 30 transition      
Age 28-33 
Action Logic 
2: Diplomat 
Full 
Membership in 
early career  
Age 17-30 Stage 3: 
Manager/Coach        
Age 26-35 
Culminating Life 
structure for early 
adulthood         
Age 33-40 
Establishment 
Stage 
Action Logic 
3: Expert  
Full 
membership, 
mid-career    
Age 25 + 
Third Stage Transition: 
Manager coach to 
Department Head 
Mid life transition       
Age 40-45 
Mid Career 
Crisis            
Age 35-45 
Stage 4: Head of 
Department              
Age 35-45 
Entry Life 
structure for 
middle adulthood 
Age 45-50 
Action Logic 
4: Achiever 
 
 
Late career in 
leadership or  
non-leadership 
role               
Age 40  - 
retirement       
Maintenance 
Stage 
Fourth Stage Transition: 
Department Head to 
Divisional leader 
Age 50 Transition      
Age 50-55 
Stage 5: Divisional 
Lead                         
Age 45-55 
Culminating life 
structure for 
middle adulthood 
Age 55-60 
Action Logic 
5:  
Individualist 
Decline and 
disengagement 
Age 40 until 
retirement 
Decline Stage 
Fifth Stage Transition: 
Divisional Leader to 
Organisational Leader  
Action Logic 
6: Strategist 
Stage 6: Organisation 
Leader Age 50-70 
 
Late adult 
Transition         
Age 60-65 
Action Logic 
7: Alchemist 
 Late adulthood 
Age 65  
 Retirement 
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Super’s self concept model (1957, 1963) is an early development of the idea that 
identity evolves over the course of a career, and as such was quite pioneering. 
However, it is less useful for the purposes of this project because the participants 
in this study were selected because they continued to develop and evolve late 
into their career rather than settle into a mid-career stability that leads to 
maintenance and retirement as proposed in Super’s model. It is also perhaps less 
useful when discussing the evolution of identity and transition expertise over the 
course of a career as it happens in contemporary 21st century society.   
Levinson’s life eras (1986) deal with broader life issues, but include both steady-
state stages and transition stages. While there are significant parallels between 
his transitions and those that emerged in this study, a major difference is that 
Levinson’s transition stages reflect general life/work changes that take place over 
a period of years whereas the model developed in this study attempts to identify 
more specific transition events in careers that will reflect the operation of 
transition expertise. Another difference is that Levinson doesn’t really describe 
in any depth the later transitions in his model that would correspond to 
transitions to Career Stages 5 Divisional Leader and 6 Organisational Leader in 
the Connolly model, though these are important career stages and transitions 
amongst the participants in the study.  Also, some participants in this study 
reached stages in Levinson's model earlier than he would have predicted. Again 
this discrepancy may reflect general changes in career patterns that have emerged 
of the last 30 to 40 years since the publication of Levinson’s work. 
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Schein’s career stages (1978) also have correspondences with the development 
stages that emerged amongst the participants in this study. But, like Levinson, 
Schein offers little explanations for career stages after the age of 40 even though 
these later stages are crucial for understanding the whole adult career cycle and 
the nature of transition expertise. While some of the issues and tasks associated 
with Schein’s career stages such as “accepting higher levels of responsibility” or 
“working through one’s relationship with mentors and preparing to become a 
mentor” are relevant, their generalness makes them less useful for understanding 
transition expertise.  However, Schein’s differentiation of inclusion transitions 
which involve moving closer to the centre of an operation to understand and deal 
with strategic issues and functional transitions which involve moving to areas 
outside of an individual’s primary domain expertise to acquire wider 
organisational knowledge, have helped explain career moves that take place at 
Career Stages four and five amongst participants in the study. These ‘lateral’ 
transitions can be as demanding and radical as hierarchical transitions. 
Torbert’s LDF model (2004) also has correspondences with the Connolly Career 
Transition Cycle presented above. There are clear parallels, for example, 
between the Career Stage four Head of Department and Torbert’s Diplomat 
action-logic and between the Career Stage six Organisational Leader and 
Torbert’s Strategist and Alchemist action-logics.  In addition, Torbert’s Expert 
action-logic refers to a combination of primary domain expertise that has been 
generalised and the development of secondary expertise in management which 
would be characteristic of transitions to Career Stage three 
Manager/Coach/Professor or Career Stage four Head of Department.  
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8.2 Transition expertise over time 
While the foregoing summaries do not do justice to the depth of research in 
lifespan learning in the fields of expertise and intelligence, they further confirm 
the generally agreed propositions across many fields of study that individuals 
develop a range of cognitive processes and mechanisms for maintaining and 
enhancing performance levels over the course of their lifetime even while some 
functions may be declining in their efficacy. If expertise and intelligence do 
evolve and adapt over time  whether initiated by an individual or in response to 
changing environments or both  then transition expertise could and would also 
develop over time. Therefore, while many illustrations from the data were given 
in the previous chapters on the operation of the various components of transition 
expertise, it is also possible to summarise the different ways in which transition 
expertise operates at different transition stages.  
8.2.0 Before transitions: Career Stage 1 Studentship 
Before any of the individuals in this study embarked upon a career or made 
career transitions, they first engaged in the study and acquisition of the expert 
skills that they would use in their subsequent professional career. Sports and 
music students engaged in intensive training early in their lives which resulted in 
attainment of very high levels of expertise by the time they had finished their 
‘studentship’ at ages as early as 16-18. Business people remained professionally 
more open and uncommitted during their studentship, some still not knowing 
their eventual career field and area of expertise when they left university at ages 
22-24 or even after postgraduate studies. As discussed in Chapter 4, expertise 
was often developed in more than one domain during this period by most 
  
309 
 
participants in all the fields under study. Cognitive flexibility was also developed 
during this period 
8.2.1 Stage Transition One 
8.2.1.1 The new career stage: Performer  
In this first career stage all of the participants begin their professional careers, 
develop domain expertise further and also manage their professional life. 
Musicians usually organise their own career which required self-discipline and 
solitary endeavour. Sports people begin to perform and compete at quite young 
ages and continued to follow a highly structured regime combining personal 
commitment to training with an external discipline imposed by their sporting 
institution. They tend to have less autonomy than musicians. Business people 
move into organisations where they learn to meet performance goals in a 
structured environment. Their socialisation process into their expert domain 
culture begins at this stage, later than that of musicians and sports people.  
8.2.1.2 The transition 
Van Mannen (1973, 1977) described this transition as a “breaking in 
phenomenon.” Schein (1978) described it as “negotiating a viable psychological 
contract” with tasks like “learning the ropes” and getting along.” Becker and 
Strauss (1956) talked about a portion of a person’s life space being blank before 
they join an organisation for the first time. It is probably one of the most highly 
studied transitions because of the access by researchers to university students 
who are making such professional transitions.   
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8.2.1.3 The transition expertise 
In table 8.3 there are some representative statements made by the participants 
that are indicative of different aspects of transition expertise in this transition. 
Table 8.3  Some statements indicative of transition expertise from studentship to professional 
Cognitive flexibility 
 So I went out there and I was prepared to do anything, absolutely anything.  
 This was a way of broadening out. 
 So that entrepreneurial streak was always there. 
 I think that took me away from being this narrow thing that I started with. 
Domain expertise generalizability 
 I used the work that was being done and researched there as part of my PhD. 
 A perfect amalgamation of three tendrils that were hanging; one from each of those fields. 
Induction, inference and analogical processes 
 I can abstract things  
 There must be generic dynamics  
 I used the same skills and [….] it was very magic for these people. 
Intrapersonal self awareness  
 You think, ‘this is too stupid’ it cannot fulfil me.  
 It did take quite a lot of self-belief  
 I knew what I had was valuable,  
 So my view was I suppose a very conscious one 
 Do I really want to do this? Do I not want to do? 
 It was quite conscious to find the things you do least well and remedy them  
 I didn’t find it stressful.  I enjoyed the adrenalin 
Intrapersonal self regulation 
 But that’s time management. 
 It had just come to me innately to rehearse all possibilities, 
 I had to sit down with a points scheme that July and work out. 
 I’ve also been very good at working out what it is I have to do to make the teams. 
 I was really managing myself.  
Interpersonal intelligence 
 I was learning leadership skills. 
 Got lots of people involved in fencing, we had a lot of fun. 
 This is starting to get interesting because this was real customers. 
 I’ve always had an ability to put people together. 
 Practical intelligence 
 I had to understand the context, what people are doing, why they are doing stuff and how 
can I help them to provide the solution. 
 I just did it on my own. I just solved them. 
 You learn to set and you read the rules and work it out in finite detail, plot the path and then 
do it. 
 I experimented, right. So basically when I saw the situation I analysed it quickly, what goes 
wrong here right?  
This transition involves little generalisation from primary domain expertise 
which is not surprising in that the transition is primarily more about applying 
learned expertise in performance contexts that require expert knowledge and 
processes. It usually involves a further development of the self management 
skills which might have been initiated during studentship. Cognitive flexibility is 
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seen to operate in the individual’s willingness to do whatever is required of them 
in order to perform. Interestingly, analogy operates through bringing experience 
acquired in different or parallel domains to bear on performing in the primary 
domain. Intrapersonal intelligence seems more important than interpersonal 
intelligence as individuals seek to understand themselves better and learn from 
the feedback they are receiving. Practical intelligence operates pragmatically to 
solve problems and take advantage of opportunities. In both this transition and 
the following one, it is too early to look for life-span or wisdom related 
development of transition expertise.  Rather, we see the continued development 
of all the aspects of transition expertise though still mostly in their application to 
continuing high performance. The operation of cognitive generalisabilty and 
inferential mechanisms broaden the application of both domain and transition 
expertise  not from any need to compensate for age related decline or otherwise 
 but simply because their application of expertise is continuing to develop and 
expand. 
8.2.2 Stage Transition Two 
8.2.2.1 The new career stage: Manager/Coach/Professor  
The transition to this stage takes place at varying ages and is characterised by a 
move into managing and directing the performance of others, running operations 
within an organisation, and becoming a promulgator of institutional norms. The 
ability to generalise previous performance-linked knowledge and processes to 
coaching and managing people is central to this stage. At the same time this stage 
requires the development of a new range of skills even while the individual 
might continue to perform as a domain expert.  The management/coaching 
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functions associated with this career stage assume different levels of priorities 
amongst the three domains. It becomes co-equal with performing in the case of 
musicians whose performing career might actually be peaking at this stage. It 
replaces the performing career of sports people, sometimes over a few years, 
sometimes almost overnight e.g., at the end of an Olympics or due to an injury. 
Business people move away from hands on performance and a promotion might 
change their function abruptly from a performing/delivery role to a 
managing/organising role. 
8.2.2.2 The transition 
This transition requires that individuals apply their primary domain expertise 
beyond personal performance e.g., in their capacity to teach or coach others in 
the acquisition of domain expertise or to implement a course of action based 
upon situational knowledge they have acquired. Having learned how to perform, 
they begin to exteriorise that knowledge for others; having managed themselves, 
they begin to provide structure and organisation in which others can manage 
themselves; having developed the intrapersonal knowledge necessary to become 
expert, they begin to develop interpersonal skills to convey that knowledge to 
others.   
8.2.2.3 The transition expertise 
In table 8.4 there are some representative statements made by the participants 
that are indicative of different aspects of transition expertise in this transition. 
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Table 8.4 Some statements indicative of transition expertise from Professional to 
Coach/Manager/Professor  
Cognitive Flexibility 
 A very good job as regards having to be flexible, the difficulties that you face, working 
around them.  
 I adapted  
 It’s not pre-planned so you had to think fast.   
 I think one of my natural strengths is to recognise opportunities all the time.  
 That means you’ve got sort of disestablished the whole skill set into various elements.  
Domain expertise generalisability 
 They took me on board there on the basis of my, if you like, practitioner’s experience. 
 I knew that the experiences that I had as a player, as an outreach projects manager meant 
that I could do the job. 
 It’s all very well having the skill but, you know, it’s actually being able to transfer it. 
 And also broadening my musical horizons  
Inferential, inductive and analogical intelligence 
 Music notation. I developed sport notation in the ‘80’s.  
 I had never been coached in sailing, but I’d been coached in rugby. 
 Taking from one field and applying to another.  
 Intrapersonal self awareness 
 I remember thinking ‘No, actually, I think I could learn a lot doing that.  
 I found this leadership stuff fascinating and then I kinda wanted to be different. 
 When the 360 feedback started to come it was very awakening for me  
 I was never sort of terrified of failure  
 But it’s absolutely clear in my mind that what my passion was, 
 I just remember thinking ‘Right this is what I’ve wanted to do 
 I try to search and look down inside: “Where does the motivation come from?” 
Intrapersonal self regulation 
 Yeah and that’s all about those milestones – the sense that I’m growing – I’m getting there.  
 A lot of goal setting milestone thinking is most effective when you realise that ultimately it 
is just about ticking off the journey.  
 I think that sense of being able to work progressively and logically  
  I think a lot of it comes down to being organised  
Interpersonal intelligence  
 Eventually became the leader, you realised just how important it was for you to be directing 
what the section would do. 
 Have to be seen to be able to communicate and get on with people and do the things that 
get them on in life  
 And you were able to mobilise people. 
 For me to you know develop a coaching career at that stage   to want to help the younger 
players a little bit more. 
 The interaction with the people was kinda more appealing  
 And actually using your contacts, being able to thread them all together. 
 I was learning leadership skills and think that’s some of the common threads that I look 
back  
Practical intelligence 
 Everything I learned I was able to apply the other day. 
 There was administration 
 So fundamentally you have to underpin any coaching with good basis of organisation 
 Becoming a jack-of-all-trades master of none. The diversity of knowledge   
  Situational Leadership and the way you needed to be relative to the experience of the 
people you were leading. 
 I’d come in and try stuff out in the office and see how it worked. 
 And I just applied what I learned in theory into practice, because it was kind of obvious. 
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In this transition individuals become more conscious in their use of cognitive 
flexibility to experiment and continuously try things out. They continue to use 
inference and analogy to generalise from other domains to their primary domain 
 if anything more often than previously  by drawing eclectically from previous 
experience. But the main focus is on generalising performing skills from primary 
domain expertise to showing others how to perform. Interpersonal intelligence 
develops rapidly in this context as individuals learn to understand and respond to 
the needs of those who they are coaching of managing. Self regulation can 
continue to contribute to performance though less directly. Practical intelligence 
generalises from personal organisation to organising others. Super’s (1963) 
‘exploratory stage’ involves “reality testing” which includes modifying “non-
appropriate elements of self concept.” It is possible to see this modification 
taking place as individuals generalise from performance to coaching and 
developing other.  In this transition the self-reflexive nature of intrapersonal 
intelligence becomes much more conscious. Awareness of motivating factors 
becomes more explicit: the individual begins to search inside to identify what 
drives them and determines their career choices and direction.  In some ways this 
transition parallels Levinson’s ‘age thirty’ transition period (Levinson et al., 
1974) in which individuals begin to question their early vision of their career and 
push out from their original life structure. This transition is the first transition 
that requires moving beyond primary domain identification. 
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8.2.3 Stage Transition Three  
8.2.3.1 The new career stage: Head of department 
In this career stage individuals assume major organisational roles in their field. 
The many aspects of running a department or functional area such as planning, 
resource utilisation and people development come under their purview. This 
stage transition almost uniformly requires a movement away from a hands-on 
operation to leading and managing colleagues who manage others.  In the case of 
business there is almost no direct involvement in performance delivery i.e. 
engineers no longer designed, traders no longer traded. Most sports people move 
out of performing in their domain though some continued to compete in senior 
leagues.  Musicians, however, continued to perform though they may have 
reached the peak of their career progression in their domain i.e. ensemble players 
were unlikely to launch solo careers and soloists who had not attained star status 
are unlikely to do so. 
8.2.3.1 The transition 
Third stage transitions require significantly different applications of transition 
expertise because individuals often move into roles with fundamentally different 
requirements than the previous career stage.  On a simple level the transition 
requires the rapid acquisition of new skills and knowledge to perform in the new 
role. Simple generalisations from performance expertise or from teaching, 
managing or coaching would be insufficient because this transition often requires 
an individual to move tangentially from their main expert knowledge base: a 
musician may move from a performance department into heading up an 
academic department; a sports person may move from coaching to running a 
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political pressure group; a business person may move out of running a centralised 
trading function into leading a small regional operation. They will need to 
become knowledgeable  if not expert  across a wider range of domains than 
their own e.g., a musician will have to develop mathematical skills to plan and 
budget or a business manager will have to develop interpersonal stakeholder 
management skills. Transitions at this stage may also require that individuals 
create a ‘culture’ of expertise and expert systems for the people who work for or 
with them.  
8.2.3.3 The transition expertise 
In table 8.5 there are some representative statements made by the participants 
that are indicative of different aspects of transition expertise in this transition. 
Table 8.5  Some statements indicative of transitions from Coach/Manager/Professor to 
Department Head 
Cognitive flexibility  
 Trying some different ways 
 Some of the things I realised I may have to give up in order to achieve what I want,  
 If there is something in the way I like to find my way around it.  
 Not fighting battles that you can’t  
 The ability to be relatively quick on the uptake. 
 Whatever it is, there’ll be a solution.  
 The challenge was adapting and doing a job that was totally unfamiliar very quickly  
Domain expertise generalizability 
 So I was able to bridge and I knew how these guys were thinking.  
 A parallel that ran with my academy growing and my playing growing,  
 You learn from managing traders is that you get great confidence that any people 
management issue you [encounter] is easy.  
 Like teaching really, I find organising departments the same kind of skill that you need.   
 Developed physical and then cultural capital and I converted it into professional capital.  
 Wrote stuff that could be used in management which is now being used in the schools. 
 And it was really on the back of that that it gave me the ability to move into a whole sort of 
different area of the music industry  
Inferential, inductive and analogical intelligence 
 You’d hear somebody else was doing this and you’d think oh bloody hell that might work 
for us as well. 
 So that was ten years of operations experience, into running a group of accountants in 
finance.   
 I wasn’t doing the technology work but ‘The architecture should look like this.’ 
 Benchmarking manufacturing processes in world class manufacturing companies  
 I’d brought those two interests together. 
 I realised quite quickly on – a bit like the swimming – ‘I have a natural feel for this.’ 
 ‘We don’t do NIH here, we do the SBID: ‘You swipe the best ideas and do it. 
Intrapersonal self awareness 
 And so there were various phases of self-recognition  
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 It’s funny; I never had any doubts that I could do this job.   
 A sense of what’s appropriate to say and what’s not appropriate to say  
 ‘Right I’m literally going to be in effect master of my destiny here.’ 
 Where I failed in not dissimilar situations is that I’ve not consciously built in and then 
protected – very disciplined fashioned   what I think I’ve now called reflective time. 
  Starting to think I've really got to find something that I'm happier in.  
 Realising that you weren’t an all-powerful machine that could carry on at higher revs. 
Intrapersonal self regulation 
  So when I failed it was a conscious failure; therefore you’re in a position to learn. 
 Constantly trying to learn from incrementally moving on, 
 It’s based on to do lists and long term goals and evaluation of those goals over time 
 I made sure my diary had free space to plan the day, think about what’s ahead,  
 Putting some sign posts in to make sure that I don’t waste time  
 I know the way I work – if I don’t put some milestones in the dairy, then I’ll drift,  
Interpersonal intelligence  
 See what they’re wanting, what makes their career better  
 Had to manage these two teams that had become one  
 I solve problems by talking to people  
 Actually you have go and get on with people. 
 A point where you don’t know how to do it and you’ve got to manage people who do.   
 Thinking a lot about where do I want to take these guys?  
 Deal with people, how you use people, how you get them to work for you  
Practical intelligence 
 More process, more management processes. 
 So I did enjoy all that very much and organising  
 I wrote down ‘This I can do… this I can’t do’ .  Eventually I decided, yeah, I could do 
enough here to change things. 
 I’m quite a practical person, so, I’m quite well organised.  
 I’ve always been quite well organised but I became even more sharply organised  
  So wide responsibilities for a number of small areas. 
 I sorted out the politics, sorted out the structure  
 ‘Well, you know, what would that actually look like? What would the ingredients be?’  
 Organisational skills.  For the Board, you need to be incredibly well organised  
 I have clearly become more political.  
This transition requires that individuals break from their reliance on the expert 
knowledge and processes of their primary domain. They begin to give up their 
old self conception and old ways of performing in order to allow new kinds of 
expert skills to be developed and fitted into their growing constellation of 
abilities. The use of inference has changed. In the first transitions it involved the 
use of analogy to infer from earlier experience to current situations e.g., from 
childhood sporting performance to musical performance. In this transition it is 
now likely to take the form of using analogies to apply experience across 
departments or from their previous working situation to another.  These analogies 
are also more inductive as they move from specific applications to more general 
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conceptualisations like “the architecture” of an organisation. Intrapersonal 
awareness increasingly becomes a steering and guiding process rather than a 
controlling and managing process and individuals now self-direct through 
making more time to reflect and consider. Interpersonally, individuals seem to 
spend more time listening and seeking feedback: this transition marks a move to 
thinking about people in the larger picture rather than simply managing teams 
and relationships. Problem solving strategies previously used for resolving 
conflict amongst teammates may need to be generalised to conflict resolution 
across departments.  When individuals define a problem itself, they begin to 
consider what Laipple (1992) identified in older adults as the “social and 
interpersonal aspects of a problem.” Goals and objectives become more strategic. 
Individuals develop more sophisticated strategic and administrative abilities 
which utilise broader generalisations from previous problem solving, analysis, 
and communication strategies. One can clearly see elements of Torbert’s (2004) 
'Individualist' action logic which “creates unique structures" and "resolves gaps 
between strategy and performance.” It is at this stage that one can also see 
elements of Levinson’s (Levinson et al., 1974) midlife transition in which 
individuals “modify life structures.” However, for Levinson this is more about 
family, values and social outlooks whereas, in terms of transition expertise, it 
involves moving beyond narrow self definitions. It is at this stage that most work 
adjustment models (e.g., Holland, 1973; Crites, 1976; Osipow, 1983) begin to 
fail as explicators of transition expertise because they are so focused on 
adjustment and congruence rather than change and development. 
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8.2.4 Transition Stage Four  
8.2.4.1 The new career stage: Divisional or strategic leader   
This transition requires a further shift in skills and cognitive processes away from 
day to day operational issues towards strategic planning, stakeholder 
management and operational oversight. Individuals often have to oversee a wide 
range of operations with which they may have had no previous performance or 
operational experience. They spend increasing time interfacing with peers within 
or outside their organisation. They need to be able to move beyond their identity 
as a domain expert or manager of an area of domain expertise. Both this stage 
and the previous stage are the periods in an individual’s career where Schein’s 
(1978) non-hierarchical career progressions are most likely to take place. These 
could occur through changing a function e.g., from national coach in a sport to 
performance management in the national sporting governing body, from running 
a large trading operation to running a small business unit in another country, or 
from heading up a music faculty in a music college to running a  performing arts 
department at a university. It could also occur through making an inclusive move 
towards the strategic centre of an operation, e.g. consulting all sporting bodies on 
funding bids, heading up the performance function for all instruments in a music 
college, or overviewing all research areas in a business.  
8.2.4.2 The Transition 
This fourth stage transition often involves adapting to a radical shift in the arena 
in which one is operating. It comes primarily in two forms.  It could involve a 
shift in scope e.g., a regional sports coach will move to become national director 
or a music professor who had been a head of faculty will move to becoming a 
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dean of studies. Or it could involve a shift in the operating arena as when a head 
of an academic research department moves to head up a research division in a 
business or a head of a trading department moves to lead a logistic division.   
Sometimes this transition requires both a scope and arena change e.g., when a 
head of a woodwind music faculty moves to head up a faculty of multimedia 
creative performance.  Sometimes individuals move to an arena where they have 
more operational scope though the overall operation is itself smaller e.g., a 
football coach will become an assistant manager at a lower division football club 
to acquire management skills, a musician will become the dean of academic 
studies at a less prestigious college of music, or a business person will agree to 
run a daughter company overseas in order to gain wider operational expertise.  
8.2.4.3 The transition expertise 
In table 8.6 there are some representative statements made by the participants 
that are indicative of different aspects of transition expertise in this transition. 
Table 8.6 Some statements indicative of transitions from Department Head to Division Leader  
 Cognitive flexibility  
 Suddenly see all these various options that exist.  
 Modify my mind-set  
 You can’t just do the same as you have done for the last 10 years. 
 Actually getting more sophisticated  
 Seeing how different countries did business in different ways. 
 I’ve always been better at standing back and looking at the bigger  
 You’ve come without the baggage.  
 I’ve been letting some things go 
Domain expertise generalizability 
 At the same time, I did a lot of internal strategy stuff 
 On the UK Sports board with a specific remit to be somebody with performance 
experience.    
 I was the person who could do it both technically and managerially. 
 So it was the whole thing – legal, membership, marketing, publishing. 
 I was able to provide scientific leadership to the group. 
 It was a very different domain within the same field  
Inferential, inductive and analogical intelligence 
 Skills that I would never have learnt as even a Dean of a faculty of arts,  
 Deliberately seeking the series of external roles   
 I would probably gain most of my important professional development outside the context 
of music or the arts 
 It was deliberately an exercise to say how much can you learn and how can you start 
applying that to the real benefit of my employer. 
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 I’d gone from sport and administration to now knowing all about anaerobic digestion and 
green policies. 
Intrapersonal self awareness 
 Going through this process of take myself back and always consider, consider, consider. 
 What do I want to do? What do I want to be? What impact do I want to have? 
 The shadow that you cast as a leader.  I’m very aware of my shadow now as never before. 
 I think that’s half the battle knowing what I ought to be doing, 
 I think that’s because I recognise my faults and that’s the way to mitigate them. 
 I ask myself questions of ‘What should I have been doing differently all this time?’  
 There was a degree of a very self conscious sort of revolt really   
 As with everything that I’ve ever done is I’ve stepped back and said ‘What was the goal?  
 And so there were various phases of self-recognition 
 Each time I’ve changed job, I go through a transitional phase where I do question ‘Am I 
doing the right things? 
 Intrapersonal self regulation 
 I think when you become a General Manager you need some sort of discipline to make sure 
that the generalities are all covered,  
 What I call managing self and the need to manage self.   
 You need to learn to delegate more, you need to actually clear your brain and make sure 
that you’re looking after yourself. 
 Methodically analysing your diary in peace and quiet and saying ‘over the next month is 
this covering the agenda that I wanted to cover 
 Am I in charge or am I reacting?’ and just making sure you’ve got the time diarised  
Interpersonal intelligence 
 Reaching out to those people who are maybe less willing to participate. 
 Find out where their interests are and make sure that their interests are represented. 
 Fascinating to work with different cultures  
 So it’s a different style how you reach out, how you connect. 
 I think what I’ve always analysed is what affect do I have on people? 
 I then listened and learnt and picked up enough knowledge to improve my performance  
 There’s a point where you can get them close to where you want and you’ll say ‘Well I 
wouldn’t have made that decision but it’s your decision.’  
Practical intelligence 
 The day-to-day stuff gets done by other people – it never gets done by me. 
 Just not taking it all back when I come back – constantly trying to free up my time  
 I had then to learn how to deal with politics;  
 We have established a stakeholder map 
 That job which was a smaller people management job, but a very complex in terms of the 
interface between the business and  
 Structuring the research programme of this business. 
 What would be the right way to organise a group like we already had  
 Designing organisational structures […] ‘The architecture should look like this.’ 
 I like to create something that is then able to run itself  
  I’m realising the context 
In this transition the use of intelligence and expertise move quite dramatically 
from applied actions to consideration of general principles. Experts who began to 
let go of previous self concepts and ways of thinking in the previous transition 
stage now step even further back from their previous performer identity as they 
generalise expert process and knowledge from content to principles, from 
specific to general applications. If cognitive flexibility has been sufficiently 
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developed, it now enables them to make these conceptual shifts. Their use of 
analogy and inference changes.  In transitions 1 and 2 they used analogies to 
build bridges from other domains to their primary expert domain. In transition 3 
it was used to make comparisons across similar department or between self-
management and management of a large department.  Now in transition 4 
individuals build bridges outward from their primary domain expertise to apply it 
to new domains, external roles and strategic performance. Intrapersonal 
intelligence also steps back from application to a more pure and unvarnished self 
reflection and search for insight in which self regulation is used to free up time. 
Interpersonal intelligence on the other hand reaches out beyond one’s immediate 
context to stakeholders, building bridges across departments and understanding 
the cultural context in which they are working. Life span psychologists (e.g., 
Alexander & Langer, 1990; Baltes, 1997) call this a meta-heuristic that includes 
contextual, cultural and temporal perspectives in cognition and decisions. 
Similarly, Schein’s (1978) 'late career in leadership role' involves becoming both 
a “senior partner" and "an internal entrepreneur.” It focuses significantly on how 
individuals begin to change the actual organisational structures in which they 
operate. Practical intelligence moves from pragmatically applying knowledge to 
considering ‘the architecture’ of an operation, designing interfaces across 
departments and dealing with higher-level politics. Individuals use induction to 
generalise from their self regulatory experiences to considering how a 
department might be self regulating.  Much of this is consistent with Torbert’s 
(2004) ‘Strategist’ who “weaves short term goal orientedeness with longer term 
developmental process orientedness.” 
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8.2.5 Stage Transition Five 
8.2.5.1 The new career stage: CEO  
This final Career Stage involves leading an organisation within the individual’s 
field of expertise and sometimes beyond it. This could be as a group vice 
president or CEO of a business, a vice chancellor or principal of a college, a 
manager of a premiership team or head of a national sporting governing body. 
The individual can be leading the total organisation or institution which includes 
direction over most areas of the operation as well as accountability to external 
stakeholders, boards of directors, trustees, governmental and regulatory bodies.  
8.2.5.2 The transition 
In this transition core identity and self concept which have been evolving during 
transitions 3 and 4 become more constant and consistent even while skills, 
abilities and  indeed  intelligences continue to be modified and adapted. In 
order to make this transition an individual will have needed to have been exposed 
to a wide range of performance positions which will enable them to apply expert 
knowledge and processes across multiple domains.  Even though their previous 
roles may all have been within the same field e.g., sport or banking, the 
development of their abilities and cognitive processes will have been subject to 
widely divergent requirements. This wide range of applications of their domain 
expert knowledge in conjunction with the acquisition of different types of 
expertise in their various positions will have enabled them to move from their 
domain constraints and ties to expert knowledge to understanding processes and 
principles in the abstract.
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8.2.5.3 The transition expertise 
In table 8.7 there are some representative statements made by the participants 
that are indicative of different aspects of transition expertise in this transition.
 7
 
Table 8.7 Some statements indicative of transitions from  Divisional Leader to Organisational 
CEO 
 Cognitive Flexibility  
 I would probably gain most of my important professional development outside the context 
of music or the arts. 
 You can have an eight carriage motorway and you can run all sorts of things in your life 
and the art is how you sneak in and out of your carriageways and achieve what you want to 
do and get out of life. 
 The history of my life, instinct.  I think I’ve got fantastic instinct.  
 I’ve lived abroad and have had to lead a high performance environment in a completely 
foreign set up has helped me tremendously.  
 Ultimately these really senior positions like the conductor or the Vice Chancellor demand 
both leadership and management. 
 Domain expertise generalisability  
 I found lots of other things to do. And I continue to evolve.   
 We will end up in larger structures where the arts will then collaborate   
 Even when you’re running a company you still sit down with people and decide what 
you’re going to do and it happens at every level and you’re just dealing with more money 
and bigger decisions. 
 One of the skills I think I have is taking something that’s not so good and polishing it and 
making it better, 
Inferential, inductive and analogical intelligence 
 What role do I play in this leader/manager role which gets the best out of that like the 
orchestra gets the best out of the ensemble’? 
 An orchestra tells you about that. A training in a Government department may not  
 Above all, it colours the way I see the world. I often do use music in artistic analogies as a 
way to confronting an issue. I’m not coming in from textbook management 101. 
 Now you learn that through being part of any musical texture; you don’t learn that in 
management school. 
 Understandings of issues in medical sciences and technology and natural sciences which 
often then became role models for things you could take back to areas of humanities and 
social sciences 
 Intrapersonal self awareness 
 Whenever I’ve gone in a new role I’ve taken one step backwards before I’ve gone 
forwards. 
 I go through a transitional phase where I do question ‘Am I doing the right things? Am I 
contributing as much as I was before?’ 
 I try and solicit, seek out areas of potential weakness or areas for improvement. 
 If you haven’t reinvented yourself it’s a recipe for bitterness. 
                                                 
7
 Of the individuals who took part in this study, 50% from each domain made this stage 
transitions. Three of the four musicians who made this fifth stage transition took significant 
(usually fourth stage) tangential transitions into a different field e.g. business, media studies, 
academic studies before making their fifth stage transition. Only one business individuals made a 
tangential fourth stage transition into another field and from academia into business.  Only one 
sports person took a significant tangential transition out of sport (to become a lawyer): they 
progressed very much within their field and stayed in the same arena, only increasing scope 
during previous transitions to broader or more global responsibilities. Two sports people made 
these transitions after they had taken part in the interview - one to being manager of a 
premiership football club and another to the Chef d’Equipe of their country’s Olympic team. One 
musician transitioned to the presidency of a college after her interview.   
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 I think I am pretty laid back and I don’t think it is such bad thing 
Intrapersonal self regulation 
 In terms of prioritisation and organisation you heavily lean on an administration that can 
make you function, but going back I think I had to be pretty organised anyway. 
 I do make up a list and I still do it now.  
 I like to be organised and ahead of the game, rather than running alongside or even worse 
running behind  
 I do work to get myself organised, to feel confident that when I go back, I’ll be in control. 
Interpersonal intelligence  
 Even when you’re running a company you still sit down with people  
 I knew a huge number of the people already, I made my business to know the rest 
 What you do in the end is the same:  I mean you listen to people. 
  I don’t summon people here and I sit and I listen and it is pretty relaxed; it’s pretty 
informal.  What I am doing is collecting my information.  
 The further you go up the tree it is about relationships and it’s about building relationships 
and I think I do have a good ability to build relationships. 
 Now I’m probably better at understanding where they are and being more in tune with them 
and understanding what it is that every person can give.    
 I think it goes back to the fact that I have a sensitive radar. 
Practical intelligence 
 You’re just dealing with more money and bigger decisions. 
 You observe the rhythm and pattern of an Institution that’s already under momentum and 
start to make analysis of what is strong and what’s weak, what attributes need changing?  
 I’m always looking for the formal representation and I’m looking for the informal 
representation  
 I’ve tried to get the right people around me.  
 I’m definitely better at using people around me to achieve the same thing 
 Where I’ve got a shortfall in my skill set then I’ll listen to somebody who appears to have 
more knowledge and then try and interpret what they’re telling me.  
Transition expertise at this stage presents a dual aspect in which individuals use 
their expertise and intelligence to address broad issues while simultaneously 
maintaining a simple almost intimate perspective on their immediate context. On 
the one hand there is continued generalisation of expertise to wider arenas and 
the use of inductive processes to expand across fields and develop a unified 
philosophy or approach. They focus on global issues, institutional regulation, and 
the search for deeper patterns and rhythms which operate within an organisation. 
The shaping of culture, philosophy, direction and vision operates as a ‘higher 
order’ kind of practical intelligence. On the other hand, individuals apply their 
refined transition expertise  particularly their personal intelligences  to their 
immediate context. Interpersonal intelligence is focussed on one’s immediate 
vicinity: talking, speaking, listening, and managing a small circle of intimate 
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team members. This is particularly reflective of Torbert’s (2004) ‘Strategist’ 
action logic which he describes as “self awareness in action” and which 
encompasses both the ability to see the bigger picture and to relate to the 
personal needs and individual differences of the people around oneself. 
Intrapersonal intelligence conducts an ongoing self-dialogue, an internal 
question-and-answer process, designed to continually steer a course of action in 
line with one’s values and motivation. This combination of broad vision and 
personal awareness which continually influence each other is probably 
characteristic of   a leader who creates corporate culture (Schein, 1992). In 
Eriksson’s epigenic cycle it is called “integrity”.  Baltes and Staudinger (2004) 
refer to it in as “the strategies and heuristics for dealing with the meaning and 
conduct of life.” 
8.2.6 Summary of development of transition expertise 
Perhaps the best way to summarise the development of transition expertise 
throughout the course of career is to view each of the main areas of transition 
expertise as they develop over time through the five stage transitions.  This 
developmental process is presented in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8 Development of transition expertise over the course of a career 
1. Development of cognitive flexibility over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
The individual is flexible to doing anything required to perform. 
They avoid narrowness and seek to broaden out at an early age. 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
Individuals continued to develop and use cognitive flexibility. But 
it is now a more conscious approach. They continue to try things 
out but now there is more selective experimentation and choices. 
Cognitive flexibility is more directed at the acquisition of skills for 
their new position. 
 
Transition 3: From 
Coach, Professor, 
Manager to Head of 
Department 
Individuals begin to let go of attachments generally and often 
specifically to their identity as a performer. They find ways around 
obstacles, are quick at adapting, and continues to develop new 
repertoire of activities appropriate for their   
 
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Cognitive flexibility enables individuals to see things in different 
ways. They step back to see the big picture. This transition sustains 
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Division a shift in mind-sets which avoid preconceptions and attachments. 
 
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
Perspective and vision are further expanded This is enhanced 
through balancing managing and leading functions and through the 
pursuit of multiplex knowledge and performance. 
 
2. Development of expertise generalisability  over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
There is little generalisation. Rather this transition is largely 
focused on application of expertise acquired in studentship. 
 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
As would be expected the main expertise generalisation is from 
performing to showing other how to perform.  
 
Transition 3:From 
Coach, Professor, 
Manager to Head of 
Department 
The individual continues to generalise existing knowledge with 
clear links back to previous expertise but now to broader arenas. In 
addition this transition also begins to move beyond applications of 
existing expertise: generalisation of domain expertise is necessary 
but insufficient. 
 
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Division 
There is a conceptual shift as expert knowledge is generalised 
beyond operational issues to principles and abstract ideas.  
Individuals now advise, consult, and provide strategic leadership.  
 
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
This transition generalises expertise on two levels. Expertise 
evolves into still broader applications in a wider arena. But 
individuals also revert to using the fundamental skills developed 
during the first transitions to coach, develop and lead individuals. 
 
3. Development of inferential intelligence  over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
There is already a significant use of analogy. However, most 
analogy is applied from other domains to the primary domain to 
enhance their performance in their primary domain expertise. 
 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
Inference is now almost transparently used as the basis for applying 
primary domain expertise to the instruction and development of 
others. 
 
Transition 3:From 
Coach, Professor, 
Manager to Head of 
Department 
There is continued use of inference only now it is more from one 
department to another, applying operational experience from one 
position to another. However there is still inference from how one 
has managed oneself in performing to managing a department. 
 
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Division 
Induction operates on a large scale to support analogy in the use of 
primary domain expertise. There is less like-for-like use of analogy 
and more building upon general rules and principles as the basis for 
building bridges outward to new domains, external roles or 
operating at strategic level.  
 
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
Inference operates in a dual capacity in this transition. There is a 
continued expansion in one’s field through the inductive 
development of a vision and philosophy. There is also a continued 
analogous usage of primary domain expertise in meeting the more 
personal role requirement of new positions.  
 
4.  Development of intrapersonal self awareness  over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
Intrapersonal intelligence is a significant contributor to transition 
expertise at this early stage. Self awareness is used to enhance self 
confidence, self belief and ability to learn. But it is reactive to the 
environment into which the individual moves and is often still 
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engaged in an ‘awakening’ of self awareness. 
 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
Self awareness continues to be developed and used as a basis for 
actions and decisions in this transition. Motivation enters as an 
emergent factor that impinges on self awareness: individuals are 
now more aware of their motivation for making career transition 
choices. 
  
Transition 3:From 
Coach, Professor, 
Manager to Head of 
Department 
Self awareness is no longer focused on identity issues but rather 
operates to support self development. Individuals think harder, 
listen more, and reflect more deeply on their personal development. 
Furthermore motivation now operates through self awareness, not 
simply as an emergent process, but as a conscious part of self-
reflection on what is the right career choice. 
 
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Division 
Self awareness is almost pure and unvarnished now. Individuals 
self consciously consider, step back, and reflect about what they are 
doing. Self awareness is used to develop self recognition, and 
understand why they are motivated. 
 
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
Self awareness operates as an intrapersonal dialogue involving self 
questioning and reflecting.  Motivation begins to use self awareness 
as it becomes almost aspirational and self actualising. Together self 
awareness and aspiration operate as steering mechanisms for 
behaviour and choices.  
 
5. Development of intrapersonal self regulation  over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
Self regulation operates as expected: time management, analysing, 
and self management all focus on enhancing performance during 
transitions. 
 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
More setting of goals and milestones, working logically and 
progressively. Self regulation at this stage involves more logical, 
sequential planning. 
 
Transition 3:From 
Coach, Professor, 
Manager to Head of 
Department 
Self regulation is still focused on goals and planning, but it is more 
sophisticated, with more conscious learning elements built in. The 
management of time and diaries becomes more important. 
 
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Division 
Self regulation is focused on freeing space and organising self 
reflection time in which to think. This transition also sees a 
movement towards an abstracting process in which personal self 
regulation experience is generalised to department regulation 
processes.   
 
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
Self regulation processes are generalised to regulation of an 
institution and involve controlling and managing information, 
environment and context.  Strategy and vision are important. 
 
6. Development of interpersonal intelligence  over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
This transition uses elements of the interpersonal context in which 
individuals operate e.g., relationships with a friend or colleague, to 
operate more effectively and to enhance performing opportunities. 
 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
Interpersonal intelligence is now used to focus on developing other 
people, directing, coordinating and mobilising them. 
 
Transition 3:From 
Coach, Professor, 
Interpersonal intelligence moves beyond simply managing of teams 
to considering how to utilise team members to compensate for gaps 
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Manager to Head of 
Department 
in one’s own abilities or knowledge.  There is a focus on 
developing the expertise of people who are operating as part of a 
management team. Managing of large groups becomes important. 
 
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Division 
Interpersonal intelligence is actively used to reach out beyond one’s 
immediate context or team to stakeholders and to build bridges 
across institutional divides. Understanding of cultural contexts is 
now a major focus. 
 
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
Interpersonal intelligence is refocused on basic, simple abilities: 
sitting down with people, talking with them and understanding 
them. The individuals rely on a small circle of intimate team 
members with whom they build understanding and rapport. 
 
7.  Development of practical intelligence  over the course of career transitions 
Transition 1: From 
Studentship to Performer 
The individual works within the context in which they find 
themselves.  But they also are independent, solution oriented, and 
pragmatic in their analysis. They simply get things done. 
Transition 2: From 
Performer to Coach, 
Professor,  Manager 
Organising and administrative abilities emerge.  They may have 
been generalised from managing oneself but they also include 
applying theory, trying things out and optimising efficiency.   
Transition 3:From 
Coach, Professor, 
Manager to Head of 
Department 
Efficiency and being organised continue to be present in this 
transition but there is the beginning of a movement toward 
abstraction: individuals set out structures, deal with management 
processes and generally organise the context in which they operate.     
  
Transition 4:From   Head 
of Department to Lead of 
Division 
Practical intelligence is applied to structural and infrastructural 
issues. Designing of operations involves a higher level operation of 
practical intelligence which now includes designing interfaces with 
other divisions and dealing with high level politics.  Inference, 
induction and analogy are clear enablers of this process.  
  
Transition 5: From   
Lead of Division to CEO 
Practical intelligence now addresses global issues.  Individuals look 
for deeper levels of patterns and stretch their knowledge across 
disparate arenas of performance. They are concerned with building 
cultures and organisational contexts. Still this is accomplished 
through getting the right resources and the right people on board.   
 
8.4  Concluding discussion 
Careers progress through stages. These stages and the transitions between them 
are more malleable and nonlinear than most models suggest including those 
developed in this dissertation. However, most of the participants in this study 
moved through most of the stages and transitions that have been used for this 
dissertation.  There are clear connections between a number of the career stage 
models and the elements of transition expertise as individuals work through 
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repeated, progressive career stages. Some models such as Levinson’s (Levinson 
et al., 1978) and Schein’s (1978) present clear parallels at the beginning to 
middle stages of a career but don’t describe the later transitions very effectively.  
Adjustment models ( e.g., Holland, 1973; Crites, 1976; Osipow, 1983) tend to 
identify skills and behaviours closely associated with attaining stability rather 
than managing change and don’t seem to describe the transition process that took 
place amongst most of the participants in this study. Torbert’s (2004) action 
logic, on the other hand, builds a developmental model of leaders that includes a 
range of skills and mental mind-sets that may apply to transitions as well as his 
leadership positions. However, in some ways, the closest parallels to the 
progressive development of transition expertise over the course of a career seem 
to lie in wisdom models of learning and development (e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 
2000; Sternberg, 2003). 
Transition expertise develops and evolves over the course of a career. Individuals 
were able to generalise their expert knowledge and processes, interpersonal and 
intrapersonal intelligences and practical intelligence  which had all been utilised 
in their early transitions from student to performer  to increasing broader and 
larger arenas. This development was fostered by cognitive flexibility which used 
induction, inference and analogy as the main mechanisms for generalising expert 
knowledge and processes.  During earlier transitions (1 & 2) there was little 
generalisation from domain expertise. Rather, inferential processes built bridges 
from other domain experience back to the primary domain which were used in 
conjunction with personal and practical intelligence to enhance performance. In 
mid-career transitions (2 & 3) expert knowledge was generalised between 
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different arenas of operations within a field or organisation. In later career 
transitions (4 & 5), having made a number of transitions within their field, 
individuals then began to infer their domain expertise outward to larger arenas of 
application. Inferential processes not only generalised expert domain knowledge 
and processes: personal and practical intelligences that had been developed in the 
earlier career transitions were also generalised inductively and inferentially from 
specific applications to general principles.  
Of particular interest in later career transitions was the variety of ways in which 
inductive expansion of expert knowledge from specific applications of 
intelligence or expertise to more abstract principles and philosophy enabled 
individuals to develop a greater understanding of the context in which they had 
transitioned and to build the structures, processes, operations and organisational 
culture they needed to make successful transitions.   Of equal and contrasting 
interest is the re-emergence of the use of the personal intelligences during the 
later transitions in very intimate and personal applications for building rapport 
and understanding team members, colleagues and stakeholders. This dual 
operation of using inductive expansion of expertise and experience from earlier 
specific applications to general principles and philosophies for running an 
operation while simultaneously returning from the generalised principles of 
personal intelligences back to using intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence 
for managing oneself and one’s intimate working relations is one of the more 
striking characteristics of late carer transitions.  
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Chapter 9. The Transition Process:  
Stability versus Change 
This chapter will review the transition process itself and in particular the 
movement from a stable career stage or position through an unstable transition 
process to a stable new position. I will then discuss the two main types of 
transitions encountered in the data: 1) completed transitions which has two main 
subcategories in the form of reactive versus initiated transitions and 2) non-
transitions which also has two main subcategories in the form of failures versus 
choosing not to transition. This will be followed by some conclusion about the 
operation of transition expertise during these different types of transitions. 
9.1 The transition process reviewed 
In the literature on the transition process a variety of models have emphasised 
different perspectives, included different numbers of transition stages and 
different stage names.  For the purpose of this study, a simple three-stage model 
had been used initially: 1) leaving a position, 2) making a transition and 3) 
integrating into the new position. Based on the analysis of the data, this model 
was changed: the second stage of ‘making a transition’ was divided into two 
stages   investigation and integration and the stages were renamed to clarify 
their operation. This resulted in a four-stage model: Inception, Investigation, 
Integration and Stabilisation which is presented in Figure 9.1 in contrast to some 
of the models reviewed in Chapter 1. 
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Table 9.1 Comparison of some transition cycles with the patterns in the data 
v Gennep Separation Initiation Reintegration 
Crites Career 
motives 
Tasks and 
problems 
Career 
adjustment   
Anxiety 
reduction 
Satisfaction and 
success 
Nicholson Preparation Affect and 
Sense making 
Adjustment Stabilisation and 
preparation 
Elsner & 
Farrands 
Leaving Arriving                 Surviving                      
reflecting, reframing, reshaping 
Thriving 
Bridge Endings Neutral zone New beginnings 
Ibarra Exploring 
possible selves 
   Lingering between identities                              
crafting, shifting, making sense 
Grounding
deep change 
 
Connolly 
 
 
Inception 
 
Investigation 
 
Integration 
 
Stabilisation 
1) Inception. This stage was originally called ‘leaving.’ But amongst the 
participants in the study it was more of a forward-looking process of 
searching for or deciding about the right next position. The process of 
transitioning out of a position is more usefully understood in terms of 
examining the future, identifying opportunities and recognising the ‘pull’ of 
the next step or position. These and similar factors will shape the thinking 
and behaviour of an individual before they move as well as their preliminary 
responses when they actually take up a new position.  
2) Investigation. When an individual enters into a new environment and takes 
up their new position they begin an active process, a period of exploration 
and interrogation of the system during which they seek to understand what is 
expected of them, how their abilities match the requirements of the position 
and how the environment will support or constrain their performance. The 
individual questions the new system of which they have become a part while 
the system is simultaneously interrogating them in terms of their capabilities 
and performance. 
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3) Integration. In this third phase the individual is beginning to perform in their 
new context. They have settled into their position, understood their roles and 
responsibilities and are beginning to proactively initiate work, pursue their 
own agenda, make decisions and implement decisions. Their environment 
and organisational context also begin to increase performance demands upon 
them as the preliminary ‘grace period’ ends. 
4) Stabilisation. The fourth phase returns to a more stable situation in which the 
individual is more fully integrated and they complete the transition process. 
They are no longer viewed  by themselves or their organisation  as being 
in transition but rather as a fully operational member. 
The career transition process seems to operate as a mutual inquiry and 
exploration between the individual and the environment into which they move. 
Below are a few illustrations from the data indicative of the stages of the 
transition process. 
9.1.1 Inception 
A transition is initiated by a business person at Stage Transition 3: 
So {company} said ‘What do you want to do now?’ and I so I said ‘I want to 
come back to London’. So rather than ‘I want this job’ or ‘you can send me 
where you like’, I was suddenly thinking I want to take control over where I go, 
having been sort of shuffled {city a}, {city b}, {city c} at the sort of company’s 
whim – I wanted to be back in London, so I said ‘I want to be back in London’. 
And I was sort of happy to see what came up job-wise and you know [….] So 
they offered me a job of running logistics in Europe which was sort of 
completely not what I had experience of (BSN R2 Karl) 
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A transition produces a career transformation in a sports person:  
The next passion, the next dream I suppose is, well “How can I help some 
cyclists be the best in the world” which at the right time I would have spent time 
dreaming about and visualising what does that actually look like? And that 
timed very nicely with the phone going from {colleague} for (national sporting 
body} as it would have been at the time saying that ‘Will you come to the 
Olympic games as a support member of staff’ in 1988.  That was massive for me 
because that I hadn’t seen coming. He could probably take another mechanic, 
another masseur or whatever, but he wanted to take me. I’ve never really talked 
to him about it, but I mean for me, it was an inspired decision looking back 
because to be placed in that environment, to see the enormity of what an 
Olympic games is - it’s a completely different vision of success. (SPT R3 
Edward) 
9.1.2 Investigation 
Some transitions give opportunity for investigation: 
There was a very wise guy who was senior vice president responsible for the 
research centre and he said ‘Look you know when a person of your seniority… 
we don’t want you to make a mistake coming here and we don’t want to make a 
mistake in hiring you if you aren’t going to be right for this[…]. What we should 
do is get used to each other; if you think this might be interesting and we think it 
might be interesting, why don’t you – we’ll sign you on as a consultant and 
we’ll, you know you come out once a month, we’ll pay you for it and we’ll start 
sending you reports and stuff of what we do and nobody here need to know what 
you’re doing – you’re just one of our senior consultants and you go around and 
you’ll meet people and you’ll… and then you’ll come to me and {person} and 
ask us challenging questions like, what is this / why are you doing this / what 
about the level science here etc, etc. and we’ll see whether it works. ’And that’s 
what I did. (BSN R4Oliver) 
Others require that the individual engage in a self-initiated inquiry process: 
It gave me absolutely the shock of my life really. I mean it was very good for me 
and I started talking to photographers and I mean the multi-media aspect was 
fantastic and we were opposite {media company} so we had a relationship with 
them. And you know digital animation and all this kind of stuff. The degree 
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shows were amazing actually lots of very talented kids but not sort of academic. 
(MUS R3 William)  
Some investigations are well structured by the organisation: 
And then I came into ‘functional management’ which was much more open. And 
then I wanted to do a degree in Business Administration and Economics, which 
was again a 3½ year thing which was kind of you really had to prepare yourself 
and it was also quite selective in the {country} environment. That opened my 
horizon. I also had assignments around ‘exposure management’, ‘credit 
exposure management’ for the bank and I learned stuff; first I was working with 
consultants – a big consultants firm and they introduced me to simple stuff. 
Programme Management; Presentations; Articulation of Thoughts, Business 
English and I really sucked the whole stuff in. (BUS R2 Peter) 
Other investigations are “sink or swim” processes: 
It was one of “sink or swim.” Something you either make it or you don’t, it’s 
quite hard-nosed in that way, a much less supportive environment in that sense. 
It’s sort of ‘go out and prove yourself and we’ll tell you if you’ve made it or 
not’. And I think my early development was, it was helped and hindered by that. 
It was helped in that my natural inclination is of hard work, excellence etc.; that 
was a value that I held already, so that worked well. (BUS R2 Nicola) 
9.1.3 Integration 
Musicians often take up a teaching position at an academy or college while they 
are still in the midst of their playing career which results in a gradual integration 
process: 
I became very interested in words with doing classics and writing good English 
and that sort of stuff and instead after {university} instead of going to a place 
like this and doing some more {instrument] learning, I went to {university} and 
wrote a thesis on the eighteenth century {instrument}. Over the course of a very 
nice year I drifted along for another two terms and saw an advert for temporary 
job in academe, in the Music Department, met my wife who was a student and 
I’m still married to her. And, wrote a PhD on an aspect of the very early history 
of the {instrument}. (MUS R1 William) 
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For some, integration into their professional career is quite rapid and total: 
 
Yeah.  I left {university} in 1976, so I was about, I was 25 I guess and then I 
went to London and then I hit the playing scene in a big way: I played in the 
{orchestra} and at the {orchestra} so there was a lot of playing went on.  If you 
look back in my old diaries, I was all over the country, night after night playing, 
broadcasts, you name it. (MUS R5 Richard) 
A businesswoman took six months to make a transition into her new role in 
which the end of the integration process resulted in a change to her function:  
I took the decision quite early on then not to pursue the hotel career path. And 
to carry on within that investment banking framework, so quite after I think it 
was six months of being there, I changed roles from being a secretarial support 
to performing a clerical role within the operation there. (BUS R1Nicola) 
9.1.4 Stabilisation 
The stabilisation stage of the transition process is not the main focus of this 
dissertation per se because when individuals reach this stage they have moved 
out of the transition process and back into the stable performance environment.  
However some illustrations are useful: 
It’s what I set out to do  - so I like to create something that is then able to run 
itself and doesn’t need,  either doesn’t need me personally or doesn’t need 
somebody doing my job at all and we’re nearly there. (BSN R3 Nicola) 
And: 
And it’s only afterwards when people say to you “You’re very efficient at this” 
or “You're very good at this” it’s then that you begin to think, actually, yes, the 
way that my brain works. (MUS R5 Stephen) 
And: 
 I learned a lot about how to deal with difficult situations, more process, more 
management process […] a more rigorous criteria for thinking about 
promotions and grades and appraisals and objective setting. (BUS R2 Oliver) 
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9.1.5 The Transition process and stability or homeostasis 
Figure 9.1 illustrates the transition process. The dotted line represents the relative 
stability  high or low homeostasis  of an individual’s situation during the 
transition process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The individual starts out from a position of relatively high stability but as they 
enter into a transition they rapidly move into a situation with lower stability and 
less homeostasis. Stability is further decreased after they begin their investigation 
into the new situation when they begin to understand what they do and don’t 
know and the position begins to make demands upon them to evolve and grow 
into it.  Through a series of first reactive and then initiated actions they go 
through periods of relatively lower and higher homeostasis before returning, 
through the integration process, to increasingly higher degrees of stabilisation.  
9.2 Initiated and reactive transitions 
One of the distinctions that emerged in the course of the interviews with 
participants in the study was that transitions could be initiated or reactive. 
High Homeostasis 
Low Homeostasis 
STABILISATION INTEGRATION INCEPTION 
Stable: 
Old 
position 
INVESTIGATION 
Change 
Initiated 
Completing 
transition 
process 
Stable: 
New 
position 
Figure 9.1 The Transition Process 
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Initiated transitions are transitions that were identified in advance, chosen and 
often planned for over time e.g., when a football player chooses to train as a 
coach or a musician seeks out a head of faculty position. Reactive transitions are 
unanticipated, often unplanned and sometimes take place very rapidly e.g., when 
a business manager is headhunted to lead up a division of a different company or 
a football player jumps from the reserves to the first team because of an injury to 
another player. There are a large number of statements by the participants in the 
study illustrating both initiated and reactive transitions at all of the stage 
transitions. I will present a few examples from each stage transition to 
demonstrate the general characteristics of initiated vs. reactive transitions. 
9.2.1 Initiated transitions 
1 From Student to Performer  
At the end of a four year academic programme a business person choose to end 
an apprenticeship with an engineering company:  
So straight after university I should have done another year with {company a} 
but bearing in mind I had a job with {company b} I then resigned from 
{company a} and actually took a cut in pay to come down south, kind of with a 
view that this was a) more interesting and b) better long term prospects. (BSN 
R2 John)   
Transitions for musicians often required that they choose between a career as an 
academic and a career as a performer:  
Having finished my degree and finished my course here, I then really I suppose 
was confronted by the same choice that I had avoided making before going into 
higher education and then I felt, ‘Right I’ve done what my parents wanted to do, 
I’ve got my Degree, now I am going to go for performing.’ (MUS R1 Robert) 
2 From Professional to Coach, Professor or Manager 
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Sports people often made the decision to coach while they were still in their 
performing career, even though the transition took place over time: 
But at that time I had decided that I wanted to do my coaching badges, wanted 
to get involved in coaching sessions, coaching some kids and as I say 
heightened my knowledge of the game.  So by that stage I knew I wanted to stay 
in the game and then it was really just about getting the opportunities. (SPT R4 
Brian)   
Musicians build up the components required for the next career stage at an early 
age before actually making the transition to becoming a professor: 
On leaving [university] I then went to London, I took pupils in and started to 
teach instrumentally and that went on to the point where I was appointed with 
my own Institution of {conservatoire} as Professor of {instrument} so that was 
also another strand in my parallel development. (MUS R4 Richard) 
3 From Coach, Manager Professor to Department Head 
At this stage transition, individuals will often have been looking for an 
opportunity such as Head of Faculty, even though the actual position may 
emerge suddenly: 
This job came out of the blue. I got very excited about it 'cos I thought I really 
want to come here, and work, and head a department.  {Colleague} also said 
“You must go for it.  Don’t want to lose you but you must go.  a) You're an ex-
student so it’s ideal 'cos you’re going back to your roots in a way and b) I’m 
still here for another five years maybe a little bit more and time’s rolling on for 
you” you know.  (MUS R1 Yvonne) 
Business individuals frequently initiated or sought out stage transitions to head 
up a department: 
Anyway I was beginning to think ‘What am I going to do now?’ I saw an advert 
in the paper for a Chief Engineer at {company] and I applied and got it and I’d 
always liked cars and {company} was an independent PLC at that stage and I 
thought to go and be a Chief Engineer at {company} was rather a good move 
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and I liked the glamour of the company, I liked the cars, it was a promotion, so I 
liked that. (BSN R6 Michael) 
4 From Department Head to Division Lead    
In the fourth stage transition, an individual moved to a different country to 
become a national director of performance in a sport:  
And I would say that that was a normal thing, was bound to happen, but at the 
same time there was {country b} who was stuck and weren’t getting anywhere 
and they were just looking for this guy to please bring in somebody that is going 
to rock our foundation and take us on again.  So yeah, I mean you might say 
that’s a coincidence; I don’t believe in that.  I think that you create those 
opportunities – I mean the opportunity with {country b} was there because of 
what I did with {country a} before; otherwise I would not have had opportunity 
so you create those. (SPT R7 Frank) 
The stage transition may require moving to a parallel expert arena or to a 
different institution: 
I mean what happened I suppose the third term at {university a} there was an 
advert, a {university b} advert in the Times Higher for the Dean, for Pro-Vice 
Chancellor of the Faculty and Dean of the Arts which was Music, Art and 
Design and Media. Well suddenly I got this phone call from this head-hunter 
and I’d never been headhunted or anything like that. This woman rang up and 
said you know we’d very much like to speak to you further about this, you know 
and this that and the other. (MUS R2 William) 
5 From Division Head to Organisation Leader 
Often, having progressed in both their field and the organisation in which they 
have been involved, this transition can coincide with an individual’s aspiration: 
Okay, so they needed a new CEO now, because it was only a temporary step up 
and advertised the normal way.  I thought about it a long, long time whether I 
was going to do another round, another Games leading to 2004, but by then I’d 
been in Olympic {sport} since ’83 – you know   close on 20 years and I’d been 
to ’84, ’88, ’92, ’96… we’d been to five Olympics in a performance role and 
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achieved as much as I could achieve – you know three Gold’s and two Silver 
was a good score. So I thought this opportunity won’t come up again in my 
lifetime… in my working lifetime, so I went for it. (SPT R4 George) 
Stage transitions are usually entered into with eyes wide open. They can often be, 
even at this final stage, part of a long-term career path envisioned by the 
individual: 
It was a challenge and it focus is something different.  This is a University for 
business and the professions; it’s not a University with strong liberal and 
fundamental scholarship yet curiously it has a five star rated music department 
amongst the top, it was rated for its music department which is a thoroughly 
musicological department, so in personal terms there is a department here very 
close to my own interests. (MUS R6 Thomas) 
As with other transitions these fifth stage transitions are usually accompanied by 
awareness of how one’s strengths and limitations match the requirements to 
perform at this level: 
I suddenly thought I can do that and I had visited here before so I could picture 
in mind – there were all sorts of things and I knew it to be a struggling 
Institution and one of the skills I think I have is taking something that’s not so 
good and polishing it and making it better, so I know I am a kind of turnaround 
person and I’ve got the doggedness to stay within something and really do my 
best by it. It was the most phenomenal moment. (MUS R 6Richard) 
9.2.2 Reactive transitions 
1 From Student to Performer  
Sports people seem to have a fair share of reactive first stage transition, for 
example when an unexpected performing opportunity emerged: 
We got to a semi-final of a cup competition and I don’t think I was going to 
play, but what happened [was] the left back got injured so the decision from the 
coach at the time was either for me not to play or to play me in a different 
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position. And that was it:  they played me in a different position at left back and 
that was it. (SPT R1 Brian) 
2 From Performer to Coach, Professor or Manager 
Stage transitions into a management role in business can come when an 
individual has to deputise for someone who subsequently moves on and they find 
themselves suddenly promoted to the role: 
My boss resigned and the big boss decided that he wasn’t going to replace him; 
he was actually going to move the other boss out and he was going to effectively 
take a layer out of the organisation so suddenly I became one of a team of about 
eight that was the leadership team. (BUS R2 John) 
Sometimes, a transition to coaching is a reaction to decline in performance or the 
immediate consequences of having failed to succeed at the highest levels: 
I tried to do the Olympics in ’84 and then in ’88 I tried to do it and, I didn’t win 
the trials but the guy who won the trials , I went to the Olympics with him in ’88 
as his coach and he won a gold medal then, so that’s the start of that. So that’s 
the start of that? Coaching, yeah.  (SPT R5 Alan) 
3 From Coach, Manager Professor to Department Head 
Being headhunted by a different organisation for a more senior post is a common 
example of a reactive stage transition in business:  
I was approached - I didn’t do anything about my concerns at {company a}. It 
didn’t last very long either; it was only a couple of months until this role was 
presented to me. Had it have been longer, I might have looked for a job but I 
didn’t think it was worth doing that. So the attraction of the job at {company b} 
- there was a big transition at that point because the job was far more senior.  
(BUS R2 Nicola) 
And sport:  
Then I get a phone call from {university}: ‘We’re thinking of starting a new 
research centre around youth sport. Would you be interested?’ I mean terribly 
lucky because they’ve let me come here and set up a research centre which is all 
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around my own research interests. It’s just like, again I’m like a pig in muck, 
it’s fantastic. (SPT R2 Diane) 
4 From Department Head to Division Lead    
As stage transitions progress hierarchically, they become less reactive.  But 
reactive transitions can still occur: 
And then suddenly he sort of said ‘I’d like you to create and run this new 
function called corporate communications’. […] So you knew you had the 
potential for a very big step and so this came along and he said ‘it’s a Group 
Vice President’… and suddenly you’re moving into the top 40 of the company 
and certainly in remuneration terms, this is a sort of material leap really and so 
of course you sort of think ‘Yeah sounds great.’ (BUS R10 Karl) 
5 From Division Head to Organisation Leader.  
Very occasionally fifth stage transitions can be reactive: 
And then one day I’m trying to get back into having a legal career and an 
envelope falls through the door saying ‘You might be interested in this 
application to the Chair of {national organisation}?’ And I thought that sounds 
interesting and it’s like it’s the next stage in the Administration career [...] and 
next thing I know, I’m Chair of {national organisation} (SPT R4 Claire) 
9.2.3 Discussion: Initiated and reactive transitions. 
In all of the domains statements made by the participants at various times could 
be coded as indicative of reactive or initiated transitions (See Table 9.2).  
Table 9.2 Statements indicative of initiated vs. reactive transitions 
 Music Sport Business Total 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Reactive 59 .22 110 .37 163 .51 332  .375 
Initiated 208 .78 187 .63 157 .49 552  .625 
Total 267  297  320  884  
 
Of all the 884 statements coded as reactive or initiated, 332 or .375 per cent were 
made about reactive transitions and 552 or .625 per cent were indicative of 
initiated transitions. However, musicians were far more likely to initiate 
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transitions than react to a transition situation: they mentioned initiating a 
transition 3.5 times as often as reacting to a transition. Sports people were also 
more likely to initiate than react to transitions, initiating 1.7 times as often as 
reacting.  However, business people spoke about reacting to a transition situation 
almost the same amount as they did initiating a transition: their proportion of 
reactive transitions was higher than the overall average of the participants. The 
difference is large enough to suggest that transition choices in the career paths of 
musicians and sports people are different than those of business people.  
Business people, on the one hand, enter into a professional environment where 
many of their career development decisions are organised and planned for them: 
they follow the relatively predicted career paths charted for them by their 
organisation in which career choices are made for them as frequently as they 
seek them out. The careers of musicians, on the other hand, involve a large 
amount of freelance work and self organised progressions during their early 
stages.  If a musician does not initiate change, self-start and proactively manage 
their career, it is highly unlikely that they will achieve their optimal career 
success or attain their full performing potential. Sports people, who fall 
somewhere in between, pursue career paths which may be tightly controlled and 
less initiated during their performing years and their early development as a 
coach. But often, having achieved a coaching position, their careers then become 
much more self directed and initiated. 
Not all statements that had been coded as a particular type of transition expertise 
were also coded as a statement about a reactive or initiated transition. For 
example, an individual might have made a statement about cognitive flexibility 
which was not linked to a specific initiated or reactive transition e.g., “A life-
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long quest to touch as much as possible.”  Conversely, an individual may have 
made a statement about a reactive transition, without it necessarily being coded 
as a particular type of transition expertise e.g., “My boss resigned and the big 
boss decided that he wasn’t going to replace him.”  
9.2.3.1 Relationships between reactive/initiated transitions and 
elements of transition expertise 
In the following discussion, data will be presented which illustrate the 
relationship between the various elements of transition expertise and reactive and 
initiated transitions. It will show the number of mentions of a particular transition 
expertise and its relative percentages made in association with reactive and 
initiated transitions and then compare it against the number of times it would 
have been mentioned if it had conformed to the same percentages of times 
reactive and initiated transitions were mentioned in total (See Table 9.2 above). 
For example (See table 9.3 below), there were 28 statements associated with both 
intrapersonal intelligence and reactive transitions. These constitute .24 per cent 
of total (117) intrapersonal statements associated with either reactive or initiated 
transitions. The 89 statements of intrapersonal intelligence associated with 
initiated transitions constitute .76 per cent of the total intrapersonal statements.  
As a comparator, figures are shown which represent the number of statements 
about intrapersonal intelligence that would have been made (e.g., 44 and 73) if 
they had been in the same proportion as all statements associated with reactive 
(332) vs. initiated (552) transitions, that is .375 vs. .625 respectively. 
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9.2.3.2 Personal intelligences and reactive/initiated transitions 
Table 9.3 show how the personal intelligences were used during reactive and 
initiated transitions. 
Table 9.3 Use of personal intelligences during transitions 
 Reactive Initiated  
 
Actual 
number 
(percentage) 
Projected  to 
match total 
statements  
Actual 
number 
(percentage) 
Projected to 
match total 
statements  
Total 
Interpersonal Intelligence 
52 
(.35) 
56 
(.375) 
97 
(.65) 
93 
(.625) 
149 
Intrapersonal Intelligence  
28 
(.24) 
44 
(.375) 
89 
(.76) 
73 
(.625) 
117 
Total 
80 
(.30) 
100 
(.375) 
186 
(.70) 
166 
(.625) 
266 
The use of interpersonal intelligence during transitions corresponded closely to 
the number of overall mentions of reactive and initiated transitions, suggesting 
that there was little difference in its use during different type of transitions (See 
Table 9.3). One explanation for this could be that interpersonal intelligence will 
still be accessible and used during reactive and initiated transitions because 
understanding the context into which one moves is unavoidably important 
(Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). However, intrapersonal intelligence was used more 
often during initiated transitions (.76) than during reactive transitions (.24) when 
compared with the overall mentions of initiated transitions (.625) and reactive 
transitions (.375).  This would be consistent with the operation of self-regulatory 
conceptions of personal intelligence (Schunk & Zimmerman, 1998; Kuhl, 2000) 
that focus on planned and organised self-management processes and that might 
operate more during initiated transitions where there is time and psychological 
space to plan and organise.  
Emotional intelligence models (Goleman, 1995; Bar-On, 1997) propose that 
individuals who score “high” on emotional intelligence scales would be more 
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effective in “management of emotions” and “stress management.” However there 
was very little mention amongst participants of using affect management in 
particular to support their transitions.  It may be the case that, when responding 
to a sudden change as often encountered in reactive transition, an individual may 
not necessarily have the time or ‘psychological space’ to reflect or self manage 
which a more controlled, initiated transition might afford. They might react 
without as much intrapersonal reflection. 
9.2.3.3 Practical Intelligence and initiated/reactive transitions 
Table 9.4 shows how practical intelligence was used during transitions. 
Table 9.4 Practical intelligence in reactive and initiated transitions 
 Reactive Initiated  
 
Actual 
number 
(percentage) 
Projected  to 
match total 
statements  
Actual 
number 
(percentage) 
Projected to 
match total 
statements  
Total 
Administration  
10 
(.24) 
15 
(.375) 
31 
(.76) 
26 
(.625) 
41 
Problem resolution 
5 
(.12) 
16 
(.375) 
37 
(.88) 
26 
(.625) 
42 
Resource utilisation   
28 
(.36) 
29 
(.375) 
49 
(.64) 
48 
(.625) 
77 
Total 
43 
(.27) 
60 
(.375) 
117 
(.73) 
100 
(.625) 
160 
Problem resolution is used even more frequently in initiated transitions relative 
to reactive transitions i.e. 88% ofproblem resolution statements were associated 
with initiated transitions as opposed to only 12% during reactive transitions. 
Administration is also used more often in initiated (.76 vs. .625) than reactive 
(.24 vs. .375) transitions when compared to proportions of overall initiated and 
reactive transitions. The most straightforward interpretation of this difference is 
that initiated transitions will be more amenable to management and control 
during the transition process. Administrative processes would be more accessible 
and usable under controlled transitions, since these skills are largely regulatory 
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and managing processes associated with control. Similarly, the analytical, 
sequential processes associated with problem resolution techniques would be 
used more readily when a change is anticipated, for example when planning to 
make a transition and mapping out how the transition process will take place. 
Resource utilisation, however, is used in relatively the same proportions as 
statements about reactive vs. initiated transitions (.36/.375 and 64/.625). It is 
probable that resource utilisation is less directly related to controlling the 
unstable elements of a transition process and becomes more evident when 
delivering performance during transitions once the way in which the resources 
can be utilised is understood, planned for and brought under control.  
The operation and role of practical intelligence in transitions does seem to 
overlap with other elements of intelligence. Social intelligence models that are 
associated with personal intelligence are also concerned with strategies for 
planning, monitoring progress and outcomes of plans (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 
2000).  This is also reflected in the interpretation of the data mentioned earlier 
that intrapersonal self regulatory processes might be more accessible during 
initiated transitions (Schunk & Zimmerman, 1998). This would reflect the clear 
overlaps between practical intelligences and more specific cognitive process such 
as Guilford’s convergent and evaluation operations (1967), Sternberg’s meta-
components (Sternberg, 1985),  and factors in Carroll’s (1993) lexicology like 
quantitative reasoning and general sequential reasoning. 
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9.2.3.4 Expertise generalisability and reactive/initiated transitions 
Expertise generalisability was operative during both reactive and initiated 
transitions (See Table 9.5). 
Table 9.5 Expertise generalisability in reactive and initiated transitions 
 Reactive Initiated  
 
Actual 
number 
(percentage) 
Projected  to 
match total 
statements  
Actual 
number 
(percentage) 
Projected to 
match total 
statements  
Total 
Early Expertise 
Generalisability 
 
6 
(.19) 
12 
(.375) 
25 
(.81) 
19 
(.625) 
31 
General Cognitive 
Flexibility 
 
12 
(.21) 
22 
(.375) 
46 
(.79) 
36 
(.625) 
58 
Domain Knowledge 
Generalisability 
 
5 
(.14) 
14 
(.375) 
32 
(.86) 
23 
(.625) 
37 
Domain Process 
Generalisability 
 
11 
(.37) 
11 
(.375) 
19 
(.63) 
19 
(.625) 
30 
General Transition 
Processes 
 
21 
(.36) 
21 
(.375) 
38 
(.64) 
38 
(.625) 
59 
Total 
55 
(.26) 
81 
(.375) 
160 
(.74) 
134 
(.625) 
215 
Statements that were indicative of general transition processes corresponded with 
the pattern of general statements about reactive and initiated transitions (.36 vs. 
.375 and .66 vs. .625). There were also similar proportion of domain (specific) 
process generalisability in reactive (.37) and initiated (.63) transitions. Of interest 
is the low proportion of mentions of domain knowledge generalisability (.14) in 
reactive transitions. This would suggest that specific domain knowledge becomes 
less generalisable as ambiguity increases in emerging transition situations. While 
it is difficult to draw clear causal relationships in this data, it is likely that 
semantic memory retrieval (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), long term working 
memory (Ericsson & Kintch, 1995), schemata (Hoffman, 1977; Woods, et. al., 
1994), templates (Gobet & Simon, 1996b), and similar models do in fact describe 
the limited generalisability of expertise when it is tied to specific knowledge 
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rather than process. But constraints on the use of expert knowledge in transitions 
may also be influenced by factors which are outside of the scope of this project 
such as attributions of stability and control (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1980) and  
self belief (Bandura, 1997) which influence perceptions of one’s ability to 
perform and the ensuing behaviour.   
The relatively low mention of early generalisability of expertise (.19) during 
reactive transitions can be accounted for because these statements were usually 
limited to the early stages of a career where initiated transitions are usually more 
common. Reactive transitions were mentioned more often during mid-career but 
at this point instances of early generalisability of expertise no longer apply. 
However, one would have expected to see general cognitive flexibility present in 
similar proportions during reactive transitions. But it wasn’t (.21) and there is no 
obvious accounting for the reasons for this.   
9.2.3.5 Inferential Intelligence and reactive/initiated transitions 
Table 9.6 presents the use of inferential intelligence during reactive and initiated 
transitions. 
Table 9.6 Inferential intelligence in reactive and initiated transitions 
  Reactive Initiated Total 
 
Actual 
number and 
(percentage) 
Projected  to 
match total 
statements  
Actual 
number and 
(percentage) 
Projected to 
match total 
statements  
 
Induction/Analogy 
1 
(.10) 
4 
(.375) 
9 
(.90) 
6 
(.625) 
10 
Intelligence generalised 
12 
(.34) 
13 
(.375) 
23 
(.66) 
23 
(.625) 
35 
Primary domain intelligence 
generalised 
15 
(.37) 
15 
(.375) 
25 
(.63) 
25 
(.625) 
40 
Total 
28 
(.33) 
32 
(.375) 
57 
(.67) 
53 
(.625) 
85 
The use of intelligence generalised (.34) and primary domain intelligence 
generalised (.37) parallel the mentions of reactive and initiated transitions. This 
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is as would be expected, as this category of coding identifies the inferential 
cognitive mechanisms that are used to apply processes beyond primary domain 
applications and corresponds with the use of general transition processes and 
domain process generalisability as described earlier. While the wide divergence 
of the use of analogy between reactive (.10) and initiated (.90) transitions might 
imply that this specific process operates better when parameters of the home 
domain from which the analogy is drawn and those of the new application to 
which it is applied are both clearly defined, the small number of mentions of the 
use of analogy in relation to these transitions makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions.  
9.2.3.6 Summary: Reactive vs. initiated transitions 
The relative frequency of mentions of initiated vs. reactive transitions was 
different in each of the three fields under study. Business people mentioned 
relatively similar numbers of initiated (.51) and reactive (.49) transition 
situations.   Sports people went through almost 1.7 as many initiated (.63) as 
reactive (37) transitions. And musicians discussed 3.5 times as many situations 
involving initiated (.78) transitions relative to reactive transitions (.22). The most 
obvious conclusion to draw from this divergence of the populations in the 
different domains in this study is that career progressions within these different 
fields are subject to very different field and contextual influences. Musicians 
would need to be more self-initiating in terms of their career development. 
Business people will tend to be more reactive. Sports people match the overall 
average. This almost certainly reflects the different characteristic of the fields in 
which the expert domains operate. It may also reflect the nature of the domain 
expertise itself. Different motivational and personality factors which may be 
  
353 
 
characteristic of the different domains may also influence predispositions 
towards initiated versus reactive transitions.  
When mentioned in conjunction with transitions it was the case that domain 
processes generalised (.37/.63), general transitions processes (.36/.64), 
generalised intelligence (.34/.66) and generalised primary intelligence .37/.63) 
were all used in nearly equal proportions to reactive vs. initiated transitions. One 
could conclude that the cognitive processes that are used to generalise experience 
from one domain of operation to another are used in any type of transition.  
However, more content specific applications of cognitive process such as 
administration (.76), problem resolution (.88) and domain specific knowledge 
(.86) would pertain more during initiated transitions. Anticipation, which would 
be more present during initiated transitions, might enable these aspects of 
transition expertise to operate more effectively. Problem solving and 
administrative abilities which bring control and stability to situations might be 
applied more effectively in initiated transitions. Domain knowledge is 
generalised more frequently in anticipated transitions suggesting that familiarity 
with the content of the new position may make it easier to generalise that 
knowledge. General cognitive flexibility (.79) and possibly analogy (.90) may 
operate more effectively when transitions are anticipated. This could be because 
the cognitive stretch required to generalise from past experience to new 
situations may be more achievable if other conditions are more stable.  
At the risk of oversimplification, the distinctions discussed above do seem 
congruent with accepted conceptions of convergent and divergent cognitive 
processes and the mechanisms of intelligence which have been delineated most 
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clearly in Guilford’s divergent and convergent productions (See Figure 5.1 in 
Chapter 5). It is useful to quote Guilford at some length: 
[In divergent production] the problem itself may be loose and broad in its 
requirements for solutions; or the problem, if properly structured, may 
call for a unique solution, but the individual may have an incomplete 
grasp of it; or he may comprehend the problem fully, but he is unable to 
find the unique answer immediately, resorting to trial-and-error 
behaviour, which means divergent production alternated with evaluation. 
[In convergent production] the problem can be rigorously structured and 
is so structured, and an answer is forthcoming without much hesitation. In 
the former case, restrictions are few; in the latter there are many. In the 
former, the search is broad; in the latter it is narrow. In the former, output 
is in quantity; in the latter it is limited (Guilford, 1967, pp. 214-215). 
Guilford goes on to qualify that “in everyday life, of course, the middle ground 
between these two kinds of functions is not excluded, and the individual very 
frequently engages in much divergent production on the way to a convergent 
answer” (ibid., 215).  
The operation of various elements of transition expertise in reactive and initiated 
transitions as discussed above can also be seen to operate in corresponding ways 
in a number of the career transition models reviewed in Chapter 1. Adjustment 
theories include elements like “preparation” (Nicholson, 1984), “task and 
problem solving” (Crites, 1976) and “dissipation of doubts” (Tiedeman & 
O’Hara, 1963) in which individuals seek to minimise ambiguity and subject 
transitions to more structured and controllable processes. Bridges’ (1991) 
transition process suggests that individuals confront fears and self doubt through 
structured processes, clear goals, and small wins which are followed by planning 
the future and identifying the role one has to play. Elsner and Farrands (2006) 
identify a number of issues in their arriving stage which deal with getting a 
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situation under control, identifying competence, and building trust, while their 
subsequent surviving stage actually contains a number of intrapersonal processes 
like “self reflecting” and finding ones “internal compass.” This suggests that, for 
them, stabilising and controlling are prerequisites to self awareness. Ibarra’s 
(2004) model incorporates planning and controlling processes into the first stage 
of her transition process during which an individual is “experimenting with 
possible selves.” In addition the first part of her recursive “identity in practice 
cycle” has individuals engaging in “crafting experiments” on a small scale and 
testing them before implementing. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn 
in the foregoing discussion that in an initiated and more controllable transition, 
intrapersonal intelligence might be have more cognitive space in which to 
operate. 
Figure 9.2 indicates that stability during initiated transitions starts out high and 
remains relatively high during the transition process, only dropping when the 
individual begins to move from the initial exploration period into integration by 
which time the position and environment into which they have moved will have 
revealed its real demands and constraints upon their performance. 
Figure 9.3 indicates how, during reactive transitions, it is likely that stability will 
drop much more rapidly as individuals enter into a situation over which they do 
not feel that they have control. Such transitions will present fewer opportunities 
to plan and direct their responses and may also result in a longer period of 
relative instability before the individual begins to re-establish their control over 
their working situation. 
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Finally, it is striking that, in all of the data, none of the cognitive transition 
expertise processes under discussion in this dissertation are used more frequently 
in reactive transitions than in initiated transitions. It is possible to conclude that, 
while transitions almost by definition involve successful movement through non-
stable situations requiring new abilities or adaptation of old ones, when the 
transition environment and the requirements of a new career stage are more 
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Figure 9.2 Stability in the Transition Process during initiated transitions 
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Figure 9.3 Stability in the Transition Process during reactive transitions 
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controllable, then such a controlled context will be more supportive of generative 
cognitive processes that are so central to transition expertise. 
9.3 Non-transitions 
There were a number of situations where transitions did not take place. These 
non-transitions typically fell into two categories: 1) an individual failed to make 
a transition or 2) an individual chose not to make a transition. 
Under the first category of failed transition there were three subcategories: 
1.1 An individual failed to make a transition and this more or less proved 
to be the end of their hierarchical career development.  
1.2 An individual failed to make a transition and used the learning from it 
to refine and develop their domain expertise or transition expertise or 
modify their career direction.  
1.3 An individual failed a transition and this failure was a radical break 
for them which caused them to reconsider their goals, priorities and self 
image.  Such radical breaks were identified as major life changing events. 
Under choosing to not make a transition there were three sub categories: 
 2.1 An individual had to choose between different career domains and 
directions and in the process decided not to pursue further development in 
a domain. 
2.2 An individual chose to not make a transition because it was not in line 
with life aspirations and values or it was contrary to their well being and 
happiness in their career or personal life. 
2.3 An individual chose to step back from or reverse a successful 
transition i.e. moving back to the previous career stage or moving to a 
lateral position away from the previous transition. 
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9.3.1 Failed transitions 
9.3.1.1 Failed transition: End of road 
There were only a few cases amongst the participants in this study where a failed 
transition meant the end of further career progression. 
In one case an individual who failed to transition to working with the national 
body stayed at the level of a coach: 
(Do you get involved in the management of… the policy of {national 
organisation}?) Yeah I did do at one stage but my views were probably not 
conducive to their views so they didn’t really want me involved in that. (SPT R7 
Alan)  
In a second case, an individual had reached Career Stage five and, following a 
failed transition, had to take early retirement. At the time of the interview he was 
considering how to re-launch his career:  
It does make you look back and think you know ‘Where did I go wrong?’ or 
‘Where were the points when I should have intervened and done something?’– I 
mean I was really sort of kicking myself that I didn’t sort of take control of it 2/3 
years ago and what I needed to do was demonstrate I can run businesses. (BSN 
R8 Karl) 
9.3.1.2 Failed transition: Leading to self refinement and modifications 
in career direction 
More often, a failed transition was viewed as an impetus to seek other 
opportunities. 
A failed transition helped an individual view things over the longer term and 
become more resilient in the face of short-term setbacks: 
Because after that, you know, you take a broader view, a longer view all the 
time, so you are not going to worry about small things or falling out with 
{orchestra}  and not being re-engaged you know.  As a matter of fact they did a 
  
359 
 
huge favour – without that I probably wouldn’t have gone to {conservatoire}, 
without which I wouldn’t have been head of wind there and wouldn’t have been 
head of wind here. (MUS Vivian R3) 
A failed transition awoke a realisation in one individual that he was interested in 
“running something”:  
I was shortlisted – I mean I didn’t get the job, but I was on the final short list of 
five or six people so I did an interview for it – I didn’t do the interview very well.  
I mean in a way it was a one-off, I didn’t then apply for other jobs quite like 
that, but I mention it because I think there was something going on in the 
background that was thinking ‘maybe this is not going to be my life forever’, you 
know ‘maybe I will do something a little bit different at some point’ and 
obviously I was also thinking in terms of running something. (MUS Robert R1) 
A person realised that she would need to pursue additional training i.e. in 
interview techniques to perform better in future transitions: 
A job came up at {conservatoire} when I was I think forty which was the Head 
of Keyboard job and I went for it.  And {colleague} was appointed who was a 
very good pianist and I have a lot of respect for him and I didn’t get it.  It was 
my first interview ever, really and I was lousy, I was absolutely dreadful at 
interview, I felt I really didn’t do, and I also felt they were quite, they asked me 
very challenging questions but I wasn’t prepared in the right way for the 
interview because musicians aren’t.  (MUS Yvonne R1) 
In one case a failed transition i.e. not getting into the Olympic Games as a 
competitor, was accompanied by a simultaneous transition into coaching: 
I tried to do the Olympics in ’84 and then in ’88 I tried to do it and, I didn’t win 
the trials but the guy who won the trials, I went to the Olympics with him in ’88 
as his coach and he won a gold medal then, so that’s the start of that. (SPT R2 
Alan) 
9.3.1.3 Failed transition: Major career adjustment 
In some cases the shock of a failure at a transition was so strong that an 
individual re-directed their career in their domain completely. In the following 
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three illustrations, it is worthwhile quoting at greater length to follow their 
retrospective reflection on the process. 
One person stopped competing in his sport at an early age when he felt that he 
had not been “taken seriously.” He moved almost immediately into coaching: 
I felt desecrated almost; I mean violated. I felt I wasn’t taken seriously  and 
which I think I wasn’t,  I think that my feeling was correct but I have to admit 
that the guy who was the first goalie, who was 6 years older I think than I, and 
he was a darned good goal keeper. I mean in the coaches mind, there could 
never been a question about who should have been the first goalkeeper: it was 
that guy – he was actually really quite good, I later realised. I mean it was a 
traumatic experience. [….] The thing however is, is that I think after I left that 
club, which means that I was probably 19, I never played in a high performance 
match ever again, so it led to a drastic decision. I guess I said something like 
‘I’m not going to allow for people to put me in that position’.  So I started 
coaching more; I had already started coaching and I started coaching more, 
coaching very seriously, started playing again but I never played a high 
performance goal keeper match again, although I now realise that a goal keeper 
comes to his peak at 25 or 26.  I never gave it that chance. (SPT Frank R4) 
This individual went on to become national director in his sport and led the 
national team in back-to-back wins at the Olympics. 
Similarly, another individual felt he didn’t reach his full potential as a performer 
due in part to the lack of support for youthful competitors within the sport:  
So at that point in time  sixteen   I was outstanding within the UK. I won the 
national championship in a record time by a record margin and a big gap 
between me and the rest which was interesting. Then a period of – how would 
you best describe it? – relative failure I suppose[….] I didn’t get a helluva lot 
better – found myself trying to pursue this ambition with very little path to 
follow. The coach that had helped me to get to that national level, felt he wasn’t 
able to take me further. The national team system as you might call it at the 
time, certainly offered me nothing. It was pretty fragmented; people cast opinion 
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saying ‘Do this do that’ and I guess I lost my way – is the simple truth [….] I 
was trying to learn all these new tricks and found myself doing a whole load of 
things I didn’t understand, probably didn’t particularly enjoy and wasn’t 
particularly winning the level I would have aspired to [….] So we kind of fast 
forward to 18.  No longer on the national squad because didn’t make an obvious 
step up between 17 and 18. Got quite ill – had a number of bad {injuries}. (SPT 
Edward R2, 3) 
He subsequently moved into sport science and became one of the leading figures 
in his field of exercise physiology and scientific support for elite competitive 
performance. This eventually led to his becoming national director for his 
national team. 
One individual was dismissed as the national coach:  
The biggest reverse for me as an athlete, was actually I was made {country} 
coach after I finished playing as a player; I became the coach for a World cup – 
it was held in {country} and we didn’t do very well in the World Cup and I was 
fired within a few weeks of getting back and I felt that it was grossly unfair and 
looking back, I did, I went through sort of social death you know because for 25 
years I’d given my heart to this sport and suddenly I had no status, no position, I 
was not playing any more, I felt as if I’d done everything I could. And what 
happened was as I reached coming out of the Kübler-Ross curve, I decided to 
walk away from sport – not professionally – but in my personal leisure time and 
I started politics. I started getting involved in sports politics. So instead of being 
a coach, I got involved in running a pressure group for women’s sports and 
became an active feminist by this point; I’d brought those two interests together. 
(SPT R4 Diane) 
The individual decided to move to a parallel pursuit in the academic study of 
sporting culture politics. In this position she become a national leader in her 
field, attained international recognition for her work and significantly changed 
the direction of policies and practices in the field. 
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Another person’s falling out with her opera company led to a major decision to 
move away from a singing career:  
They dropped me from the season, singing a role that I loved and had sung 
many, many times before and that was probably emotionally harder because it 
had confused very, very deep friendships that had set together in an esprit de 
corps and established this company who’d won the Prudential award for opera. 
You know, it was all great stuff.  And then I was just dropped; that was 
appalling because it broke up a very, very dear friend as well. And what I am 
trying to ask myself today is whether that experience further turned me away 
from this area of pursuit. There were lots of other things I didn’t like about it. I 
think I suspected   which sounded appalling after all the time, energy and care 
people had put into developing me   I think I suspected it would feel limited. 
That as a singer you were ultimately  of course you had the attention and the 
glory and a lot of emphasis on your physical health and looking if you felt 
alright or not – a bit like being an athlete, you know I had to be there, people 
were expecting you.  But it didn’t have  I mean lots of politics, but you had no 
 you were way down on the food chain. You were vital to them so, if you’re not 
there it’s a problem, but didn’t have any influence on the direction; the overall 
direction of it – at least not in that day. (MUS R6 Susan) 
Subsequently this person went on to finish her PhD in musicology and eventually 
to became the president of a college. 
9.3.1.4 Summary: Failed transitions 
Amongst participants in this study, failed transition almost always led to 
reassessment and redirection.  However, there seems to have been a gamut of 
responses to failed transitions ranging from minor course corrections, decisions 
to pursue more training, re-assessment of one’s abilities, through to major course 
corrections and radical career changing moves. Only 1 participant out of the 24 
in the main study failed in a way which effectively ended their progression in 
their career. 
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Intrapersonal intelligence seems to have played a key role in the response of 
individuals to a failed transition: participants in the study “think back,” 
“reassess,” “ask myself,” consider “doing something different” and generally 
self-assess after failure.  This self assessment usually led to a decision to proceed 
in a modified or new direction. In some cases, individual changed careers 
directions almost overnight. In other cases this transition to a new field could 
take several years e.g., an individual who finished his performing career when he 
was 18 but didn’t actively take up a research career until 4 years later.   
Failed transitions can often ‘push’ an individual to generalise their expertise. 
When movement was stopped in one direction, individuals often moved 
tangentially: from playing to coaching, from performing to studying 
performance, from singing to running a research project on musical performance, 
from playing to administering. Such ‘failed transitions’ that led to lateral moves 
within a field were most common in sport. This may reflect the nature of the 
different performance curves in the domains. Sports people often reach the end 
of their performing life at an early age, sometimes abruptly due to injury, and are 
‘compelled’ to make a lateral transition.  
A failure was generally not under control of the individual and seldom initiated.  
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that control over one’s career and 
maintenance of autonomy were important factors in the response to failed 
transitions. One of the most interesting responses to this failure was when an 
individual determined that as a consequence of the failure, they will take 
themselves out of an arena in which they have no power i.e. where other people 
make decisions about them or where they have no control over their own life. In 
  
364 
 
this context the response of the individuals was indicative of a variety of factors 
including motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985), self belief (Bandura, 1997) and 
personality resilience (Block & Block, 1980).  
Self reflection was more in evidence during failed transitions and was the basis 
for learning from failures. However, if over the course of a career an individual is 
repeatedly stymied in their transitions, it might be the case that intrapersonal 
intelligence would become a more recursive, neurotic recycling of thoughts of 
failure and self recrimination rather than a tool of development.   
9.3.2 Choosing not to make a transition 
9.3.2.1 Stopping performing in one domain to concentrate on another 
Early on in a career, often at the transition from student to performer or from 
performer to coach, some individuals had to make decisions about the domain to 
which they would dedicate themselves. Some typical examples are listed below. 
Stopping law school to coach sport full time: 
I mean this was now a very serious team; I was actually being paid decently to 
do so to coach that team and I gave it everything I had – night and day, night 
and day  which is also when probably it coincided with the moment where I 
had to communicate to my parents that I was just not going to get this degree – I 
mean I’d been studying for 7 years but I was just not going to get this degree 
and I went full out with that one. We were successful; I coached the team for 4 
years and we won the league. (SPT Frank R1) 
Stopping university to concentrate on sailing: 
I didn’t really want to carry on with the aeronautical engineering – it was too 
deep, scientifically for me – and so, they gave me the opportunity of going 
straight into the Navy which meant seamanship, navigation, meteorology etc. So 
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it was still all inter-related to the sport, the scientific aspects of the sport. (SPT 
Alan, R1) 
Stopping music to concentrate fulltime on sport: 
Yes my music faded a bit while I was in PE college; I kept it going but not 
seriously and by the time I got to {university}it really was lapsed you know 
sports had taken over.(SPT Diane R1) 
Stopping sport to concentrate on music: 
I just thought I’m a musician; I even stopped running because I used to run 
races and win them like mad and I now regret that I didn’t go on being an 
athlete because I ran the mile in 4 minutes 28. At 17 that was quite important to 
me at that stage. (MUS R1 Richard) 
9.3.2.2 Choose to not transition because not the right choice 
Sometimes individuals choose not to make a transition because it was not the 
right choice.  Often this was because the new position was incompatible with 
their values and life-purpose. 
One individual stopped academic research to get back to teaching/coaching: 
I went to see my Masters tutor towards the end of my course and he sat me down 
and said ‘You must go on and do a PhD’ and I said ‘No, I must stop being a 
student and start teaching’. I got a job in a high school. I had my eye on this 
high school for ten years  it was the one place I wanted to work because there 
was a very good woman head of department who I wanted to be my mentor. And 
he said to me ‘No, no you must go on and do a PhD’. I mean now I look back I 
think he was probably right, but at the time I had been a student for five years 
and thought it was time to get out and earn a living and see the world and stop 
being a student. (MUS Diane R3) 
Some individuals choose not to transition because it conflicted with their values: 
The braver decision or the more confident decision would have probably been 
‘Go for it’, but I think my whole sort of upbringing and way of thinking was ‘No, 
no stick with the sort of corporate thing and you’ll do well in there and you’ll 
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continue to go to different things.’ There was a bit of discomfort of working in a 
sort of John Grisham like place where you’re basically selling your soul to 
extremely professional  nice  but people who were going to pretty much do 
anything to make a buck and that did feel a little uncomfortable. (BSN R1 Karl) 
Some individuals choose not to transition because they felt they were at the right 
level of their aspirations: 
Last year I applied for two jobs and got short listed and both of them were 
slightly higher up the food chain than I am now and I very quickly realised, 
through doing the applications and then interviewing for them, that at the 
moment the tension between my administrative job, my managerial job, and my 
playing is at its fullest extent.  I think step one further up and there’s no 
relationship possible really.  You move further and further away from, not only 
from the hands-on educational experience but certainly the hands-on playing 
experience, the two become almost mutually exclusive then.  So I had to really 
sort of come to terms with this dichotomy of, do I stay where I am because 
actually it enables me still to carry on doing the things that I want to do. (MUS 
Stephen R1) 
9.3.2.3 Achieve a transition but decide that the new stage is not what 
they want and choose to drop back or move tangentially 
This is perhaps the most interesting non-transition in which individuals who have 
made successful transitions decide that they don’t want to continue at that level 
of performance: they step off or back down the hierarchical career ladder.  This 
is particularly the case where individuals have moved from coaching to running a 
department and subsequently decided to quit running the department in order to 
revert to coaching people. 
One individual choose to reverse a transition because he didn’t want the 
administrative responsibilities: 
I felt a kind of bifurcation in the road coming up where either I had to sort of 
commit myself fully to these managerial aspects of the job, you know the 
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academic parts of the job.  And most important of all, I had begun to feel that 
because I was carrying on teaching at the time – I had a lot of students here – I 
had a conversation with my line manager here and said ‘I am worried about 
this, I feel that my own teaching is suffering through it’ and he said ‘Well you 
shouldn’t be doing so much teaching’ and you know, that was the crunch for me, 
that was the crunch: I thought but this is, the first half of my life was playing 
oriented, the second half was teaching oriented, that’s what I loved doing, and 
what I, how I foresaw the job was enabling and facilitation myself and my 
colleagues to teach at the highest possible level in a productive and lively 
environment and yet my energies for doing that seemed to be getting gradually 
sucked away by other things. I think I also felt I was running out of ideas. For 
example when I started doing it, in one of the things I loved doing was 
organising master classes – getting people in from outside who I had always 
wanted to get in.  By my last year of doing it, I was thinking ‘Oh God it’s the 
calendar deadline coming up for master classes and I haven’t arranged 
anything; who can I get?’ Sort of rather than thinking you know ‘What am I 
going to make of this opportunity’, sort of hanging on to keep up with the 
schedule and I just thought this no longer feels like what I wanted to do. (MUS 
R3Robert) 
Another quit as head of his national sporting association because he didn’t want 
to be managing people all the time: 
I think I did most things adequately; I mean I did some things very well. I think if 
you’re adept with the basic mathematics and can work a spreadsheet, you can 
make a pretty good job of tracking what you’re business is doing or interpreting 
management accounts when they come in if they’re done properly so some 
things were quite easy to do. I guess where I was least successful and 
ultimately was probably the compelling reason I moved on from it  was the 
more routine day to day management of people, their needs, their challenges on 
a day to day and sometimes on an hour to hour basis on the ground is probably 
the thing I’ve been least effective at. [….] I don’t think I lack emotional 
intelligence if that’s the right understanding; when I’m in a coaching mode, I 
think I’m probably better than average in relating to people and working quite 
hard to see the world through their eyes, to ask questions and listen in a way 
that builds empathy and trust. I think that’s actually a very, very important 
feature of coaching in getting the best out of people.  But that didn’t transcend 
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to all the challenges that comes with managing large teams of people and 
managing the culture and the climate that they’re working in. That seemed to be 
something that I didn’t do that well at in all honesty   or recognise that it needs 
to be done exceptionally well to then take things to higher levels, so I would 
happily settle for the description of me as a sort of a chief engineer designer of 
the world class programme that is now so successful in cycling and probably 
somebody who did a lot of innovation in the growth years to get it to a certain 
point. But where it has now gone to since is I think much more about managing 
those broader dynamics and something that’s now got a very good foothold but 
realises the next level of performance is achieved by maintaining a level of 
stability when people are pushing that high all the time. And that’s not a skill set 
that I think is one that I’m desperately driven to develop; actually I think I get  
I don’t want to say it was bored  but I think that once most of the milestones 
that I can see have been crossed, I’m kind of looking for the next challenge (SPT 
Edward R5) 
9.3.2.4 Summary: Choose not to transition 
While failed transitions were almost always reactive, the choice not to transition 
tended to be initiated. Motivational factors were important as individuals made 
these decisions about what career paths they would follow.  For example, it was 
common for musicians to decide that they needed to concentrate on music which 
led them to stop training in sport or in academic disciplines. Such decisions were 
usually taken upon entering more seriously into a performing career at the first or 
second stage transitions but, crucially, not before they had acquired some 
expertise in another domain which would support generalisation of their primary 
domain. Individuals also stopped training in a different domain which had no 
apparent overlaps with their primary domain such as law or engineering in order 
to pursue a sporting career. There were also choices to move away from 
performing or coaching in sport in order to pursue an academic career studying 
sporting performance. Such shifts away from performing but still within the field 
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of the primary domain were all made by the second and third stage transitions. 
They represent examples of Schein’s (1978) inclusive or functional transitions. 
Another factor which contributed to the choice not to transition involved values 
and life aspirations.  Positions were sometimes offered which presented 
fundamental conflicts with personal values and ethics  and were declined. 
Individuals also chose not to make a transition because it would compromise the 
quality of their life or their family life. Still others chose not to transition because 
they were happy at the level they had reached: to move would take them away 
from the kind of work they loved.   
Some individuals gave up a successful position to revert to a lower or lateral 
position.  These latter choices were usually the result of a realisation that the new 
positions required too much administration or took them too far away from 
actually working with people. These types of non-transitions were mentioned 
more by musicians and sports people. While Ibarra’s (2004) model of working 
identity is concerned with how individuals prepare for and then implement 
identity changes, the same process might be followed when an individual decides 
that they want to revert to a previous identify e.g., from head of a faculty of 
music to a performer. It seems clear that any understanding of the choices not to 
transition requires an understanding of how motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1986; 
Weiner, 1980) and values (Schein, 1990) operate to steer career choices. 
It is possible to see convergent processes operating in choices to not transition as 
individuals weigh up factors and make considered decisions about whether to 
take up a position or to revert back to a different position. Similarly, after failed 
transitions, as they seek to regain control and develop capabilities, individuals 
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can react by seeking more control over future transitions and anticipate how they 
need to plan and develop further.  
9.4 Concluding discussion 
During transitions an individual will move from a relatively stable homeostatic 
position into an unstable, non-homeostatic transition process before returning 
eventually to a newly stabilised position in a different role or function. Transition 
expertise provides individuals with the cognitive processes and abilities that 
enable them to traverse these transitions in ways that 1) take advantage of the 
opportunities that exist in the non-homeostatic transition situation through 
applying divergent cognitive processes while 2) using convergent cognitive 
processes to bring the transition situation under control so that they may operate 
effectively.    
Transition expertise operates differently during reactive transitions than it does 
during initiated transitions. This difference highlights the key 
divergent/convergent dialectic that exists within the various elements of 
transition expertise. During initiated transitions there is more opportunity to use 
elements of transition expertise that bring stability or homeostasis to a situation 
through managing, planning and otherwise controlling the transition process and 
the environment into which one is transitioning. During reactive transitions 
individuals are more often called upon to use elements of transition expertise that 
are cognitively flexible and generative to respond to emergent issues and to adapt 
existing abilities or develop new ones. This duality of cognitive process that 
stabilise and control as well as generalise and adapt can work in ‘cooperation’ 
during most transitions. It is likely that too much of one or the other at the wrong 
  
371 
 
time or place may lead to difficulties in managing a transition. The capacity to 
judiciously decide how much and when to apply convergent and divergent types 
of transition expertise is an important meta-process during transitions which has 
not been fully explored in this project.   
Non-transitions were of equal interest. A failed transition almost always resulted 
in an intrapersonal reassessment on the part of the participant and was 
accompanied by a decision to develop further capabilities or a decision to move 
or to change career direction or sometimes both. These non-transitions were 
often be the impetus for generalising domain expertise. Choices to not transition 
were often the product of this same reflective process which took place before 
the transition occurred.  
The responses of the participants in the study during all of these various types of 
transitions indicated that other factors were in operation during transitions such 
as motivation, self beliefs, attributions of control and personality resilience that 
are beyond the scope of this project.  
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Chapter 10. Conclusion  
10.1 Objectives and approach of this project 
This project has sought to understand how experts in high performance 
professions such as athletes, musicians and bankers are able to make repeated 
and successful career transitions to attain senior positions in their field. Initially it 
addressed five areas thought to have the biggest impact on career transitions: 
expertise, intelligence, self-beliefs, motivation and personality resilience.  This 
proved overly ambitious and the areas under study were narrowed down to 
expertise and intelligence. Through taking a largely cognitive approach to 
studying the abilities and processes that enable successful career transitions, the 
parameters of the thesis were further narrowed and the research questions 
became more focussed. The use of retrospective interviews as the main 
methodology for the study was undertaken to develop an understanding of career 
transitions. Ultimately three main research areas were arrived at and research 
questions were formulated accordingly. 
The first set of research questions address the operation of cognitive flexibility 
and inferential intelligence during transitions. The first of these questions 
concerned the characteristics of the cognitive flexibility that enables experts to 
overcome the constraints of expert domain specificity so that they can apply the 
expert processes and knowledge acquired within their primary domain during 
transitions and to new domains? This issue was addressed in Chapter 4. The 
second questions concerned the actual mechanisms that individuals use to 
generalise cognitive processes across different domains when making 
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transitions? These mechanisms were identified as induction, inference and 
analogy and were addressed in Chapter 5.  
The second set of research questions address the operation of other aspects of 
intelligence during transitions. The first question proposed that personal 
intelligences, which are prominent in most theories of intelligence, would play a 
major role in how individuals managed transitions. This was addressed in 
Chapter 6. The second question proposed that practical intelligence would 
provide the abilities necessary to manage the environment into which an 
individual was moving  and its material resources and could explain how 
expert knowledge and processes were applied pragmatically and contextually 
during transitions. This was addressed in Chapter 7.  
The third set of two research questions addressed the nature of transitions 
themselves. The parameters of these questions emerged more clearly during the 
preliminary analysis of the data. Firstly, in order to understand career transitions 
one had to understand the career cycle and stages through which individuals 
progressed. These were initially reviewed in Chapter 1. But in studying 
transitions at the various career stages it emerged that transition expertise was not 
a static collection of processes and abilities: it developed over time. This 
question of how transition expertise evolved throughout the course of a career 
was addressed in Chapter 8.  Secondly, a number of types of career transitions 
were identified in which transition expertise operated differently. Understanding 
the different ways transition expertise operated in these different transition 
situations would enable a better understanding of the nature of transitions and 
transition expertise as a whole. This was addressed in Chapter 9. This last set of 
  
374 
 
questions helped build a more coherent sense of how different elements of 
transition expertise interacted and, in the end, helped develop a more unified 
conception in which abilities, cognitive processes and skills developed over time 
into something that could be called transition expertise. 
10.2. The findings of this study 
10.2.1 Expertise, generalisability and inferential 
mechanisms 
10.2.1.1 The expert conundrum 
The arguments for the non-generalisability of expertise are compelling and the 
research extensive: expertise training, domain specificity, functional fixedness, 
reductive bias, and automatisation can and do limit the generalisation of expertise 
(Dunker, 1945; de Groot, 1946; Simon & Chase, 1973; Sternberg, 1988; 
Salthouse, 1991; Sloboda, 1991; Krampe & Ericsson, 1996; Feltovitch, & 
Coulson, 1997; Ericsson, 2003; Chi, 2006; etc). The non-generalisability of 
expert processes and knowledge could limit the ability to make successful 
transitions between career stages. However, many of the cognitive processes and 
structures that support the application of expertise are in themselves innately 
malleable and there is equally extensive evidence for how cognitive flexibility 
can be developed to avoid the constraints associated with expertise or overcome 
them if they have been embedded in a specific domain (Egan & Greeno, 1974; 
Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Holyoak, 1984; Keil, 1984; Spiro et. al., 1987; 
Amabile, 1996; Feltovitch & Coulson, 1997; Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1997; 
Demitriou, 1998; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Gobet, 2005; Krampe & Charness, 
2006; Chi, 2006; Horn & Masunaga, 2006; etc.). Consequently and ultimately, it 
has not been the objective of this dissertation to determine if expertise can be 
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generalised:  clearly it can be and is. Rather, the more pertinent questions are: 
what are the characteristics of expert processes and knowledge than make them 
generalisable and how do experts use this generalisability to support repeated 
and successful career transitions.  
The ways in which individuals acquire their expertise is a main contributor to its 
generalisability. The findings of the study indicated that the early development of 
expertise in multiple domains contributed to its generalisability e.g.,  oboe 
players were also athletes, energy traders were also linguists and engineers, 
sports women were lawyers and musicians, engineers were athletes, athletes were 
engineers, musicians were scholars, and so forth. This development of multiple 
points of view from diverse domains contributed to cognitive flexibility (Spiro et 
al., 1989; Feltovich, Spiro & Coulson, 1997) and created expert domain 
knowledge and processes that were less domain tied, less rigid and less reductive. 
Expertise could become more open to variation and combination, more 
accessible from a multiple routes and generally more flexible. The cognitive 
processes used in transition expertise were less reductively biased, functionally 
fixed or automatic (Feltovitch et al., 1984; Hoffman, 1987; Woods et al., 1994; 
Gobet, 1998; Feltovitch, Spiro & Coulson, 1997). Individuals also developed a 
wider range of cognitive processing mechanisms (Salthouse, 1991; Ste Marie, 
2003) which made them more able to perform effectively in new positions. 
Individuals were able to generalise both expert domain processes and knowledge. 
While the domain specific knowledge that makes up the content of templates and 
schemata can tie their use closely to the domain to which the knowledge is 
acquired, there are also arguments for how discrimination nets can be broadened 
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(Gobet, 1998), multiple routes can allow varied access to templates (Gobet & 
Simon, 1996b), rule induction can take place ( Egan & Greeno, 1974) and more 
general access to knowledge can be incorporated into semantic memory (Tulving 
& Thomson, 1973). All of these processes would enable domain knowledge to be 
generalised. However, expert processes seemed more readily generalisable than 
expert domain knowledge (Glick & Holyoak, 1983) and schema organised 
processes that might limit generalisability can be interrupted through reasoning 
based on “first principles” (Chi, Feltovitch, & Glaser, 1989) while cognitive 
processes and heuristics can “break free of perceptual and cognitive sets” 
(Amabile, 1996) and domain specificity over time. These and similarly malleable 
cognitive processes will enable individuals to respond to new situations without 
being limited by the primary domain expertise constraints associated with 
content specific structures and processes.  
One of the more surprising findings in the study was the relatively few mention 
of deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993) as a contributor 
to the acquisition of primary domain expertise and was not mentioned at all by 
participants in conjunction with transitions.  This is not to say that individuals did 
not train and study hard: there were numerous mentions of assiduous training, 
particularly amongst sports people and musicians, but not in ways which 
conform to deliberate practice criteria. The two sports people who did mention 
training in ways that could be considered deliberate actually did not progress 
beyond third stage transitions in their sport. There is a strong possibility that 
deliberate practice may contribute to cognitive inflexibility and by default to 
difficulties in making  transitions.  
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10.2.1.2 The inferential solution 
While cognitive flexibility enables the generalisation of cognitive processes and 
knowledge in general and expert processes and knowledge in specific, the 
cognitive mechanisms in most theories of intelligence generally described as 
induction, inference and analogy were the main tools identified by the 
participants in the study for making such generalisations.  
Induction opened the door of generalisation. Individuals could revert to first 
principles (Hoffman, 1987) in their expertise and access deeper levels of 
meaning (Chi, 2006) to gain insight into new situations. In the findings of the 
study individuals used inductive processes to generalise from the specific 
experiences to more general ones (Carnap, 1962; Guilford, 1967; Carroll, 1993; 
Vickers, 2010). They could apply personal experience from their performing 
career to subsequent coaching and managing positions (Ste Marie, 2003) and 
derive principles from their domain experience in these earlier career stages to 
apply to more general policy and subsequent organisational leadership issues 
(Schein, 1992). Inference enabled individuals to apply existing processes and 
knowledge from one domain to another through inferring, mapping and 
application (Spearman, 1923; Sternberg, 1977). They were able to educe 
common categories such as concepts, class membership, rules, processes and 
causal relationships to apply from one experience to another (Rumelhart & 
Ortony, 1977; Egan & Greeno, 1974).  
  
378 
 
Some inferences closely matched past experience with new situations, others 
were generalised more broadly, some stayed within their domain and others used 
knowledge from diverse domains and bridged multiple expert knowledge domain 
boundaries. Analogies, which are special cases of inferential induction, further 
enabled individuals to generalise rules, propositions, production processes, and 
schema laws from experience in one domain to another (Egan & Greeno, 1974; 
Rumelhart, 1980; Glick & Holyoak, 1983). Metaphor bridged the largest 
distances between domains. Generalisations from ‘modular’ intelligences beyond 
their domains of application often took place, despite Gardner’s (1985) 
contention that the domain specificity of symbolisation systems, critical thinking, 
and modular processes would limit general application. Even Fodor, a key 
proponent of modularity, acknowledges that individuals seemed to constantly 
‘over-ride’ or circumvent these “modular intelligence” constraints in which “the 
higher flights of cognition” were mediated by “comparatively domain-free 
capacities” (1983, p. 43).   
It was not evidenced in the data that the inferential and inductive cognitive 
processes used by participants in transitions operated in hierarchical or 
necessarily sequential ways. While some of the participants assessed their 
transition situations and planned accordingly, there were few indications that 
participants subjugated their inferential mechanisms to executive control in a 
linear, sequential way as characterised by Sternberg’s (1988) meta-component 
process. Individuals seemed to arrive at their own internally validated heuristics 
for managing transitions which did not appear to follow the linear process often 
imposed by cognitive scientists seeking to order the workings of the mind.  This 
is not to say that there were not common patterns of usage of cognitive 
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inferential mechanisms amongst the participants in the study. However, each 
person used their own abilities and predilections to develop and refine their 
personal repertoire and idiosyncratic approach to using inferential mechanisms.  
The data confirmed that inferential intelligence  whether one describes its 
mechanisms using the theories of Spearman (1927), Thurstone (1947), Carnap 
(1962), Miller (1970), Sternberg, (1978), Guilford, (1967), Carroll (1993), or 
others  operates in tandem with cognitive flexibility to generalise expert 
knowledge and processes.  
Schema models (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Rumelhart, 1980; Glick & 
Holyoak, 1983; Goldman & Pellegrino, 1984; Zeits, 1997) provided useful 
cognitive constructs or frameworks with which to describe how inferential 
mechanisms operated to generalise expert knowledge and processes during 
transitions.  
10.2.2 Personal Intelligences 
10.2.2.1 Intrapersonal intelligence: From self awareness to self 
regulation and back again 
In the analysis of the data, intrapersonal intelligence was divided into statements 
indicative of self awareness and self regulation.  Most self awareness statements 
made by the participants in the study concerned issues of self identity, self 
confidence, self motivation, and self acceptance. Individuals used self awareness 
to accumulate self knowledge, understand themselves better, access their 
strengths and weaknesses, know their motivations, and ultimately to determine 
courses of action. As such, self awareness seemed to encompass more than 
Spearman’s (1927) first noegenic laws: “the apprehension of one’s own 
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experience.” Participants were actively involved in the “awareness and 
management of themselves” (Guilford, 1967) and intrapersonal intelligence was 
used in a way that reflected Gardner’s “project of the self” (1983). Metacognition 
(Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990), however, was less common than had 
been anticipated and participants in the study seemed less involved in thinking 
about how they thought and felt than had been anticipated in the original research 
questions. Intrapersonal intelligence used during transitions seemed to stop short 
of extensive metacognitive monitoring and control. 
Self regulation processes were also mentioned less than had been hypothesised 
and there were few generalisations of self-regulatory processes from earlier 
performance stages to later transitions. Self regulatory processes used to enhance 
performance (e.g., Kuhl, 2000; Zimmerman, 2006) may be inappropriate for use 
in transitions because they tend to structure an activity through planning and 
ordering in an essentially linear, incremental ways. These processes may be more 
accessible and perhaps more suitable for maintaining existing, stable, predictable 
states than adapting to emergent, non-homeostatic transition states. Deliberate 
practice (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993) is an illustration of a 
collection of self regulatory processes which can lead to enhanced expert 
performance but can also reduce cognitive flexibility.  The fact that participants 
in the study mentioned self regulation less than self awareness and mentioned 
deliberate practice even more infrequently suggests that these kinds of controlled 
self-management processes may not provide the cognitive flexibility necessary to 
manage the transitions process itself. 
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Business people made more references to intrapersonal intelligence during 
transitions than sports people or musicians which was attributed to a need to 
develop greater self awareness because, typically, they tend to move further 
away from the familiarity of their primary domain knowledge earlier in their 
career. It is also probable that the intrapersonal intelligence which musicians and 
sports people developed in their studentship would be more likely to become 
tacit (Polyani, 1966; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985) whereas for business people 
intrapersonal intelligence is trained explicitly at later career stages.  
The composite nature of emotional intelligence models (Goleman, 1995; Bar-On, 
1997) that included motivation, self image, self beliefs, coping strategies, and 
affect management made them less useful for the purposes of this study. Nor was 
emotional or affective self regulation (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) widely 
mentioned by the participants in the study.  
10.2.2.2 Interpersonal intelligence: From self to other and back again 
As expected, interpersonal intelligence was generally used by the participants in 
the study to understand how to act in relationship to others as has been proposed 
by most of the earlier models of intelligence (e.g., Thorndike, 1920; Spearman, 
1927; Vernon, 1959; etc.) Certainly, stage transitions to coaching and 
professorship in sport and music were heavily focussed on developing their 
students and protégés. But throughout the transition processes to subsequent 
career stages, participants remained concerned about the development of others.  
There were also clear examples of individuals using interpersonal intelligence to 
develop themselves through use of feedback from interpersonal sources, as was 
proposed by Gardner (1983). They adapted their behaviour based on this 
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feedback which they would seek from the people who they coached and managed 
and also from mentors and colleagues (Schien, 1990; Torbert, 2004). 
Furthermore, participants used interpersonal intelligence to understand and 
respond to organisational dynamics and corporate climate issues. This was most 
obvious in the ways they managed stakeholders and the politics of an 
organisation during later career transitions.  This aspect of interpersonal 
intelligence could be explained as a “social intelligence” used to accomplish 
social tasks as described by Cantor and Kihlstrom (2000). It may also reflect the 
operation of a kind of structuration (Giddens, 1984) that involves a recursive 
self-reflective process whereby individuals are both socialised by the institutional 
culture into which they transition and in turn shape the culture and its processes. 
This may also characterise the relationship between organisational leadership and 
the development of corporate culture (Schein, 1992). 
Some participants demonstrated strong indications of interpersonal intelligence 
early on in their careers and for others it only emerged at later stages in response 
to job requirement. But almost all of the participants continued to develop the 
skills associated with interpersonal intelligence progressively throughout their 
career transitions as they took on high degrees of responsibility in their field.  
This is consistent with the research from lifespan psychologies in which older 
adults are more likely to consider the social and interpersonal aspects of 
problems (Laipple, 1992) and will be more interpersonally sensitive to the actual 
nature of a problem than younger adults (Sinnott, 1989). Wisdom models of 
expertise describe this as “contextualisation meta-heuristics” (Alexander & 
Langer, 1990; Baltes, 1997).  
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10.2.3 Practical Intelligence:  
10.2.3.1 Grasping and manipulating the environment 
Practical intelligence was used by all of the participants to address “real-life” 
situations during transitions. Problem solving and solution resolution tended to 
operate as an inquiry during the early exploration stage of a transition as 
suggested by most transition models (e.g., Tiedman & O’Hara, 1963; Crites, 
1976; Bridges, 1991) followed by “crafting” strategies (Mintzberg, 1985) during 
the subsequent integration stage. This is consistent with Ibarra’s (2004) “testing 
and learning” phases of transitions. But problem solving in practical intelligence 
was not rigid and linear; it was more “skilled” and “flexible” (Scribner, 1986). 
There were only a few illustrations of individuals sitting down to consciously use 
sequential, analytical processes during their transitions: practical intelligence was 
not synonymous with either analytical intelligence (Sternberg, 1996b) or 
sequential meta-components (Sternberg, 1987). Even business people who were 
trained regularly in analytical problem solving techniques did not mention them 
as contributing significantly to their transition expertise.  
Administrative kinds of practical intelligence were mentioned more by musicians 
and sports people in transitions than business people. The “squeezing and 
moving” skills (Scribner, 1986) associated with this kind of practical intelligence 
were usually developed during their performance career stage which often 
required more self management than was the case with business people. After 
this, these practical intelligence skills become almost tacit before remerging 
amongst sports people and musicians to be generalised explicitly during 
transitions to larger operations such as head of faculty or a head coaching 
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positions. Business people did develop administrative kinds of intelligence, often 
through formal training. However, they did not consider it to be so important for 
managing transitions. It is worth noting that in both problem resolution and 
administration, as they operate in practical intelligence, one can see the use of 
inferential mechanism as described in Carroll’s flexibility of use and induction 
factors (Carroll, 1993), Guilford’s divergent production operations (1967) or 
Sternberg’s performance and knowledge acquisition components (1988). 
Participants manipulated their environmental resources. They “adapted to and 
shaped” (Sternberg, 1988) their environment and drew upon “facilitating 
conditions” to “fit means” to situations (Welford, 1974). Because practical 
intelligence is so involved with the manipulation of the environment, it is 
necessary to view it contextually and, of all the intelligences, this is the one 
which is most amenable to an ecological (Gibson, 1986; Neisser, 1976) or social 
cognitive (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Scribner, 1984) explication. Practical 
intelligence, ultimately, is “instrumental” (Dixon & Baltes, 1986). 
10.3 The Career Transition  Cycle  
10.3.1 Transition expertise as a developmental process 
One of the key findings that emerged during the course of this study was that 
transition expertise develops and evolves over the course of a career. For 
example, in earlier career transitions (1 & 2) inferential processes were used 
primarily to apply knowledge from non-domain specific experiences to support 
expert performance in the primary domain. In mid-career transitions (3 & 4) 
expert knowledge and processes were generalised between different parallel 
arenas or positions within a field e.g., from heading a faculty of music to heading 
  
385 
 
a multi-media performing department. In later carer transitions (4 & 5) 
individuals began to use their primary domain expertise as a source for the 
analogies and metaphors used to expand upon their experience to large arenas of 
application.  
Inductive (Carnap, 1962; Vickers, 2010) expansion of expert knowledge from 
specific applications to more abstract principles (Hoffman, 1987) was used 
continuously throughout a career in ways that enabled individuals to develop 
increasingly broad understandings of the contexts into which they had 
transitioned and to apply their previous experience to these new situations. This 
enabled them, for example, to move from coaching others to managing 
operations to building corporate structures to developing organisational culture 
as they progressed successively through stage transitions. Inductive processes 
often worked in conjunction with practical intelligence to expand from specific 
experience to the general applications. 
The evolution of the use of personal intelligences in transitions was more 
convoluted. In earlier career transitions, intrapersonal intelligence was important 
for self management and personal development as proposed by Gardner (1983) 
whereas interpersonal intelligence became more operative later when moving 
into positions which required managing people and teams of people which would 
indicate the operation of social intelligence (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). In mid-
career transitions, interpersonal intelligence continued to be developed for 
understanding stakeholders and the organisational context while intrapersonal 
intelligence was less in evidence as individuals seemed to be largely externally 
focussed. However, in the later career transitions both personal intelligences 
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reverted to more simple and intimate applications: intrapersonal intelligence was 
used to reflect on one’s sense of purpose and direction in life and interpersonal 
intelligence was used to build rapport with colleagues and team members in 
one’s intimate circle. This is congruent with life span learning theory (e.g., 
Laipple, 1992; Strough, Berg & Sansone, 1996). 
Personal intelligences retained this malleability which enabled them to be used as 
a basis for inference from earlier domain performance to more general 
subsequent issues while still continuing to be used for managing oneself and 
one’s intimate working relationships. This may reflect the fact that personal 
intelligences are not specific to the domains under investigation (Gardner, 1993) 
and so were less tied to domain content specific performance.  But it may also 
reflects an evolving  understanding by the participants in the study as to how best 
to use one’s full range of intelligences. This may be more generally indicative of 
how transition expertise is consciously developed over the  course  of a career. A 
number of life development and transition career cycle theories support this 
evolutionary concept of self awareness. Erikson’s epigenic matrix describes the 
psychology mechanisms of increasing self awareness during the life cycle in 
which “wisdom and integrity are active, life-long developing processes” (1985, 
p. 9); Gardner’s “sense of self” is viewed as an "emergent capacity [that] grows 
out of the intrapersonal and the interpersonal intelligence” (1983, p. 296); 
Levinson’s life structure “evolves through a standard sequence of periods” 
(1978, p. 41); Torbert’s leadership development framework explains the 
unfolding “self transformation towards fully and regularly enacting the values of 
integrity, mutuality and sustainability” (2004, p. 65); Ibarra’s working identity 
cycle is repeated until after “several loops around this cycle, we eventually 
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undergo a more profound change that allows fuller expression of whom we have 
become” (2004, p. 161). 
Another conclusion about the evolution of transition expertise is that cognitive 
flexibility seemed to be developed during the early periods of an individual’s 
career. It is possible, if too inhibited through functional fixedness, automation, 
deliberate practice and other reductive training, that it could be constrained or 
“stunted”. This would make it more difficult for many cognitive structures to 
generalise expert processes and knowledge during transitions, to operate as 
robust yet flexible platforms for inferential mechanisms, or indeed to be more 
widely available for the multitude of applications required for successful 
performance in one’s career. 
10.3.2 The transition process 
10.3.2.1 Reactive and initiated Transitions 
Transition expertise operated differently during reactive and initiated transitions.  
While interpersonal intelligence was used to the same extent in both reactive and 
initiated transition, intrapersonal intelligence was more in evidence during 
initiated transitions. One interpretation of this is that initiated transitions give 
more scope for intrapersonal activities like reflecting, considering and  from a 
self-regulatory perspective  anticipating and planning for transition. The 
circumstances of initiated transitions may also enable the application of 
administrative and problem resolution types of practical intelligence as they  
support “dealing with constraints” (Goodnow, 1985) and developing an “apt 
formulation or redefinition of a problem” (Scribner, 1986). Domain knowledge 
generalisability was also more available during initiated transitions and it is 
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possible that an anticipated and controlled transition might make transfer of 
domain knowledge easier.  
It is possible to conclude that a number of elements of transition expertise such 
as self reflection and anticipation, managing and regulating the transition 
environment, or the application of existing knowledge to a new situation may be 
used more readily in a transition situation where change is anticipated and 
consequently more controllable.  A further possible conclusion is that, where 
they can be applied because the situation is more controlled, these kinds of 
processes may bring further stability to an otherwise uncertain transition situation 
and enable individuals to use existing knowledge to perform more within their 
previous range of experience. These conclusions are consistent with a number of 
transition process models (e.g., Bridges, 1991; Elsner & Farrands, 2006) in 
which the main focus is on controlling ambiguity and anxiety. It is also 
characteristic of adjustment theories (Tiedman & O’Hara, 1963; Crites, 1976; 
Nicholson, 1984).   
Transitions, however, are movements through non-stable periods of a career. The 
operation of cognitive flexibility, inferential intelligence, and expert cognitive 
processes (as opposed to knowledge) are more likely to be the means whereby an 
individual adapts during unstable periods or in unknown situations through 
generalising existing abilities and, where necessary, developing new ones. The 
data suggests that these cognitive processes seem to have been used equally in 
anticipated and reactive transitions.  
The use of different aspects of transition expertise in initiated versus reactive 
transitions seems to conform in a number of ways with the generally accepted 
  
389 
 
dichotomisation of the mechanisms of intelligence into convergent and divergent 
cognitive processes (Guilford, 1967). The main focus of this study has been on 
the divergent processes associated with cognitive flexibility and adaptation rather 
than the consistency and control more associated with convergent processes. 
However, it seems likely that individuals who are expert at transitions may use a 
judicious combination of both: they regularise what they can to reduce ambiguity 
and minimise lack of control and they use generative and flexible cognitions to 
adapt to changing circumstances and grow into new positions. Convergent 
cognitive processes that contribute to control and regulation might also allow 
divergent mechanisms such as inference, analogy and induction to make existing 
expert knowledge and processes more applicable and generalisable. A review of 
the transition process models seems to confirm this dual function.  Some, like 
Bridges (1991) and Elsner and Farrands (2006), focus more on managing and 
controlling the transition process while others, like Ibarra (2004), are more 
concerned with generative processes.  
10.3.2.2 Non-transitions 
Amongst the participants of the study, there were, a number of non-transitions 
that could be divided into two categories: either a transition was attempted and 
failed or a choice was made not to transition. Failed transitions almost always 
resulted in a watershed experience in which individuals used intrapersonal 
intelligence to reassess themselves and their career positions and which in turn 
lead to decisions to develop further capabilities, change career direction or 
sometimes both. Importantly, such failures could often be the impetus for 
generalising domain expertise.  
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When an individual chose not to transition, other factors could be seen to be 
operating such as motivation, self belief, attributions of control and personality 
resilience.
 
Most non-transitions involved motivation for autonomy, self 
actualisation and work satisfaction rather than a need for status or reward.  
10.4  Limitations of this study 
Good qualitative research can produce “well-grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations [...] more likely to lead to serendipitous findings and new 
theoretical integrations [in which] the findings from qualitative studies have a 
quality of ‘undeniability’ ” (Miles & Huberman, 1984, p. 13). It is hoped that the 
findings in this dissertation meet this standard since the study was entered into as 
an exploratory process and was intended to generate as much insight into the 
nature of transition expertise as possible. However, there were limitations in the 
scope and methodology of this study. 
The study used three very different populations  sports people, musicians and 
business people  as a basis for comparison rather than a formal control group. 
This proved effective in the analysis of the data since noteworthy differences 
amongst the populations emerged in areas such as: the early acquisition of 
expertise; the use of the inferential, personal and practical intelligences; the 
number of reactive versus initiated transitions participants made; the types of 
training participants undertook to enhance their performance during career 
transitions; the length of their performing career’s overlap with subsequent career 
stages; and the types of  inclusive and functional transitions (Schein, 1978) made 
in mid-career. No doubt other populations would have provided different 
comparators. 
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The different populations used in the study were limited to music, sport and 
financial/engineering business people. This was intentional (representative of 
Gardner’s musical, kinaesthetic and logical/mathematical intelligences) so as to 
focus on three domains where the transitions from their primary performance 
domain to leadership in the field would require significant changes in their 
performance over time.  This would provide the kind of distinct transitions to 
elicit how expertise was generalised. It would also enable the study to examine 
transition expertise itself since performance in the domains requires significantly 
different types of abilities, skills and expertise than would be required to perform 
in subsequent management and leadership career stages and during the 
transitions themselves. At the same time, it was decided to exclude permanent 
transitions out of a primary domain field e.g., from sport to business or 
engineering to advertising.  This question of generalisation of expert 
performance to completely different field e.g., the rugby player who becomes a 
CEO of a bank or the jazz musician who runs an IT company, is an interesting 
and important issue. But it was beyond the self-imposed limitations of the scope 
of this study. 
The study did not initially set out to investigate the early development of 
expertise and how this might influence its generalisability. However, in the 
interview process, time was given for participants to talk about their early 
education and development of their expertise. The participants were keen to 
discuss these early development periods and all the interviews ‘overran’ the time 
planned for discussing this period of their career.  This proved fortuitous because 
the analysis of the data from this period of the participants’ lives gave clear 
indications as to how the development of expertise could influence their 
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subsequent ability to manage transitions.  A more targeted interview process for 
this studentship period would have provided more detailed information about the 
way in which expertise is developed that might influence its subsequent 
generalisability. This in turn would provide further information about how 
individuals might develop the ability to manage transitions more effectively.  
10.5  Insights and surprises 
Cognitive flexibility and expertise generalisation. Expertise theory often 
presents a conception of expertise which is domain specific and non-
generalisable. In reviewing the literature on expertise it was evident that domain 
specificity, functional fixedness, reductive bias, automatisation, and other similar 
narrowing of the application of cognitive processes could limit expert 
generalisability and constrain transfer of knowledge and processes beyond a 
domain. This dissertation challenges the idea that expertise was non-
generalisable. Rather, it maintains that expertise is susceptible to structuring 
which may render it non-generalisable through the narrowing of objectives and 
micro-targeting of goals during the acquisition processes, restricting career 
choices, inhibiting exploration in other domains, minimising experimentation and 
through the use of constraining acquisition processes like deliberate practice. But 
the nature of expertise is not synonymous with this characterisation and the 
participants in the study clearly demonstrated that such limitations to expertise 
and its generalisability need not prevail. Expert skills, processes and knowledge 
were regularly applied and generalised beyond domain performance situations.  
Cognitive flexibility was developed during studentship and early expertise in 
multiple domains supported transfer of knowledge and processes across domains. 
  
393 
 
Participants in the study avoided the most limiting consequences of rigid training 
processes: they remained open to emergent situations, they developed 
entrepreneurial attitudes, and they repeatedly used a variety of cognitive 
mechanisms such as induction, inference and analogy to generalise experience. 
The data demonstrate that expertise is neither inherently domain specific nor 
non-generalisable.  
Convergent and divergent thinking. The division of transition expertise into 
convergent and divergent cognitive processes was not initially a focus of this 
study. However, this widely used dichotomy of cognitive operations or 
mechanisms emerged in the analysis of the data, particularly when comparing 
reactive and initiated transitions. It is too simplistic to say that convergent 
processes are more likely to operate during one type of transition or another. 
Rather, analysis of the data suggests that individuals may use more convergent 
processes and mechanisms to stabilise and control the transition environment 
while divergent processes and mechanisms will be used to generalise expertise in 
unfamiliar contexts and adapt previous experience to a new situation. But the 
data also suggests that convergent processes, when used in advance for 
anticipation and planning, may make it easier for generative processes to operate 
during the transition. The balance of convergent and divergent processes and the 
appropriate place for them to operate in the transition process would be of 
interest in future research. 
Domain knowledge and process generalisability.  The data suggests that expert 
domain processes are more readily generalised than domain knowledge. While 
this had not been anticipated in the initial research questions, it emerged in 
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conjunction with the overall analysis of cognitive generalisability. This could be 
explained in part because many theories of expertise and expert performance 
derive their theoretical foundations, early research data and general processes 
from models of memory acquisition, storage and retrieval which are closely tied 
to content. It is understandable from these perspectives that, the more detailed the 
domain content and the situation-specific expert knowledge, the less 
generalisable it might be.  Consequently, where convergent processes operate 
during transitions, particularly when they are initiated, the less generalisable 
elements of expertise such as domain knowledge may be used more effectively.  
Secondary role of self regulation. Another surprising finding in the study was 
that self-regulation played a secondary role in transitions. An initial hypothesis 
had been formed that individuals would use self regulation techniques as a 
central set of tools for managing their transitions. This was based upon research 
that indicated how important self-regulatory processes were for performance in 
elite domains like sport. While this may be the case in developing expertise, the 
use of self regulatory processes during transitions was not nearly as extensive as 
had been predicted.  This might be because they were operating on a tacit level or 
because the data collection process was inadequate.  However, when these results 
emerged in the preliminary data from the pilot, the questions for investigating 
this area were strengthened and targeted for use in the main study.  But the main 
study also failed to indicate widespread use of self regulation. This led to the 
conclusion that this lack of self regulatory processes during transitions was not 
due to inadequacies in the methodology.  Individuals who are successful in 
transitions simply do not use these kinds of controlled and deliberate process as 
central techniques with which to manage their transitions. They are more likely 
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used to maintain homeostasis in performance or add to incremental 
improvements in existing performance. 
Movement from interpersonal to intrapersonal intelligence over the course 
of a career. Another unexpected finding was the way in which the use of 
personal intelligences evolved over the course of a career.  It had been 
hypothesised that intrapersonal intelligence would be the more important than 
interpersonal intelligence for managing transitions because adapting to changing 
circumstances would require continued self reflection and self awareness.  While 
this use of intrapersonal intelligence appeared to be important during the early 
transitions, interpersonal intelligence became increasingly more important during 
later transition stages.  This can be explained if early career stages and the 
transitions between them are viewed as more concerned with self discovery in 
which self reflection is used to learn and acquire knowledge and expertise, 
whereas later transitions become increasingly involved with managing the world 
around oneself and utilising external resources which are often controlled by 
others. Another way of stating this is that earlier career stages and transitions 
concern learning how to manage oneself in relationship to one’s domain whereas 
later transitions concern learning how to manage one’s field in relationship to 
oneself.  
10.6 Gender Issues 
Most gender studies (as discussed in the opening chapters) that concern women 
and careers tend to focus on issues of bias and discrimination for men and against 
women in career promotions rather than during career transitions themselves and 
consequently provide little theoretical leverage for addressing differences in man 
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and women during career transitions. And while no firm conclusions can be 
drawn from the data of this study concerning differences in demonstration of 
transition expertise between men and women, it is nonetheless likely that women 
will demonstrate some elements of transition expertise more often than men and 
visa-versa. Further studies following up this one would need to include direct 
comparators between men and women in terms of their the demonstration of 
different kinds of skills as part of their overall transition expertise, the kinds of 
career paths they follow, whether skills viewed more favourably as contributing 
to transition expertise in men are less valued in women, and generally whether 
women are better at some aspects of transition expertise than men or visa versa.  
Such studies would address whether transition expertise is equally subject to the 
cultural and gender-influenced biases so in evidence in comparisons between 
career development and promotion amongst men and women.  
It is also possible that transition expertise may operate more “beneath the radar” 
than job skills and hence be less subject to discrimination or bias so that high 
degrees of transition expertise could be equally effective for both men and 
women. Intriguingly, it could also be possible that high degrees of transition 
expertise in women might be a larger contributing factor to their successful 
career development over time than would be the case with men if they are more 
likely to manage a successful transition or less likely to fail in the transition 
process itself. In other words high levels of transition expertise might actually 
contribute more to the successful career development of women than men.  
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10.7 Future areas of research 
Development of cognitive flexibility. This area requires further study to clarify 
the educational and training practices which limit cognitive flexibility or 
augment it and the impact that they may have on longer term career 
development. This study would best be conducted in conjunction with 
identifying how expertise can be developed in ways which do not constrain its 
generalisability or an individual's overall development of cognitive flexibility. 
Development of transition expertise over time. It seems clear from this study 
that transition expertise evolves over time. Future research in this area would 
help dis-entangle some of the overlapping of models that might explain this 
evolution. Is the development and evolution of transition expertise a general 
pattern of maturation over the course of a life cycle, is it specifically a response 
to changing contexts throughout the career, does it reflect the change of the 
operation of gc and gf over the lifetime, does it reflect a general evolution of self 
concept, or is it a reflection of the development of wisdom?  
Motivation. It became clear in the review of the data that motivation was 
important for understanding how and why individuals make transitions.    
Important issues concerning the search for autonomy, the need for achievement, 
perseverance in the face of difficulties, the importance of work satisfaction in 
career choices, and the choosing of transitions that enable self actualisation are 
all linked to motivational factors. Many of these issues emerged in the interviews 
in which motivation proved important not only for making a transition choice but 
also for the nature of behaviour during the transition itself.  
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Personality resilience. The operation of personality traits in career selection, 
performance and transitions was not addressed in this study.  While there are 
many different trait models and psychometric instruments for measuring such 
traits, a more rewarding area for future research in transition expertise would be 
the investigation of the role of personality resilience and issues like ego control 
and resiliency during transitions. This seems important if one is to understand 
how individuals responded to setback, failures, challenges and difficulties. 
Vulnerability and defensiveness could be inhibitors to successful transitions and 
also contribute to cognitive inflexibility. Initiative, opportunism and similar non-
defended behaviour could enhance performance during transition when 
individual need to respond to emergent situations.  
Cognitive beliefs. Self beliefs and cognitive attributions will influence the ways 
individuals act and respond during transitions. Attributions will influence 
behaviour during transitions. They shape the perceptions of control and stability 
in the environmental factors which in turn will shape the responses individuals 
make during transitions in these environments. Self efficacy beliefs may 
influence whether individuals think they can meet the demands of a new 
situation, how well they respond to challenges, the levels of challenge that they 
chose in a transition, and their perseverance in the face of obstacles. Both self 
efficacy beliefs and attributions are cognitive constructs about one’s capability to 
perform and they may be subject to influences and factors similar to those 
involved in the acquisition of expertise. For example, the operation of self 
efficacy beliefs during transitions may be similar to expertise and their 
generalisability may be determined by how they are developed during the early 
stages of a career. Changes in self beliefs may also be influenced by an 
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individual’s ability to use in inductive and inferential kinds of cognitive 
processes. 
10.8 Implications for application in the field 
This project was initiated out of the recognition that as job mobility becomes 
ever more the norm career transitions have become increasingly important 
element of career paths in contemporary society. The study population was 
selected with the hope that there would be applications in the field when working 
with athletes, business people and musicians. I think that this hope has been 
realised and there are at least three major ways in which these findings might be 
applied.  
Coaching career transitions. People regularly find themselves in career 
transitions without necessarily knowing how to manage them.  It could be 
possible to ‘profile’ individuals in terms of their transition expertise by using the 
same process that was used to generate and analyse the data in this study, i.e. 
interviewing the subject on their past transitions and coding the data against the 
criteria established in this study. In the interview one could also ask more 
forward-looking questions steering the individual towards the kinds of issues 
they might encounter during the transition and asking them what processes they 
thought they might use to manage these issues. There are three advantageous 
opportunities during which this coaching support could take place.   
1) At the beginning of transitions individuals could be coached to reflect on 
the nature of an imminent transition and the challenges they may face. 
Activating a self-reflective process before a transition would enable 
individuals to utilise more conscious planning and coordination of efforts 
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which was often under-utilised by participant in this study. Individuals 
could identify their strengths in order to optimise them and play to them 
and also identify their weaknesses and recognise how to compensate for 
them or at least mitigate the downside of these shortcomings. 
2) Coaching in the midst of transition. Sometimes individuals make a 
transition and find they are struggling as they move into new or foreign 
territory.  In these circumstances it is possible to coach an individual, in 
much the same fashion as the first instance, to profile them and then use 
this data and the discourse during subsequent meetings to address 
emerging issues that are challenging or unanticipated in light of their 
particular transition expertise profile. 
3) While coaching can be done at all transition stages, there is an argument 
that the Transition Stage 2 from performing to coaching or managing may 
prove particularly fruitful.  This is because an awareness raising process 
associated with the more prominent role of intrapersonal intelligence 
often takes place during this transition stage and could be supported by a 
coaching process. Developing the intrapersonal skills associated with this 
awakening may serve the individual to self manage better during 
transitions.  Individual could learn to self-profile so that during 
subsequent transitions they will understand better their strengths and 
weaknesses and what they need to do to minimise the possibility of a 
transition failure. Equally, the Transition Stage 4 from heading a 
department to leading a division often involves significant breaks from 
both the expert content of the domain in which the individual had become 
an expert and the domain context in which they had hitherto operated. 
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Bridging these knowledge and cognitive gaps is not easily achieved 
without support.  
Talent Management. The second area of applications in the field would support 
developing talent management programmes to prepare and enable individuals for 
career transitions.  A key characteristic of successful organisations is their 
capacity to nurture and develop their people across repeated career progressions: 
businesses invest significant amounts of time and resources to develop people 
with a view to their progressing hierarchically to more senior levels in the 
organisation; music academies attract and retain faculty and will often invite 
previous graduates to take up teaching positions; national sporting associations 
like the Football Association and UK Sport run coaching programmes to enable 
retiring players to move into coaching roles. In almost all cases, (particularly in 
organisations and to a lesser degree in well-financed sports) considerable time, 
effort and money are invested in an individual. Successful organisations, sports 
associations and music academies can recoup their investment in recruiting 
people by either retaining them in the organisation or enabling them to return at 
later carer stages: an organisation that enables an individual to make successful 
transitions is more likely to be viewed favourably by its members. A good talent 
management programme should facilitate repeated successful transitions and a 
programme that included the development of transition expertise could offer 
training programmes for the specific skills associated with transition expertise. It 
would profile individuals on the elements of transition expertise to predict how 
successfully they might encounter and manage transitions. 
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Contextual support. Organisational, contextual and ecological questions were 
not a primary focus of this study. Nonetheless it is clear that the organisational 
climate and culture within which one transitions can influence positively or 
deleteriously how the transition will be made and how effectively one settles into 
a new position.  While there are sink-or-swim cultures in many organisations, 
there are also organisations which actively support individuals in making 
transitions.  Elements of an organisational contexts that would support transitions 
include recognition and acceptance of both coaching and mentoring programmes, 
encouragement for generalising experience, support of cognitive flexibility and 
adaptivity, balance between single ways of doing things and innovative 
approaches, active interpersonal discourse and dialogue during transitions, 
support of entrepreneurial and initiating activities, as well as attempts to support 
intrinsically motivating factors as opposed to extrinsic rewards. Different 
performance criteria might give contextual feedback on how individuals are 
transitioning rather than how they are performing against the criteria of their new 
role.   
Many business organisations are conscious of their culture and how this 
influences individual performance.  Music organisation, on the other hand, while 
they may recognise the role of culture in creating an organisational context, are 
less involved with consciously building a climate to create a certain type of 
culture sometimes allowing a sink-or-swim climate.  Sports organisations tend to 
fall somewhere between the two, often having a large array of supporting 
processes during the earlier transitions stages in the form of a tightly knit team 
identity and strong social interactions and mores which enable individuals to 
understand more the contexts into which they are transitioning and also to find 
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more readily the support and information they require to perform well in new 
roles. 
10.9 Concluding comment 
Life transitions have been the subject of considerable research encompassing 
arenas that range from adolescence to marriage to geographical moves to death 
and dying.  Career cycles, career stages and career transitions have also been 
widely studied. However, surprisingly little research has been conducted on the 
actual cognitive processes that contribute to successful transitions in careers. In 
particular there has been no systematic study of how these processes might 
interact, develop over time and aggregate into a coherent whole which in itself 
could become an expertise, i.e. transition expertise.  The central objective of this 
project has been to discover what transition expertise is and how it operates. It is 
hoped that this dissertation has achieved its objective.   
This study was an educational process approached through a research project. 
The scope has been kept intentionally broad because the objective has been to 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and operation of 
transition expertise while, where possible, validating and challenging existing 
models and theories of expertise and career transitions. The findings of the study 
have, I believe, done both.  In the process of clarifying both the broad scope of 
the processes involved in transition expertise as well as their specific operation, 
this project has raised as many, if not more questions, as it has answered.   For 
some this is indicative of a ‘good’ project while for others it may imply the 
limitations of the study. Nowhere is this more obvious than in my own 
reflections on this experience: I have broadened my understanding of the field of 
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expertise and in particular transition expertise enormously while I have 
simultaneously encountered boundaries of my comprehension and the limitations 
of my prowess as a researcher. The potential for further personal intellectual 
inquiry and growth is immense. 
My encounter with expertise research has led me to conclude that the 
development of expertise is not neat and tidy: expertise  its acquisition, 
application and generalisation  can be more complex, multifaceted, irregular, 
full of exceptions, contradictory, and unpredictable than conceptualised by 
cognitive psychologists or studied in laboratories. The question “What is 
transition expertise?” will produce a multitude of answers depending upon 1) 
one’s theoretical approach, 2) what is studied, 3) who is studied, 4) the context in 
which they are studied, 5) what questions are  asked,  and 6) the methodology 
used to conduct the inquiry.  Different combinations of these parameters can 
produce a wide range of answers, all of which will contribute to understanding 
how people make repeated and successful transitions throughout their career and 
life. It is hoped that this project has contribute to this enquiry or even laid a 
foundation for the framework within which to raise these further questions. 
However, a cautionary story told to me many years ago by Dr George Brown  
psychologist, educationalist and friend  might illustrate the challenge to finding 
definitive answers to these questions.  
 In a rural village two farmers met with the village Elder to resolve a conflict.  
Over a cup of tea brewed by the wise man’s wife they present their cases.  The 
first farmer says: “Elder, all my life I have farmed our family land.  All of his life 
my father farmed our family land and his father before him.  And we have been 
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content. But last year, after the spring floods, the river changed course and now 
it flows through my land and our northwest field is on the other side of the river.  
My neighbour on the west side of the river has claimed that this land is his. But, 
elder, it is my family’s.  For three generations we have cultivated our land and 
now our neighbour claims that it is his.  Tell me, wise man, that the land belongs 
to my family and ask the neighbour to leave it.”  The wise man paused, reflected 
and then replied: “You’re right, you’re right, you’re absolutely right.” Then the 
second farmer spoke.  “Elder, when our people moved to these lands in the times 
of our grandfathers, we laid down the laws for governing our community and 
reached agreements for the rights to the use of the land.  Our three grandfathers 
agreed then that everything to the west of the river was my family’s to cultivate 
and everything to the east of the river belonged to the family of my neighbour.  
This spring, after the big floods, the river’s course was altered and some of the 
land that was on the east side of the river is now on the west side. I am still only 
farming the land west of the river in accordance with the agreement reached by 
our grandparents and as is my right. Wise man, tell me that this land belongs to 
me and my family and ask my neighbour to leave me in peace.”  The wise man 
paused, reflected a bit longer and replied: “You’re right, you’re right, you’re 
absolutely right.”  Now, the wise man’s wife who had been listening quietly in 
the background spoke out in protest: “But husband, our two farmers are fighting 
over the same piece of land and they give different arguments for why it is theirs. 
And to both of them you respond: ‘You’re right, your right, you’re absolutely 
right’.  But, husband, surely they cannot both be right.” The wise man reflected, 
took a sip of tea, and after a still longer meditative pause responded to his wife: 
“You’re right, you’re right, you’re absolutely right.”  
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Appendix 1. Informed consent and debriefing 
forms 
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“The Transition in expertise from Individual performance to Coaching, Managing 
&Teaching” 
Conducted by Christopher Connolly, MA 
INFORMED CONSENT SHEET: 
The School of Social Sciences and Law at Brunel University requires that all persons 
who participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so.  Please read 
the following and sign it if you agree with what it says. 
I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project entitled "Mid 
Career Transitions: a cross domain study in Music, Sport and Business” to be conducted 
at Brunel University, with Christopher Connolly, principal investigator.  The broad goal 
of this research program is to explore the attributes of individuals who make a transition 
from performance as an individual in a specific domain such as being a violinist, energy 
trader or sprinter to working as a team leader, coach or educator in the same or possibly 
different field.  Specifically, I have been told that I will be asked to take part in a 
retrospective interview in which I will discuss how I experienced such a transition. The 
session should take no longer than two hours to complete. 
I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.  I also understand 
that if at any time during the session I feel unable or unwilling to continue, I am free to 
leave without negative consequences.  That is, my participation in this study is 
completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from this study at any time.  My withdrawal 
would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise.  My name will not be linked 
with the research materials, as the researcher is interested in similarities and differences 
across the three domains in general -- not any particular individual's experiences or 
attributes in particular.   
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the procedure, and my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I have been informed that if I have 
any general questions about this project, or ethical issues relating to the project, I should 
feel free to contact Christopher Connolly at christopher.connolly@brunel.ac.uk   
I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study.  My 
signature is not a waiver of any legal rights.  Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
___________________      ____________________________         __________ 
Participant’s Signature        Please Print                                          Date  
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-named 
has consented to participate.  Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed 
consent form for my records. 
________________________       ________________________     ___________ 
Principal Investigator Signature              Please Print                           Date 
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“The Transition in expertise from Individual performance to Coaching, Managing 
&Teaching” 
Conducted by Christopher Connolly, MA 
DEBRIEFING FORM 
 
This research is seeking to identify the attributes common to individuals who make a 
transition from one type of expertise to another in the same field e.g. when a professional 
athlete reaches the end of their individual performance career due to age or injury and seeks 
to make a transition to a coaching or management position; when an equities trader is 
promoted to a position which requires management skills, interpersonal intelligence and 
organisational understanding; or when a musician seeks to expand their impact musically 
by lecturing at a college of music or leading a chamber group.  
 
   In particular: 
 What are the differences between the skills and abilities required by a performer 
in their individual domain vs. those skills and abilities required in domains 
which involve leading, educating, or coaching others? 
 What skills have individual performers acquired which help them to make the 
transition? 
 What new skills do individuals have to acquire in order to make the transition? 
 How do individuals think about and represent to themselves their knowledge 
and experience from their first domain in a way which enables such a transition? 
 What motivational factors influence their transition? 
 
The following studies might be of interest to you: 
Gardner, H. (1993). Frames of Mind (Second Edition). Hammersmith London: Fontana 
Press 
Sternberg, R. (1997). Successful Intelligence.  New York: Plume 
Ericsson, K A (Ed.) (1996). The Road to Excellence. New Jersey Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers  
Bloom, Benjamin (Ed.) (1985). Developing Talent in Young People. New York: 
Ballantine Books  
Deci, E. with Flaste, R. (1995). Why we do what we do.  London: Penguin 
Csikszentmihaly1, M. (1996). Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and 
Invention. New York: HarperCollins 
 
  
Once again, thank you for taking part in this study.   
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Appendix 2. Interview Protocol 
  
Expertise Transition Research 
Project  
Christopher Connolly 
Main Study 2 
Interview Questions  
 
The objective of this interview is to explore how you have continued to 
develop your expertise in your profession throughout your career.  I am 
going ask you to discuss how developed through several stages of your 
career and in particular how you made the transitions between these stages.  
 The first period will be about the development of your expertise or 
knowledge for your profession leading up to and through the 
beginning of your early career. 
 The second stage will be the development beyond the first stages of 
your career and acquiring your expertise in your profession.  There 
may be several career changes or developments during this period 
each with a specific transition. 
 The third stage will be about further periods in your career where you 
progressed towards responsibility for larger or more ‘organisational, 
coaching or educational’ roles. 
 
In discussion each of these periods I will ask you about how you further 
developed your expertise at that phase of your career. I will also ask you 
questions about the nature of your career transitions and what you did to 
manage those transitions. 
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1a Early Development of Expertise 
 
(INTELLIGENCE) How would you describe your early experience of 
the potential or intelligences required to pursue your profession?  
 
(EXPERTISE & SELF REGULATION)  
How did you develop this early potential? E.g. how did you manage your 
time, resources, learning experiences, utilise feedback, set goals, etc? 
 
(CONTEXT)What in your environment, people, etc. supported your 
early development? 
 
(MOTIVATION)What motivated you to develop this potential? To put 
in the required time, effort, commitment, etc. 
 
(SELF EFFICACY) What lead you to believe that you could excel in 
performing in this area?  
Learning experiences, feedback, emotional experiences or 
mental insights? 
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1 Transition to early career 
(FIRST CAREER TRANSITION) 
Describe the early position you moved into as a professional & how old 
you were. 
(CONTEXT) Describe the context i.e. the environment, resources, 
people, etc. that you encountered or utilised and how they enabled or 
challenged you. 
 
(EXPERTISE) How would you describe the skills and expertise which 
you brought to your early professional career that made you successful in 
the transition? 
 
(INTELLIGENCE) How would you describe the way you used your 
mind to adapt and respond during the transition? Did you use any special 
techniques, ways of thinking, early experience or other special approaches 
during the transition? Did you have any special abilities? 
 
(RESILIENCE) How did you deal with the demands of the situation 
e.g. challenges, stress, setbacks, opportunities? How did you develop 
confidence and resilience in these circumstances?  
 
(SELF EFFICACY) When or how did you know that you had 
established or stabilised your expertise at this new level or performance 
and what characterised this attainment? 
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2 Transitions in Career Stages  
(This is repeated for each transition) 
Now let’s talk about the phase of your career when you moved beyond 
your performance as an individual or member of a team or small group. 
Describe the new position you were moving into as a professional and how 
old you were. 
(TRANSITION STATE)  
Was this a sudden change or a gradual transition?  
An unexpected change or anticipated or even planned? 
 
(CONTEXT) What was the context in which this transition took place?  
Environment and resources 
People, peers, mentors, team 
Learning or training, etc. 
 
(TRANSITION EXPERTISE)  
How would you characterise your ability to make this transition?   
What skills to make the transition? 
What were your mental attitudes? 
How did you analyse the situation and shape your responses? 
 
(INTELLIGENCE) How would you describe the way you used your 
mind to adapt and respond during the transition?  
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Did you use any special techniques, ways of thinking 
Did you have early experience or other special approaches?  
Did you have any special abilities? 
 
(SELF REGULATION)  
How did you did you manage resources, learning experiences, utilise 
feedback, etc.  
Did you engage in conscious planning, goal setting, etc?  
Did you reflect or self evaluate very much? 
Did you practice a lot?   
How did you organise the new knowledge? 
 
(RESILIENCE) How did you deal with the demands of the new situation?  
Opportunities or surprises? 
How did you adapt to changes or setbacks?  
Challenges, stress, frustrations? 
How would you characterise your self confidence? 
 
(MOTIVATION) 
What were your motives to take up this new challenge?  
The same motive or different from the earlier phases of your 
career? 
What sustained you when the going got difficult? 
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3 Transition Summary 
 
(Transition Expertise)  
What would you say are the characteristics of being able to make a 
successful transition to a new or different level of expertise?   
What are the skills and abilities required in making transitions?   
How would you assess yourself against these skills?  
How would you characterise your successes in making 
transitions? 
Where have you been most challenged and what did you do? 
Would you say you are good or an expert at making such 
transitions? 
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Appendix 3. Summary of Coding Hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
Early expertise in multiple domains and early cognitive flexibility 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Early 
cognitive  
flexibility 
 
8 41 5.13 8 29 3.63 6 25 4.17 22 95 4.32 
Early 
Multiple 
Domain 
Expertise 
7 23 3.29 3 8 2.6 3 5 1.67 13 35 2.77 
Cognitive flexibility in transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
General 
cognitive 
flexibility 
6 14 2.83 1 2 2 5 8 1.43 16 24 1.5 
Non-
fixedness 
or non-
reductive 
bias 
7 21 3.14 4 6 1.75 7 15 2.14 18 42 2.44 
Non-
automaticit
y 
2 2 1 3 8 2.33 7 14 2 12 24 2 
             
Totals 8 37 4.63 5 16 3.2 8 37 4.63 21 90 4.26 
Domain process and knowledge generalisability during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
Domain 
Process 
Generalisa
bility 
8 23 2.88 4 12 2.6 4 12 3 16 47 2.94 
Domain 
Knowledge 
Generalisa
bility 
8 18 2.25 7 20 2.86 3 8 2.67 18 46 2.56 
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TOTAL 8 41 5.13 7 32 4.57 4 20 5 19 93 4.89 
Intelligence generalised during transitions 
 Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
General 
experience 
transferred  
7 17 2.43 4 7 1.75 6 19 3.17 17 43 2.53 
Generalisin
g through 
induction  
&  
inference 
8 19 2.36 5 18 3.6 5 17 3.4 18 54 3 
Analogies 
& 
metaphor 
5 11 2.2 5 5 1 6 11 1.83 16 27 1.69 
TOTAL 8 47 5.88 7 27 3.86 8 47 5.89 23 124 5.4 
 Intrapersonal intelligence during transition 
 
Music Sport  Business 
TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
During 
Transition 
 
8 21 2.63 7 39 5.57 7 56 8 22 116 5.27 
Total  21   39   56   116  
Metacognition & self regulation  during transitions 
 
Music Sport  Business TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref Ave 
SELF REGULATION 
Forethought  3 
6 
 
 2 
3 
 
 6 
13 
 
 
11 
 
22  
Performanc
e  Control 
1 2  1 2  1 1  3 5  
Self 
Reflection 
0 0  0 
0 
 
 2 
2 
 
 
2 
 
2  
General 
Self 
Regulation 
7 16  8 18  6 14  21 48  
META COGNITION 
Controlling 
2 2  1 1  4 6 7 7 
9 
 
 
Monitoring 1 1  1 1  4 6 6 5 8  
General 
Metacogniti
on 
2 2  2 4  3 7 7 7 13  
Total  29   29   49   107  
Interpersonal intelligence during transitions 
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Music Sport  Business 
TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
EARLY  
Interperson
al 
intelligence  
3 4 1.33 3 4 1.33 5 9 
1.8 
11 17 1.56 
DURING TRANSTION 
Interperson
al 
Intelligence  
7 22 3.14 8 28 3.5 8 59 7.38 23 109 4.74 
POST TRANSITION 
Interperson
al  
Intelligence 
8 21 2.65 6 17 2.83 6 20 3.33 20 58 2.9 
TOTAL 8 47 5.88 8 49 6.13 8 88 11.0 24 184 7.67 
Interpersonal intelligence during transitions in specific arenas 
 
Music Sport  Business 
TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
SELF             
Openness 
to Feedback 
1 1 1 4 6 1.50 6 34 5.67 11 41 3.73 
OTHERS             
Supporting 
Others 
6 12 2.0 5 16 3.20 5 15 3.0 16 43 2.69 
Motivating 
Others 
6 7 1.17 3 7 2.33 5 12 2.40 14 26 1.86 
Giving 
Autonomy 
2 5 2.50 3 11 3.67 6 22 3.67 11 38 3.45 
CONTEXT             
Corporate 
& 
Stakeholder 
3 4 1.33 0 0 0 5 14 2.8 9 18 2.0 
TOTAL 8 29 3.63 8 40 5.0 8 97 12.13 24 166 6.92 
Practical intelligence and problem solving during transition   
 
Music Sport  Business 
TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
 Problem 
formulation 
2 2 1 6 13 2.17 4 12 3.0 12 27 2.25 
Problem 
resolution 
3 7 2.33 3 3 1 7 16 2.29 13 26 2 
 
Total 
4 9 2.25 6 16 2.67 8 28 3.5 18 53 2.94 
Practical intelligence during transition 
 
Music Sport  Business 
TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Administra-
tion 
Intelligence 
7 18 2.57 5 20 4 4 9 2.25 16 47 2.94 
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 Practical intelligence and resource management during transition 
 
Music Sport  Business 
TOTAL 
 
Cases Ref Ave Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Cases Ref 
Ave 
Knowledge  
expertise  
3 8 2.57 7 17 2.43 5 10 2 15 35 2.33 
Environme
nt Support 
7 14 2 7 14 2 5 10 2 19 38 2 
Education 
and training 
3 3 1 7 15 2.14 4 18 4.5 14 36 2.57 
 
Total 
7 25 3.57 8 44 5.5 8 38 4.75 23 107 4.65 
 
 
 
 
 
